ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - Petitioner Rameshwar Kumar has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 21.5.87 passed by II Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar. 2. The instant case is a sordid sage of acrimonious feud between the parties. The landlord intends to occupy the shop in dispute while the tenant inherently intends to protect the tenancy. More than two decades have elapsed but the passage of time has not proved a healing touch to either of them. 3. In the light of this past spectacle where parties are battling either to occupy the shop or to retain its possession, the facts have to be scanned in entirety. Remeshwar Kumar took on rent a shop No. 112 situate at Nawabganj Sharki, Sarafa Bazar, Muzaffaranagar on monthly rental of Rs. 55/- some time in the year 1959. The impugned shop was owned by Brahm Prakash, respondent No. 2. 4. Earlier a shop No. 90 was in the tenancy of one Bhure Nechaband. A suit was filed by respondent No. 2 against the said Bhure Nechaband. On the death of Bhure Nechaband, Gafoor Khan and others who were the heirs became the tenant. This shop was on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. Some time in the year 1958 respondent No. 2 filed Suit No. 526 of 1958 in the Court of Munsif city on the personal ground for establishing his son which was decreed - vide judgment and order dated 19.8.59. Consequent to the vacation of the shop by the old tenant the shop was bifurcated into two shops renumbered s Shop No. 111 and shop No. 112. One part of the shop renumbered No. 112 was let out to the petitioner initially on monthly rent of Rs. 55/- while the other part of the shop renumbered as shop No. 111 was let out to M/s. Bengal Crockery on a monthly rent of Rs. 65/-. With the passage of time on more than one occasion the rent was enhanced and instantly is payable at the rate of Rs. 100/- Per month besides water tax by the petitioner. 5. Later on after few years landlord respondent No. 2 filed suit No. 3 of 1970 for the eviction of the petitioner. It was alleged that the provisions of Act III of 1947 U.P. Temporary Rent Control and Eviction Act (Old Act) are not applicable. 100/- Per month besides water tax by the petitioner. 5. Later on after few years landlord respondent No. 2 filed suit No. 3 of 1970 for the eviction of the petitioner. It was alleged that the provisions of Act III of 1947 U.P. Temporary Rent Control and Eviction Act (Old Act) are not applicable. However, with coming in force of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 the suit was dismissed on 1.12.72 s the petitioner had deposited the entire arrears of rent and claimed the benefit under S. 39 of Act XIII of 1972. 6. Within a couple of years some time in the year 1976 another application under S. 21(10)(a) of Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed for its release on the ground that it is bona fide required by respondent No. 21 to cater the requirements of the family which is needed for establishing his sons. 7. Before proceeding to highlight the lis in between the parties, few facts cannot escape notice. 8. Some time in the year 1968 one Tufail Ahamad filed and application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Muzaffarnager alleging that the shop in question was got vacated under S. 3 of the Old Act on the ground of genuine requirement for starting a business for his sons. Instead of utilising the shop for the need of his son, the respondent No. 2 had converted the shop into two shops and had illegally let out to different tenants at an exorbitant rent of Rs. 75/- and Rs. 110/- per month without allotment. It was alleged that formerly the rent of the shop was only Rs. 15/- and with the bifurcation of the shop an letting them out on higher rent the landlord (respondent No. 2) had played the fraud on authorities in seeking the eviction of the applicant. Restoration of the shop was thus claimed by the Tufail Ahamad. 9. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after hearing the landlord (respondent No. 2) came to the conclusion that no doubt the shop has been bifurcated into two but in view of substantial reconstruction by making substantial changes in the year 1972 held that in view of the reconstruction in the year 1972 the two shops did not come within the purview of Act XIII of 1947 as amended. 10. 10. At this stage in these proceedings it is not possible to examine the propriety or the validity of this order. 11. It also transpires from the record that respondent No. 2 had also filed Suit No. 45 of 1970, Brahm Prakashv. Bengal Crockeries but the same also seems to have been dismissed - vide Judgment and order dated 25.1.73. 12. Adverting to the application filed on 20.5.76 by respondent No. 2 under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act it is revealing from the perusal thereof that it was filed on the ground that the shop in the tenancy of the petitioner (shop is question) is bona fide and genuinely required by respondent No. 2 inter-alia on the ground (1) that the respondent No. 2 has seven sons namely, (1) Jagroshan Lal a/a 32 years assisting respondent No. 2 in the business. Jagroshan Lal has his wife, two sons and 2 daughter of marriageable age. (2) Jag Mohan aged about 30 years has his wife, two sons and 2 daughters and is employed as a clerk in civil court on a petty salary income whereof is insufficient to make both ends meet. (3) Sushil Kumar aged 27 years is married and has a wife and a daughter of about 4 years old but unemployed. (4) Vijai Kumar aged about 24 years who is unmarried and is working as a patrol-man on temporary basis in the Telephone Department on daily basis at Rs.5/- Per day excluding holiday. (5) Pritam Singh aged about 22 years is unmarried and is learning the work of photography and there is no premises for the work of photography. It is intended to settle him as a photographer. (6) Devendra Kumar aged about 9 years is unmarried and is unemployed for want of premises (instead of unemployed the appropriate usage would have been unoccupied). (7) Swaraj Kumar aged about 17 years is a student of High School. (8) Wife of respondent No. 2, and (9) besides the above family members respondent No. 3 has three daughters but they have been married. 13. It is admitted by respondent No. 2 that the still continues to be the owner of the shop No. 3 which is occupation of a tenant. It has been alleged that the respondent No. 2 tried to settle his employed sons but to no avail. 13. It is admitted by respondent No. 2 that the still continues to be the owner of the shop No. 3 which is occupation of a tenant. It has been alleged that the respondent No. 2 tried to settle his employed sons but to no avail. It is stated in the application that the respondent No. 2 placed his difficulties before the petitioner who assured that in view of purchase of a shop by him in Katra Khayadin and on the vacation of the said shop the shop in question would be vacated by him. However, the petitioner has not evicted the shop as yet which compelled the respondent No. 2 to file an application. It was stated in the application of the respondent No. 2 that the shop in question is required for his sons business. The need as such was bona fide and genuine. Two of the sons could be accommodated in the shop which is suitable for Sarafa and photography business and the sons are competent to work in both these shops. It is further alleged that Katara Khayadin is the best place suited for business of general merchandise where the petitioner can shift his business. 14. On such ground the eviction of the petitioner from the shop in question was claimed. 15. Written statement against the application was filed by the petitioner against the application filed by respondent No. 2 for the release of the shop in question. 16. It was alleged by the petitioner that the need so spoused by respondent No. 2 is neither genuine nor bona fide and is only a device to seek the eviction of the respondent No. 2 from the shop in dispute. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 2 is transacting Sarrafa business from a very spacious shop besides that the respondent No. 2 has many other shops and perhaps in the town where the sons of respondent No. 2 Brahm Prakash can establish themselves in any business if they so desire. It was further alleged that his sons Pritam Singh and Jag Roshan have separated themselves from the family and are transacting separate business elsewhere. It was further alleged that his sons Pritam Singh and Jag Roshan have separated themselves from the family and are transacting separate business elsewhere. AS regards Jag Mohan (another son of the respondent No. 2) it was alleged that he is doing service in the civil court whereas Sushil Kumar the 4th son was doing liquor business and Vijai Kumar another son was employed in the Telephone Department. However, it was alleged that Devendar Kumar and Swaraj Kumar were students at the relevant time. 17. It was very significantly alleged by the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 Brahm Prakash has not specified in his application as to for which of the two sons the shop in dispute is required. Further it was alleged that respondent No. 2 had got the shop (unbifurcated) vacated in the year 1959 for his personal use but after partition one part of the shop had been let out of the petitioner and the other part to M/s. Bengal Crockery. The petitioner is support of his defence filed an affidavit on 7.7.1977. 18. The petitioner to supplement his case filed the plaint of Original Suit No. 3 of 1970 and the judgment and orders of dismissal of the said suit besides filing the application of Pritam Singh son of respondent No. 2 for allotting the shop No. 13 Tahsil Baghpat, Station Road the order of allotment in his favour. 19. After considering the entire evidence on the record and the respective contentions of the parties, the Prescribed Authority rejected the application filed by respondent No. 2 under S. 21 of the Act. It was held that the need of the respondent No. 2 was not bona fide. As the respondent No. 2 has sufficient accommodation at his disposal in the town an in case the respondent No. 2 wants to establish his sons, he could made use of the accommodation which he got vacated earlier instead of letting out to tenants at higher rents. The Prescribed Authority also found that Sushil Kumar and Pritam Singh for whom the respondent No. 2 required the shop in dispute were already occupied as Sushil Kumar accepted in the affidavit that he had started Sarafa business in Khalapur Mohalla. The Prescribed Authority also found that Sushil Kumar and Pritam Singh for whom the respondent No. 2 required the shop in dispute were already occupied as Sushil Kumar accepted in the affidavit that he had started Sarafa business in Khalapur Mohalla. Another cardinal feature which swayed the Prescribed Authority was that the respondent No. 2 had agreed to sell away the shop in dispute to Smt. Vimla Devi and an agreement to that effect has already been entered into by the respondent No. 2 and Smt. Vimla Devi, Smt. Vimla Devi in view of the respondent No. 2 wriggling out of the agreement filed a suit for specific performance. It was thus found that the need of the applicant for the shop in dispute was not bona fide and the application filed by the Respondent No. 2 for the release of the shop in his favour was rejected by the Prescribed Authority - Vide order dated 17.5.79. 20. Aggrieved against the order of the Prescribed Authority rejecting the application the respondent No. 2 filed an appeal which was allowed by II Addl. District Judge by order dated 24.5.80. 21. It had been alleged by the petitioner (while filing W.P. No. 7562 of 1980) that the respondent No. 2 without considering the accommodation already available at the disposal of the respondent No. 2 further when considering the fact that the respondent No. 2 was in the hope of getting the accommodation vacated for the cooked up need of his sons, had let out such accommodation after their vacation on higher rents to the tenants. It was further alleged by the petitioner that the appellate authority did not consider the fact that the shop in dispute and adjoining shop bearing No. 111 Nawabaganj was earlier one shop bearing No. 90 Nawab Ganj in the tenancy of Bhoore Nichaband. The petitioner has thus alleged that the respondent No. 2 earlier filed an application under S. 3 of Act III of 1947 against Bhoore Nichaband alleging that the shop is needed for settling his sons. The respondent No. 2 successfully got the eviction of Bhoore Nichaband. It may be mentioned here that Bhoore Nichaband was occupying the shop (unbifurcated) on a monthly rental of Rs. 15/-. However, this shop was bifurcated into two and was let out at the rate of Rs. 55/- and Rs. 65/- per month. 22. The respondent No. 2 successfully got the eviction of Bhoore Nichaband. It may be mentioned here that Bhoore Nichaband was occupying the shop (unbifurcated) on a monthly rental of Rs. 15/-. However, this shop was bifurcated into two and was let out at the rate of Rs. 55/- and Rs. 65/- per month. 22. It has been alleged by the petitioner that the heirs of Bhoore Nichaband filed an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer alleging that the permission so granted by revoked as the respondent No. 2 has not utilised for settling his two sons and instead he had let the same after bifurcation. However, this application has rejected on the ground that the shops were reconstructed and Act III of 1947 was not applicable. It was however, found that the shop was got vacated by the respondent NO. 2 with mala fide intention. It had been alleged by the petitioner that the learned Addl. District Judge committed an error in holding the fat that the issue regarding ship No. 90 (in the tenancy of Bhoore Nichaband) which was got vacated by respondent NO. 2 is irrelevant to the controversy. It was alleged that it has been proved to the hilt that the sons of respondent No. 2 are fully occupied. On several other grounds also the order passed by II Addl. District Judge dated 24.5.80 was assailed. 23. The petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 24.5.80 preferred a writ petition No. 7562 of 1980. This petition was allowed by Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. vide order dated 25.10.83 (reported in (1985) 1 All Rent Cas 447) with a direction to the appellate court to consider the question of cooperative hardship between the parties. However, the finding in regard to the bona fide need was not disturbed. 24. Pursuant to the remand the appellate court again vide judgment dated 27.7.84 allowed the appeal against which the petitioner filed another Writ Petition No. 5592 of 1984 which was allowed by Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. on 12.9.84 with a direction to the appellate Court to decide the question of comparative hardship after taking into consideration the entire evidence on record in accordance with law. It is worthy of mention here that while allowing the writ petition by order 12.9.84 a direction was given to the lower appellate court to decide the appeal within 3 months. It is worthy of mention here that while allowing the writ petition by order 12.9.84 a direction was given to the lower appellate court to decide the appeal within 3 months. However, it took about 3 years for the appellate court to decide the appeal by the judgment and order dated 21.5.87 allowing the appeal. Meanwhile the petitioner as well as respondent No. 2 filed S.L.P. before the Supreme Court but both were dismissed. 25. While disposing of the appeal as per the directions of this Court given on 12.9.84 the appellate Court-vide judgment dated 21.5.87 heard the parties on two grounds, firstly as to whether the question of bona fide need could be considered again since the lapse of about 11 years after filing of the application under S. 21 of the Act and secondly, on the ground of comparative hardship between the parties. 26. As regards the need of respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 1 did not consider this aspect in view of the decision of this Court which was thus not considered. However, as regards comparative hardship respondent No. 1 on perusal of the evidence found that the wife of the petitioner has a house where 3 shops are situate. Impliedly the respondent No. 3 shops are situate. Impliedly the respondent No. 3 took the view that the petitioner can occupy any of the three shops. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent No. 1 failed to consider that all the three shops were in the occupation of the tenants and were presently not available for occupation of the petitioner. Another solitary aspect appears to have impressed the petitioner has not taken any step to get any of the shop vacated. 27. The appeal so preferred by the respondent No. 2 was allowed by respondent No. 1 as shown above by judgment and order dated 21.5.87 giving 3 months time to the petitioner to vacate the shop in dispute. 28. The petitioner has also alleged in the petition that he has 8 children (7 sons and 1 daughter) and all his sons are major. The petitioner has only the instant accommodation in dispute wherefrom he is transacting his business and which is the only source of livelihood of the entire family of the petitioner. 28. The petitioner has also alleged in the petition that he has 8 children (7 sons and 1 daughter) and all his sons are major. The petitioner has only the instant accommodation in dispute wherefrom he is transacting his business and which is the only source of livelihood of the entire family of the petitioner. It has also been alleged that the shops in he building owned by the his wife are being occupied by old tenants at the rate of Rs. 25/- an to seek their eviction may not be an easy exercise. The petitioner had further alleged that his 4 sons are married and are unemployed and the business which he being transacted from the shop in dispute is the only bread-giver. The petitioner is trying to get some accommodation for his order sons. 29. It has further been alleged that the petitioner is a very old tenant of the shop in dispute while the adjoining shop No. 111. Nawabaganj had been let out to Bengal Crockery at a very much (later) date after the petitioner was admitted into tenancy. It has thus been alleged in the petition that the respondent No. 2 has chosen the petitioner as his target instead of Bengal Crockery with a mala fide intention. 30. When this petition was filed sri Panna Lal Agnyan had accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No. 2. The case was heard at some length on 10.6.87 an in view of the statement of the counsel for the parties that it may be finally disposed of by the Court after exchange of counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed. The allegations in the writ petition have been denied. It has been reiterated on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that the shop in dispute is required for the two sons. A rejoinder-affidavit had ben filed. 31. Heard learned counsel for the parties on more than one occasion that too in detail. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a period of 11 years (now about 13 years) have lapsed since the application for release was filed and there is no finding as to whether the need still exists or not and this fact was liable to be considered while appreciating the hardship which would be caused to the petitioner. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a period of 11 years (now about 13 years) have lapsed since the application for release was filed and there is no finding as to whether the need still exists or not and this fact was liable to be considered while appreciating the hardship which would be caused to the petitioner. In any case it has been submitted that this Court vide its order dated 12.9.84 had directed while remanding the case for being disposed of within 3 months instead the case was finally decided after a lapse of 3 years. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that need is not a static phenomena and while weighing the hardship to the parties it was incumbent on the appellate authority to have found out whether the need still exists or not for weighing the hardship to the petitioner. To butress his submission learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that subsequent facts should have been taken into consideration by the respondent No. 1. It has further been submitted that R. 18 framed under U.P. Act XIII of 1972 namely U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 provides a gap of 6 months for a subsequent application under S. 21 of the Act. To supplement his submission that subsequent facts after the remand and in view of the pendency of the case for more than 3 years before the respondent No. 1, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed catena of decisions in support thereof, namely Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 ; Ram Nath Export Private Ltd. Agra v. Addl. District Judge, Agra, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 397 : 1984 UPLT NOC 37 and Jamuna Prasad v. II Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, (1986) 2 All Rent Cas 206. This Court had found the need of the applicant to establish his two sons as bona fide but the need being not specific could not be compared with the hardship which may be caused to the petitioner. District Judge, Bareilly, (1986) 2 All Rent Cas 206. This Court had found the need of the applicant to establish his two sons as bona fide but the need being not specific could not be compared with the hardship which may be caused to the petitioner. The need of the sons of the respondent No. 2 cannot be examined in view of the decisions of this Court but while comparing the respective hardship it was incumbent on the respondent No. 1 to have weighed the hardship which may be caused to the petitioner vis-a-vis the existing need of the sons of the respondent No. 2. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the past act and conduct of the respondent No. 2 should have been considered. Pritam Singh, his son had purchased ship No. 13 Bhagat Singh Road, Muzaffaranagar for Rs. 9000/- and had sold it for Rs. 24,000/- on 13.1.81. It has thus been submitted placing reliance on Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, AIR 1987 SC 741 that the release application was liable to be rejected in view of the conduct of the respondent No. 2. This was a material circumstance which the court below failed to consider and should have considered while considering the hardship to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very strenuously urged that there is apparent error on the face of record and the respondent No. 1 illegally ignored the provision of Rule 16(2)(b) as farmed under Act XIII of 1972. It has been submitted that this rule is mandatory. It has been submitted that this rule is mandatory. It has been submitted that only such alternative accommodation which was readily available to the tenant for shifting his business without substantial loss can be taken into consideration. It has been submitted that the respondent No. 2 erred in taking into consideration that the three tenanted shops which are owned by the wife of the petitioner are available as alternative accommodation. As shown above the three tenants in the house owned by the wife of the petitioner are old tenants. They are not readily available where the petitioner could have shifted his existing business. Reliance has been placed in the case of (1979 UPRCC 572) and Ved Prakash v. II Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, (1984) 2 All Rent Cas 485 : 1985 All.L.J. 24. 34. They are not readily available where the petitioner could have shifted his existing business. Reliance has been placed in the case of (1979 UPRCC 572) and Ved Prakash v. II Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, (1984) 2 All Rent Cas 485 : 1985 All.L.J. 24. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that Rule 16(2)(c) which is also mandatory required that the respondent No. 1 should have considered the various businesses and employment of the landlord and his sons but has failed to do so. 35. Lastly it has been submitted that the growing need for the petitioner should have been considered and for such non-consideration the judgment and order of the respondent No. 1 is vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fortified his submission while placing reliance in the case of Praksah Chand v. First Addl. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1980 All Rent Cas 52. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed catena of decisions to repel the submission of the counsel for the petitioner. It has been submitted that in the case of Virendra Kishore v. District Judge, Etah Rule 16(2)(c) was considered. This case is of little help to the respondent No. 2 as in this case the landlady had no other shop while seeking the eviction of the tenant. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has placed reliance in the case of N.S. Datta v. VII Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 113 : 1984 All LJ 256. However, this case again is not the least applicable to the controversy of the present case. In this case again is not the lest applicable to the controversy of the present case. In this case the son of the landlord had obtained the technical education and had claimed the benefit of Rule 16(2)(d). Moreover in this case it was clearly spelt out that the tenant was not doing any business. Respondent No. 1 while allowing the appeal had based his conclusions on catena of decisions. 38. Rule 16(2)(b) and Rule 16(2)(c) are reproduced below :- "16. Application for release on the ground for personal requirement : (1) .......... Moreover in this case it was clearly spelt out that the tenant was not doing any business. Respondent No. 1 while allowing the appeal had based his conclusions on catena of decisions. 38. Rule 16(2)(b) and Rule 16(2)(c) are reproduced below :- "16. Application for release on the ground for personal requirement : (1) .......... (2) While considering an application for release under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following : (a) ............ (b) Where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application; (c) The greater the existing business of the landlord's own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises. the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case. the Prescribed Authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition whether the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but any serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the Prescribed Authority. Inconvenience is not synonym of hardship. Hardship may engrain inconvenience. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 1980 Reprint at page 593 has defined the meaning of word 'hardship' as a thing, or conditions, hard to bear : privation; an instance of hard treatment;. True hardship to a tenant vis-a-vis the need of the landlord cannot be weighed in golden scales but while considering the hardship it is incumbent on the courts to consider various aspects to determine that the hardship which would be caused to the petitioner is bigger than the hardship which may be caused to the respondent No. 2. Incidentally in the instant case the respondent No. 1 did not consider the aspect of hardship in correct perspective. The extent of the business of the petitioner was to be examined. The stock in trade lying in the shop ought to have been assessed. Incidentally in the instant case the respondent No. 1 did not consider the aspect of hardship in correct perspective. The extent of the business of the petitioner was to be examined. The stock in trade lying in the shop ought to have been assessed. Financial involvement in the shop in question was to be involvement in the shop in question was to be determined. Value of the goods lying in the shop besides the expenditure incurred in the fittings and fixtures etc. should have been locked into. How much goods were given on credit to the customers was also a material fact for consideration. 39. Hardship requires an objective consideration. A business may flourish at a particular place but may not yield desired result in shifted to some other place. The respondent No. 1 has not yield desired result if shifted to some other place. The respondent No. 1 has not viewed the case with this aspect while considering the hardship that may be caused to the petitioner. Moreover the environment for a business has to be evaluated. Location and the type of business are integral. The scope for the sale or merchandise require consideration. The facilities which may be available at one place may not be available at the other place. Financial involvement in the transhipment of the merchandise to the shop in question required consideration. All this has not been done though may not have been pleaded by the petitioner but they are integral part of hardship. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is utter lack of application of R. 16(2)(b) and R. 16(2)(c). The accommodation where he could shift the business as enjoined under S. 16(2)(b) is not available. The house is owned by his wife where 3 tenants are sitting for along time. The usage of the word 'available' clearly demonstrates that it is instantly available where the business can be shifted. Further such shifting can be done without any substantial loss. The respondent No. 1 has failed to appreciate the question as regards a suitable accommodation being available to the petitioner. Moreover the suitability of the accommodation is also imperative. 40. Rule 16(2)(c) enjoins that the existing business of the landlord has to be considered. Apparently respondent No. 2 has a big Sarrafa shop. The respondent No. 1 has failed to appreciate the question as regards a suitable accommodation being available to the petitioner. Moreover the suitability of the accommodation is also imperative. 40. Rule 16(2)(c) enjoins that the existing business of the landlord has to be considered. Apparently respondent No. 2 has a big Sarrafa shop. Learned Counsel for the applicant has thus submitted that the respondent No. 1 has not applied R. 16(2)(c) in its correct perspective. On a perusal of the judgment of the respondent No. 1 it is clearly manifest that there in no application of Rs. 16(2)(b) and R. 16(2)(c) which are mandatory in character. The judgment thus suffers from an apparent error on the fact of the record. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 lastly submitted that the petitioner has failed to make any effort to secure another accommodation. I do not find merit in this submission as it is a business accommodation and not a residential one. Scarcity of accommodation what to say of business accommodation has attained large proportions. It is not easy to get an accommodation. It is also a universal phenomenon that the prices of the land and building have escalated. Old tenants paying meagre rent are becoming eye-sore to the landlords and but for the legislature protecting the interest of the tenants it would have become difficult for such tenants to retain their tenancies. 42. The respondent No. 2 has not applied the provisions of R. 16(2)(b) and R. 16(2)(c) which are mandatory correctly thus vitiating the order by committing illegality. 43. In view of the above the petition deserves to be allowed. 44. Before parting with this petition the intriguing fact could not be reconciled as to why respondent No. 2 has chosen the petitioner who was a tenant earlier than Bengal Crockery Shop No. 111. With unabated fury respondent No. 2 is battling to evict the petitioner. 45. In the result the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The case is remanded back to respondent No. 1 with the direction to dispose of the case in the light of above observation and by rigidly applying to provisions of R. 16(2)(b) and R. 16(2)(c) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Costs on parties.