JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by Ashok Pareek, praying or a writ of mandamus as against the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to allow the petitioner to appear in the interview for the post of Assistant Architect in the Public Works Department which was going to be held on August 3, 1989. 2. The assertions of the petitioner are that an advertisement was issued for the post of Asstt. Architect in the Public Works Department by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and the last date for receipt of the applications from candidate was May 19, 1989. The petitioner applied for this past and after completing all the formalities sent the application form to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer by registered post on May 12, 1989, through the Post Office situated at Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur. According to the petitioner, his registered letter containing the application form should have, in the normal course reached Ajmer within three days. However, the Rajasthan Public Service Commission returned the application form of the petitioner on June 7, 1989, with its letter Annexure/l wherein it was mentioned that the application form was received by the Commission on May 27, 1989 i.e. after 8 days of the last date fixed for the entertainment of applications. The petitioner sent a notice (Annx. 2) to Rajasthan Public Service Commission and to the Post Master General, Rajasthan, Jaipur. The Postal Department intimated to the petitioner by Annexure/3 dated June 24, 1989 that enquiries made into the case reveal that the registered letter sent by the petitioner under Postal Receipt No. 432 dated May 12, 1989 was delivered to the Secretary. Rajasthan Public Service Commission on May 27, 1989 under clear receipt. It was also mentioned that the article was received on the same day at Ajmer. 3. The petitioner has contended that so far he was concerned, he had sent the application form to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission well in advance i.e. seven days before the last date. The petitioner had also impleaded Post Master General, Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur and Union of India as parties to the writ petition. 3. The petitioner has contended that so far he was concerned, he had sent the application form to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission well in advance i.e. seven days before the last date. The petitioner had also impleaded Post Master General, Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur and Union of India as parties to the writ petition. The petitioner has said that respondent No. 2 is also a part of the State and therefore, it should be their responsibility in delivering the letter late and the Rajasthan Public Service Commission must have allowed the petitioner to be interviewed even if there had been delay in delivery of the application form by another wing of the State. 4. Reply has been filed by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and it is pleaded that it was the responsibility of the petitioner to submit his application form in time and any fault on the part of the Postal Department cannot be made a ground by the petitioner to compel the' Commission to accept the time barred application. 5. Although. appearance was made on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3, but no reply has been filed. 6. So far as the facts are concerned, they are quite clear that the petitioner had sent the application form to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission on May 12, 1989 for the post of Assistant Architect. It is also not in dispute that the last date for entertaining the application for the post was May 12, 1989. On account of delay on the part of the Postal Department, the registered letter was delivered to the Secretary, Rajasthan Public Service Commission as late as on May 27, 1989. It took a fortnight for a registered letter handed over to the Postal Department to travel from Jaipur to Ajmer. We can safely and strongly depricate the postal inefficiency. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 and 3 referred to Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 which provides that the Government shall not Incur any liability by reason of the loss, misdelivery or delay of, or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post except in so far as such liability may in express term be undertaken by the Central Government as thereafter provided, and no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any such loss delay etc. unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default. No doubt. Section 6 of the Act given immunity to the Government except where it had undertaken the liability by express terms and also protects the offices of the Post Office unless the loss or delay had been caused fraudulently or by wilful act or default. In this writ petition the petitioner has riot claimed any damages against respondent No. 2 and 3. However, instead of such a contention being advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 and 3, it was expected of the Union of India as well as from the Post Master General to tell to this Court that they had departmentally tried to fix the responsibility for this inordinate delay in delivery of postal article and if any negligence or wilful act or default was found, they had impugned penally for misconduct as provided for in Chapter X of the Act. The public would lose confidence in Postal Department if it so care freely states before the Court that it is immune. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain decisions to support his contention that when there was no delay on his part in sending the application by registered post sufficiently before the expiry of the last date, respondent No. 1 should he directed to declare result of his interview as by an interim order paused on August 1, 1989 he was allowed to appear provisionally. The first decision relied upon is in the case of Narayan Fakirsa Javre v. Union of India (1979(1) SLR 175) . This decision does not help the petitioner. In that case, the petitioner was already in Government service and therefore, according to Instruction No. 9 annexed to the application form, he was bound to apply and get his application foe m forwarded through proper channel. The petitioner in that case had got, on 22nd February, 1974, forwarded his application from the Deputy Controller of Sores to the Controller of Stores. However, the Controller of Stores did not forward the application till 23rd March, 1974 for onward transmission to the Railway Service Commission. In the present case, there were no such instructions of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to the petitioner that the application for candidature would be sent by registered post. However, the Controller of Stores did not forward the application till 23rd March, 1974 for onward transmission to the Railway Service Commission. In the present case, there were no such instructions of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to the petitioner that the application for candidature would be sent by registered post. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission had not specified postal channel as the channel through which application should he made. The next decision relied upon was in the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 214 ) which also hardly applies to this case. The question in that case was, whether an order of suspension of Government servant passed takes effect when it is made, or when it is actually served on and received by him. The facts in that case were that on July 16, 1958, the Himachal Pradesh Government had granted for the respondent 19 days' leave preparatory to retirement which was to take place on August 4, 1958. The Punjab Government in the year 1958 decided to take disciplinary action against the respondent and had informed of it to the Himachal Pradesh Government on July 17, 1958 after the leave had been granted. There was Rule 3 .36(d) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, which provided that a Government servant under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be permitted to retire on his reaching the date of compulsory retirement but should he retained in service until the enquiry into the charge was competed and a final order was passed thereon. The argument advanced was that as the respondent was not served with the said order of suspension on or before August 4, 1958 and as he had retired on that dale, he was no longer in service and the enquiry held against him and the order of dismissal was in violation of the said Rule and was illegal if, The order of suspension in that case was passed on July 31, 1958 and a telegram had been despatched by the respondents on that date informing him that he was placed under suspension with effect from August 2, 1958. By Memorandum dated July 31, 1958 the Punjab Government passed the order of suspension and further ordered not to permit the respondent to retire on August 4, 1958. That information had also been forwarded to the respondent. By Memorandum dated July 31, 1958 the Punjab Government passed the order of suspension and further ordered not to permit the respondent to retire on August 4, 1958. That information had also been forwarded to the respondent. The question, therefore, arose whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned Government servant and, in that context, interpretation of wort "communicate" was made. It was held that once an order was issued and sent to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. Their Lordships disagreed to the interpretation that communication of order should be treated only from the date of actual receipt by the person concerned because if that would have been the true meaning, it was possible for the Government Servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other. Having regard to the nature the action taken against the respondent, this was the interpretation of the rule on the question of communication. The present case is not concerning a disciplinary action against an employee. What was more important in the above ca.a was the decision of the Government to take disciplinary proceedings and putting its decision out of its control to be varied.In the present case, it was the sole responsibility of the petitioner to make the application form reach the Rajasthan Public Service Commission on or before the specified date and it was only when this was done that a duty was cast upon the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to accept the candidature of the petitioner. 8. The next decision relied upon is in the case of Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ) . This decision has also no bearing on a case like the present. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission had not allowed the petitioner to appear in the interview for the post, rather it had refused the candidature of the petitioner. In Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (supra) the candidate had been allowed to take the examination and latter the University withdrew the candidature. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission had not allowed the petitioner to appear in the interview for the post, rather it had refused the candidature of the petitioner. In Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (supra) the candidate had been allowed to take the examination and latter the University withdrew the candidature. The decision in Randhir Singh v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1977 SC 2209 ) has also no application for the simple reason that in that case the required intimation had not been given to the petitioner regarding the medical test, which information had to be given one week before the date fixed for the test. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Reliance on this section is totally misplaced because we are not construing any Act or Regulation which requires a document to be served by post. The provisions contained in General Clauses Act are meant for construction of statutes. 10. The law is very well settled that when a person is required to do a certain thing within a certain time and he utilised the services of another agency to do that thing for him, the agency employed by him is his agent. The Post Office was an agent of the petitioner. The Rajasthan Public Commission had nowhere specified that the application should be sent only by registered post and not otherwise. Unless that express direction had been given by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, the Rajasthan Public Service Commission cannot be said to have employed the Post Office as its agent for sending the application form. If the agent of the petitioner has wrongly delayed the delivery of the registered letter to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, the petitioner can only have his remedy, if any, against respondents No. 2 and 3. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission did not owe any duty to accept a time-barred application. 11. This writ petition has no merit in it and it is hereby dismissed. It may, however, be observed that respondents No. 2 and 3 should see as to how careless action on their part can affect the destiny of an individual and it should ensure that its functionaries ought to act efficiently and not negligently as they have done in the instant case. 12. It may, however, be observed that respondents No. 2 and 3 should see as to how careless action on their part can affect the destiny of an individual and it should ensure that its functionaries ought to act efficiently and not negligently as they have done in the instant case. 12. A coy of this judgment will be sent to the Post Master General, Rajasthan, Jaipur.Petition dismissed. *******