JUDGMENT B.L.Yadav, J. 1. Whether the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in proceedings under section 16 (1) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (for short the Act), ignoring the material evidence on record, can be maintained, is the short question for determination in this petition filed by the tenant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner along with his brother Bhimraj was tenant of Shop No. 41 in dispute and respondent no. 3 Smt. Chandra Kala was the landlady. She made an application under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to release the shop as the petitioner has sub-let it to Sri P. K. Rastogi (not a party to this petition). A report was obtained from the Rent Control Inspector, which indicated that the back portion of the shop was delapidated. In that there were sign boards one being "Sewa Sadan Clinic" and the other as "Mahavir Mishthan Dhartawala" Prop. Arjun Lal Yogesh Kumar Gupta. The petitioner filed objection to the report of the Rent Control Inspector. His case was that he has not sub-let the tenancy to Sri Rastogi and no part of the shop was dilapidated, nor Rastogi Sweetmeat shop was run there, rather Sri Rastogi was an employee. Lateron he opened the shop at a different place, which was closed in 1985, but some Card Board named "Rastogi Sweetmeat Shop" appears to have been fabricated by the landlady. The petitioner filed a number of documents including purchase of items indicating that the payment was made to Sri Rastogi as servant for April, 1985 (vide Annexure 7 to the petition), a number of affidavits including that of Madan Lal (Annexure 8), Brijmohan (Annexure 9) and Bharat (Annexure 10) and affidavits of Chiranji Lal, Devendra Gopal Rastogi and Govind Singh were filed. Pradeep Kumar Rastogi himself filed an affidavit (vide Annexure 12-B) similarly other documents were also filed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 19-10-85 (Annexure 14), declared that the petitioner as tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under section 12 (2) of the Act. The petitioner's revision was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Dehradun by his order dated 19-11-87 (Annexure 15 to the petition). 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 19-10-85 (Annexure 14), declared that the petitioner as tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under section 12 (2) of the Act. The petitioner's revision was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Dehradun by his order dated 19-11-87 (Annexure 15 to the petition). 3. Sri H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the application of respondent land lady was under Section 16 (1) (b) for the release of building, whereas the impugned order declaring the deemed vacancy was under section 12 of the Act for which no grounds were made out, and even the considerations in respect of release of vacant building did not weigh, nor even the comperative need of the landlady or the tenant was taken into account. The impugned orders, accordingly, cannot be sustained. It was next urged that important documentary, and oral evidence on record including receipts for purchase of items and payment to Pradeep Kumar Rastogi (Annexure-7) and the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar Rastogi, (Annexure 12-B) who was alleged to have occupied the shop after the petitioner or in whose favour sub-letting was alleged to have been, and other affidavits and important evidence have not been considered. The findings of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ignoring important documentary and oral evidence on record, cannot be sustained. Reliance was placed on Nanhe v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1975 AWC 1 (FB), Smt. Sonawati v. SRI Ram, 1967 AWR 844. 4. Sri Ranjit Saxena, appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that just the nomenclature of the section, either section 16 or Section 12 would not be material. The substance of the order that the shop would be deemed to have fallen vacant, was the crucial question that has been decided and it was not necessary to refer to each and every piece of document and evidence, and that no ground for interference has been made out. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the first point that falls for determination is as to whether the relief for deemed vacancy under section 12 (2) could have been granted, when in fact, the application and prayer was under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the first point that falls for determination is as to whether the relief for deemed vacancy under section 12 (2) could have been granted, when in fact, the application and prayer was under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion, it is better to state that the provisions of Sections 12 and 16 may harmoniously be considered so that both may operate in the field specified and indicated by the legisalture and not to create any repugnancy between its different provisions as it has been basic assumption underlying every exercise pertaining to construction that the legislature must be assumed not to have enacted to contradict itself. The court is also duty bound to prefer that interpretation which avoided repugnancy between two provisions of the Statute- See Associated Cement Company Ltd. v. CTO, AIR 1981 SC 1887 . In the matter of rent control legislation the object of interpretation is to strike a balance between the landlord and the tenant and keeping in view the object of enactment to remove the hardship of the tenants. 5. Section 16 opens with the clause "subject to provisions of this Act", inasmuch as, the provisions of SECTION 16 are subject to provisions of SECTION 12. SECTION 12 does not open with the expression contained under section 16, rather it provides that the landlord or the tenant of a building shall cease to occupy the building or a part thereof, if he has substantially removed his effects therefrom or has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or in case of a residential building, he has taken a residence elsewhere. SECTION 12 (2) of the Act, on the other hand, provides, that in the matter of non-residential building, as in the instant case, admits a person, who is not a member of his family, as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. The emphasis by the legislature is on the words 'admits as a partner or a new partner'. The emphasis by the legislature is on the words 'admits as a partner or a new partner'. The word 'admit' has not been statutorily defined, the dictionary meaning can be looked into, but that must be with great caution as words are used in different senses, according to its context and a dictionary gives all the meanings of a word and the court would have, therefore, to select the particular meaning which would be relevant to the context in which it has to interpret the word-See State of Orissa v. Titaghar Paper Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1296. 6. According to Samuel Johnson, English Poet, critic, essayist and dictionary maker, "the dictionaries are like watches, the worst is better than none, and the best cannot be expected to give quite true. Every honest lexicographer agrees, knowing that no matter how keenly he strived to make his book go true, he would inevitably loose the battle with what might be called linguistic in-determinancy. Since inedeterminancy will be prime fast of his professional life, he will often be tempted to deny and resent like grammarians of 17th and 18th century, the radical instability of language." In Kerr v. Kennedy, (1942) 1 KB 409 (per Acquith J. page 413), it was observed : "Dictionaries are for consultation in the absence of any judicial guidance or authority." 7. According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 'admit' means "acknowledgment by one party of the truth of some matter alleged by the opposite party." In the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, on page 11, 'admit' means to allow, to enter, to recognise as true, to make an acknowledgment." ACCORDING to Webster's Third International Dictionary, the word 'admit' means "to accept as true or valid" 8. The burden of proof was on the landlord to prove that the tenant has admitted P. K. Rastogi as a sub-tenant or partner. As stated, the word 'admit' connotes to permit, to acknowledge as lawful. In case this burden is discharged by the landlord by leading positive evidence thereafter the tenant would be required to lead evidence in rebuttal. But neither nature of the building i.e. other than residential, was taken into account, nor the evidence was led by the land-lady to prove that the tenant has admitted somebody else as a partner. In case this burden is discharged by the landlord by leading positive evidence thereafter the tenant would be required to lead evidence in rebuttal. But neither nature of the building i.e. other than residential, was taken into account, nor the evidence was led by the land-lady to prove that the tenant has admitted somebody else as a partner. Except Card Board, which was denied by Sri P. K. Rastogi himself in his affidavit, (Annexure 12-B), there was no other evidence worth the name. The word 'deemed' means that where a person is not in reality, but the Act requires him to be treated as if he were or as if he has attained that status. In other words, the statute enacts that something should be deemed to have been done, which in principle has not been done. It creates legal fiction and the court is entitled to ascertain for what purpose and between what persons the fiction has to be made applicable. In the present case, the first burden is on the land-lady to prove that the tenant has admitted somebody elso as a partner in the business in the case of non-residential building. If that initial burden is discharged only then the deeming provision or the statutory fiction would apply. The learned Additional District Judge, as well as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, even did not consider the entire evidence including evidence on record, rather much emphasis has been laid by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order on the fact that Sri Pradeep Kumar Rastogi was alleged to have been admitted by the petitioner as sub-tenant. But as was evident (vide Annexure 12-B to the petition) that he was not admitted as subtenant or as a partner in the case of non-residential building, has not been taken into account. Sri P. K. Rastogi stated in para 2 of the affidavit that even the Card Board showing Rastogi Sweet-Shop, pertains to his sepa ate shop and not to the shop in question, and that he did not see any body else to do business of sweetmeat in the shop in dispute, other than the petitioner (vide para 5 of the affidavit). Similarly the affidavits of Madan Lal, Brij Mohan, Bharat, Chiranji Lal, Govind Singh, etc (Annexures 8 to 12) were not considered by respondent nos. Similarly the affidavits of Madan Lal, Brij Mohan, Bharat, Chiranji Lal, Govind Singh, etc (Annexures 8 to 12) were not considered by respondent nos. 1 and 2 to ascertain as to whether the land-lady has discharged her burden as contemplated by Section 12, and whether it has been proved that the petitioner has admitted Sri Pradeep Kumar Rastogi as his sub-tenant or a partner, so that intendment of legislature about admitting a partner might be operative. Simply because some Cardboards indicating 'Rastogi-Sweet-Shop' were found on the spot, would not discharge the burden on the landlady to prove sub-letting or admitting a partner. The initial burden, in such matters to prove sub-letting or admitting as a partner, is on the landlord or the landlady. 9. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi, 1984 AWC 375 , it was held that even if some body else other than the tenant sits in the shop, that would not prove that the tenant has sub-let the accommodation in favour of the person sitting there. So long as the control over the premises is kept by the tenant and business in the permises is run by the tenant, the sub-letting or admitting another person as a partner cannot be proved or assumed or presumed. The Act does not require assumption of sub-tenancy or creation of a new partner merely from the fact of presence of an outsider. 10. Special precaution has to be taken by the court while interpreting provisions creating a legal fiction. The Court has to ascertain first as to for what purpose (i.e. to create sub-tenancy or to admit another person not a member of his or her family as a partner), the fiction is created. It is only after ascertaining these facts, as to whether the fiction of sub-tenancy or in case of non-residential building whether admission of non-family member as partner in the building has been proved by the landlord/land-lady, that the court shall assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corrolaries to the giving effect to the fiction. In other words, unless the land-lady proved the factum of creation of sub-tenancy or admission as a partner and this fact has been ascertained, the court cannot proceed to the consequences of legal fiction, i.e. that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building. In other words, unless the land-lady proved the factum of creation of sub-tenancy or admission as a partner and this fact has been ascertained, the court cannot proceed to the consequences of legal fiction, i.e. that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building. In the present case simply on the basis of Cardboards in the name of Rastogi Sweet Shop, sub-tenancy or creation of a new partner cannot be presumed. As the landlord or land-lady did not discharge her initial burden nor any positive evidence was led, the factum of sub-tenancy or creation of a new partner cannot be presumed. It has to be proved by leading positive evidence. In such matters where it is doubtful as to whether the tenant has lost his status as tenant or is being prevented to continue as tenant, the object of the Act has to be ascertained as given in the preamble. The preamble indicates that it is an Act to provide in the interest of general public for the regularisation of letting and rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas. The letting has to be regulated and procedure has to be followed. The procedure for sub-letting or admission of a non family member as a tenant has been provided under Section 12 (2). Where the Act requires the court to proceed in a particular manner or to exercise jurisdiction in a particular way, it has to be done in that way. 11. There are two Latin maxims-1st is "Averbis Legis Non Est Recedendum" (i.e. from the words of law there should be no departure), and the second is "Quod Contra Legam Fit Pro Infesto Habftur" (i.e. what is done contrary to law is deemed not to have been done at all). To put it differently, if in the exercise of power and jurisdiction the court has been instructed to act in a particular manner by following a particular procedure, the exercise of jurisdiction and power will have to be done in that way alone. (See 1988 (3) SCC 26 , page 31). 12. In Nanhey v. Dy. To put it differently, if in the exercise of power and jurisdiction the court has been instructed to act in a particular manner by following a particular procedure, the exercise of jurisdiction and power will have to be done in that way alone. (See 1988 (3) SCC 26 , page 31). 12. In Nanhey v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (supra), a Full Bench of this Court while considering the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, held that where a Tribunal or Court in exercise of jurisdiction erroneously ignores the vital plea or material evidence which affects the result, in such matters the error of law apparent on the face of record is proved. The failure of justice can be said to be established. IN the present case also a number of documents including purchase of items indicating payment to Sri Rastogi (Annexure 7) and affidavits including Annexures 8, 9, 10 and 12-B etc. and other evidence have been erroneously ignored by respondent nos. 1 and 2. In Smt. Sonawati's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled while considering the scope of Sections 100 and 101, CPC where the appellate court had arrived at its conclusion ignoring material evidence on record, in that event the findings arrived at is not binding. Even though the scope of section 100 CPC was not similar to the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution but nevertheless the duty of the tribunal or appellate court and the trial court was pointed out with respect to appreciation of evidence on record. In that connection the case of Smt. Sonawati, 1967 AWR 844 (supra), appears to be relevant. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 committed error apparent on the face of record in ignoring the important and vital evidence including documents and affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner. Consequently, the findings of respondents nos. 1 and 2 cannot be sustained. 13. Applying the posteriori and priori reasonings, the impugned orders dated 19-11-1987 and 19-10-1985 passed by respondents no. 1 and 2 cannot be sustained. 14. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders dated 19-11-1987 and 19-10-1985 are hereby quashed. Respondent no. 2 Rent Control and Eviction Officer is, however, directed to proceed with the case and decide it afresh in the light of observations made above.