Jagdish Chandra v. Oriental Fire and Insurance Co.
1989-03-08
B.B.L.SHRIVASTAVA
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal arises out of an award dated July 18, 1986, in Claim Case No. 17 of 1982 of the Court of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shajapur, awarding a sum of Rs. 17,000 as compensation to the legal representatives (respondents Nos. 3 to 7) of the deceased, Bansilal, who died due to overturning of matador No. MBB 8097 which was being driven by respondent No. 2, Maqbul Hussain, and which was owned by the appellant under insurance with respondent No. 1. ( 2. ) CASE of applicant-respondents Nos. 3 to 7 is that the deceased, Bansilal, while travelling in the aforesaid vehicle, died in consequence of injuries sustained due to its overturning, on account of negligent driving by the driver. The contention of the owner and driver of the vehicle was that the deceased never travelled in the aforesaid vehicle and the accident in question was for no fault of the driver. The insurance company contended that carrying passengers in the goods vehicle was contrary to the policy condition and there was thus no liability for payment of any compensation whatsoever. The Tribunal exonerated the insurance company after accepting the aforesaid plea. ( 3. ) SPECIFIC contentions in the appeal memo filed by the appellant, the owner of the vehicle are that besides the incorrect finding relating to the drivers negligence and relating to entitlement of compensation assessed on wrong principles, the insurance company could not be exonerated and the further finding that the deceased was travelling in the vehicle was not only erroneous but it was contrary also to the owners positive orders thereabout. ( 4. ) SHANKERLAL, PW-2, a co-passenger in the vehicle, categorically asserts (para 1) that the deceased persons were passengers and even a fare was paid for that lift. His direct evidence is corroborated by not only, Shivnarayan, PW-5 (para 2) who had come to see them off, but also by his immediate FIR, Exhibit P-3, after the accident which has corroborative value of no small degree. These witnesses could not even otherwise be dislodged on that point in their detailed cross-examination. Shivnarayan, PW-5, further asserts (para 2) that, in fact, the vehicle owner had himself collected the fare, thereby ruling out any chances whatsoever, or otherwise, of instructions by him, as contended in his written statement. Shivnarayan, PW-5, had himself also travelled like that (para 12) twice earlier.
Shivnarayan, PW-5, further asserts (para 2) that, in fact, the vehicle owner had himself collected the fare, thereby ruling out any chances whatsoever, or otherwise, of instructions by him, as contended in his written statement. Shivnarayan, PW-5, had himself also travelled like that (para 12) twice earlier. In a written statement, the driver himself does not rule out that contention completely but, on the other hand, submits a possibility thereof, but without his knowledge. Conclusion with regard to the deceased having been an outright passenger is thus based on superior evidence and is maintained. ( 5. ) THE insurance company, in its written statement, specifically contended that carrying passengers in a goods vehicle amounted to breach of a policy condition and, therefore, it was entitled to be exonerated. The aforesaid ground for exoneration was certainly not an admitted fact in the trial court, which could dispense with proof thereof. In spite of this, the insurance company led absolutely no evidence whatsoever to prove the relevant policy condition or its breach. As per the Division Bench of this court in Rehana v. A. Majid [1985] ACJ 193 ; [1986] 60 Comp Cas 893, it is for the insurance-company to prove all that, regardless of cover note, otherwise, it is liable for payment of the amount. The Supreme Court has gone further in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1988 SC 719 ; [1988] 63 Comp Cas 847, by observing that where the insurance company wishes to take a defence relating to the liability aspect, it should file and prove (unless admitted) the relevant condition and should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof. Thus, the trial court should not have exonerated the insurance company without actual proof of the relevant policy condition as strictly laid down by our Division Bench decision as well as by the Supreme Court, merely on the basis of a certificate of the insurance company, which certainly is no substitute for the policy or its detailed conditions, particularly when extra risk and wider use coverages under additional premiums and also extensions of contractual coverages are not uncommon at all these days. For the reasons detailed above, the insurance company should not have been exonerated by the trial court. ( 6.
For the reasons detailed above, the insurance company should not have been exonerated by the trial court. ( 6. ) BASHIR, PW-6, who examined the vehicle soon after the accident, is not only an experienced driver (para 2) but also a mechanic and he firmly submitted (para 1) that one of the tyres was in a condemned condition and in the event of a burst, the vehicle could easily overturn. He justly maintained this throughout, though repeatedly challenged in cross-examination. He need not unnecessarily be disbelieved. There was thus intolerable negligence in driving the vehicle with the aforesaid tyre condition, that too with great (PW-2, para 2) speed and the relevant finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, maintained. ( 7. ) ON going through the evidence on record, it is seen that the findings of the Tribunal, with regard to factors determining compensation, are based on proper appreciation thereof after due consideration of other connected aspects also with no sufficient grounds to justify any interference, which, in case of marginal difference, as made out on consideration of the instant cross-objections, is even otherwise viewed as improper. The sum of compensation awarded is thus upheld. ( 8. ) THE cross-objections are, therefore, dismissed, while the appeal is thus partly allowed with no order as to costs, only to the extent that the Tribunals order exonerating the insurance company is hereby set aside, with a direction that it will also in addition be liable for payment of compensation as directed by the Tribunal.