Judgment Binod Kumar Roy, J. 1. The plaintiffs have come up against an order holding that all the issues will be tried together in the suit filed for eviction of the defendants on the grounds of personal necessity and damage to the disputed premises under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Both sides led evidence and when the parties were being heard, counsel for the plaintiffs impressed upon the Court that a judgment be given in regard to the question of personal necessity first and thereafter, other issues in relation to arrears of rent and factum and quantum of damages be decided separately. At that stage, the defendants filed a petition dated 27th May, 1985 to decide the suit taking into account general procedure to which the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder dated 28.5.1986 and resisted that prayer. By the impugned order, the Court below decided to take up all main issues viz, (i) persenal necessity (ii) arrears of rent, and (iii) factum and quantum of damages involved in the suit together for passing a common judgment. It further took the view that since issues have not been framed properly they require re-framing. It also took a further view that if the plaintiffs feel that they have not led full evidence on all the issues they would be at liberty to adduce further evidence. It so advised and that the defendants shall also have a right to lead evidence in rebuttal. While passing the aforementioned order, the Court below took into account an order of Hon ble Supreme Court reported in 1985 PLJR 18 (SC) (wrongly typed as BLJR in the certified copy of the impugned order), holding that two trials in such type of suits did not find favour from the apex Court, and on that basis it held that there should be only one trial of the suit in question. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Sudhir Chandra Ghose, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, urged that the view taken by the Court below is wholly misconceived and contrary to an unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Revision Case No. 419 of 1985, Athar Hussain V/s. Kanhaiya Lal Gupta, decided on 14.2.1986 holding categorically that the legal principles decided in Lalan Kishore Sharmas case reported in 1984 BBCJ 396 was never set aside by the Supreme Court in 1985 PLJR 18 (supra) and the principle decided in Lalan Kishore Sharmas case still holds good even though the operative part of the order has been set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of the consent of the parties. 4. To appreciate contention of Shri Ghosh, it would be better to re-produce the relevant part of the judgment in Civil Revision No. 419 of 1983 relied upon by the learned Counsel: 5. The submission of the learned Counsel is that the principle of law laid down in the case of Lalan Kishore Sharma, (supra) by this Court should not have been followed by the learned Munsif, when that decision was set aside by the Supreme Court with a direction to the Subordinate Judge for holding a fresh trial on all the issues involved. Apparently, this submission appears to be attractive, but on close examination, it does not stand to reason. It is apparent from the order of the Supreme Court, quoted above, that the Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court had not passed the order setting aside the order of this Court after disagreeing with the principle of law enunciated to this Court. In fact, their Lordships did not go into the correctness or otherwise of the principle of law laid down by this Court, rather they passed a consent order setting aside the order passed by this Court in the said case and ordered for fresh trial on all the issues involved in the suit. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the principle of law decided by the Division Bench of this Court has been disapproved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In fact this principle of law has been considered at all by their Lordships on merits, rather they disposed of the matter on the basis of agreement between the parties. In fact this principle of law has been considered at all by their Lordships on merits, rather they disposed of the matter on the basis of agreement between the parties. Indeed, they did not consider it necessary to examine the aforesaid principle of law, as the parties agreed before them that the order be set aside and the matter be remanded to the trial Court for fresh trial on all the issues involved. In certain cases as appellate Court, while allowing the appeal on the basis of agreement between the parties, may give some share/property in suit even to a person who has been held by the lower Court to be not entitled to that share/property in the eye of law. Even in such a case, it cannot be said that the principle of law on the basis of which the lower Court had refused to give the share/property to that person has been disapproved by the appellate Court. A consent order as the term suggests is an order passed on the basis of an agreement between the parties without any adjudication either on the facts or law involved in the case. Since a consent order is based only on consent, without any consideration of the principle of law involved in the case, it cannot be said that a consent order setting aside the order of the lower Court has the effect of washing out the legal principles decided in the original order/judgment by the lower Court. So, the true effect of the order passed by the Supreme Court was that the operative part of the order passed in the case of Lalan Kishore Sharma (supra) was set aside and not the legal principle decided in that case. Therefore, the legal principle decided by this Court in the said case will hold good, even though the operative part of the order has been set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of the consent of the parties. 7. In view of the discussions made above, the legal principle decided by this Court in the case of Lalan Kishore Sharma (supra) still holds good. 5. 7. In view of the discussions made above, the legal principle decided by this Court in the case of Lalan Kishore Sharma (supra) still holds good. 5. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned decision which is by a Division Bench and binding on me, it is crystal clear that the legal principles enunciated by this Court in 1984 BBCJ 396 (supra) still holds good as it was not set aside by the Supreme Court. 6. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Gurnam Kuer -- it was explained by the Supreme Court itself about the effect of its own consent order as follows: It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, nor lay down any principle, quatability as law applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decident: (emphasis added) 7 In view of this legal position, it is clear that the Court below has committed a jurisdictional error in refusing to decide the question of personal necessity alone first as laid down in 1984 BBCJ 396 (supra). 8. For the reasons mentioned above, I set aside the impugned order and allow this Civil Revision application but without costs. Since the suit was instituted about six years ago and the legislature provides a summary procedure for speedy disposal of suits in regard to personal necessity and evidence in that regard has already been led by the parties, I direct the parties to appear in the Court below on 3rd April, 1989 and on that day the Court concerned shall fix a day for hearing the parties and from that day it shall take up day to day hearing and proceed to pass a judgment in regard to personal necessity.