JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed dated 16th September, 1971 executed by the plaintiff-respondent in favour of the defendant-appellant and the defendant-respondents, who are all the seven of them brothers. The plaintiff-respondent's daughter Rameshwari Devi married to Yogendra Prasad Singh, the sixth defendant who is the second respondent in this Court. 2. While issuing notice of the appeal after hearing under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court indicated under sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the substantial question of law involved in the appeal was : "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the present case the present suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 3. The suit was filed on 17th July, 1974. The plaint allegations were : The plaintiff's only daughter Smt. Rameshwari Devi was married to the sixth defendant Yogendra Prasad Singh on 31st May, 1970. The defendants are own brothers, Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh, defendants Nos. 3 & 4, used to visit the plaintiff quite often after the marriage. The distance between village Parashurampur where the plaintiff resides and the defendant-respondent's village was less than a mile. There was a litigation between the plaintiff and some others about some land in the consolidation courts. Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 used to do pairavi on behalf of the plaintiff and had gained her confidence in the course thereof. The plaintiff expressed to Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh her desire of making a gift of her entire property in favour of her daughter Smt. Rameshwari Devi. Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh approved of the move of the plaintiff and said that they would take the plaintiff to Rasra and have gift-deed registered. Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh, defendants Nos. 3 and 4, brought the plaintiff to Rasra on 16th September, 1971. She was made to sit in the compound of the registration office, and she paid the amount of money which they said would be needed for expenses. The stamps were purchased in the plaintiff's name but instead of getting only a gift-deed executed in favour of Smt. Rameshwari Devi. Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh, defendants Nos. She was made to sit in the compound of the registration office, and she paid the amount of money which they said would be needed for expenses. The stamps were purchased in the plaintiff's name but instead of getting only a gift-deed executed in favour of Smt. Rameshwari Devi. Arjun Singh and Janardan Singh, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 got two deeds executed by her, that is, a gift-deed in favour of Smt. Rameshwari Devi, and a sale-deed in favour of all the defendants. In this manner defendants Nos. 3 and 4 played a fraud on the plaintiff. The consideration for sale shown in the sale-deed was Rs. 14,000/-. The plaintiff was told that only a gift-deed was executed in favour of Smt. Rameshwari Devi. There was absolutely no talk between the plaintiff and the defendants for the sale of her property to them. Her thumb impression on the sale-deed had been obtained by fraud. The sale-deed was not read out to her nor was it explained to her, and defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in conspiracy with the Sub-Registrar, got the two deeds registered by her in respect of the entire property. The endorsement of payment of Rs. 7,000/- before the Sub-Registrar was false, wrong and fictitious. No money was paid to the plaintiff before the Sub-Registrar and if some money had been shown before the Sub-Registrar by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and taken by them, the plaintiff has had no knowledge about the same. She was told that she was executing a gift-deed in favour of her daughter. The Sub-Registrar only asked her about the gift to the execution of which she expressed her consent. The contents of the gift-deed or the details of the property, were neither read nor explained to her. The sale-deed was fraudulent and the scribe and the Sub-Registrar being in league with defendants Nos. 3 and 4 they also kept the fact of the execution of the sale-deed secret from the plaintiff. A plea was added by amendment of the plaint that the market value of the property is Rs. 10,000/- per acre and the sale consideration was entirely wrong and fictitious. The area of the land is 11.14 acres. The plaintiff came to know of the sale-deed for the first time on 25th June, 1974 when defendants Nos. 3 and 4 started interfering with her possession on the property. 10,000/- per acre and the sale consideration was entirely wrong and fictitious. The area of the land is 11.14 acres. The plaintiff came to know of the sale-deed for the first time on 25th June, 1974 when defendants Nos. 3 and 4 started interfering with her possession on the property. When she asked them why they did so, they asserted that they had got a sale-deed executed in their favour. The plaintiff thereupon obtained a certified copy of the sale-deed on 2nd July, 1974 and came to know of the full facts, that the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 had obtained that sale-deed by fraud. The relief claimed was a decree for cancellation of the sale-deed and an injunction against the defendants from interfering with her possession over the property in suit, and in the alternative for possession over the property in suit. 4. Yogendra Prasad Singh, the sixth defendant admitted the plaintiff's claim in his written statement filed on 31st July, 1975. Only the fourth defendants Janardan Singh, who is the appellant in this Court, contested the suit. It is not necessary to recite the plea raised by him. The issued framed by the trial Court bring out the points in dispute between the parties. They are :- 1. Whether the sale-deed dated 16-9-1971 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants has been obtained by fraud alleged in para 9 of the plaint? 2. Whether the sale-deed is without consideration? 3. Whether the sale-deed is not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court? 4. Whether the suit is cognisable by this Court? 5. Whether the suit is undervalued and court-fee insufficient? 6. Whether the suit is barred by Section 49, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? 7. Whether the suit is barred by principles of resjudicata? 5. On issue No. 1 the trial court held that the sale-deed in question was not the mental act of the plaintiff and that the defendants had abused her confidence for their selfish ends and had practised fraud; and on issue No. 2 that no consideration was paid for the sale in question. On issue No. 3 the trial Court observed that the contesting defendants had not led any evidence nor advanced any argument in support of the plea that the sale-deed was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court issues Nos. On issue No. 3 the trial Court observed that the contesting defendants had not led any evidence nor advanced any argument in support of the plea that the sale-deed was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court issues Nos. 4 and 5 were not pressed, and no arguments were advanced on issues Nos. 6 and 7 before it. In the result the trial court decreed the suit and conceited the sale-deed in question. 6. The lower appellate court considered the issues raised once over again, and, confirming the findings of the trial court, it dismissed the appeal and maintained the decree for cancellation of the sale-deed in question. 7. The findings recorded by the two courts below on issues Nos. 1 and 2 are concluded by facts found by them and being based on an appraisal of the evidence on the record, their correctness could not be disputed in this Court. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of the only question which was formulated under sub-sec. (4) of Section 100, at the hearing of this appeal under Order 41, R. 11, C.P.C. An application for amendment of the plaint was, however, moved by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in this Court where by a new plea was sought to be raised, the plea being that the sale-deed was void for having been executed without the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. A document being the certified copy of the entries in C.H. Form No. 2-A in respect of a part of the land in suit was also sought to be filed by the plaintiff-respondent with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By this document it was sought to be shown that plot No. 130, area, .03, plot No. 131, area, .05; and plot No. 451/4, area, .04, were Abadi land, for the purpose of showing that the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the right of the parties in respect of the same, and a plea to that effect was also sought to be raised by the said application for amendment of the plaint. The amendment application was opposed. The suggestion that the said three plots were Abadi plots, was denied as false in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the defendants-appellant. Rejoinder-affidavits were filed in reply to the counter-affidavits in both these applications, reaffirming what had been or suggested therein. The amendment application was opposed. The suggestion that the said three plots were Abadi plots, was denied as false in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the defendants-appellant. Rejoinder-affidavits were filed in reply to the counter-affidavits in both these applications, reaffirming what had been or suggested therein. 8. In view of the limitation of the scope of the second appeal by the question formulated by this Court while issuing notice of it. I did not decide those applications before hearing the appeal on the merits inasmuch as the application could, if at all, be entertained only if they had some impact on the determination of the question so formulated. 9. It is necessary to notice some further facts. The consolidation operations were indisputably going on when the suit was filed. The plea of the bar of Sec. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was raised by amendment of the written statement, which was allowed by the trial court's order dated 15th December. 1975 on the application 50-Ga-2. The only allegation made on this point, by the amendment, was that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. No facts were-given, and no grounds were specified. Further as already noticed above, no evidence was adduced, nor any arguments advanced, before either of the two courts below in support of the plea. Yet the appeal having been admitted for hearing on that point, Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad learned counsel for the defendant-appellant argued the point at some length, and contended that the sale deed being according to the own case of the plaintiff-respondent a void document, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in face of the provisions of section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act inasmuch as the consolidation authorities could, in spite of the document, adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, that is to say, if the plaintiff had gone before them and proved that the document had been procured on a misrepresentation as to its character and was not her mental act, the consolidation authorities could, on coming to that finding, ignore the document as null and void and adjudicate upon her rights to land on a proceedings being taken before them under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was stated before me at the bar by Mr. It was stated before me at the bar by Mr. V.K.S. Choudhary, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, that the consolidation operations came to a close in the village where the land in suit is, situate, by the issue of a notification under Section 52 of the Act, on 18th November, 1978. The consolidation operations were thus going on even while the first appeal from the trial court's decree was pending in the lower appellate Court, the suit being of the year 1974, the decree of the trial court being dated 2nd February, 1977 and the decree of the lower appellate court being dated 10th October, 1979. 10. It further appears from the documents on the record, vide-paper No. 34 Ga-1, that proceedings by way of an objection dated 11-3-1972 were initiated under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for correction of the revenue record on the basis of the sale-deed in question. The objection appears to have been allowed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 20th April, 1972 but an appeal therefrom was allowed on 19-3-1975 by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) under Section 11 (1) (Appeal No. 1099 of Mauza Parsurampur) Vide - Ext. 2, and the matter was remanded. A certified copy of an application for review of that order made by the defendants-appellants and the defendant-respondents Nos. 3 to 7, its paper No. 35. Ga-1, Ext. A-4 on the record. What happened thereafter before the consolidation authorities is not proved by any paper on the record. But Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, stated before me that in spite of notification dated 18-11-1978 under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, bringing the consolidation operations to a close, the mutation proceedings were still pending. Ext. A-1 purports to be a copy of the C.H. Form No. 23 (Part-1). That shows that effect was given to the sale-deed by the consolidation authorities by directing the removal of the name of Smt. Ram Dulari from the land in suit and the entry of the names of the defendant-appellant and defendant-respondents Nos. 3 to 7 as Bhumidhars thereof but this document was filed on 4-1-1975 and Ext. 2 shows that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had on 19th March, 1975, set aside the Assistant Consolidation Officer's order in that case. Ext. 3 to 7 as Bhumidhars thereof but this document was filed on 4-1-1975 and Ext. 2 shows that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had on 19th March, 1975, set aside the Assistant Consolidation Officer's order in that case. Ext. A-10 is the certified copy of the order dated 27-3-1975 of the Sessions Judge, Ballia in Criminal Revision No. 103 of 1976 on a revision application made by the defendants-appellants and the defendant-respondent No. 7. It shows that the land in suit was ordered to be released in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of the said defendant-appellant and defendant-respondent No. 7, as against the defendant-respondent No. 2, namely, the husband of the plaintiffs daughter. 11. I may further take note of an application dated 29-3-1979 which was moved before the IVth Additional District Judge, Ballia in the first appeal from the trial court's decree in this case, wherein it was stared that the Consolidation Courts after making a thorough enquiry decided the case u/s. 12 of the U.P.C.H. Act and adjudication upon the sale-deed in the Consolidation Courts is made and the sale-deed was held valid not enquirable by Civil Court..................that if a Consolidation Court decided any dispute u/s. 12, it is the decision of the Consolidation Court about the title, "and that" no Civil or Revenue Court can entertain a suit in respect of the same cause of action which was decided or ought to have been decided during the consolidation proceedings, "and that" that suit is barred u/s. 49, U.P.C.H. Act. The prayer made was that the appeal be allowed and the suit be held to be barred by Section 49 of that Act. The learned Judge of the lower appellate court ordered thereon that the appeal may be fixed for hearing on 5-5-1979 and that the legal position could be "advanced at the time of hearing." The first appeal, it appears could not be heard by the learned Additional District Judge who had passed that order, but was heard by the learned District Judge himself who disposed of Issues Nos. 6 and 7 in the following words:- "The defendants also did not adduce evidence on these issues and the learned Munsif had also rightly decided that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the Chakbandi Act and by Section 11, C.P.C." The learned District Judge had further observed at the end of this judgment that:- "the order for mutation got passed by the defendants in their favour was cancelled vide the orders Ext. 2 and in the litigation in the Chakbandi, Pan Kumari had lost the case as against Smt. Dularia on 5-4-1972. The property attached in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. was released in favour of Smt. Dularia vide Ext. 13, and she was in possession". From this the learned Judge inferred "the appellants could not be in possession and the suit was filed when the defendants had interfered with the possession of the plaintiff. The levy was also realised from Smt. Dularia." 12. The Order Ext. 2 is the appellate order dated 19-3-1975, of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in Appeal No. 1099, under Section 11 (1) already referred to above. The order Ext. 13 is an order dated 5-4-1972, of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not, however, appear to have been passed between the parties to the present litigation. The appropriate order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the proceedings between the parties to the present litigation appears to be that of the learned Sessions Judge, Ballia, dated 27-3-1976, in Criminal Revision No. 103 of 1976 (Ext. A-10). According to the statement made by Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhari, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, the mutation proceedings commenced before the close of the consolidation operations on the basis of the sale deed in question were still pending, despite the closure of the consolidation operations by the notification dated 18-11-1978, under Sec. 52. 13. In so far as the revisional order Ext. V.K.S. Chaudhari, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, the mutation proceedings commenced before the close of the consolidation operations on the basis of the sale deed in question were still pending, despite the closure of the consolidation operations by the notification dated 18-11-1978, under Sec. 52. 13. In so far as the revisional order Ext. A-10 in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is concerned, that cannot affect the grant of relief in the present case, for the order was passed during the pendency of the suit and even if the possession of the property in suit was delivered to the defendant-appellant and the defendant-respondent No. 7, in pursuance of that order possession over the land in suit could certainly be restored to the plaintiff-respondent in case this Court finds that the second appeal is fit to be dismissed. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts, I do not think it possible to shut out the appeal on the question formulated by this Court, on the ground that the defendants-appellant did not press the plea or adduce evidence in support of it in the two courts below. The material on the record clearly shows that proceedings were taken before the consolidation authorities in respect of the land in suit on the basis of the sale deed in question and as the record stands at present by the last order of the consolidation authorities, namely, that dated 19-3-1975, of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), he had set aside the order of mutation which was passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 20-4-1972, and the matter was remanded to him for a fresh decision on the merits. It may be that the matter was still pending before the consolidation authorities as suggested by Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhari, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. It may even be that the matter has been decided one way or the other, but the fact remains that it was raised and heard before the consolidation authorities. The bar placed by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the entertainment of "any suit or proceedings with respect to the rights in the land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken". The bar placed by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the entertainment of "any suit or proceedings with respect to the rights in the land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken". Under that Act, would seem to be applicable to the present suit in case it is found that the consolidation authorities had the jurisdiction to ignore the sale deed in question as null and void on coming to the finding that it was not the mental act of the plaintiff-respondent or that it was procured from her by misrepresentation as to its character, without its being cancelled by the Civil Court under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellant, relied on the following cases in support of his contention that the sale deed in question could be so ignored by the consolidation authorities and that on the facts and circumstances of the case, they had the fullest jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Gorakhnath Dubey v. Hari Narain ( AIR 1973 SC 2451 ); Baijnath v. Binda (1978) Rev Dec 77: (AIR 1978 NOC 66) (All); Amanat Ullah v. Mohd Fariyad 1978 Rev Dec 262 : (1978 All LJ 661) Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna (1976 Rev Dec 220 : 1976 All WC 412 (FB)); Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya (1979 Rev Dec 212: 1979 All LJ 800). The first of these, namely, the decision of the Supreme Court is Gorakhnath Dubey's case may be said to be the precursor of the law on this point. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Jagarnath Shukla v. Sita Ram Pandey (1969 All LJ 768) which held the field till then was that question relating to the validity of the sale-deed, gift deeds and wills could be gone into in proceedings before the consolidation authorities, because such question naturally and necessarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudication of rights or interest claimed by the contending parties in the land which was the subject-matter of consolidation proceedings. The Supreme Court did not accept that view so widely stated. The Supreme Court did not accept that view so widely stated. It declared: "We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interest in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings - but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it." The observation of the Supreme Court in that case that it found itself in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Jagarnath Shukla's case was with reference to the point that it is the substance of the claim and not its form which is decisive. This is how the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gorakhnath Dubey's case has been interpreted in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna (1976 Rev Dec 220 (Paras 3 and 4) : 1976 All WC 412) (FB) which has been referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant himself and also in another Full Bench decision of this Court in Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha Uskar Ghaziapur ( AIR 1977 All 360 para 31 at pages 368-369) : (1977 All LJ 310). The decisions of this Court in Baijnath (1978 Rev Dec 77): (AIR 1978 NOC 66), Amanat Ullah v. Mohd. The decisions of this Court in Baijnath (1978 Rev Dec 77): (AIR 1978 NOC 66), Amanat Ullah v. Mohd. Fariyad (1978 Rev Dec 262): (1978 All LJ 661) and Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya (1979 All LJ 800): (1979 Rev Dec 212) followed the said decision of the Supreme Court, in Gorakhnath Dubey's case (supra) and it was held in each of these three cases that the transaction was void and could, therefore, be ignored by the consolidation authorities and it was not necessary to have it cancelled by a civil court on a suit under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. In Baijnath's case Hon'ble R.M. Sahai J., relied on certain observations of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 (957) for holding that the deed in question before him was void. In Amanat Ullah's case, a compromise decree was in question and on a consideration of the effect of Ss. 19 and 23 of the Indian Contract Act and certain cases on the point, Hon'ble S.D. Agarwal, J. held on the basis of the allegation made in the plaint that the decree was null and void and ordered abatement of the second appeal and the suit giving rise to it under Section 5 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In Ram Roop's case the transaction in question was a sale deed and the executant was the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to the second appeal in this Court. Hon'ble P.N. Goel, J., relied on the same observation of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 (957) as had been relied upon in Baijnath v. Binda (1978 Rev Dec 77): (AIR 1978 NOC 66) and on that case itself for holding that the sale deed was on the facts of that case a void document and the revenue court could adjudicate upon the right of the parties in the land involved in the suit without requiring the executant to have the deed cancelled by the Civil Court. 15. There is no dispute between the parties about the interpretation of Gorakhnath Dubey's case. The dispute centres round the question whether the impugned sale deed was voidable or void Mr. 15. There is no dispute between the parties about the interpretation of Gorakhnath Dubey's case. The dispute centres round the question whether the impugned sale deed was voidable or void Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary contended that it was voidable and had to be set aside under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as the plaintiff-respondent had not in her plaint challenged the existence of the sale deed or the fact that she had executed it, her case being that she had been misled into executing it by fraud and undue influence. In support of his contention Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent first read to me Section 31 (1) of the Specific Relief Act and urged that a suit under that provision could be filed by any person against whom the instrument is either void or voidable. He referred to a Full Bench decision of Madras High Court in Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaswami Pillai ( AIR 1960 Mad 1 ) in this context. There can be no dispute that the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act are applicable to and can be availed of for filing a suit for cancellation of any instrument which may be either wholly null and void and may not in that sense be binding even on the executant, or may be voidable at his instance or any other person prima facie bound by it on proof of facts entitling him to avoid the instrument. It is not disputed by the defendant-appellant that but for the provisions of S. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the suit could not be said to be not maintainable under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. It is not disputed by the defendant-appellant that but for the provisions of S. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the suit could not be said to be not maintainable under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary then submitted that under Section 19 of the Contract Act, "when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused." He disputed the correctness of the two decisions in Baijnath v. Binda (1978 Rev Dec 77): (AIR 1978 NOC 66) and Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya (1979 All LJ 800 : 1979 Rev Dec 212) and urged that if fraudulent misrepresentation with regard to the character of a deed rendered it void and a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents rendered it merely voidable were the correct principle to adopt, then in that case deed procured by coercion would be void as coercion vitiates consent, but Section 19 of the Contract Act expressly laid it down that a deed obtained by coercion is voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so obtained by coercion. However Mr. Chaudhary proceeded also to distinguish the two cases on the ground that the signatures of the executant were totally denied in both of them and that being so, the plaintiff in those cases could not have filed suits for cancellation of the deeds in question as the deeds were, on their own case, not real. On the other hand, urged Mr. Chaudhary, the execution of the deed has not been denied and that has been pleaded by the plaintiff in the present case is that she was misled into executing the sale deed by fraud and undue influence. The fact of execution of the sale deed has not been challenged. Mr. Chaudhary urged that even in a case where the misrepresentation is as regards the character of a document, but the execution of which is admitted, the execution can, under the second paragraph of Sec. 19 of the Contract Act, insist that the contract shall be performed "and that" he shall be put in position in which he would have been if the representation made had been true. In support of his plea Mr. In support of his plea Mr. Chaudhary relied on another decision, of a learned single Judge, of this Court in Hawaldar Singh v. Aditya Singh (1978 All WC 344): (AIR 1978 All 226). The very same decision of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 (957), which has been relied upon in the cases of Baijnath and Ram Roop (supra) was considered by Hon'ble K.N. Seth, J., in Hawaldar Singh's case. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 ) the learned single Judge quoted the following passage therefrom:- "It is well established that a contract of other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded". The learned single Judge then proceeded to observe that the argument of the learned counsel for the applicants in that case based on the distinction pointed out by the Supreme Court between the contents of the document and the character of the document, was untenable inasmuch as in the case before the Supreme Court two plots were fraudulently got included in the gift deed in question, although the donor never intended to transfer those plots and the Supreme Court held the document to be voidable and not void. I am, however, relieved of the difficulty of resolving the conflict, if any, between the two seemingly although not really conflicting interpretations of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 ) on the one hand by two learned single Judges of this Court in the cases of Baijnath v. Binda (1978 Rev Dec 77): (AIR 1978 NOC 66); Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya (1979 All LJ 800): (1979 Rev Dec 212) and on the other hand by another learned single Judge of this court in Hawaldar Singh v. Aditya Singh (1978 All WC 344): ( AIR 1978 All 266 ) inasmuch as the question has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata (1979 All WC 524) and on a consideration of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 ) and in Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Harinarayan ( AIR 1973 SC 2451 ) and the decision of Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J., in Baijnath v. Binda (1978 RD 77) : (AIR 1978 NOC 66) as also certain English cases, the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "(10) A close analysis of the various cases decided by Courts in England and in India indicates that if a party has been misled into executing a deed or signing a document essentially different from one he intended to execute or sign, he can plead nonest factum in an action against him. It is invalid on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature and that he never intended to sign the transaction to which his name is appended." "(11) The question that now arises is whether the suit which has given rise to this revision application will abate under Section 5 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or the relief can be granted by the Civil Court. The settled view of this Court is that the allegation in the plaint determine the jurisdiction of the Court. A close scrutiny of the plaint would indicate that the allegations made are in regard to fraudulent representation as respects the nature of the document and not in regard to the contents of the document. The settled view of this Court is that the allegation in the plaint determine the jurisdiction of the Court. A close scrutiny of the plaint would indicate that the allegations made are in regard to fraudulent representation as respects the nature of the document and not in regard to the contents of the document. If the fraudulent act alleged was in respect of the contents of the document then the document will hold the field unless it was set aside. In that event the suit would lie in the Civil court as the relief for the cancellation of the sale deed cannot be granted by the Consolidation Courts. If on the other hand, the relief claimed is in regard to the fraudulent act as respects the nature of the document, the document would be void as in the eye of law no such document was executed by the executant. Since the element of consent to the document set up is lacking, the deed can be ignored as the transaction which the document purports to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended. In such an eventuality, the sale deed can be ignored on the ground that it is void and the Consolidation Courts can ignore the document and determine the rights of the parties. In our opinion, the allegations in the plaint are such that the relief can be granted by the Consolidation Courts. We find support for our view from a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 All WC 412. The observations of the Full Bench may be quoted as follows: "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Supreme Court has laid down the law in Gorakh Nath's case, ( AIR 1973 SC 2451 ), that suits in respect of void documents abate by reason of Sec. 5 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. But the suits for cancellation of voidable deeds do not abate". But the suits for cancellation of voidable deeds do not abate". "(12) R.M. Sahai, J., in Baij Nath v. Binda, (1978 All WC 52) : (AIR 1978 NOC 66), relying upon Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, AIR 1968 SC 956 has held that if the fraudulent act alleged is in regard to the character of the document, the document would be void and the proceedings will abate under Sec. 5 (2) of the Act but if the allegations are in regard to fraudulent representation as to the contents of the document, the document would be voidable and the suit will not abate as the relief for cancellation of the document would be the appropriate relief which can be granted only by the Civil Court". Applying the principles enunciated in this case, one has to look to the plaint allegations. The plaint allegations were that the plaintiff was misled into executing the sale deed in question, in favour of the defendants-appellants and the defendants-respondents, in addition to and in plea of a gift deed in favour of her daughter which alone she had intended to execute. The present case is not one where the plaintiff-respondents could be said to have consented to execute the sale deed in question and her consent was obtained by fraud or undue influence. On her own allegation, she never intended to execute the sale deed in question and the sale deed that was got executed from her being a document essentially different from the gift deed which she had intended to execute. She could plead nonest factum in an action against her, meaning thereby that it was not a deed executed by her. 16. Following the rule laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata, (1979 All WC 524) (supra) it must, therefore, be held that the sale deed in question was null and void and that being so, the plaintiff-respondents could show before the consolidation authorities that it was so and that the consolidation authorities did have the jurisdiction in the present case to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties even by ignoring the sale deed if they find that it was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff-respondent on the grounds alleged by her. The present suit must accordingly be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The present suit must accordingly be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. I may, however, add that the plaintiff respondents is not likely to suffer any injury by the dismissal of her suit on this ground inasmuch as according to the statement of her learned counsel Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary, the proceedings initiated by the defendants-appellant and the other defendants on the basis of the sale deed under section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are yet pending and could still be proceeded with and decided under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of that Act in spite of the closure of the consolidation operations by the issue of notification under subsection (2) of Section 52. I have no doubt that the consolidation authorities concerned will take up the case pending before them from the stage where it happens to be and proceed to decide it on the merits in accordance with law. 17. The two applications (1) for amendment of the plaint and (2) for admission of C.H. Form No. 2-A may now be considered. The first part of the amendment sought to be made, namely, the allegation that the sale deed in question could not be acted upon or in other words was null and void for having been executed without the necessary permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) cannot be allowed, inasmuch as the allegation if correct would only establish that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act, on account of the alleged nullity of the sale deed on that ground also. The second part of the amendment sought raises the question that 3 of the plots of land Nos. 130 (area 0.03 acres). 131 (area 0.05 acres) and 45 1/2 (area 0.04 acres) were abadi sites and, therefore not 'land' within the meaning of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and that consequently the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties in respect of those plots. The copy of C.H. Form No. 21 has been sought to be filed by the other application, in order to prove that allegation. The allegation has been denied by the defendant-appellant. The copy of C.H. Form No. 21 has been sought to be filed by the other application, in order to prove that allegation. The allegation has been denied by the defendant-appellant. Be that as it may, prima facie, so long as the land is claimed by the plaintiff-respondent to be held by her as her Bhumidhari, the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities to determine whether she continues to be Bhumidhar thereof, despite the impugned sale, remains intact, and the Revenue authorities alone can determine whether it continues to be 'land' or not in a proceeding for a declaration under Section 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Even if the suit was not otherwise barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, the question whether it was 'land' could not be decided by the Civil Court itself. It could only be referred to the Assistant Collector Incharge of the Sub-Division, under Section 331-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. For all these reasons, and for the reason that the suit as framed is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. consolidation of Holdings Act, the two applications are rejected as not maintainable. 18. In the result, this appeal must succeed and is allowed. The decree under appeal is set aside and the suit is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own respective costs throughout.