JUDGMENT P. S. Chauhan, J. 1. BY means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking the relief of issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents for making payment of salary to the petitioner for the period commencing July, 1987 till fresh appointment is made in place of the petitioner after selection of the candidate by the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission. 2. The notice of motion of this petition was duly served on the learned standing counsel on 8-5-1989. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri U. S. M. Tripathi and the learned Standing Counsel. Accordingly, we propose to dispose of this writ petition finally under the second proviso to clause (I) of rule 2 of the Rules of Court, 1952. There is no private party to be served. 3. The facts concerning the controversy involved in the petition are confined to a narrow compass. 4. The case of the petitioner is that an approval of his appointment as ad hoc teacher in L. T. Grade in Lakshmi Narain Uchchater Madhyamik Vidyalaya Bhaura Kerakat, Jaunpur, was given by the DIOS on 4-10- 1985 which was for the period w.e.f. 8-7-1985 to 30th July 1986. The petitioner in persuance of his appointment continued to work as ad hoc teacher and he was paid his salary uptil 30th June, 1987 and has not been paid his salary since after July 1987, though the petitioner has been continuously working on the post as ad hoc teacher and discharging his job of teaching. He also stated that no candidate selected by the U. P. Secondary Education Commission has joined or taken over from the petitioner. He has also stated that he as well as the Management of the College repeatedly requested the DIOS Jaunpur for payment of salary, but the same were paid on deaf ears. The petitioner along his petition has filed the order of approval dated 4-10- 1985 passed by the DIOS. It appears that the date 30th June, 1987 has been wrongly given, it should have been 30th June, 1986, which is the date of last terminus of the approval accorded under the order dated 4-10-1985. 5. The petitioner along his petition has filed the order of approval dated 4-10- 1985 passed by the DIOS. It appears that the date 30th June, 1987 has been wrongly given, it should have been 30th June, 1986, which is the date of last terminus of the approval accorded under the order dated 4-10-1985. 5. It may be pointed out that the question as to whether the ad hoc teachers are entitled to continue beyond 30th June, following the date of such appointment, is no more resintegra. References may be had to the cases of Shiv Chandra Misra v. D. I. O S. Allahabad, 1986 Education Cases 35 and Committee of Management of Sanatan Dharm Intermediate College Daulatpur district Mainpuri v. D. I. O S. Mainpuri, 1985 Education Cases 322. 6. Accordingly the status of the petitioner, as per settled law, as aforesaid, is that he is entitled to continue to work as ad hoc teacher till such time, the selected candidate by the U. P. Higher Secondary Education Service Commission takes over from him, irrespective of last terminus date of approval. The petitioner has categorically stated in the petition that no teacher in L. T. Grade has been appointed in his place after selection from the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and the petitioner is continuing on this post and is wroking since July 1985, but he has not been paid his salary since July 1987. This is really a sorrow state of affairs that the ad hoc teachers, inspite of the settled view of this court, are made to rush to this court and the attitude of the concerned authorities is callous in not observing the law laid down by this court which has got general applicability and has got the binding afficacy on all the concerned authorities. The liability of payment of the salary to the teachers and other employees of a recognised institution receiving the grant-in-aid is that of the concerned DIOS under the provisions of U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. This liability has started w.e.f. 31st March, 1977 and the salary is paid from the funds provided for the purpose by the State Government. 7. This liability has started w.e.f. 31st March, 1977 and the salary is paid from the funds provided for the purpose by the State Government. 7. Learned counsel submits that since the petitioner has been continuously working as ad hoc teacher right from the date of his appointment uptil now and no candidate duly selected by the Secondary Education Commission has taken over from the petitioner, he is, in all fairness, entitled for getting his salary for the work he has done and he is also entitled for the salary for working till the regular selected candidate from the U. P. Higher Secondary Education Service Commission takes over from him. The petitioner has been deprived of his salary illegally and in an arbitrary manner adversely affecting the fundamental rights of livelihood of the petitioner. 8. We find force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and he is entitled for the relief prayed for. No doubt the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 has held the right of livelihood to be the right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. We may quote the following : "The sweep of the right to life conferred by Art. 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life can not be extinguished, or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life." 9. Apart from it the other aspect as to whether under the frame of the Constitution one can be deprived of his wages for the work done by him. It cannot be done so. In the face of the Article 23 of the Constitution which imposes safeguards against such actions as the non-payment of wages for the work done by a person will amount to 'Begar' which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. 10. We see no justification for non-payment of the salary to the petitioner for the period for which he has worked. He is entitled for the salary for the period beyond last terminus date of approval for the duration for which he has worked. The matter has to be viewed seriously in view of the fact that non payment of salary amounts not only deprivation of the right of livelihood covered under Art. 21 of the Constitution, but it also breaches the mandate under Article 23 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent no. 1 (D. I. O. S. Jaunpur) for the payment of salary to the petitioner for the period for which he had actually worked as ad hoc teacher in Lakshmi Narain Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya Bbaura, Kerakat, Jaunpur. This direction be complied with punctually within a period of 3 months from the date of service of the certified copy of this order. We further direct that the petitioner shall be kept to be paid continuosuly his salary for his work tiil such time the candidate duly selected by the U. P. Higher Secondary Education Service Commission, takes over from him. 11. With the above direction, writ petition is disposed of.