JUDGMENT M.S. Ratnaparkhi, J.-. The process issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha on 12-4-1988 under Section 406 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code, has been challenged in this petition. 2. The petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 are the daughters-in-law of the respondent complainant in this petition. They were married to the sons of the complainant. The petitioner No.2 happens to be the brother of respondents Nos.' 3 and 4, whereas the petitioner No.1 happens to be the father of petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 3. The case made out by the complainant before the Trial Court was that, the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 were married to his 2 sons and at the time of the marriage, he had given some golden ornaments to them. These ornaments are detailed in paras 3 and 4 of the complaint. It is his contention that some ornaments are given at the time of marriage, whereas some ornaments were given after the marriage. His further case is that, on 6-8-1987, the accused No.2 took his two sisters (accused Nos. 3 and 4) to Sujalpur (Mandi). Accused Nos. 3 and 4 took all these ornaments along with them. They were to stay at Sujalpur for about 8 or 10 days and were thereafter returned back to their matrimonial home along with the ornament. However, it is alleged that accused Nos. 1 and 2 kept both these females at their house along with the ornaments. It is contended that the ornaments have not yet been returned back. The accused Nos. 1 to 4 have committed breach of trust in respect of these ornaments, and therefore, a complaint was lodged before the Court. The Court recorded the verification of the complainant on 13-11-87. It appears that the police were asked to enquire into the matter under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After the receipt of the report and the enquiry papers, the learned Magistrate passed an order on 12-4-1988 issuing process under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against all the four accused. 4. This order has been challenged by all the four accused by this petition. Mr. Shukla, the learned advocate for the petitioner strenuously contended before me that there is absolutely no material on record to show that the ornaments were entrusted either to the accused Nos. 4. This order has been challenged by all the four accused by this petition. Mr. Shukla, the learned advocate for the petitioner strenuously contended before me that there is absolutely no material on record to show that the ornaments were entrusted either to the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 or to any of them at all. He contended before me that unless a trust is made out, there cannot be a breach of trust and the Court would not be justified in taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. There is much substance in what Mr. Shukla says. 6. I was taken extensively through the allegations made in the complaint. Suffice it to say that the ornaments detailed in paragraphs 3 and 4 were given in marriage to both these females. These ornaments, according to the complainant, were purchased from Wardha market itself. Some additional gold was supplied by the complainant himself from his ancestral property. The complaint further makes out that some ornaments were given at the time of the marriage and some were given after the marriage. Thereafter the accused Nos. 3 and 4 along with accused No.2 left the matrimonial house and they are now staying with accused No. 1. On these allegations, the complainant claims a presumption of trust. 6. Mr. Shukla, the learned advocate for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that there is absolutely no material to make out a trust. He invited my attention to that contention of the complainant wherein he has stated that these ornaments were prepared by him at Wardha and were given to his daughters-in-law in marriage. According to Mr. Shukla, as these ornaments were given in marriage, it becomes- a Stridhan property. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary at this stage to decide whether it was a Stridhan property exclusively or it was any other property. Suffice it to Say that these ornaments were on the person of accused Nos. 3 and 4 when they left matrimonial house and the ornaments have not been returned. The question is, whether these allegations can make out a case of trust? 'Mr. Suffice it to Say that these ornaments were on the person of accused Nos. 3 and 4 when they left matrimonial house and the ornaments have not been returned. The question is, whether these allegations can make out a case of trust? 'Mr. Shukla invited my attention to Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar.1 It was a case instituted by the wife on the allegations that the ornaments were her Stridhao property had they were entrusted with the husband and the husband had committed a breach of .trust. The Supreme Court observed in para 7 that the Stridhan property belongs absolutely to the wife and she can deal with it in any manner she likes. The arguments based on the provisions of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act were repelled by the Supreme Court in fact A.I.R. 1982 Punj. and Har. 372 was overuled. The Supreme Court observed in para 27 :- "To sum up, the position seems to be that a pure and. simple entrustment of stridhan without creating any rights in the husband excepting putting the articles in his possession does not entide him to use the same to the detriment of his wife without her consent. The husband has .no justification for not returning the same articles as and when demanded by the wife nor can he burden her with losses of business by using the said property which was never intended. by her while entrusting possession of stridhao. On the allegations in the complaint, the husband is no more and no less than a pure and simple custodian acting on behalf of his wife and if he diverts the entrusted property elsewhere or for different purposes he takes a clear risk of prosecution under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code." 7 . The position of law that prevails is that the property becomes the exclusive property of the wife. In this case, the accused Nos. 3 and 4 themselves are being treated as trustees or custodians and the process under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is asked for against them. One fails to understand how they can be trustees when the law considers them as the absolute owners. 8. As far as the accused. Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, there is absolutely nothing in the complaint to show that they bear any characteristic of the trusteeship. There was no entrustment with them. One fails to understand how they can be trustees when the law considers them as the absolute owners. 8. As far as the accused. Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, there is absolutely nothing in the complaint to show that they bear any characteristic of the trusteeship. There was no entrustment with them. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint to that effect. Mr. Modak urged before me that even according to the allegations made in the complaint, some property was given to them at the time of the marriage, whereas some ornaments were given after the marriage. This does not make any difference as far as the present case is concerned. The position, which prevails to-day according to the complainant, is that accused Nos. 3. and 4 left the matrimonial house along with the ornaments the part of which was given to them at the time of marriage and a part thereafter. Still this position does not clothe the accused with the character of a trust. 9. The Trial Court before issuing the process under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was under obligation to apply its mind and to find out whether the allegations made in the complaint make out a trust. As there is absolutely nothing to lead to the inference of trust, the process issued by the Trial Court cannot be sustained. The application, therefore, deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order issuing the process under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against accused Nos. 1 to 4 (the present petitioners) is hereby quashed. The whole complaint is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms above. 1. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 628.