JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This petition arises out of the order dated November 28, 1988 of Rent Controller (I), Simla. The petitioner has been ordered to be evicted from the premises in his occupation on the ground of nonpayment of arrears of rent and also on the ground that the landlord, an army officer, was serving under special conditions and required the premises for the occupation of his family members. The arrears of rent are stated to have been paid within the stipulated period, therefore, the only ground that survives for determination relates to issues Nos. 1, 3 and 5 as framed by the trial Court and the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner also concentrates his assault around these issues. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the respondent presented a petition under the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) on the grounds that he is serving in the Army under special conditions and, therefore, required the premises for the occupation of his family members after re-construction/renovation and also that the petitioner was in arrears of rent The petitioner contested the petition and asserted that the respondents got into the ownership of the premises collusively with the intention to succeed in getting the premises vacated from the petitioner and the transfer in favour of the respondent was not, therefore, bona fide. It was also disputed that the respondent was serving under such conditions which entitled him to get the benefit of these special provisions under section 14 (3) (iii) of the Act. Regarding the point of arrears of rent, it is contended that the rent of the premises is Rs. 20 per month inclusive of all taxes which the petitioner was ready to pay. An objection as to the maintainability of this petition has also been taken but was not pressed before the Rent Controller. The proceedings ultimately resulted in the aforesaid order of eviction of the petitioner. 3. Sh. P. K. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the present petition should not have been filed under section 14, the same should have been filed under section 14 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. There is no substance in this argument. Simply because the main provision of the Act—Section 14—has been used, it does not mean that the petition has not been filed in accordance with law. There is no substance in this argument. Simply because the main provision of the Act—Section 14—has been used, it does not mean that the petition has not been filed in accordance with law. It is the substance of the application and the substantive provision of law under which the same has been filed which is to be seen. Therefore, there is no substance in this submission of Sh. Sharma. Moreover, such an objection has not been raised before the Rent Controller and it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time by way of this objection and the same is, therefore, rejected. 4. It is further submitted that the premises against which eviction is sought have not been clearly identified. It is asserted that there is vagueness on this aspect of the matter. There is no pleading on this aspect nor could there by any as there is no dispute on this aspect of the case. The respondent is clear, the petitioner is clear and so also the court which has passed the impugned order. The relevant documents produced on this aspect by the respondent make things absolutely clear and beyond the pale of controversy. The only doubt entertained by the petitioner appears to be as to the owner/landlord of the property and his assertion is that the property had been in the ownership of Kanwar Madan Singh and he was ready to pay the rent whosoever happens to be the owner of the same. 5. It is further contended by Sh. P. K. Sharma that the respondent was neither serving under special conditions at the time of the presentation of the petition nor at this stage to enable him to seek the benefit of the special provisions in favour of such an army personnel under the Act and the certificate (Ex. P-E) issued under section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, cannot be relied upon being only a photo-copy of the original. Sh Bhupinder Singh, who appears for the respondent, has submitted that the original copy of the certificate (Ex. P-E) was filed before the Court and after perusal of the same and on the direction of the Court, the photo-copy thereof was submitted. It is further contended that certificate, in question, is conclusive evidence as to the service conditions of the respondent. P-E) was filed before the Court and after perusal of the same and on the direction of the Court, the photo-copy thereof was submitted. It is further contended that certificate, in question, is conclusive evidence as to the service conditions of the respondent. A reference to 1969 (IV) RCJ 373, Raj Kumar v. Major Gurmitinder Singh, has been made. It is relevant to quote para 7 of this judgment :— "The next argument of the learned Counsel was that the certificate, Exhibit P-l, of the Commanding Officer produced by the respondent was not in order and, consequently, the landlord could not take advantage of the provisions of law by which the Act had been amended in 1966 to provide for accommodation for the families of the members of the armed forces of the Union of India. By virtue of the amendment made in the Act by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Amendment Act, 1966, the following sub-paragraph was inserted after sub-paragraph (i) of Paragraph (a) in sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act :— ‘(i-a) In the case of a residential building if the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union of India and requires it for the occupation of his family and if he produces a certificate of the prescribed authority, referred to in section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of that Act. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-paragraph— (1) the certificate of the prescribed authority shall be conclusive evidence that the landlord is serving under special conditions ; and (2) "family" means such relations of the landlord as ordinarily live with him and are dependent upon him". From a reading of this newly inserted provision, it would be clear that if the landlord was a member of the armed forces of the Union of India and required the residential building belonging to him for the occupation of his family, then he could get the same vacated, if he produced a certificate of the prescribed authority referred to in section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that he was serving under special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of that Act. It was further made clear in the Act that the Certificate of the prescribed authority would be conclusive evidence that the landlord was serving under special conditions. In the present case, it was not disputed that the respondent was a member of the armed forces of the Union of India. It was also conceded that the respondents wife would be covered by the word family occurring in this newly inserted sub-paragraph, because the explanation thereto had defined the word as meaning "such relations of the landlord as ordinarily live with him and are dependent upon him." The only argument raised by the learned Counsel was that the certificate, Exhibit P-l, did not fulfil the conditions laid down in the sub-paragraph, inasmuch as it had to state that the respondent was serving under special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, and the certificate in the present case merely said that the respondent was serving under war conditions. Exhibit P-l, which is signed by the Officer Commanding, runs thus:— "Certificate (Under Indian Soldiers Litigation Act, 1925). Certified that IC-14796 Major Gurmeet Inder Singh Grewal S/o. Sh. Devinder Singh Grewal is serving in the 5th Bn< Brigade of the Guards under War conditions." It is to be seen whether from this certificate it could be said that the respondent was serving under special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925. Certified that IC-14796 Major Gurmeet Inder Singh Grewal S/o. Sh. Devinder Singh Grewal is serving in the 5th Bn< Brigade of the Guards under War conditions." It is to be seen whether from this certificate it could be said that the respondent was serving under special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925. The said section reads as under :— "For the purposes of this Act, an Indian Soldier shall be deemed to be or, as the case may be, to have been serving, (a) under special conditions—when he is or has been serving under war conditions, or overseas or at any place beyond India, (b) under war conditions—when he is or has been at any time during the continuance of any hostilities declared by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette to constitute a state of war for the purposes of this Act or at any time during a period of six months thereafter, (i) serving out of India, (ii) under order to proceed on field service, (iii) serving with any unit which is for the time being mobilised, or (iv) serving under conditions which, in the opinion of the prescribed authority, preclude him from obtaining leave or absence to enable him to attend a Court as a party to any proceeding, or when he is or has been at any other time serving under conditions service under which has been declared by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette to be service under war conditions; and (c) * * * * * According to this section, an Indian soldier would be deemed to have been serving under special conditions when he was or bad been serving under war conditions. Exhibit P-l says that the respondent was serving under war conditions. Consequently, he would be deemed to be serving under special conditions. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there were no war condition in India at the time when the certificate was issued, inasmuch as there was no declaration of war by the Central Government published in the Gazette and he referred to the provisions of clause (b) of section 3 in that behalf. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there were no war condition in India at the time when the certificate was issued, inasmuch as there was no declaration of war by the Central Government published in the Gazette and he referred to the provisions of clause (b) of section 3 in that behalf. This argument ignores the explanation added to the sub-paragraph in section 13 of the Act, which laid down that the certificate of the prescribed authority would be conclusive evidence that the landlord was serving under special conditions. It was not suggested that the certificate in the instant case was not issued by the prescribed authority or was not genuine one. That being so? the said certificate bad to be taken as conclusive evidence of the fact that the respondent was serving under special conditions. This argument also, therefore, fails." With reference to the present case, it is pertinent to reproduce the certificate (Ex. P-E) as well: "Certificate (Authority:—The Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Rules, 1938, Rule 3), 1. Under the provisions of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No IV of 1925), it is certified that IC-26599-W Lieutenant Colonel Mohan Krishan Chauhan Son of Late Sh. S. D. Chauhan of District Simla, Himachal Pradesh is :— (a) The Commanding Officer of 122 Infantry Battalion (TA). (b) Serving under special conditions as prescribed in clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 of the said Act, i. e. the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV of 1925) Authority Army Headquarters Signal No. 3474531/TA 2 dated 30th October, 1987. (Contents of letters not to be disclosed due to security reasons). (c) Under the provisions of sub-clause (iv) of clause (b) of section 3 of the above mentioned act due to exigencies of service is allowed to be represented by a personal duly authorised by him in the court case concerning his residence, Theog House, located in Khasra Number 162/2 in Mauza Sanjauli of District Simla, Himachal Pradesh. 2. It is also certified that:— (a) The officer has completed 20 years of minimum pension able service period. (b) In the eventuality of proceeding on pension prematurely as stated by the officer wishes to settle at Simla and expressed desire to renovate the Theog House for his personal residential purpose at the earliest possible. 2. It is also certified that:— (a) The officer has completed 20 years of minimum pension able service period. (b) In the eventuality of proceeding on pension prematurely as stated by the officer wishes to settle at Simla and expressed desire to renovate the Theog House for his personal residential purpose at the earliest possible. (c) He has an old ailing mother, who is under treatment and stays with him. 3. It is also certified that the above facts are true to the best of my knowledge as has been ascertained from the various records available about the officer and also from the personal statements of the Officer in my presence. Sd/- No. (U. Damodaran) Station : Cannanore Colonel, Station Commander, Dated : 14th November, 1987. Cannanore." 6. It can, therefore, be said that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary having been placed on the record by the petitioner, it is clear that the respondent is working in the Army under special conditions as prescribed under clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act 1925 and is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 14 (3) (iii) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act and the plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is devoid of any merit. 7. Adverting to the second aspect of this issue, it is in evidence that the respondent requires the premises for the occupation of his family after its renovation/re-construction as the building is stated to be very old. It is in evidence that the Municipal Corporation, Simla, has vide communication dated 1-7-1988 (Ex. P-F) accorded permission to the respondent for the repairs of the house at Engine Ghar, Sanhauli. It is in evidence that whenever the respondent comes to Simla he stays with his father-in-law and the house in question requires extensive repairs being about hundred years old. The petitioner (RW 1) admitted in his statement that he came to know about the ownership of the respondent when he received a notice. He further states that Kanwar Madan Singh who used to receive the rent from him stopped receiving the same since January, 1987. He was prepared to pay the rent and that the building is all right and worth living. He further states that Kanwar Madan Singh who used to receive the rent from him stopped receiving the same since January, 1987. He was prepared to pay the rent and that the building is all right and worth living. Nowhere in his statement the petitioner has challenged either the maintainability of the petition or the genuineness of the certificate (Ex. P-E) or the bona fide requirement of the respondent. He has also not stated about the collusive, deliberate and mala fide transfer of the premises as asserted in the reply! The result, therefore, is that the respondent has succeeded in establishing that he is the landlord serving in the Indian Army under special conditions as certified and it is also proved that the premises in question are needed by him for the occupation of his family after making repairs/renovation and there is no lack of bona fide in the transfer of this property in his favour by his father-in-law as a similar transfer by gift has been made in the name of Professor V. V. S. Dogra and Mrs. Shakuntala Dogra as well. The learned Rent Controller (1), Simla, has very exhaustively dealt with every aspect of this case and I uphold his conclusions, findings and order. 8. The result, therefore, is that there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.