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1989 DIGILAW 80 (PAT)

Rajendra Mishra Alias Mootur Mishra v. Kailash Pati Mishra

1989-02-27

N.PANDEY

body1989
Judgment Narbdeshwar Pandey, J. 1. The present civil revision petition has been filed against an order dated 20-11-1987 passed, in Title Suit No. 114 of 1966, by Sri. S. Nath, Subordinate Judge, Sasaram, wherein he has dismissed the petition dated 18-11-1987, filed under Sec. 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. In order to appreciate the full facts of the case, it is necessary to state few facts of the case. Since this case has got a chequered history therefore, in order to appreciate the same it may be stated that the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 114 of 1966 for declaration of their title with respect to the disputed lands as detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint and also for confirmation of possession over the same and in alternative a relief for recovery of possession was also sought for. 3. Earlier to the present title suit in Title Suit No. 45 of 1961 was filed by Kamlapati Mishra, Kalish Pati Mishra, KabiIashpati Mishra and Laxmi Pati Mishra in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sasaram against the defendants That suit appears to have been decreed and the defendants excluding Gouri Mishra and Smt. Maniraj Devi, filed an appeal in this Court which was numbered as First Appeal No. 372/65. While that appeal was pending in this Court the plaintiffs of title suit No. 45 of 1961 along with their children filed the present title suit No. 114/196. In that suit the principal-Defendants were the defendants to title suit No. 45/1966. While title suit No 114/66 was pending in the trial court, the first appeal No. 372/65was disposed of by this Court on the basis of a compromise catered into between the defendants and the appellants, except appellants Brajendra Mishra and Harendra Mishra, whose name were expunged on 22-9-1966 in the aforesaid first appeal and the plaintiffs Respondents, namely, plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4, who are the same as the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 in title suit No. 114 of 1966. 1 to 4, who are the same as the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 in title suit No. 114 of 1966. By the aforesaid compromise petition which forms part of the decree passed by this Court in the aforesaid first appeal, agreements were arrived at between the parties to compromise not only with respect to, the properties in title suit No. 46/51, but also in respect of the properties which were the subject-matter of title suit No. 114/66. After setting out the compromise on which the appeal had been compromised the compromise petition run as follows:- That the parties to this compromise application have agreed to settle all their differences not only in present appeal but also Title Suit No. 110 of 1966 (i.e., the present suit in question, pending in the court of Additional Sub-Judge III, i.e., this Court) at Sasaram. The parties agree to compromise the said suit too on the following terms and conditions and undertakesb to file a joint compromise petition in that court within 2 months from the date of the disposal of the present appeal in accordance with terms here under mentioned. As I have already said that the appeal was disposed of in terms of the compromise by order No. 66 dated 27-30-1975 of this Court passed in the aforesaid appeal and it Was ordered that the compromise petition would form part of the decree of this Court. 4. Thereafter, as it appears that on 5-1-1976, this plaintiffs of title suit No. 114/66 filed a petition for compromise before the 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge, Sasaram, where the case was pending, giving the fact of the compromise of the suit purported to have been entered into during the course of first appeal No. 372 of 1965 of this Court. A prayer was made that the compromise may be recorded and the suit be disposed of on the terms of compromise and ex parte decree be passed against the defendants, who have not joined in the compromise petition; Since the defendant Nos. 2 to 10 did not sign the compromise petition; a prayer was made that they be directed to sign the compromise petition. The defendants opposed that application and filed rejoinder on various grounds. The plaintiffs made a prayer that the decree passed in First Appeal No. 372/65 was effective and binding on the parties. 2 to 10 did not sign the compromise petition; a prayer was made that they be directed to sign the compromise petition. The defendants opposed that application and filed rejoinder on various grounds. The plaintiffs made a prayer that the decree passed in First Appeal No. 372/65 was effective and binding on the parties. The defendants contended that the said compromise decree was effective and binding on the parties, only to the extent of the land in dispute of that case. The court could not compel the defendants to enter into compromise, as prayed for by the plaintiffs. 5. The Additional Subordinate Judge rejected the petition filed on behalf of the plaintiff holding that in absence of a direction of this Court in title suit No. 114/66, the court cannot direct the defendants to sign the compromise petition. The said order was affirmed by the Additional District Judge in appeal having been preferred by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs thereafter, filed Civil Revision No. 2129 of 1978. 6. This Court, by order dated 2nd of March 1982, set aside order of the appellate court as well as of the trial court and allowed the civil revision application and remanded the case back-to the trial court to dispose of the matter relating to the compromise after investigating into the various questions set out in the order, namely (i) Whether the suit had been adjusted wholly or in part or any agreement or compromise and, (ii) Whether that agreement or compromise was lawful and as all the defendants were not parties to the alleged agreement, further to decide (iii) Whether the compromise should be recorded so far as the parties to the compromise were concerned. 7. Thereafter, as it appears that a petition under Sec. 4(c) of the Act was filed on 18-11-1987 before the trial court to the effect that the village, in which the disputed lands situate, has been notified under Sec. 3 of the Act and therefore, the prayer was made for abatement of the suit under Sec. 4(c) of the Act. 8. The trial court, after hearing the parties by its order dated 20-11-1987, rejected the prayer of the defendant. 8. The trial court, after hearing the parties by its order dated 20-11-1987, rejected the prayer of the defendant. The plaintiffs, while opposing the prayer made on behalf of the defendant, submitted that by an order passed in civil revision No. 2129/78, the matter was remanded before the court below to investigate and pass an order on the matter relating to compromise, recorded earlier in the first appeal. The trial court, while rejecting the petition of the defendant, has held that there was a direction by the Hon ble High Court to pass a fresh order in the light of the observation/direction made in the Civil Revision No. 2129/of 1978. The trial court has further held that he has to consider and decide the matter relating to compromise as per the direction of the High Court and it was open to him to consider any other matter unless the matter relating to compromise was finally decided. 9. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the compromise recorded in the first appeal No. 372/65 was not binding against the defendant-petitioner because all the interest parties have not joined the compromise petition. On coming to the merit of the petition under Sec. 4(c) of the Act, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that with respect to the properties of title suit No. 114/66, a compromise was yet to be recorded, therefore, the suit was not disposed of. By the aforesaid-proposition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to submit that since the suit was pending, therefore, the provision of Sec. 4(c) of the Act would attract. He has further submitted that since, the suit was pending therefore, the moment a petition under Sec. 4(c) of the Act is filed, the court has to consider the same on its merit The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that simply because some of the parties of the present title suit had signed the compromise petition, which was filed in the First Appeal No. 372/65, it cannot be said that the present title suit was disposed of and there was nothing to be adjudicated. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the moment it is construed that the suit is pending, the provision of Sec. 4(c) of the Act is attracted and the court had no option but to pass an order for abatement of the suit. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the moment it is construed that the suit is pending, the provision of Sec. 4(c) of the Act is attracted and the court had no option but to pass an order for abatement of the suit. 10. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite parties has submitted that this Hon ble Court, by an order No. 66 dated 27-10-1975, disposed of the appeal in the terms of the compromise and held that the compromise petition will form part of the decree of this Court. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that in the compromise petition, it was clearly mentioned "to settle all the differences not only in the present appeal, but also in title suit No. 114/66 pending in the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Sasaram. The terms and conditions were also settled. The compromise petition was to be filed within two months from the date of disposal of the first appeal. The terms and conditions of the, compromise of the present title suit i.e., title suit No. 114/66,were clearly mentioned in Paragraph 2 of the compromise petition, Accordingly, .he has submitted that said compromise petition was allowed and became the part of decree of this Court. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that since the compromise petition became the part of the decree of this Court, there is nothing pending before the trial court to be adjudicated. According to him the trial Court has to record the compromise in accordance with the terms mentioned in the compromise petition, filed before this Court. He has further submitted that the court below has no option, but to pass an order for recording the compromise as per the provision of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which runs thus:- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted. He has further submitted that the court below has no option, but to pass an order for recording the compromise as per the provision of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which runs thus:- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted. wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall, order such agreement, compromise, or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance there with (so far as it relates to the suit whether or not the subject of agreement, compromise or satisfaction is same is the subject-matter of suit, In support of the aforesaid contention, learned Counsel for the opposite parties has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Silver Screen Eateprtses V/s. Deoki Nandan Nagpal. The relevant findings on the subject from the aforesaid judgment are as follows:- Once a dispute is validly settled out of court, it is open to a party to a litigation to move the court to pass a decree in accordance with the compromised Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit (which expression includes an appeal) has been settled wholly or in part by any lawful agreement, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to that suit. This is a mandatory provision. It is somewhat surprising that the High Court should have felt itself helpless under the circumstances of the case to do justice between the parties. 11. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has further submitted that the defendant having accepted some of the terms of the compromise on the basis of which a decree has been passed, cannot be allowed to run away from entering into compromise with respect to the remaining terms. 12. 11. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has further submitted that the defendant having accepted some of the terms of the compromise on the basis of which a decree has been passed, cannot be allowed to run away from entering into compromise with respect to the remaining terms. 12. Having considered the aspect of the case and the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, I am of the view that the court below should have carried out the directions made by this Court in Civil Revision No. 2129 of 1978 passed on 2nd March, 1982. It is surprising that till 18-11-1987, no step by either party was taken up. Even the court below did not care to investigate and decide the questions set out in the above mentioned civil revision by this Court. However, by the impugned order, the court below has rightly rejected the petition filed under Sec. 4(c) of the Act on the ground that he had to decide the matter relating to compromise in the terms of the order of this Court dated 2-3-1982 passed in Civil Revision No. 2129/78. 13. Since this Court had already formulated certain questions to be decided by the trial court after proper investigation of the various facts, I do not think proper to record any finding on the merit of the compromise, But while parting with this order, I must direct the court below to pass an order in accordance with the directions and observations made by this Court in Civil Revision No. 2129/78 within a period of two months from the date of production of this order. 14. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed; but in the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.