JUDGMENT N. N. Mithal, J. 1. A decree for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act having been passed against the appellant on the ground of desertion, the present appeal has been filed. 2. Admittedly the parties were married on 16-2-1975 when the husband was living jointly with his elder brother. After some time he left that house and begain to live in a separate house. Since the latter part of 1977 the parties are not living together as the wife now lives with her mother at Jabalpur. The oral evidence of the parties is very scanty and consists of uncorrborated statements of parties only besides two letters which constituted the entire documentary evidence. According to the case of the petitioner the wife was the root cause of discord in the family because of which he had to set up a separate establishment ever since Novembet, 1975. In October, 1977 the wife's mother had come for a few days and took his wife along with her to Jabalpur without his consent and against his wishes. Since then she has not returned to the matrimonial house. In December, 1977 he made an attempt to bring the appellant back but she refused to do so without any reasonable cause. 3. In defence, the wife denied all the allegations made by the petitioner and put the blame squarely on petitioner himself. She denied having created any discord in the family or to have pressed him for separate residence. According to her she had been the victim of torture by the petitioner and it was due to cruelty that she had to leave Allahabad. Her case further was that the petitioner had left for Kanpur saying that he had official work but did not return and she was left to fend for himself. Forced by these circumstances and with no money with her she had no other choice but to go to Jabalpur with her mother whom she had called. She also denied having ever refused to come back to the matrimonial home. On the contrary the husband himself had refused resumption of marital relations. 4. The following three issues were struck on the pleadings : 1. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition ? 2. On the contrary the husband himself had refused resumption of marital relations. 4. The following three issues were struck on the pleadings : 1. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition ? 2. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty ? 3. To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled ? The findings returned by the trial court are that the appellant wife had deserted her husband without his consent and against his will and that she had failed to show any reasonable cause for living separately. The decree for divorce was, therefore, granted on the ground of desertion by the wife. 5. Placing heavy reliance on the case of Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhawati, AIR 1957 SC 176 it was urged that in the absence of a finding of animus deserendi on the part of the appellant no decree for divorce could be granted to the respondent. In that case the Supreme Court has laid down the essential features which constitute desertion. Although the case before the Supreme Court arose under the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act but its provisions are almost in the same language as those of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The law laid down in that case is fully applicable to case under Section 13. The Supreme Court had this to say :- "For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (Animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid." Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. If, in fact there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. If, in fact there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. If a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poentientiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses the offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former." "Hence, it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any other matrimonial offence beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law, the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court." 6. According to the Supreme Court the mere fact that the parties had been living separately is of no consequence unless the deserted spouse further proves animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. In the light of these observations an examination of oral evidence of the petitioner false much too short of the target. There is nothing in it to show animus deserendi on the part of the appellant. All that he has stated is that the wife had left bis house without his consent and against his wishes and was, as a fact, living separately. It is true that the conduct of the parties before and after the separation is of great importance and may lead the court to conclude . whether deserting spouse had or had no intention to desert. It is true that the conduct of the parties before and after the separation is of great importance and may lead the court to conclude . whether deserting spouse had or had no intention to desert. Both have been living apart but the admitted fact that the wife had instituted proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights at Jabalpur and the fact that the matter is still sub-judice goes a long way to show that she did make an effort to re-establish conjugal relations. On the contrary the husband's conduct in filing these divorce proceedings can safely be taken as indicative of his intention to break the marital life. To accuse the wife with having animus deserendi would, therefore, be unjustified and misplaced. 7. At this stage it will also be relevant to consider the two letters sent by respondent's brother to the members of the appellant's family. The first letter is dated 29th September, 1980. It appears that on the occasion of the marriage of appellant's younger sister the respondent and other family members were also invited. The latter after acknowledging this invitation mentions that the respondent had come on ten days leave and had gone back. He was informed about the marriage and an effort was made by his brother to pursuade him to attend the same and after forgetting the past to rehabilitate the home. The respondent is said to have declined as he had tried once but had failed. The only option, according to him, was that the appellant (wife) may settle the matter amicably and rehabilitate herself on a give and take basis. From the contents of the second letter it appears that it must have been written about three years later but it bear no date. This letter also runs almost on the same lines and in the same repaint. Again it suggests that dispute be resolved by compromise with the help of mutual well wishers. 8. The respondent admitted that these letters were in his brother's hand but neither disputed the contents nor he offered any explanation for them. He did not even deny anything attributed to him in these letters. It will therefore, not be unreasonable to assume that whatever facts are stated therein were true and the respondent had nothing to say as to their correctness. He did not even deny anything attributed to him in these letters. It will therefore, not be unreasonable to assume that whatever facts are stated therein were true and the respondent had nothing to say as to their correctness. The letters clearly indicate the efforts being made from appellant's side to resolve the impasse but for respondent's right and stubborn attitude who never liked the idea of reconciliation even if the wife wanted to resume marital relations, surprisingly the learned trial court failed to take into consideration both these letters although these were quite relevant to the controversy. It was pointed out that respondent had even gone to Jabalpur to bring his wife but she had refused to come with him. In this connection it will be pertinent to notice that according to his testimony he was not even permitted to enter the house at Jabalpur. This fact is, however, contrary to his own pleadings and cannot be believed for that reason. Strangely, we do not find any exchange of notice or letter between the parties which could throw some light on their respective cases. Thus the evidence on the records falls much too short of establishing that there was any desire on the part of the appellant to put an end to marital relations or to leave marital home permanently and to abandon the same. It is for the petitioner to establish such an intention on the part of the wife before his petition can be sustained on the ground of desertion. A mere allegation of desertion by the wife without proof of animus deserendi is fruitless. What we have is a bare statement by the husband which only establishes that the appellant left his house without consent and was still living away. These facts standing along do not establish the essential ingredients of desertion although these may prove their separation. The documentary evidence as been above only indicates that it is the husband who had closed his doors for reconciliation or to re-establish the matrimonial relationship. In these circumstances the finding of desertion on the part of the appellant cannot be sustained. 9. The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside and the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, filed by the respondent is dismissed. In these circumstances the finding of desertion on the part of the appellant cannot be sustained. 9. The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside and the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, filed by the respondent is dismissed. We, however, do not propose to make any order as to costs which shall be easy throughout.