JUDGMENT A. N. Dikshita, J. - The facts precisely are that the respondent No. 2 was appointed as Clerk/Cashier at Kanpur Branch of the Bank purely on a casual basis in view of the exigencies of the work and additional requirement of the Bank for a period of 75 days. 2. It is significant that no formal letter of appointment was issued by the Bank in favour of respondent No. 2 nor any letter terminating his services. 3. In public sector organisation or companies recruitment's are made through the recruitment board but in view of the pressure of the work, the Union of the Bank vide its letter dated 19th May, 1980 insisted for some additional hands to cope with the work. The Branch of the Bank at Kanpur had also been pressing the Head Office for additional staff but as it was not possible to make regular appointments through the recruitment board, the Branch of the Bank was directed to make temporary arrangements till the appointments are made through the regional recruitment board. The respondent No. 2 was thus appointed for a period of 75 days on temporary basis. 4. It may be relevant to mention here that no appointments can be made as per policy after constitution of the Regional recruitment board but in view of the hazardous procedure and considering the exigencies of the work casual/temporary appointments with the object of carrying out of the work of the Branch has been made so that the interest of the Bank are safe- guarded. 5. As regular appointments through the Regional recruitment board were not forthcoming and in view of the pressure of the work the respondent No. 2 was temporarily appointed on 14th November, 1980 and with the expiry of 75 days, his services came to an end on 27th January, 1981. 6. Some time in the month of January 1981 the Kanpur Branch of the Bank was informed by said office that four persons had been allotted to the Kanpur Branch in the clerical cadre and thus the need for the temporary hands ceased to exist. The petitioner has submitted that no temporary appointments even on casual basis were made in the said Branch of the Bank during the year 1981. 7. The petitioner has submitted that no temporary appointments even on casual basis were made in the said Branch of the Bank during the year 1981. 7. Aggrieved by the said cessation of the temporary services of respondent No. 2 an Industrial dispute was raised and was referred by the Central Government to respondent No. 1 in the following terms vide its order dated 9th December, 1981: "Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Indore in relation to its R.K. Nagar Branch, Kanpur in not providing employment to Shri. Shiv Narain Dixit, Clerk/Cashier after 27.1.1981, (afternoor) and terminating his services is fair, just and legal? If not to what relief is the workman concerned entitled? 8. It has been shown in the petition that the case of the respondent No. 2 as contended before the respondent No. 1 was that he had been appointed against regular vacancy, that his appointment was not that of a temporary employee; that no letter of appointment or termination was issued to him; that the Bank had violated the provisions of Sections 25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial Dispute Act and had further acted in contravention para 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite Settlement and para 495 and 522 of the Shastri Award. 9. The Petitioner Bank filed its written statement and contested the proceedings on the grounds that the appointment of the respondent No. 2 was purely temporary for a period of 75 days; that his appointment was that of a temporary employee within the meaning of para 20.7 of the Bipartite settlement dated 19th October, 1966; that the respondent No. 2 could not have been appointed on permanent basis except through Regional Recruitment Board; that provisions of Section 25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial Dispute Act were not applicable nor had the Bank acted in contravention of the term of Shastri and Desai Awards. In support of their respective pleadings the parties filed their affidavits. 10. On a consideration of the respective contentions is of the parties, the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned award holding that the action of the Management of State Bank of Indore in relation to its R.K. Nagar Branch, Kanpur in not providing employment to Shri. Shiv Narain Dixit, Clerk/Cashier after 27.1.1981 (afternoon) and terminating his services is not fair, just and legal. It was further held that the workman is entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages. Hence this petition. The petitioner has alleged that the award so given by the respondent No. 1 is patently perverse and suffers from manifest errors of law which are apparent on the face of the record. It has been alleged that the respondent No. 1 was more swayed by the appointment of another temporary clerk (M.K. Tewari) in the said Branch of the Bank. It has been alleged that the respondent No. 1 while giving the impugned award has acted under a mistaken impression of fact that some temporary hands were appointed even after January 1981. It has further been submitted that the appointment of Shri M.K. Tewari who was appointed for a period of 45 days with effect from 29th December, 1980 continued to work to only up to 11th February 1981 where after his appointments came to an end but this fact seems to have erroneously impressed the respondent No. 1. The petitioner has further alleged that section 25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Rules 76,77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 are 1990 applicable only if the cases of workman who has been in continuous service for not less than 1 year. Similarly, it has been also alleged by the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 failed to notice the provisions of para 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite settlement where under a temporary workman's appointment cannot exceed a period of three months where after the vacancy has to be filled upon on a permanent basis. It has further been alleged by the petitioner that after four permanent hands were provided to the Branch of the Bank there was absolutely no necessity of a temporary employee being retained in service. 11. Thus the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the impugned award dated 5th July, 1985 which was published in the gazette on 31st August, 1985 and was received by the petitioner on 25th November, 1985. A counter affidavit denying the allegations of the petitioner has been filed. It has already been shown above the contention of the respondent No. 2. A counter affidavit denying the allegations of the petitioner has been filed. It has already been shown above the contention of the respondent No. 2. A rejoinder affidavit reiterating the allegations as contained in the affidavit and repudiating the allegations as contained in the counter affidavit has been filed. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the award so given by the respondent No.1 is patently perverse. To buttress his submission the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal was more swayed with the appointment of Shri M.K. Tewari ignoring the fact that Shri M.K. Tewari was appointed only for 45 day. w.e.f. 29th December, 1980 and his employment came to an end on 11th February, 1981. It has been very strenuously urged that no appointment in the year 1981 was ever made by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the applicant has further submitted that this is not a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sections 25(G) and 25(H) are reproduced below : "25-G. Procedure for retrenchment - Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman." "25-H Re-employment of retrenched workmen:- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as maybe prescribed, give an opportunity (to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment, and such retrenched workmen) who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons." 13. The learned counsel after high-lighting the provisions as reproduced above has thus submitted that the respondent No. 2 was not a workman and as such the provisions of Section 25(G) and 25(H) of the said Act would not be applicable. I find merit in this submission. The learned counsel after high-lighting the provisions as reproduced above has thus submitted that the respondent No. 2 was not a workman and as such the provisions of Section 25(G) and 25(H) of the said Act would not be applicable. I find merit in this submission. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further of the Shastri Award which is as under : "495-As regards the period of probation Mr. Chari suggested two modifications of the directions given in the Sen Award - (1) the a period of probation should be only for 3 months which may be extended to 6 months in extreme cases, and (2) the probationers should be given the same salary as permanent employees. In respect of the first, he stated that certain banks such as the Central Bank of India Ltd., Bank of India Ltd., and Bank of Baroda Ltd., generally require probation for 3 months, but in the case of the Imperial Bank of India and the Punjab National Bank Ltd., they require Probation for 6 months. This demand was opposed by the banks on the ground that ordinarily a period of 3 months suggested by the workmen was not sufficient to enable the Bank management to decide whether or not the probationer should be confirmed. The Sen Award fixed the period of probation at 6 months, which in certain cases would extended by 3 months. We respectfully agree with the said direction and direct that ordinarily the period of probation should not exceed 6 months. However, in case of persons whose work is not found to be quite satisfactory during the said period but who are likely to improve and give satisfaction if a further opportunity is given to them, the period may be extended by three months provided due notice in writing is given to them and their consent in writing is obtained before the extension of their period of probation. In all other cases probationers after the expiry of the period of six months should be deemed to have been confirmed, unless their services are dispensed with on or before the expiry of the period of probation. In all other cases probationers after the expiry of the period of six months should be deemed to have been confirmed, unless their services are dispensed with on or before the expiry of the period of probation. We further direct that on a candidate's appointment as a temporary employee a probationer or a permanent member of the staff, the bank shall given him a written order specifying the kind of appointment and the pay aid allowances to which he would be entitled to that such a written order shall be given on the appointment of a part-time employee also." 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner while claiming indulgence in para 495 has very vehemently submitted that before appointment of a temporary employee a written order specifying the kind of appointment and pay and the allowances to which he would be entitled and that such a written order shall be given on the appointment of a part-time employee also is not fulfilled in the instant case. It is the admitted case of the parties that no written order was ever given to the respondent No. 2. 15. The respondent No. 2 has filed an,affidavit be re the respondent No. 1. This affidavit has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the rejoinder affidavit. Para-2 of this affidavit filed by the respondent No.. 2 is very material to the instant controversy and is recited herein-below. "2-That I was appointed as a temporary clerk n the Bank on 14.11.80 and no appointment letter was issued to me." 16. From the above, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed purely on a temporary basis to meet the exigencies of work as a casual employee for a fixed period of 75 days as has been shown above. Had the period existed 90 days, it would have been incumbent on the petitioner to have made a permanent appointment. Para 522 of the Shastri Award provides that the services of any employee other than the permanent employee or the probationer maybe terminated after 14 days notice. The petitioner as well as the respondent No. 2 both admit categorically that the respondent No. 2 was appointed purely on a temporary basis. The respondent No. 1 has superfluously held that the bank is guilty of violation the provisions of Statue, bipartite agreement and the Shastri award. The petitioner as well as the respondent No. 2 both admit categorically that the respondent No. 2 was appointed purely on a temporary basis. The respondent No. 1 has superfluously held that the bank is guilty of violation the provisions of Statue, bipartite agreement and the Shastri award. The respondent No. 1 has unnecessarily dwelt upon the primitive aspect of hire and fire. There is no illegality which has been shown on behalf of the respondent No. 2 to the action of the petitioner. 17. The respondent No. 1 has admitted that no appointment letter was issued and which is admitted to the parties. Annexure-1 to the affidavit which is admitted to the respondent No. 2 is the format of the letter which was never issued in the instant case. Annexure-2 to the affidavit provides for the appointment by the Regional Recruitment Board. Annexure-2 to the affidavit is the letter dated 19.5.80. Annexure-3 is the letter of the head office to the Branch Manager for providing suitable staff while Annexure-4 is the letter of the Branch Manager to the head office. 18. Apparently Annexure-3 is the letter dated 2.1.1981 from the head office to the Branch Manager whereby the latter was informed about the selection of four candidates by the Recruitment Board. Respondent No. 2 neither states in Annexure-9 written statement filed by him before the Tribunal that he was appointed temporarily nor was appointed for 75 days. There is absolutely no whisper in the written statement as to in what capacity the respondent No. 2 was appointed in the Branch of the Bank. The written statement thus is too vague. Moreover, Annexure-1 is the format of the appointment to be given to the employee. Para 4 of this Annexure-1 clearly indicates that the appointment is temporary. It has been stated in clear terms in para 5 of the written statement filed by the Bank that 14 days' salary in lieu of notice was given to respondent No. 2. The learned counsel after reciting the above Annexure-1 has thus submitted that in the absence of any appointment order there can not be any termination nor it can be alleged that termination is bad. The learned counsel after reciting the above Annexure-1 has thus submitted that in the absence of any appointment order there can not be any termination nor it can be alleged that termination is bad. 495 of the Shastri Award clearly indicates the terms in which the appointment is to be made that is by a written order and when appointment has not been made according to law a right can not be claimed. I am impressed by this submission. To fortify his submission further the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the award is based on a solitary ground that Shri M.K. Tewari who was appointed later is continuing his service. I am clear that the respondent No. 1 was swayed only by this solitary fact but it has been ignored by the respondent No. 1 that Shri M.K. Tewari was appointed only for a period of 45 days w.e.f. 29th December, 1980 and that his services automatically came to an end on 11th February, 1981. 19. It is also not disputed that no appointment was made by the Branch of the Bank w.e.f. 1st January, 1989 during the whole of the year. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that if there is any violation of law no legal right would accrue to a person. I am in agreement with such submission that where a person has no right to a post or to a particular status but if the authority acts beyond its competence gives that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status. In the case of State of Punjab Versus Jagdish Singh AIR 1964 Supreme Court-521 it was held : "In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status." 20. It is clear from the facts emerging from the record of the case that the appointment on a permanent basis can be made by only Regional Recruitment Board and the Branch of the Bank. It is clear from the facts emerging from the record of the case that the appointment on a permanent basis can be made by only Regional Recruitment Board and the Branch of the Bank. The appointment of the respondent No. 2 can thus not be held to be illegal or lawful. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance in the case of Kashmir University versus Moh. Yasin, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 238 while dealing with the case of a Professor whose services were terminated it was held : "Thus the only body competent to appoint a professor, like the respondent, is the University council, and even the council shall make such appointments only on the recommendation of the Selection Committee treated by Section 36. There is no case that the Selection Committee ever considered or recommended the respondent for appointment and there is no suggestion that the University Council appointed the respondent as professor. It follows that the only statutory authority, empowered in this behalf has not appointed the respondent to the post claimed by him. There is an interim power vested in the Vice-Chancellor hedged in with limitations as is contained in the third proviso, to Section 22(f). He may make appointments of teachers as a temporary measure for period not exceeding six months to carry on the work and if the Selection Committee's recommendation is not received within that time he may extend the appointment for the duration of the academic session with the approval of the University Council. There has been no exercise of the narrow power of the Vice-Chancellor under this proviso and the conclusion is irresistible that the continuance of the respondent on the expiration of the statutory two months' period an not be legitimated by law. Of course, he remained to teach and was paid for his work. He did many other things which a legally appointed professor would do, with the full knowledge and even at the request of the Vice-Chancellor. May, be the Vice-Chancellor and others in the University were perhaps not keeping themselves abreast of the law. But the fatal fact remains that the Chancellor did not extend the services of the respondent as contemplated by Section 52(4), and this failure; finishes the plea of continuance in office of the professor. May, be the Vice-Chancellor and others in the University were perhaps not keeping themselves abreast of the law. But the fatal fact remains that the Chancellor did not extend the services of the respondent as contemplated by Section 52(4), and this failure; finishes the plea of continuance in office of the professor. We are not concern with the administrative fall-out from this finding although the salary of the teacher appears to have been sanctioned by the Vice-Chancellor a piece of conduct which may be understandable on equitable grounds. The circumstance that the respondent functioned in the University does not vest in h m the legal status of a validity appointed employee, with all the protection that the act and the relevant statutes give to such a person. In this view of the fat situation, without more, the respondent's work on the university campus can be brought to a close. No case of statutory termination of services is called for, the basis of statutory employment being absent. The adhoc arrangement by which he remained to teach did not acquire legal validity merely because the Vice -Chancellor went through the irregular exercises of extending his probation, etc. We have to hold that the curtain of fell on the office held by the respondent when, at the end of 60 days after the Act, the stands of time ran out. The ground urged successfully, as it were, before the High Court, of an implied engagement can not, in our view, be sustained. When a statute creates a body and vests it with authority and circumstances its powers by specifying limitations, the doctrine of implied engagement dehors the provisions and power under the Act would be subversive of the statutory scheme regarding appointments of officers and can not be counternanced by the court. Power in this case has been vested in the University Council only and the manner of its exercise has been carefully regulated. Therefore, the appointment of the respondent could be made only by the council and only in the mode prescribed by the statute. If a Vice- Chancellor by administrative drift allows such employment it cannot be validated on any theory of factum valet. We can not countenance to alleged continuance of the respondent in the University campus as tantamount to regular service under the University with the sanction of law. If a Vice- Chancellor by administrative drift allows such employment it cannot be validated on any theory of factum valet. We can not countenance to alleged continuance of the respondent in the University campus as tantamount to regular service under the University with the sanction of law. In short the respondent has no presentable can against the direction to quit". 22. The respondent No. 1 has relied upon catena of decisions only on the terms that Shri M.K. Tewari was retained till 11.2.1981. Such decisions are not applicable to the case of the respondent No. 2. It is manifest that respondent No.1 has not appreciated the controversy in its real intent. 23. In view of the above, the writ petition to be allowed and the impugned award is liable to be quashed, as the award is patently perverse and suffers from manifest error of law which is apparent on the face of the record. I have no intention to hold that the award is patently perverse and suffers from manifest error of law. Thus warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required in this case. 24. In the result, the writ petition is hereby allowed and the impugned award dated. 30.7.1985 passed by respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed.