JUDGMENT 1. - Admit. 2. Notice need not be issued, Since the learned Public Prosecutor is present. 3. Admitted facts of the case are that accused Kedar Prasad was given 24 qt. of levy sugar in the month of July, and August, 1981 for distribution of the same. This sugar was to be distributed among the people of Nangal Pahadi, as par the resolution. The prosecution case is that Kedar Prasad, who purchased the levy sugar, did not distribute it and wrongly entered in record many of these in different ration cards twice or thrice. He is sought to be prosecuted for offence under Sec. 406 IPC as charge has been framed under this section. He has been discharged of the offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in case of absolute ownership over the property,there is no entrustment because the person is the owner of the goods and in case he sells them without licence, to the persons other than for whom the sugar was given to him, he may commit any other offence but not the offence under Section 406 IPC since under Section 406 IPC the 'entrustment' is one of the ingredients and then there should be a mis-appropriation of the property or conversion to his own use. Reliance has been placed on Dani Singh v. State 1963 (1) Cr.L.J. 217 and State of Gujarat v. Jaswant Lal Nathalal (1968 Cr.L.J. 803). 5. Learned counsel for the State submits that case should be remanded to the learned Trial Magistrate for hearing the arguments afresh and framing charges for the offence, if any, made out including the one under Essential Commodities Act, if that can be. In a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court has wide jurisdiction to quash the entire order, even including one which has been passed in favour of the petitioner namely, discharging accused of the offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, if it has been sought to be quashed under Sec. 406 IPC only by accused. 6. I have perused the decisions placed before me. 7. 6. I have perused the decisions placed before me. 7. In State of Gujarat v. Jaswant Lal Natha Lal's case (supra) the Court has given expression to the word 'entrustment' and has held as under:- "The expression "entrustment" carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further, the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an entrustment. Thus where the Government sells cement to its contractor solely for the purpose of being used in connection with the construction work the circumstance does not make the transaction anything other than sale. After delivery of the cement the Government has neither any light nor dominion over it. If the purchaser or his representative fails to comply with the requirements of any law relating to cement control he should be prosecuted for the same. But it, cannot be held that there was any breach of trust." Their Lordships have relied upon the decision in Jaswantrai Manilal v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1956 SC 575 ) and Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 (2) Cr.L.J. 431 ) wherein also their Lordships have given a restrictive meaning to the word "entrustment". It appears that this judgment was not in the knowledge of the learned Magistrate while framing the charge. Similar view has been taken in the case of Dani Singh v. State (Supra) wherein it has been held as 7 under:- "Where an accused holding a fair price shop was supplied by the State Government with certain quantity of wheat on payment of its price on condition that it was to be sold to residents of particular villages and the accused sold the wheat to whomsoever he liked, he cannot be convicted of the offence of criminal breach of trust as there was no question of entrustment, the property in wheat having passed to the accused on payment of price." 8. In this view of the matter, the charge under Section 406 IPC cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, the charge under Section 406 IPC cannot be sustained. Since the charge has been framed on an erroneous reading of law, I deem it proper in the circumstances of the case to quash this charge and remand the case back to the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hindaun City to re-hear the arguments and frame the charge, if it can be at all under any other provision of law, after carefully studying the entire record and the law. 9. This petition is disposed of accordingly. *******