JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 23.11.1987 passed by VIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi, Respondent No. 1, in Rent Appeal No. 55 of 19876 and Cross Objection No. 65 of 1987. 2. The facts encompassing the controversy are that respondent No. 3 Narendra Bahadur Singh is the landlord and owner of premises No. D-10 Mohalla Sakshi Vinayak, Varanasi. An application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) was filed by respondent No. 3 for the release of the shop in occupation and possession of the petitioner in the premises in dispute on the ground that it was genuinely required by respondent No. 3 to establish the business of selling Rudrakash Mala, poojan samagri etc. and for further continuing his profession of urine therapy. 3. It was alleged that the shop in dispute was previously occupied by one Vishwanath Prasad, father of the petitioner, as a tenant. Vishwanath Prasad expired in September, 1979. Vishwanath Prasad had four sons, three of them having their shops in the vicinity and the petitioner was being settled in the shop in dispute as sole tenant after the death of Vishwanath Prasad. On the demise of Vishwanath Prasad in September, 1979, it is alleged by the petitioner that a new tenancy was created in favour of the petitioner with the consent of other heirs of Vishwanath Prasad on a monthly rent of Rs. 120 besides Rs. 15 per month as water-tax and Rs. 25 per month as conservancy charges. It is further alleged that respondent No. 3 claiming to be a urine therapist consumes his own urine and massages his body with it for medicinal purposes. Respondent No. 3 being qualified in urine therapy treats various patients at his house bearing premises No. CK-58/55 Chowk, Varanasi, but on account of this profession the relations of respondent No. 3 with his family members became strained and they insisted him to shift to some other place. Respondent No. 3 being qualified in urine therapy treats various patients at his house bearing premises No. CK-58/55 Chowk, Varanasi, but on account of this profession the relations of respondent No. 3 with his family members became strained and they insisted him to shift to some other place. Even the financial assistance provided by the sons of respondent No. 3 to him had been stopped due to which the finance of respondent No. 3 had depleted and he required the shop in dispute for pursuing his profession as none in the town is willing to provide accommodation to respondent No. 3 for the said purpose. He having no option compellingly took steps to get it vacated. The shop in dispute being owned by respondent No. 3 was found by him to be more suitable for establishing himself in the said profession and for starting the business of selling Rudrakash Mala, poojan samagri etc. and his profession of urine therapy. 4. Objections to the said application for release of the shop in dispute were filed by the petitioner on the ground that his father Vishwanath Prasad was a permanent lessee of the shop with a right of succession to his heirs from generation to generation by virtue of a registered lease deed dated 1.4.1966, executed by respondent No. 3 in favour of Vishwanath Prasad, father of the petitioner. On the death of Vishwanath Prasad his heirs including the petitioner inherited the tenancy rights as tenants in common though the rent was being paid by the petitioner. The allegation regarding strained relations of respondent No. 3 with his family members were repudiated and it was alleged that premises No. CK-58/54 and CK-58/55 situated in Mohalla Ash Bhairo had sufficient accommodation where respondent No. 3 can start his alleged business. It was also contended by the petitioner that the house owned by him in Mohalla August Kund is far away from the main road being situate in the narrow lane and as such was not suitable for the carrying on any business. It was also contended by the petitioner that the house owned by him in Mohalla August Kund is far away from the main road being situate in the narrow lane and as such was not suitable for the carrying on any business. The petitioner in his objections also narrated the past conduct of respondent No. 3 alleging that premises No. D-10/17 and D-10/17-A were originally owned by respondent No. 3 but to avoid taxes the promises was renumbered as D-10/17 and D-10/17-A and the latter was given by respondent No. 3 to his wife Smt. Lakshmi Devi though he is himself managing the same. Earlier certain proceedings for the release were initiated under the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947 but such proceedings culminated in a compromise between respondent No. 3 and the petitioner Vishwanath Prasad whereby some part of the tenanted portion was surrendered. It was also alleged by the petitioner in his objections that in a big hall-cum-shop of premises No. CK-58/55 the respondent No. 3 is carrying on the business of Saris in the name and style of Ambika Saree House and in the other shop business in the name and style of Deep Saris is being carried. It was admitted that CK-58/55 having two big halls and five rooms is in the possession of respondent No. 3, respondent No. 3 had also constructed two more big rooms in the said premises in April, 1984. The need of respondent No. 3 was thus described and it was alleged that there is sufficient accommodation in premises No. CK-58/55 where respondent No. 3 can carry on the proposed business and pursue the profession. Another house had been constructed by respondent No. 3 in Jawahar Nagar Colony though he got it recorded in the name of the wife of his son Balwant Singh. It was also alleged by the petitioner that Jai Singh, son of respondent No. 3, is carrying on business in the name and style of Jai Traders on the ground floor of premises No. D-13/17-A while the first floor of premises No. D-10/17 comprising of two big rooms, kitchen etc is occupied by the said Jai Singh for his residence. It was further alleged that premises No. D-10/17 and D-10/17-A are four storeyed buildings. It was further alleged that premises No. D-10/17 and D-10/17-A are four storeyed buildings. There is a big hall in the tenancy of one Hari Prasad Gupta while on the first floor there was a shop in the tenancy of Om Prakash Dhanuka, and another in the tenancy of Lok Nath Babuna and one big hall in the tenancy of Jagdish Prasad Madhesia. A big hall which was earlier in occupation of Jai Singh had been vacated by him and had been lying vacant. The shop in dispute was the only source of the livelihood of the petitioner and the need of respondent No. 3 was neither genuine nor pressing. 5. The petitioner and respondent No. 3 denied the allegations of each other and various affidavits were exchanged between the parties denying the contention of each other. In view of the fierce controversy and allegations and counter allegations a Commissioner was appointed to report against which objections and counter objections were filed. 6. After hearing the parties the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2, by his judgment and order dated 27.2.1987 rejected the release application filed by respondent No. 3 holding that the shop in dispute is not genuinely and bonafide required by respondent No. 3. It was further found by respondent No. 2 that greater hardship as compared to respondent No. 3 would be caused to the petitioner. It was further held by respondent No. 2 that the other heirs of Vishwanath Prasad were not impleaded in the case. However, it is significant that respondent No. 2 while rejecting the release application of respondent No. 3 rejected the objection of the petitioner that the application under Section 24(1)(a) was not maintainable against a permanent tenant in view of a perpetual lease. 7. Respondent No. 3 feeling aggrieved against the judgment and order dated 27.2.1987 passed by respondent No. 2 rejecting the release application preferred an appeal to the Court of the District Judge, Varanasi (Rent Appeal No. 55 of 1987 Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Moti Lal Pathara). The petitioner also feeling aggrieved by the finding that the application against permanent tenant is maintainable had filed a cross-objection before respondent No. 1, VIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi, to whom the appeal was transferred for disposal according to law. The petitioner also feeling aggrieved by the finding that the application against permanent tenant is maintainable had filed a cross-objection before respondent No. 1, VIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi, to whom the appeal was transferred for disposal according to law. Respondent No. 1 vide his judgment and order dated 23.11.1987 allowed the appeal preferred by respondent No. 3 and the judgment and order dated 27.2.1987 passed by respondent No. 2 was set aside. Respondent No. 1 also dismissed the objections preferred by the petitioner. Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 23.11.1987 passed by the respondent No. 1. 8. Heard Counsel for the parties. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri A.C. Tripathi has submitted that the instant application under Section 21 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 was maintainable and the Courts below erred in holding that it is maintainable. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri A.C. Tripathi has submitted that an agreement was arrived at between the respondent No. 3 and the father of the petitioner Sri Vishwanath Prasad and the rent was enhanced from Rs. 30 to Rs. 115 some time in the year 1960. Evidencing this agreement, the lease-deed dated 1.4.1966 was executed. This agreement provided that the respondent No. 3 earlier had obtained a permission under Section 3 of the Act 3 of 1947 against the petitioner and such a permission could not be set aside even at the level of the State Government as provided under Section 7(f) of the said Act. The respondent No. 3 had obtained such a permission for providing suitable accommodation to his son. On the basis of such a permission, a civil suit was also filed. However, the son of the respondent No. 3 succeeded in getting another accommodation for himself. The petitioner then requested the respondent No. 3 and on account of the intervention of some persons the respondent No. 3 allowed the petitioner to retain the shop in question but the rent was enhanced from Rs. 30 to Rs. 115 per month. In Clause (12) of this agreement, it is provided that respondent No. 3 would not seek eviction of the petitioner. Copy of this deed is annexed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. 30 to Rs. 115 per month. In Clause (12) of this agreement, it is provided that respondent No. 3 would not seek eviction of the petitioner. Copy of this deed is annexed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It is, thus, submitted that in view of the condition as contained in Clause 12 of this agreement, the petitioner cannot be evicted. Reliance has been placed in the case of Raj Narain v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge and others, 1979 ARC 485. The learned Counsel for the respondent Sri R.N. Bhalla has submitted that the law as laid down in Raj Narain v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge and others, does not help the petitioner and has placed reliance in the case of Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIIth Addl. District Judge, 1988 ALJ 799 : 1988(2) ARC 416, and as such the respondent No. 3 has a right to maintain the application under Section 21. I am in agreement with the submissions made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the respondent Sri R.N. Bhalla. 10. Moreover, the Prescribed Authority, as well as, the Appellate Court where such a plea was raised have repelled such a contention of the petitioner. I don't find that both the Courts below either erred in law or there was some error apparent on the face of record to repel such a submission. It is, thus, clear that Section 21 would be attracted even in the cases of permanent lease. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri A.C. Tripathi then submitted that after the death of Sri Vishwanath Prasad, his other heirs have not been impleaded in the application and only the petitioner has been impleaded. This contention of the petitioner was rightly repelled by the Appellate court where it was held a new tenancy was created in view of enhancement of the rent. The Appellate Court found that the application under Section 21 filed by the respondent No. 1 is in order and was found to be maintainable. In as much as the receipt for the first time was given to the petitioner on 11.4.1988 being the rent from October 1979 to March, 1988. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the petitioner himself moved the Nagar Mahapalika Authority for recording his name. In as much as the receipt for the first time was given to the petitioner on 11.4.1988 being the rent from October 1979 to March, 1988. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the petitioner himself moved the Nagar Mahapalika Authority for recording his name. The other brothers of the petitioner were aware about the pendency of the application under Section 21 of the Act. However, they did not object. It would, thus, be clear as has been held in Sultan v. Ist Additional District Judge Meerut, 1982(1) ARC 390 that there was an implied surrender by the other brothers in favour of the petitioner. Further the learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner is stopped from taking this plea and has placed rightly reliance in the cases of Anghaila Housing Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1975 ALJ 121 and Asst. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Co., AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1247. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A.C. Tripathi has submitted that the Appellate court has wrongly assumed the jurisdiction in holding that the need of the landlord is genuine. It is difficult to agree to such a submission. As regards the need of the respondent No. 3 the Appellate court had found it to be genuine. Neither there is any perversity nor I do find that the Appellate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which otherwise did not vest him. Catena of decisions were cited on behalf of the respondent No. 3 by the learned counsel Sri R.N. Bhalla that the conclusion arrived at regarding the need and the hardship do not require any interference as they are findings of fact. The need as already shown above was found to be genuine. The petitioner required the accommodation for his business and for practicing and propagating Urine Therapy. Now earlier the petitioner was practising Urine Therapy from his residential house but with the passage of time and on the induction of daughter-in-laws, it was found to be abhorrent to the ladies. Though a recognised old Ayurvedic system certainly may appear to be abhorrent of the ladies who have been brought up in modern fashion. The respondent No. 3 has a joint family. Though a recognised old Ayurvedic system certainly may appear to be abhorrent of the ladies who have been brought up in modern fashion. The respondent No. 3 has a joint family. It was found thus imperative that the family harmony is maintained and to prevent rift in the family, the father being of old traditions agreed to shift his clinical exercise from the residential accommodation. Moreover, Urine Therapy though not innovative to our Ayurvedic system is inviting people from the west who visit the town regularly. The Appellate Court, thus, found the need to be genuine. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that great hardship would be caused to the petitioner in case he is evicted from the shop in dispute. I don't find any reason to disagree with the above finding of the Appellate Court already recorded that no hardship would be caused to the petitioner as has been found in the case of Jagannath Prasad v. VIIth Additional District Judge, 1986(1) ARC 250. 13. Every case depends on the facts and circumstances as are revealing from the record. In the given cases, the Appellate Court found that the petitioner can shift his business to his own accommodation. Findings of fact recorded by the courts below are not to be interfered while exercising writ jurisdiction unless there is an apparent error on the face of law or there some jurisdictional error. I have gone through the judgment of the Appellate court and at no stage I find that such findings are either perverse or there is some non-application of mind or any jurisdictional error. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 Sri R.N. Bhalla has very straight forwardly suggested that he is willing to part half of the shop by raising a partition wall but the suggestion was not agreed to upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and was spurned. If such an offer which was very reasonably spurned, the court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot force the petitioner to accept the half part of the shop in dispute. It only shows that the petitioner is not coming forward with clean hands and clear conscience and is intending to activise the proceedings to a protracted litigation. The petition has no force and thus deserves to be rejected. 15. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.