JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This appeal arises out of the judgment of acquittal passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (II), Una, in Criminal Case No. 218-1-198-A, 85-11 of 1983, decided on 8-11-1985. In this case, the accused, a Driver of truck No DHL-3137, was proceeded against under sections 279/304-A of the Indian Penal Code. He was acquitted by the trial court. The State feels aggrieved by this acquittal and, therefore, challenges this acquittal by this appeal. 2. The brief facts of this case are that on 10-1-1983 at about 5 15 p m, the accused was driving truck No. DHL-3137on Una-Nangal Road rashly and negligently thereby endangering human lives. As a result of this act, the accused caused the death of Shri Ravinder Kumar (5 years) who died at the spot. Report Ex. PW I/A was lodged with the police whereupon First Information Report Ex PW 9/A was registered against the accused. Postmortem report Ex PW 9/B was prepared, site plan Ex PW 9/C was drawn. Photographs of the dead body of Ravinder Kumar and the truck involved in the accident (Ex. P. 1 to Ex. P. 3) were taken. The police also took into possession, the truck in question through Ex. PW 6/A and it was mechanically examined and a report of the same is Ex. PW 5/A. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses at the spot and after investigation, challan was preserved in the court for trial of the accused for the aforesaid offences. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. The key question to be examined in this case is whether the accused was rash and negligent or both while driving the truck and whether he was driving it in such a way that it endangered human lives on Una-Nangal Road—a State Highway. To examine these questions, it is essential to refer to the statements of witnesses examined by the prosecution in this case. 4. Shri Jagdev Singh (PW 1) states that he was sitting at the shop of Gurbachan Singh, Carpenter, at 5 p m. on 10-1-1983 on Nangal-Una-Road. At that time, this truck, loaded with coal, came. It was in great speed. On the left side of the road, Kumari Sandhya (PW 2), sister of the deceased, was going and she had been taking her brother, the deceased, by her side. At that time, this truck, loaded with coal, came. It was in great speed. On the left side of the road, Kumari Sandhya (PW 2), sister of the deceased, was going and she had been taking her brother, the deceased, by her side. The front tyre of the truck came on to the child and went on dragging the deceased upto a distance of about 45 feet He as well as Rattan Chand raised noise. Pa wan also came there They took out the dead body from the side of the tyre where it was struck While sitting there, their faces were towards the road and on the happening of the accident, Kumari Sandhya (PW 2) cried and their attention was drawn towards that side He denies the suggestion that the deceased was trying to cross the road at that time. This statement is corroborated by the statement of Kumari Sandhya (PW2) who was with the deceased at that time. She also states that they were moving on the left side of the road and the truck was in full speed. The truck hit her brother with tyre and dragged him with it. She raised noise and people collected there. She admits that while walking she was holding the finger of the deceased. She denies that they were walking to the right side of the road at the time of the accident. 5. Next witness is Bachhan Singh (PW 3). He is a shopkeeper at that place. He states that Jagdev (PW 1) was sitting in his shop. This truck, loaded with coal, was coming in sufficient speed from Nangal side. Jagdev raised noise that the boy had come under the (ruck. They stopped the truck and saw that the child was struck in the left front side tyre of the truck and the truck had dragged it on till it stopped. The child was dead when it was taken out. It had been thoroughly crushed. They had seen the child from their shop while passing through the shop He also denies that the child was on the right side of the road and it could not cross the road by the time it came under the truck. The truck moved on while dragging the child. 6. Shri Sarup Lal (PW 5) is a Mechanic. He examined the vehicle and vide report Ex. The truck moved on while dragging the child. 6. Shri Sarup Lal (PW 5) is a Mechanic. He examined the vehicle and vide report Ex. PW 5/A, the truck was not found defective, He states that if any truck is driven at the speed of 30/35 Kms per hour, it can stop at a distance of 8-10 feet on application of brakes. 7. Shri Karam Chand (PW 8) also supports other witnesses on the point of speed when he states that the vehicle was in sufficient speed. Noise was heard that a boy had come under the truck and people had collected there. He also reached the place of accident after the accident. 8. Shri Mohinder Singh (PW 9), is the sub-Inspector, who conducted the investigation. Among other things, he states that the investigation did not disclose that the boy tried to cross the road. This is the sum and substance of the prosecution evidence in this case. 9. Shri Harish Behal, appearing for the accused, submits that the trial court judgment is perfectly justifiable as the same is based on the evidence on the record. The first point argued by Shri Harish Behal relates to the rash and negligent aspect of the case. The assertion of Shri M S. Guleria. learned Assistant Advocate General, that the truck was being driven rashly and negligently has been seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the accused. It is submitted that the accused was neither negligent nor rash while driving the vehicle and it is just a misfortune that despite this the accident took place and the boy was crushed. As a matter of fact, the learned Counsel urges, there is evidence that the boy was crossing the road ; otherwise it is not possible to conclude as to how the accident actually took place. 10. Reference to 1979 Cr LJ 1258 Krishna Bhadur Chetri v. State of Assam has been made in order to submit that there is marked distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. In this judgment, in para-14, the learned Judge observed as under: "14. An offence under section 304-A is committed either by committing a rash act or a negligent act. There is a marked distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. In this judgment, in para-14, the learned Judge observed as under: "14. An offence under section 304-A is committed either by committing a rash act or a negligent act. There is a marked distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. Jn the case of a rash act the criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. A culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and sometimes with the optimism that they will not, and often with the belief that the author has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happenings Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused to have adopted. Negligence implies an omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and a reasonable man would not do. Thus culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal or mischievous act will follow, but in circumstances which saw that the actor or the author has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and if he had he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civil duty of circumspection." 11. There is no dispute so far as the principle enunciated in this case is concerned, but the facts of this case are different from the case in hand. In this case, when the truck was about 8 or 9 cubits away, two boys, threatened by a woman, suddenly and unexpectedly darted from the right hand side to the left hand side of the road. The driver saw them only at point when the boys were running through the road and darting to the middle There was only a short distance of a few cubits between the moving truck and the running boys He made an endeavour to by-pass them by taking the truck to the extreme left, without applying any brake. The driver was unsuccessful. The driver was unsuccessful. The two boys were knocked down by the truck and died on the spot. 12 In the present case, the accused could see the deceased and his sister from a distance. They were on the left side of the road. There is no evidence worth reliable from where it can be said that the boy, who was being held by his elder sister, could abruptly turn to the right side of the road and cross the road. The accused was both rash as well as negligent in driving his vehicle. He could not control it. It was being driven rashly and was negligent enough to come to that side of the road and run over the child The vehicle was so much in speed that it stopped at a distance of about 43 feet from the point of the accident. It went on dragging the child upto that distance. This shows that the speed of the truck was excessive with the result that skid marks were found on the road on the application of the brakes. The submissions, in these circumstances, of the learned Counsel for the accused are not, at all, convincing and are, therefore, rejected The driver is held guilty of rash and negligent driving Further, by driving the vehicle on the public road in such a way was certainly endangering human life as the people move on the road. There are shops People are moving about This act attracts the provisions of section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. The next point taken by Shri Harish Behal relates to the discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. I do not see any material contradictions. Minor contradictions are obvious in truthful statements recorded after the lapse of many months in a court of law. Secondly, all the witnesses belong to poor strata in the society. They are illiterate minials. Simply because they belong to low Castes and of the vicinity of the deceaseds family, it cannot be said that their versions are not truthful and they cannot be believed on this account. This argument, therefore, does not impress me and is, therefore, rejected. 14. Secondly, all the witnesses belong to poor strata in the society. They are illiterate minials. Simply because they belong to low Castes and of the vicinity of the deceaseds family, it cannot be said that their versions are not truthful and they cannot be believed on this account. This argument, therefore, does not impress me and is, therefore, rejected. 14. Shri Behal further submits that the witnesses could not have occasion to see how the accident took place, as they cannot be considered eye-witnesses to the occurrence They were sitting on the other side of the road and they were attracted to the side of the accident when noise was raised Kumari Sandhya (PW 2). Evidence shows otherwise. These witnesses were sitting in the shop. They saw the truck coming from Nangal side in great speed and immediately on the happening of the accident, a cry was there. Obviously, they saw it happening. They also saw that the truck stopped much ahead of this place and they reached the spot and took out the body of the deceased from that portion of the truck where it was involved. It can, therefore, be said that the assertion of the learned Counsel on this aspect of the matter is not convincing. 15. Shri Behal contends that in case two views are possible—one already taken by the trial Court and the other to which this Court may come to entertain—no interference is called for in such a situation. To support this contention, reference to AIR 1977 SC 1213, Jimmy Homi Bharucha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 SC 10 3, Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab, and 1979 Cr. LJ 1067, K. Lakslimana Rao v. The Public Prosecutor, State of Andhra Pradesh and another, is made to argue that this Court, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, should not interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the court below without valid and sufficient grounds. It can do so only where the lower court order suffers from manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the lower court is such which may not have been arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and the same is liable to be characterised as perverse. It can do so only where the lower court order suffers from manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the lower court is such which may not have been arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and the same is liable to be characterised as perverse. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court are manifestly perverse as they could not, at all, be reached in view of the clear cut evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused. Complete casual approach and non-application of mind by the trial Court is manifest and, therefore, calls for interference by this Court in the interest of justice. 16. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is set-aside. The accused is convicted under sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. 17. On the question of sentence, Shri M. S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, submits that accidents of heavy vehicles are on the increase Drivers of such vehicles have scant regard for the safety of pedestrians. Therefore, heavy punishment should be imposed. Reference to Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1985, State of Himachal Pradesh v (Mohinder Singh, decided on January 13, 1989, was made. Looking to the facts that the accident took place 10-1-1983; enough time has gone by. There is no evidence that the accused repeated this act after this accident Therefore, in these circumstances, the ends of justice will be met if instead of imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the accused is directed to pay a fine. Accordingly, the accused is directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and Rs. 4,000 under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, to be deposited by him within three months from today. On realisation, this amount be paid to the father or, in his absence, to the mother of the deceased by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, where this amount will be deposited by the accused. In case the accused fails to do so, he will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and for one year under section 304- A of the Indian Penal Code. Appeal allowed. -