ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. The Petitioner, an accused facing a trial on charges under Section 302/34 and 201 T.P.C., has come up to this Court aggrieved by order of the trial Court permitting re-examination of witness Smt. Laxmi at her own instance. 2. Smt. Laxmi was an eye-witness. She was examined in the Court on 15-2-89. She turned hostile. She Was so declared and cross-examined by A.G.P. and discharged after completion of her examination. On 28-2-1989, when the case was fixed for examination of the accused person under Section 313 Cr. P.C., she appeared on her own and moved an application stating that on the date of her examination she was brought from her home by the accused persons at the point of a country pistol when her husband and father-in-law were not at the house. She further stated that she was threatened to depose without implicating the accused persons failing which she would be done away with. She stated that the statement given by her was under duress and on having regained confidence on meeting the male members of her family she was prepared to depose the truth. 3. Three of the accused persons filed affidavits stating that any of them had not threatened Smt. Laxmi in the manner stated by her. 4. The trial Court by its impugned order, felt satisfied that for the ends of justice it appeared just to re-examine the witness though finding as to truthfulness or otherwise of the contents of the application moved by Smt. Laxmi could not be adjudged and recorded at that stage. 5. The learned Counsel for the accused Petitioner has vehemently attacked the impugned order and submitted: (i) the order was bad without recording a finding as to whether the grounds on which Smt. Laxmi sought her re-examination existed in fact or not; (ii) that the course adopted by the trial Court would result in endless protraction of trial as each and any witness may come up and pray for re-examination; (iii) that such a practice would open floodgates for unscrupulous tactics and at manoeuvring the witnesses because the parties would be prone to win over the witnesses already examined and thereafter seeking re-examination to secure a different version from the very same witnesses. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions made and arrived at a considered conclusion that the petition does not merit to be allowed. 7. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions made and arrived at a considered conclusion that the petition does not merit to be allowed. 7. It is first part of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is relevant. It provides that any Court may at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined Section 540 of the old Code, the predecessor provision of the present one came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra v. K. S. Dalipsinghji and Anr. AIR 1970 SC 45 ., the Supreme Court observed: The Court has inherent power to recall a witness if it is satisfied that he is prepared to give evidence which is materially different from what he had given at the trial. Though, it is true that having laid down the principle, the Court in that case chose not to permit re examination because there was no material available before the Court enabling the exercise of the power. 8. From Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178 , the following principles are deducible in so far as relevant for the purpose of the case at hand: (i) not only the Court has power to recall a witness already examined, but the recurring use of the word 'any' throughout the length of the provision indicates that the discretion conferred on the Court is wide and unlimited; (ii) the Court may act, as the exigencies of justice may require; (iii) there is no limitation on the power of the Court once it has bona fide formed an opinion that it was necessary to recall a witness, poramount consideration being the just decision of the case; (iv) the requirement of just decision of the case does not limit the action to something in the interests of the accused only an action may equally benefit the prosecution. In substance, the powers conferred by Section 311 Cr. P.C. is a discretionary power conferred on a judicial Court Like any other judicial discretion it can also not be bound in any defined limits and no set of rules can be laid down governing its exercise, but it would not be an unruly horse. In substance, the powers conferred by Section 311 Cr. P.C. is a discretionary power conferred on a judicial Court Like any other judicial discretion it can also not be bound in any defined limits and no set of rules can be laid down governing its exercise, but it would not be an unruly horse. The ends of justice would be the goal; the exigencies of circumstances would be the path; the availability of material on record would provide the means to travel; and, the wisdom acquired by judicial experience shall be the guide. 9. In the present case, it is noteworthy that not a party but the witness itself made an application seeking re examination. The grounds were mentioned in the application. There was a Police statement of the witness recorded during investigation suggesting that the statement given by the witness before the Court was contrary to her version made before the Police. The Judge seized of the trial was satisfied on such material that it was necessary in the ends of justice to permit re-examination of the witness In my opinion, the Court committed no error in exercise of its discretion in doing so 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on an unreported decision of this Court in Gopal v. State of M. P. Cr. Misc. Case No. 1813/85; decided on 20-3-1986. There two witnesses examined by the prosecution wanted themselves to be re-examined on the ground that their earlier statements were made under duress of the complainant and the Police. These applications were rejected. No one challenged this order. The accused applied for further cross-examination of these witnesses. This application was also rejected on 19-6-86 (sic 19-6-1985). This order was also not challenged. Then the case was transferred to another Judge. Thereafter, the accused moved an application once again for recalling the witnesses for further cross-examination. This application was rejected on 22-7-85. Then the accused applied for summoning the two witnesses, which application too was rejected on 25-7-85. The accused came up to the High Court challenging the orders dated 22-7-85 and 25-7-85, only. This Court examined the second part of Section 311 Cr. P. C. only because it was argued that summoning of the witnesses was mandatory. Then the accused applied for summoning the two witnesses, which application too was rejected on 25-7-85. The accused came up to the High Court challenging the orders dated 22-7-85 and 25-7-85, only. This Court examined the second part of Section 311 Cr. P. C. only because it was argued that summoning of the witnesses was mandatory. This Court held that the summoning of the witnesses was not obligatory when the witnesses did not appear to be essential to the just decision of the case. The Court also observed that there was no material on record to satisfy the Court necessitating exercise of the power. This Court rejected the prayer of the accused confirming the orders of the trial Court. The facts of this case are apparently distinguishable. 11. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner may be examined and disposed of. In the very nature of the exercise, a finding as to truthfulness or otherwise could not have been recorded in the sense in which a fact is to be found proved or not proved at the trial. The Court was right in observing that on re-examination of the witness, when the question would arise as to determining which of the two statements was entitled to consideration and weight, then that finding would be appropriate, otherwise, it would amount to prejudging the issue. 12. As to second and third contentions, suffice it to say that such occasions do arise, but rarely. If the contentions were to be accepted at their face value, the Court would never be in a position to recall a witness, though there may be truth in the averment that the witness was won over earlier and is now prepared to speak the truth. While a loose practice at permitting re-examination of the witnesses already examined may investigate to evil canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, it is equally true that if recall and re-examination were not permissible, the evil of a witness having been won over before its first examination itself shall go undetected. Much can be argued on both the sides. It must, therefore, be left to the sound exercise of discretion by the Judge in the individual cases in their own individual facts and circumstances. 13. There is yet another reason why this Court is not inclined to make an interference. Much can be argued on both the sides. It must, therefore, be left to the sound exercise of discretion by the Judge in the individual cases in their own individual facts and circumstances. 13. There is yet another reason why this Court is not inclined to make an interference. Whether or not examination or re-examination of a witness is necessary for a just decision of a case is a finding of fact ordinarily not open to interference by a superior Court. This follows from observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 2 of Abdul Latif v. State of U. P. AIR 1978 SC 472 . Scope of jurisdiction of a superior Court in substituling its own exercise of discretion to that of trial Judge came up for consideration though in different context in the Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph AIR 1960 SC 1156 , and Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd v. Sunder Bros , Delhi AIR 1967 SC 249 . The ratio of the view taken by their Lordships is that a superior Court would not be justified in interfering solely on the ground that it may have come to a contrary conclusion as a trial Judge. All that the superior Court can see is whether the discretion has been exercised reasonably, judiciously without ignoring relevant facts and without caprice. 14. For all the foregoing reasons the petition is dismissed. 15. Before parting, I would like to record appreciation of the gesture and the mannerism displayed by the learned Counsel for both the sides in the case. The impugned order was passed on 1-3-89 fixing 18-3-1989 for the examination of the witness. This petition was filed on 8-3-89 and the learned Counsel for the applicant filed an application, annexing certified copies of all such papers from the record of the trial Court and filed by either side there, as would have been necessary for hearing and disposal of the present petition. The learned Counsel for the State readily accepted the notice of the petition and agreed to have a hearing before the next date fixed by the trial Court. The learned Counsel for the State readily accepted the notice of the petition and agreed to have a hearing before the next date fixed by the trial Court. The anxiety appeared to have a question of law affecting the rights of the praties determined at the earliest by the High Court without utilising the occasion as an opportunity for stalling the trial by securing a stay order and then going through long drawn procedural formalities of hearing. The credit goes to the dispassionate attitude of the learned lawyers which enabled an expeditious disposal of this petition. If others follow the suit, much can be contributed towards securing the goal of speedy justice, so dear to all of us, but much talked and less tried.