JUDGMENT S.H.A, Raza, J. 1. The petitioner Dr. Ram SCrishna Bansal, who in the year 1954 joined the Medical and Health Services Cadre in Class II and thereafter in the year 1974 was promoted to P. M. S. class I Cadre, on 27th June, 1986 filed this writ petition, seeking the following reliefs : (a) writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding opposite parties, their servants or agents to pay entire money due to the petitioner accruing under the order Annexure7. (b) writ, direction or order in the nature of Mandamus commanding opposite parties, their servants or agents to pay to the petitioner damages for their malicious and malafide orders leading to stoppage of petitioner's promotions and consequential monetary benefits. (c) writ, direction or order in the nature of Mandamus directing opposite parties, their officers or servants to comply with the order of Tribunal contained in Annexure7, giving all promotions and consequential financial benefits. (d) writ, direction or order in the nature of Prohibition directing opposite parties not to make any further promotion of the doctors junior to the petitioner till he himself is promoted and allowed the benefits of Annexure7. (e) to allow interest on unpaid money and costs of this petition. (f) any other relief which the Hon'ble Court deems just and equitable considering the circumstances of the case. 2. During the pendency of the writ petition, on 8.1.1987 the petitioner was dismissed from service. Thereafter the petitioner preferred an application for amendment and incorporated certain pleas and challenged the order of dismissal dated 8.1.1987, contained in Annexure12. The order indicates that the petitioner was charged for committing serious financial irregularities as a result of which the administration suffered loss to the tune of several lakhs of rupees. His integrity was also found doubtful. The charges on all the seven counts stood proved against the petitioner. The U.P. Public Service Commission also gave its concurrence for taking proposed action against him, hence he was not kept in service in public interest, being a corrupt officer and Secretary, Medical and Health Department, Government of U.P., under the order in the name of Governor dismissed him from service. On 31.10.1988 the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation. The U.P. Public Service Commission also gave its concurrence for taking proposed action against him, hence he was not kept in service in public interest, being a corrupt officer and Secretary, Medical and Health Department, Government of U.P., under the order in the name of Governor dismissed him from service. On 31.10.1988 the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation. The impugned order of dismissal has been assailed by Sri P.N. Mathur, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner mainly on the following grounds : (a) Denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner during the course of enquiry; as he was not given the copies of the incriminating documents upon which the imputation of charges was based; witnesses were not examined in his presence and he was not given any opportunity to crossexamine them or examine his witnesses to establish his innocence in the matter. (b) The copy of the finding of the enquiry officer was not communicated to him. (c) Although the Enquiry Officer submitted his report in the year 1982 but the order of dismissal was passed on 8.1.87 and the delay in passing order of dismissal has vitiated the entire enquiry. (d) Although after the submission of the report of the enquiry officer, the state government sought the report from the Directorate of Medical and Health Services and which was accordingly submitted and formed the basis of the dismissal order of the petitioner from service but copy of which was not made available to him. (e) Although before passing the order of dismissal the U.P. Public Service Commission was consulted, which also submitted his report to the Government and which also formed the basis of the dismissal order, was also not made available to the petitioner, hence the petitioner was denied the reasonable opportunity to show cause against the order of punishment. 3. As far as the first ground regarding nonfurnishing of incriminating documents to the petitioner; nonexamination of the witnesses in the petitioner's presence; denial of opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses; denial of opportunity to produce the evidence is defence etc. are concerned, is without substance. 3. As far as the first ground regarding nonfurnishing of incriminating documents to the petitioner; nonexamination of the witnesses in the petitioner's presence; denial of opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses; denial of opportunity to produce the evidence is defence etc. are concerned, is without substance. In para 26 (III) of the counter affidavit which was sworn by Sri Mazid Ali, Joint Secretary to the Government, Medical & Health Services, it has been averred that the petitioner was afforded due opportunity for being heard and to represent his case before the Enquiry Officer and that opportunity was availed of by the petitioner. As such, the finding of the Enquiry Officer is binding upon the petitioner and he cannot resile from the statements made before the Enquiry Officer, which is reproduced herein below : I have been given full opportunity to examine, cross examine and see the records and I have nothing to say now. 4. In reply the petitioner has tried to wriggle out from the said averment by stating that the petitioner was asked to give a certificate on 17.11.1981 on which date the three witnesses were examined, upto that date the petitioner was satisfied about the conduct of the Enquiry Officer and he gave a certificate, as mentioned in para 26 of the counter affidavit, in the belief that further enquiry would be continued to examine the remaining witnesses. He had no objection to the case being adjourned thereafter and for that reason he gave the certificate in the words as mentioned hereinabove. 5. In view of the statement as referred hereinabove, this ground for assailing the order of dismissal fails. 6. As far as the second ground regarding nonenclosure of the enquiry report with the order of dismissal is concerned, the consistent view of this court has been that the enquiry report should form part of the dismissal order. In B.P. Chaurasia vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1983 (1), Lucknow Civil Decisions, page169, a Division Bench of this Court has held as under : Although under the amended Article 311 (2) of Constitution, it is not necessary to give to delinquent a second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty, End only one opportunity is given at the stage of enquiry, yet the proceeding being quasijudicial in nature, it is expected that the final order would be speaking order. The order, annexure12 is a nonspeaking order inasmuch as it does not discuss either the evidence or the reasons for the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal, nor does it make the enquiry report a part of the dismissal order. Mere statement of conclusion is different from reasons for the conclusion. The order merely states the conclusion, without giving any reasons therefore and without enclosing the enquiry report either. As such it is a nonspeaking order. It must, therefore, be held to be illegal. 7. The aforementioned judgment was relied upon by another Division Bench of this Court in Onkar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another, reported in 1984 (2), Lucknow Civil Decisions, page396. In Avtar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another, reported in 1989 (7), Lucknow Civil Decisions, page199, we have held the similar view; the relevant paras are quoted herein below : If the argument of Mr. D.S. Chaubey, Advocate, that no major punishment as a result of the enquiry initiated against the petitioner on 2.4.1976, could be imposed unless the petitioner was given an opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty, is not accepted, although there is a considerable force in this contention as the enquiry commenced prior to the deletion of Rule 55A of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules which provided an opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty, we find considerable force in this contention that the disclosure of the enquiry report and giving an opportunity of defence against adverse finding in the reports is a part of reasonable opportunity provided in Rule 55A of Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the order of punishment is vitiated for this reason. As a copy of the enquiry report has not been given to the petitioner, the order of punishment cannot be said to be duly communicated to him. He has thus been deprived of the benefit available to him to either file an appeal or a memorial before the highest revisional forums and other forums which may be available to him. 8. Mr. P.N. Mathur, Advocate, strenuously urged that although the Enquiry Officer submitted his report in the year 1982 but the order of dismissal was passed on 8.1.87. 8. Mr. P.N. Mathur, Advocate, strenuously urged that although the Enquiry Officer submitted his report in the year 1982 but the order of dismissal was passed on 8.1.87. The main plank of his argument is based on certain questions of fact raised in the writ petition, which indicate that the petitioner was given adverse entries in the year 197677 and 197778 and was not allowed to cross efficiency bar. He filed a claim petition, numbered as 175 of 1984, before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal. The opposite parties did not raise the question of enquiry report being adverse to the petitioner to defend the case for efficiency bar and promotion which was granted by the U.P. Public Service Tribunal. Thereafter, the State of U. P. preferred a writ petition against the Tribunal's order dated 14.8.1985 bearing Writ Petition No. 2298 of 1986, but did not raise any objection regarding the relief being given to the petitioner because there was a report of Enquiry Officer against him, which was dismissed. Thereafter, prayer for grant of leave to Supreme Court was made. The Government appears to have rejected the Enquiry Officer's report but nowhere it was mentioned that there existed any adverse inquiry report against him. Thereafter the State Government preferred a Special leave petition bearing No. 774 of 1987 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed on 12.3.1987 but this fact that there existed report of Enquiry Officer against him was not even averred. 9. The learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of U. P. placed before us the proceedings of entire enquiry report. A perusal of which indicates that after the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 31.1.82 the Government directed to obtain a report from the Directorate, Medical and Family Welfare, Government of U.P. who submitted his report on 22.3.1983. Thereafter correspondence between various officers ensued regarding taking action against some other officials who were also alleged to be responsible for committing financial irregularities along with the petitioner. On the basis of the report of Enquiry Officer as well as Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director, the notings on the file continued till the year 1987. It is really unfortunate that as a result of red tapism final orders could not be passed. On the basis of the report of Enquiry Officer as well as Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director, the notings on the file continued till the year 1987. It is really unfortunate that as a result of red tapism final orders could not be passed. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that either the delay amounts to nonapplication of mind by the Enquiry Officer and the Government by not taking any action impliedly did not accept the report of the Enquiry Officer or rejected it as it had no merit. The correspondence and the note in the office records which were placed before us, do not indicate that any higher officer of the Government had waived or doubted the correctness of the report or was of two mind. As the final order of punishment was not passed, there existed no occasion, reason or justification for the opposite parties to mention about the report of the Enquiry Officer in various proceedings which were pending before the Court. 10. The learned counsel placed much emphasis on certain admissions made in the counter affidavit. In para 26 (i) of the counteraffidavit, it was averred that the said official (Dr. P. K. Saxena) concluded the enquiry and submitted his enquiry report to the Additional Director (Administration), U.P. on 30th January, 1982. The said enquiry report was scrutinized at the level of Director, Medical and Health Services, U.P., Lucknow and was forwarded to the Government with detailed comments. It is relevant to mention that all the 7 charges levelled against the petitioner had been proved. A perusal of the enquiry report indicates that on 22.3.83 Mr. B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director gave a detailed report in pursuance of the Government order dated 22.10.82 by means of which he was directed to submit his comments on the report of the Enquiry Officer, which runs into several pages. While the Enquiry Officer in his report dated 30.1.1982 after holding the petitioner guilty of all the charges recommended for the withholding of the two years' increments of the petitioner; withholding certificate of integrity for the year 197980; adverse remarks in his character roll, and his posting on such posts where drawing and disbursing authority is not vested. Even then Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director in his comments, which is more than a report, suggested that the punishment of dismissal be passed against the petitioner. Even then Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director in his comments, which is more than a report, suggested that the punishment of dismissal be passed against the petitioner. A perusal of the report/comments of Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director of Medical and Health Department, Government of U.P. shows that it was virtually an indictment of the petitioner on all the charges. He had not only differed with the Enquiry Officer on the point of quantum of punishment to be awarded to the petitioner but came to a definite conclusion that the punishing Authority should consider the dismissal of the petitioner to set up an example to other officials so they may not indulge into such activities which may cause official loss to the State, (sic) bring down the petitioner. 11. In Avtar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another (supra) in a similar situation we held as under : It was further argued on behalf of the petitioner that the enquiry officer instead of submitting enquiry report to the Governor of the State who is punishing authority, submitted to EngineerinChief who after examining the same submitted his report to the State Government which played an important roll in taking final decisions by the State Government as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to defend himself against that adverse material and his case was seriously prejudiced. In paras nos. 19, 20 and 21 of the counter affidavit it has been admitted that the enquiry report of the petitioner was submitted to the State Government through Engineerinchief but is was denied that the decision was taken on the basis of the report of Engineerinchief. It was further stated that the report of Engineerinchief was not taken into consideration while deciding the case of the petitioner. From the aforesaid averments it is more or less admitted that the Enquiry Officer submitted the report to the State Government through Engineerinchief and he also submitted a report. It is averred that the same was not taken into consideration but the State Government was likely to have been guided by the comments in forming its opinion about the charges having been established. The petitioner has no opportunity to have his say on those comments made by the Engineerinchief who was not a part of the State Government which had to take a decision in the matter. The petitioner has no opportunity to have his say on those comments made by the Engineerinchief who was not a part of the State Government which had to take a decision in the matter. It was incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to submit the enquiry report directly to the State Government but instead of doing so he submitted the report through EngineerinChief who gave his own comments and must have given his own recommendation about the action to be taken against the petitioner. This extraneous exercise on part of the Engineerinchief might have prejudiced the mind of the punishing authority in passing the final orders of the punishment. Obviously reasonable opportunity contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India and principles of natural justice and Rules governing the conditions of the service of the petitioner demanded that a copy of the comments ought to have been given to the petitioner to enable him to meet the points raised therein. There is considerable force in the contention of the petitioner that the report of Engineerin Chief has influenced the mind of the punishing authority in passing the order of punishment, although this part of the averment was denied by the State but it is our firm view that justice should not only be done but appear to have been done but the said maxim was ignored and due to this extraneous exercise the case of the petitioner might have been prejudiced. Although in Avtar Singh's case (supra) the State Government had denied that the report of Engineerinchief had influenced the Punishing Authority in passing the order of punishment but we struck down the order of dismissal for the reason that justice should not only be done but appear to have been done and due to report of Engineerinchief which was an extraneous exercise, the case of the petitioner might have been prejudiced. In the present case as we have already indicated, it was admitted that the enquiry report was scrutinized at the level of the Directorate, Medical, Health and Family Welfare and was forwarded to the Government with detailed comments, hence principles of natural justice, fair play and equity demanded that the detailed comments made by Sri B.B. Mathur, Deputy Director, Medical and Health Services U.P., Lucknow ought to have been made available to the petitioner because the said report or comments might have prejudiced the mind of Punishing Authority while passing the order of dismissal. The Enquiry Officer had suggested certain minor punishment but the comments of Mr. B.B. Mathur must have weighed in the mind of Punishing Anthority who passed an order of dismissal against the petitioner as desired by Sri Mathur. 12. There exists another aspect of the matter which needs consideration. Although the Enquiry Officer found that all the charges stood proved against the petitioner but recommended minor punishment, i.e., withholding of the two year's increments of the petitioner and withholding of integrity certificate for the year 197980 and entry of adverse remarks in his characterroll and his posting on such post having no drawing or disbursing authority, but the punishing authority, differing with the report of the Enquiry Officer awarding dismissal of the petitioner from service. 13. Hon'ble Mr. M. Hidayatullah, C. J. aod Hon'ble Mr. G K. Mittal, J. have laid down the following principles in the case of Narayan Misra vs. State of Orissa (SC) in Civil Appeal No. 543 of 1966 decided on 25th March, 1966 : Now if the Conservator of Forests intended taking the charges on which he was acquitted, into account, it was necessary that the attention of the appellant ought to have been drawn to this fact and his explanation, if any, called for. This does not appear to have been done. In other words, the Conservator of Forests used against him the charges of which he was acquitted without warning him that he was going to use them. This is against all principles of fair play and natural justice. If the Conservator of the Forests wanted to use them, he should have apprised him of his own attitude and given him an adequate opportunity. Since that opportunity was not given, the order of the Conservator of Forests modified by the State Government cannot be upheld. This is against all principles of fair play and natural justice. If the Conservator of the Forests wanted to use them, he should have apprised him of his own attitude and given him an adequate opportunity. Since that opportunity was not given, the order of the Conservator of Forests modified by the State Government cannot be upheld. We accordingly set aside the order and remit the case to the Conservator of Forests for dealing with it in accordance with law. If the Conservator of Forests wants to take into account the other two charges, he shall give proper notice to the appellant intimating to him that those charges would also be considered and afford him an opportunity of explaining them. 14. Although the facts of the present case are different inasmuch as in the case of Narayan Misra (supra) the enquiry officer by his finding dated Jan. 7,1963 exonerated the appellant of the first two charges; but found him guilty of the third charge he recommended that the appellant be reinstated in service and that the punishing authority suggested that the period of suspension may be treated as punishment. When the matter came before the Conservator of the Forest, he called upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. In that notice he expressed the view that the punishment which was proposed was extremely light for such serious offences. The appellant showed cause. The Conservator of Forests, did not act upon the third charge but also upon the other two charges which were not proved against him. In doing so he differed from the findings given by the Enquiring Officer. Later, on representations being made to Government, the order of dismissal was modified into one of discharge from service. In the instant case both the Enquiry Officer as well as the punishing authority came to a definite conclusion that all the charges stood proved against the petitioner but they differed with the quantum of punishment. Inspite of this distinction the fact remains that the Enquiry Officer suggested minor punishment while the punishing authority indicated the petitioner for dismissal. Realising the gravity of the charges the punishing authority took a view that the petitioner deserved an exemplary punishment of dismissal. Inspite of this distinction the fact remains that the Enquiry Officer suggested minor punishment while the punishing authority indicated the petitioner for dismissal. Realising the gravity of the charges the punishing authority took a view that the petitioner deserved an exemplary punishment of dismissal. Although the domestic tribunals are not at all required to act as a court of criminal trial where even on quantum of punishment an opportunity is given to the accused to present his views, but certainly when the Enquiry Officer as well as the punishing authority differ on quantum of punishment and the punishing authority passes an order for major punishment like dismissal, the principles of natural justice requires that the punishing authority ought to have given the delinquent an adequate opportunity to explain as to why major punishment be not awarded to him. 15. In the case of Sri R. P. Srivastava vs. the State Bnnk of India, writ petition bearing No. 2905/81 decided on 26.10.1989 relying on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narain Misra's (Supra); we have indicated as under : In the instant case, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the finding recorded by the Inquiring Officer on two charges and recorded its own findings. The charges were that the petitioner wilfully and knowingly permitted the said firm to negotiate documents even though Hundis were highly inflated. The other charge which was not proved was that instead of recovering the amount of Rs. 42299.50, he delivered railway receipt to the firm on trust receipt dated 28.11.78. The disciplinary authority after making reference to the figure (sic) which indicates that there was no proportion whatsoever between the quantity of unpaid amount and the Hundis. on behalf of the petitioner it has been pointed out that there was no evidence on record regarding wilful permission of negotiation of inflated bills and yet a finding was recorded. Similarly in respect of charge No. 4 the finding was that the petitioner delivered railway receipt without recovering the unpaid bill from the firm. The finding of Inquiry Officer in respect of charges Nos. 4 and 5 was that there was only one letter of the firm dated 17.11.78 on which railway receipt was delivered to the firm, it was held that the petitioner delivered railway receipt without recovering the amount of the unpaid bill with interest from the firm and the same was conclusively proved. 4 and 5 was that there was only one letter of the firm dated 17.11.78 on which railway receipt was delivered to the firm, it was held that the petitioner delivered railway receipt without recovering the amount of the unpaid bill with interest from the firm and the same was conclusively proved. So far as charge No. 5 is concerned, it was only in respect of nonobservance of bank instructions and the charge of misconduct was not proved. As the finding of reversal was recorded by the disciplinary authority, obviously the petitioner having been exonerated on two charges, by the Inquiring Authority, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Although there is no such provision in the rules, but in case the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the principles of natural justice required that opportunity of hearing should be given to him. In this connection reliance was placed on the decision of Narain Misra v. State of Orissa (1969 SLR page 658) which was a case in respect of a forester who earlier was an employee of the Indian State but later on became an employee of State of Orissa after the merger of the said State. In the said case there is no reference to any rule one way or the other. In that case in the departmental enquiry on several charges, the delinquent official was acquitted. The punishing authority differed from the finding of Inquiring Authority and held the official guilty of the charges from which he was acquitted. No notice or opportunity was given to the delinquent official by the punishing authority. The order of removal was set aside holding the same to be violative of principles of natural justice and fair play. 16. In the present case before passing the order of dismissal the U. P. Public Service Commission was consulted which submitted his report to the Government. The petitioner has contended that the said report form basis of dismissal order but as the same was not made available to him, hence he was denied adequate opportunity to show cause against the same. 17. The petitioner has contended that the said report form basis of dismissal order but as the same was not made available to him, hence he was denied adequate opportunity to show cause against the same. 17. This part of the argument finds support with the averments made in para 24 of the counteraffidavit in which it was averred that the petitioner was served the charge sheets and after due enquiry by the Enquiry Officer the entire matter was carefully considered and examined and the Government in consultation with the U. P. Public Service Commission decided to dismiss the petitioner from service and accordingly dismissal order dated 8.1.87 had been issued and served on the petitioner on 18.1.1987. 18. Regulation 8 of U. P. Public Services (Limitation and Functions) Regulation, 1954 provides that no order for reducing the salary of a Government Servant or for reduction in rank can be passed unless the Public Service Commission was consulted and its opinion was also taken into consideration at the time of imposing the punishment by the Punishing Authority. The impugned order of punishment does not indicate as to what kind of advice was given by the U. P. Public Service Commission and as to what extent the same was considered by the punishing authority. Although in Autar Singh v. State of U, P. reported in 1989 (7) Lucknow Civil Decisions, page 199, we have laid down that the impugned order was vitiated for the obvious reason that even the order did not disclose that the punishing authority agreed with the advice tendered by the Commission and was of the view that the penalty of reduction in rank should be Imposed against the petitioner. But in the present case we need not express any opinion on this point, for the obvious reasons that this writ petition deserves to succeed on other grounds mentioned hereinabove. 19. It is really unfortunate that although the petitioner was charged for several offences which were undoubtedly grave in nature but due to nonobservance and noncompliance with important procedural requirement as well as for violation of principles of natural justice, the order of dismissal cannot be sustained. This has happened because the Officers who were assigned to conduct the inquiry and pass order of punishment did not possess proper training in the branch of administrative law. This has happened because the Officers who were assigned to conduct the inquiry and pass order of punishment did not possess proper training in the branch of administrative law. If they would have possessed sufficient knowledge about the basic requirement of natural justice, the impugned order would have not become a casualty on judicial scrutiny. It is the duty of the State to arrange proper training to those officers who are assigned to perform quasi judicial obligations. In absence of such a training the influx of writ petitions in the High Court cannot be checked and many unscrupulous persons, who are guilty of misconduct and corrupt practices will remain holding high public offices. 20. In view of what we have indicated hereinabove this writ petition succeeds and the impugned order of dismissal dated 8.1.19b7 contained in annexure12 is quashed. However it will be open for the opposite parties to initiate fresh inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law, keeping in view that the petitioner has retired from service. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.