JUDGMENT 1. 1. In this writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner Northern Zone, Insurance Employees Association has questioned the legality of the directions contained in the letter (Ex. I) dated 8th August. 1989 sent by the District Election Officer, Ajmer to the Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Ajmer. 2. The petitioner is a trade union of the employees working in the various offices in the Northern Zone of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the Life Insurance Corporation). By communication dated 8th August, 1989. the District Election Officer, Ajmer has informed the Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation at Ajmer that the general election for the Lok Sabha is to be held in December, 1989 and for the purpose of conducting the said election large number of officers and employee; are required By the said letter the Manager has been requested to send a list of the gazetted officers, subordinate service officers, ministerial staff and Class-IV staff working in his office. The said list has been called with a view to assign election duties to the said staff employed with the Life Insurance Corporation Feeling aggrieved by the said communication. (sic) has filed this writ petition wherein the validity of the said communication has been challenged on the ground that it is illegal, unlawful and without jurisdiction and it has been prayed that the same may be quashed. 3. A notice was issued to the respondents requiring them to show-cause as to why the writ petition may not be admitted and in response to the said notice the respondents have appeared and filed a reply to the writ petition. 4. At the request of the learned counsel for both the parties, argument, were heard for the stage of admission for the purpose of final disposal of the writ petition. 5. The main question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the directions given by the District Election Officer in his communication dated 8th August, 1989 arc permissible under law. In this connection the learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the provisions of clause (6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Sections 26 and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 6. In this connection the learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the provisions of clause (6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Sections 26 and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 6. Clause (6) of Article 324 of the Constitution provides as under:- "324(6)-The President, or the Governor of a State, shall, when so requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election Commission or to a Regional Commissioner such staff as may he necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission by clause (1)." 7. Section 26 and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act provide as under:- "26.-Appointment of presiding officers for polling stations. The district election officer shall appoint a presiding officer for each polling station and such polling officer or officers as he think: necessary, but he shall not appoint any person who has been employed by or on behalf of, or has been otherwise working for, a candidate in or about the election ." 159. Staff of every local authority to be made available for election work-Every local authority in a State shall, when so requested by a Regional Commissioner appointed under clause (4) of Article 324 or the Chief Electoral Officer of the State, make available to any returning officer such staff as may be necessary for the performance of any duties in connection with an election." 8. Shri Samdaria, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that clause (6) of Article 324 only empowers the President of India to make available to the Election Commission or to a Regional Commissioner the staff of the Central Government for the discharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission by clause (1) of Article 324 and similarly the Governor of a State has been empowered to make available the Staff of the State Government for the said purpose. The submission of Shri Samdaria is that under clause (6) of Article 324 it is not permissible for the President of India or the Governor of a State to make available to the Election Commission the services of a person other than an employee of the Central Government or the State Government respectively. The submission of Shri Samdaria is that under clause (6) of Article 324 it is not permissible for the President of India or the Governor of a State to make available to the Election Commission the services of a person other than an employee of the Central Government or the State Government respectively. We find considerable force in the aforesaid contention of Shri Samdaria in our opinion the power that has been conferred by clause(6) of Article 324 of the Constitution must be construed to mean that in respect of the staff employed with the Central Government the President can make available such staff to the Election Commission or to a Regional Commissioner for discharge of the Functions conferred on the Election Commission under clause (1) of Article 24 and similarly in respect of the staff employed with the State Government the Governor of the State can make available such staff to the Election Commission or the Regional Commissioner for discharge of such functions. There is nothing in the said provision which empowers the President of India to avail the services of it person who is not employed with the Central Government and the Governor of a State to avail the services of a person who is not employed with the State Government. The said provision cannot. therefore, be construed to confer a power on the President of India or the Governor of a State so as to enable them to make available a person who is not employed with the Central Government or the State Government. The employees of the Life Insurance Corporation who are represented by the petitioner are not employees of the Central Government or the State Government. This is apparent from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukh Dev Singh v. Bhagatram and another (AIR 1975 SCI 331) wherein while dealing with the Life Insurance Corporation, the Supreme Court has observed that the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation are not servants of the Union or the State. The learned counsel for the respondents and do not dispute that the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation are not employees of the Central Government or the State Government. In that view of the matter the impugned directions contained in the communication dated 8th August, 1989 cannot be upheld as having been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (6) of Article 324. 9. In that view of the matter the impugned directions contained in the communication dated 8th August, 1989 cannot be upheld as having been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (6) of Article 324. 9. We may now take up Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. By the said provision an obligation has been imposed on every local authority in a State that when so requested by the Regional Commissioner appointed under clause (4) of Article 324 of the Constitution or the Chief Electoral Officer of the State, the said local authority shall make available to any returning officer such staff as may be necessary for the performance of any duties in connection with an election. The obligation which has been imposed by this section is on 'every local authority' in a State. The question is whether the Life Insurance Corporation can be regarded as a local authority for the purpose of Section 159. The expression -local authority' has not been defined in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, reference will have to be made to the definition of the said expression contained in sub section (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as under:- "3 (31).-"local authority" shall in mean a municipal committee, district board body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund." The said definition of the term "local authority" contained in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act has been considered by the Supreme Court in Valjibhai v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1963 SC 1890 ) and Union of India v. R. C. Jain and others ( AIR 1981 SC 951 ) . 10. In Valjibhai v. State of Bombay (supra) the Supreme Court has held that Bombay State Transport Corporation established under the State Corporations Act, 1950 is not a local authority under Section 3 (31) of the Ganeral Clauses Act. In that case it has been observed that : "It will be clear from the definition that unless it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an 'authority' and is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management of a local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. In that case it has been observed that : "It will be clear from the definition that unless it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an 'authority' and is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management of a local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. No material has been placed before its from which it could be deduced that the funds of the Corporation can be regarded as local funds. It was no doubt submitted by the learned Attorney General that the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing for its business ; but even it that were so, it is difficult to appreciate how that would make the funds of the Corporation local funds." 11. In Union of India v. R. C. Jain and others (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the Delhi Development Authority can be regarded as a local authority for the purpose of Section 32 (iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act. 1965. The Supreme Court, after referring to the definition of the local authority contained in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act has observed:- "A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Section 3 (31) suggests that an authority. in order to be a local Authority must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing. therefore many if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee District Board, or Body of Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential future, namely. than it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority ? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must not be mere Governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next, they must be entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services water and sewerage town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation society welfare services etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority." 12. In that case the Supreme Court has also referred to the following observations of Hidayatullah J. in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd ( AIR 1968 SC 1232 ) wherein the learned Jude has described some of the attributes of local bodies:- "Local bodies are subordinate branches of Government activity. They are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the Government affairs in local areas. They are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self-government the power to taxation is a necessary ajunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government". 13. After considering the relevant provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. R.C. Jain (supra) held that the Delhi Development Authority is a local authority. 14. They function under the supervision of the Government". 13. After considering the relevant provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. R.C. Jain (supra) held that the Delhi Development Authority is a local authority. 14. The question is whether keeping in view the distinctive attributes and characteristics which are shared by a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners with any other local authority, as specified by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid judgment in Union of India v. R.C. Jain (supra), the Life Insurance Corporation can be regarded as a local authority. It is no doubt true that the Life Insurance(Corpn.) is a separate legal entity established by Parliament under the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act. 1956 and legally it is independent from the Central Government. But it cannot be said that it functions in a defined area and must ordinarily/or is wholly or partly, directly or indirectly elected by the inhabitants of the area. It also cannot he said that it has been entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services, water and sewerage town planning development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. The Life Insurance Corporation has not been entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would other vise be governmental duties or functions. The Life Insurance Corporation is also not entrusted with the power to raise funds for the furtherance of its activity and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or fees. A perusal of the provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, shows that under Section 6 of the said Act the function of the Life Insurance Corporation is to carry on life insurance business whether in or outside India and the Life Insurance Corporation is required to so exercise its powers under the said Act as to secure that life insurance business is developed to the best advantage of the community. This shows that the Life Insurance Corporation has been established for the purpose of carrying on life insurance business. This shows that the Life Insurance Corporation has been established for the purpose of carrying on life insurance business. As regards the funds of the Corporation, we find that in Section 24 of the Act it is prescribed that Life Insurance Corporation shall have its own funds and all receipts of the Corporation shall he carried thereto and all payments of the Corporation shall be made therefrom. Taking into consideration the provisions of the. Life Insurance Corporation Act. 1956, we are unable to hold that the Life Insurance Corporation falls within the ambit of expression ,"local authority" as the said expression is defined in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Daudayal Onkarlal v. Gulabchand Shankerlal and others (AIR 1962 M. P. 47) . In that case the question as to whether the Life Insurance Corporation is a local authority came up for consideration and the Madhya Pradesh MA Court has held that the Life Insurance Corporation could not be regarded as a local authority. In that case it has observed as under:- "Life Insurance Corporation has no hand in what may be called Municipal Administration of any locality. Prior to the coming into force of the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 the work of the life insurance has a private commercial venture and it was in the hands of several commercial bodies such as Insurance Companies both Indian and foreign. The Parliament with a view to nationalise this business made law and set up a statutory corporation under it which would take up the entire life insurance business to itself and thereafter to run it on commercial basis ensuring to the general public going in for it safety for their investment, and certainty about its availability at appropriate time. The Life Insurance Corporation may have its branches and agents throughout the country. It may have with it certain Government funds, but all that has nothing to do with administering a locality with the aid of funds derived by some kind of taxation. In that sense neither the State Bank of India with its numerous branches throughout India nor Life Insurance Corporation can be called local authority. It may have with it certain Government funds, but all that has nothing to do with administering a locality with the aid of funds derived by some kind of taxation. In that sense neither the State Bank of India with its numerous branches throughout India nor Life Insurance Corporation can be called local authority. The criterion is not whether it has statutory power to make rules, bye-laws and regulations and whether it has same fund of its own which it can manage and control but it is whether there is delegation to it of some of the functions and powers of Government with reference to a locality. It should be miniature Government for a limited purpose and area. Viewed in that light the Life Insurance Corporation cannot be called a Local Authority." 15. The learned counsel for the respondents have however, urged that Life Insurance Corporation is an authority under the control of the Government of India and that it is, therefore a local authority for the purpose of Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951, and in this connection it has been urged that Section 159 does not make any distinction between a local authority and any other authority under the control of the Government. We are unable to agree with the said submission. It is no doubt true that for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution the Life Insurance Corporation has been held to be an authority under the control of the Government of India but under Article 12 itself a distinction has been made between a local authority and other authorities. In the decision of the Supreme Count in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Life Insurance Corporation has been held to be an authority under the control of the Government of India and it has not been held to be a local authority. In Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the expression "local authority" has been wed and in our opinion the said expression cannot be construed to mean an authority other than it local authority. In that used of the matter no direction could he given with regard to the staff employed with the Life Insurance Corporation under Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 16. In that used of the matter no direction could he given with regard to the staff employed with the Life Insurance Corporation under Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 16. We may now come to Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. The said provision relates to appointment of Presiding Officers for polling stations and it empowers the District Election Officer to appoint a Presiding Officer for each polling station and such polling officer or officers as he thinks necessary but it precludes the appointment of any person who has been employed by or on behalf of or has been otherwise working for, a candidate in or about the election". The learned counsel for the respondents have laid stress on the expression 'any person' in Section 26 and have submitted that these words are wide enough to empower the District Election Officer to appoint any person irrespective of the fact whether he is an employee of the Central Government or the State Government as a presiding officer for a polling station or a polling officer. In support of his aforesaid submission the learned counsel for the respondents have invited our attention to the provisions contained in Sections 21 and 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 21 relates to Returning Officers and it prescribes that for every constituency, for every election to fill it seat or seats in the Council of States and for every election by the members of the Legislative Assembly of a State to fill a seat or seats in the Legislative Council of the State, the Election Commission shall in consultation with the Government of the State, designate or dominate a returning officer who shall be an officer of Government or of a local authority. Similarly Section 22, which relates to Assistant Returning Officers, provides that the Election Commission may appoint one or more persons to assist any returning officer in the performance of his functions. This is subject to the proviso that every such person shall be an officer of Government or of a local authority. Similarly Section 22, which relates to Assistant Returning Officers, provides that the Election Commission may appoint one or more persons to assist any returning officer in the performance of his functions. This is subject to the proviso that every such person shall be an officer of Government or of a local authority. It has been urged that the use of the words --an officer of Government or of a local authority" in Section 21 & 22 shows that in the matter of appointment of Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officer the Legislature intended to confine the choice of persons who could be appointed to officers of the Government or of a local authority and since no such qualifying words are contained in Section 26 the power conferred by the said Section must be construed to empower the District Election Officer to appoint any person, irrespective of the fact whether he is an officer of the Government or of a local authority as a Presiding Officer for a polling station or as a Polling Officer. In support of the submission the learned counsel for the respondent, have placed reliance on the decision of a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court in K. P Roy v. Rudra ( AIR 1971 Cal. 161 ) . We have given our careful consideration to the said submission of the learned counsel for the respondents but we are unable to agree with the same. The impugned directions contained in the communication in (Ex. 1) dated 8th August, 1989 are not confined in their application to persons who could be appointed as Presiding Officer and Polling Officers. The said directions cover all employees including ministerial stair and class-IV employees. Moreover in our view the scope of Section 26 cannot be held to be wider than that of clause (6) of Article 324 and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The persons who can be appointed as Presiding Officers for polling stations or as polling officers tinder Section 26 having to be amongst the persons whose services can be made available for election duties under clause (6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. The persons who can be appointed as Presiding Officers for polling stations or as polling officers tinder Section 26 having to be amongst the persons whose services can be made available for election duties under clause (6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. If Section 26 is so construed as to empower the District Election Officer to appoint any person irrespective of the fact whether he is an employee of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority then the provisions contained in Section 159 would be rendered otiose because even in the absence of the said provision it would have been permissible for the District Election Officer to avail the services of the employees of a local authority tinder Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951.It is settled rule of statutory construction that 'a construction which would attribute redundancy to a Legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons". (See : (6-A) Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax (AIR 1964 S. C. 766 at page 772) . The fact that in the Constitution express provision has been made under clause(6) of Article 324 with regard to the staff of the Central Government and the State Governments and express provision has been made with regard to staff of local authorities under Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 means that but for those provisions it would not have been possible to avail the services of the said staff for the purpose of election duties. In our opinion, there- fore, independent of clause(6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 does not confer and additional provision on the District Election Officer to avail for election duties the services of a person not covered by clause(6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 17. 17. In K. P. Roy v. Rudra (supra) the District Election Officer and appointed some employees in the Divisional Accounts Office of the Eastern Railway, Howrah, as Presiding Officers of the polling officers without the consent of those officers and some of those officers who had been thus appointed as presiding officers and polling officers had assailed the said appointment on the ground that such an appointment under Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, could not be made without their consent. A learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court rejected the said contention and held that in Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the District Election Officer has been empowered to appoint persons as presiding officers and polling officers irrespective of their consent. In that case it was not necessary nor was the Calcutta High Court required to dial with the question as to who could be appointed as presiding officers and polling officers under Section 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and whether a person who is not in employment of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority could he so appointed. In our opinion, therefore, the said decision of the Calcutta High Court does not lend assistance to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. 18. In so far as the qualifying clause contained in Sections 21 and 22 of the R presentation of the People Act, 1951 which prescribes that only an officer of Government or of a local authority can be appointed as Presiding Officer or Assistant Returning Officer it may be observed that the said qualifying clause is intended to prescribe the status of the persons who can be appointed as returning officers or Assistant returning officers and that such an appointment could only be made from an officer of Government or of a local authority. No such limitation is prescribed in respect of the presiding officers of polling stations and polling officer. This only means that a person who is not an officer of Government or of a local authority and is employed in a lower position can also be appointed as a presiding officer or a polling officer. 19. No such limitation is prescribed in respect of the presiding officers of polling stations and polling officer. This only means that a person who is not an officer of Government or of a local authority and is employed in a lower position can also be appointed as a presiding officer or a polling officer. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents have invited our attention to the following passage in Chapter III of the Hand book for Returning Officers issued by the Election Commission of India:- "For the purpose of efficient control of the polling personnel and of economy in expenditure on travelling allowances etc. each district as far as practicable. should use its own personnel. All the available personnel working under the State and the Central Government offices in the State as well as under the local bodies statutory bodies and corporations, and Public Sector Undertakings have to he mobilised and an assessment of the availability of the requisite number has to be made well in advance. This work calls for a lot of forethought and planning. The Commission has already addressed the Central Government and the State Governments who in turn have issued instructions to all heads of departments and offices for the State, Central and quasi-Government institutions, to furnish to the District Election Officer lists showing the number of officers in different categories. These list would facilitate your task of making suitable selection of polling personnel." 20. A copy of the office memorandum dated 24th October, 1989 issued by the Government of India had also been placed before us. In the said memorandum it has been stated as under:- "2. The ensuing General Election to the Lok Sabha will be held on the date, mentioned above as announced by the Election Commission. The Chief Electoral Officers of the States will, in addition to the employees of the State Governments, also require the services of the maximum number of employees working in the offices of the Government of India and Central Government undertakings located in the various States for attending to a host of duties connected with the conduct of the elections. The Chief Electoral Officers of the States will, in addition to the employees of the State Governments, also require the services of the maximum number of employees working in the offices of the Government of India and Central Government undertakings located in the various States for attending to a host of duties connected with the conduct of the elections. All the Ministries and Departments of Government of India are requested to kindly direct the Heads of offices and Central Government Undertakings functioning in the States and Union Territories, to furnish well in advance to the Chief Electoral Officers of the States concerned, a statement showing category-wise the number of all their officers and staff so that the Returning Officers could indicate the number and category of employees for being placed on election duty. The staff asked for by the Chief Electoral Officers for election duty purposes should be spared even if it involves some dislocation of normal work. The Chief Electoral Officer will, however, ensure that the entire strength of an office is not drafted." 21. We are of the view that the aforesaid directions contained in the Hand book as well as the memorandum referred to above in so far as they relate to employees of statutory bodies or Corporations and Public Sector undertakings other than local bodies have been issued under a misapprehension of the correct legal position and on the basis of the construction placed by us on the provisions contained in clause(6) of Article 324 of the Constitution and Sections 159 and 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 it must be held that the said directions are ultra vires the powers conferred by clause (6) of Article 324 and Sections 159 and 26 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. If it is felt that services of the employees of statutory bodies or Corporations and Public Sector undertakings other than local authorities must be availed for election work then express provision should be made by making necessary amendments in Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and in absence of such an amendment the employees of such bodies cannot be required to perform election duties. 22. 22. An argument was also advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents on the basis of clause(d) of Article 51-A of the Constitution which imposes a duty on every citizen of India to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents was that performing election duty at the time of general election is national service and that it is permissible for the Election Commission to direct every citizen to perform this duty by way of national service. We find it difficult to accept this contention. In order that the provisions Of Article 51-A (d) may be attracted it is necessary that the concept of "national service" must be defined to include performance of election duty at the time of general election. The concept of "national service" has not been defined in the Constitution. No provision of any law has been brought to our notice which provides that discharging election duty is part of national services. It has already been held that under Representation of the People Act. 1951 such a duty cannot be assigned to the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation. In the circumstances we are unable to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that like every citizen the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation can be required to perform election duty under Article 51-A (d) of the Constitution. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents have lastly submitted that in view of the provision, contained in Article 329 (b) of the Constitution, this writ petition filed under Article 226 is not maintainable in as much as the impugned direction is a part of the election process and the petitioner by challenging the said direction is interfering with the process of elect:on which is not permissible. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission of India v. Shivaji ( AIR 1988 SC 61 ) wherein it has been observed that the election under Article 329 (b) connotes the entire process culminating in the candidate being elected and the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain petition challenging election is taken away. 24. 24. Article 329 (b) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in this Constitution on election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall he called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. The bar of Article 329 (b) is therefore against calling in question of the election. In Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) ,a Constitution Bar, It of the Supreme Court has construed the provisions of Article 329 (b). In that case v. R. Krishna 1yer, J. (speaking for the majority) has observed as under:- "What emerges from this prespicacious reasoning, if we may say so with great respect. is that any decision sought and rendered will not amount to calling question' an election if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. We should not slur over the quite essential observation. Anything done towards the completion of the election proceeding can by no stretch of reasoning be described as question in the election". Likewise, it is fallacious to treat a single step taken in furtherance of an election as equivalent to election." 25. The learned Judge has further held that the bar of Article 329 (b) is as wide as the door of Section 100 read with Section 98 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This decision lays down that questions which can be agitated in an election petition based on grounds of challenge set out in Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 cannot be agitated by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 26. In our opinion, the bar of Article 329 (b) is not attracted to the impugned directions because the said directions were given on 8th August. 1989, i.e. before the commencement of the process of election and in anticipation that the general election would be held in December 1989. Moreover if the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohindra Singh's case (supra) are applied to the facts of the present case it cannot be said that the petitioner in the present case is calling in question any election. Moreover if the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohindra Singh's case (supra) are applied to the facts of the present case it cannot be said that the petitioner in the present case is calling in question any election. The petitioner is only seeking to challenge the directions given by the District Election Officer for sending the names of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation for the purpose of' assigning election duties. The challenge to the said directions by the petitioner whose members are directly affected by the same and who do not want to play any role in the election cannot be regarded as calling in question any election so as to fall within the scope of the bar contained in Article 329 (b) of the Constitution. In this context it may also be mentioned that directions similar to the impugned directions had earlier been given at the time of the bye-election for Pali Constituency of the Lok Sabha held in middle of June 1988. The petitioner had filed it writ petition (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1636,88) in this Court wherein it had challenged the said directions. The said writ petition could not be disposed of before that election was held and after the election had been completed the said writ petition was dismissed by order dated 18th October, 1989 on the ground that the same had become infructuous since the bye-election was already over. If the petitioner is required to wait till the election is held and to file the writ petition after the elections are over the impugned directions would have been implemented and the petitioner may face the objection that the writ petition does not lie because the election is over and the questions raised are of academic nature. In that view of the matter we are of the view that the writ petition cannot be thrown out on the ground of maintainability and the objection that has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in this regard is therefore, rejected. 27. In the light of the discussion, referred to above, we are of the view that the writ petition must succeed. The writ petition is therefore, allowed and the directions contained in the letter (Ex. I) dated 8th August. 1989 sent by the District Election Officer to the Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation. Ajmer is set aside. 27. In the light of the discussion, referred to above, we are of the view that the writ petition must succeed. The writ petition is therefore, allowed and the directions contained in the letter (Ex. I) dated 8th August. 1989 sent by the District Election Officer to the Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation. Ajmer is set aside. No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******