JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - The petitioner having been selected by the Public Service Commission, U. P., was appointed as Senior Marketing Inspector by the Regional Food Controller, Meerut Region, Meerut (respondent No. 3) by the order, dated 23-10-1967. Thereafter an order, dated 23-10-1971 for terminating his services was caused to be served upon on 25-10-1971 by the respondent No. 3. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in a civil suit before the Civil Judge, Roorkee, who dismissed the suit. The dispute was eventually carried to the Services Tribunal, which too declined the relief of reinstatement of the petitioner and hence the instant writ petition. 2. The short question for consideration is whether the termination order, dated 23-10-1971 (Annexure-'l' to the writ petition) was validly passed. Whereas the contention of the petitioner is that though the order (Annexure-1') purported to be innacuous as termination simpliciter on the face of it, but in reality, the order was passed as a result of misconduct and, therefore, the petitioner was virtually dismissed from the service without giving any opportunity as envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution. It is on this ground, the petitioner seeks quashing of the termination order (Annexure-1'). In his counter-affidavit, the Deputy Regional Marketing Officer denied having violated Article 311 of the Constitution. It is averred by him that the termination order (Annexure-T) does not cause any aspersion or stigma against the petitioner and his services were simply terminated by the order (Annexure- 1'), as the petitioner was a temporary employee. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, the averment made is that the Government did not think it proper to continue the petitioner in service any more, and, therefore, it terminated the services of the petitioner having offered one month's salary in lieu of notice. It is denied that the foundation of Annexure- 1' was misconduct on the part of the petitioner. In short, the plea of the Department is that the order (Annexure- 1') does not amount to dismissal of the petitioner from service, but that that is termination simpliciter. 3. To determine the question whether or not the termination order (Annexure 1') is passed on misconduct of the petitioner or whether that is a termination simpliciter. it is necessary to go into back-drop of the said order. 3. To determine the question whether or not the termination order (Annexure 1') is passed on misconduct of the petitioner or whether that is a termination simpliciter. it is necessary to go into back-drop of the said order. There is a well established law that the termination order should not be taken on the face value, but the veil of form of such order should be lifted by piercing into the facts preceding to the termination order. 4. By the letter Annexure 4', dated 9th December, 1970, the respondent No. 3 informed the petitioner that an enquiry revealed that the shortage of 20 bags of white wheat under lot No?. 12/100 and 21/100 purchased at Mawana Centre, was on account of the petitioner, who was called upon to appear on 22-12-1970 with all documents and papers relating to the aforesaid lots to enable the respondent No. 3 to fix up the responsibility and recover the cost of the short-fall and take any other suitable disciplinary action as deemed proper. By the letter Annexure 5', dated 12-1-1971, the respondent No. 3 required the petitioner to appear on 17-1-1971 in connection with the enquiry, as he failed to appear on 22-12-1970. By the letter, dated 14-1-1971 Annexure 5', the respondent No. 3 informed that the date fixed for enquiry was 20-1-1971 and not 1M-1971 occurring in Annexure 5' due to typing error. Before the enquiry was concluded, the petitioner was discharged from service by the order, dated 23-10-1971 (Annexure "1"), which was served upon him on 25-10-1971. The enquiry terminated on 17-11-1972 when the final order, Annexure "8" to the writ petition was passed by the respondent No. 3. By the said order, the responsibility far shortage of 20 bags wheat was fixed upon the petitioner. The order states that the petitioner had acknowledged the receipt of 100 bags of wheat, but later gave the information that only 80 bags of wheat had been received by him The shortage of 20 bags was attributed to the petitioner and, therefore, recovery of 1054.35 representing the price of 20 bags or wheat was ordered and the petitioner was directed to pay the same from his pass book, which was deposited with the Postal Department by way of petitioner's security. 5. 5. The question, therefore, is whether in this back-drop of the case, the termination order (Annexure "i") can be characterised as termination simpliciter or a punitive order amounting to petitioner's dismissal from service without complying with the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. There is a catena of rulings in this regard lying down guiding principles as to when an order terminating the services can be called an order for termination simpliciter or an order resting on misconduct of the incumbent, but the real problem appears to be one of application of these principles in a given case in determining whether the particular action taken amounts to a punishment attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution or a mere discharge simpliciter nor requiting the holding of an enquiry envisaged by Article 311. No doubt services of a temporary Government Servant can be terminated at any time by giving one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice, if his services are no longer required by the Department, but the problem arises only in those cases where an order of termination simpliciter is used as a cloak for dismissal of the incumbent. 6. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 928, the Supreme Court said : "In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. 6. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 928, the Supreme Court said : "In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But, even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with." On page 2205 in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 decided by a Bench of 7 Judges Hon'ble Ray, C.J., observed : "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminate it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution." 7. For appreciating as to how the above principle, enunciated by the Supreme Court, was applied in the case of Shamsher Singh case (supra), it is necessary to State the facts of that case in nutshell. In that case, the Judicial Officers of the Punjab Judicial Services were involved. One of the them was Ishwar Chand Agrawal, who at the material time was serving as a probationer in the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial). By an order, dated 15-12-1969 his services were terminated. In that case, the Judicial Officers of the Punjab Judicial Services were involved. One of the them was Ishwar Chand Agrawal, who at the material time was serving as a probationer in the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial). By an order, dated 15-12-1969 his services were terminated. Giving the factual position Hon'ble C.J., found that an Enquiry Officer nominated by the Director of Vigilance had recorded statement of some witnesses behind the back of the Officer concerned in respect of certain allegations of misconduct and had on that basis made a report to the High Court, which after accepting the said report made a recommendation to the Governor to the effect that the Officer was not a suitable person to be retained in service. The order of termination was because of the recommendations in the report. Applying the above reproduced principles to these facts, Hon'ble C.J., observed at page 2208 of AIR 1974 SC : "The order of termination of the services of Ishwar Chand Agrawal is clearly by way of punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court not only denied Ishwar Chand Agarwal the protection under Article 311 but also denied itself the dignified control over the subordinate judiciary. The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order as by way of punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving sigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311. In such a case the simplicity of the form of the order will not give any sanctity. That is exactly what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal. The order of termination is illegal and must be set aside." Hon'ble Krishna Iyar, J., who agreed with Hon'ble C.J., commented upon the complexity of the question as to which order amounts to termination simipliciter or dismissal in the garb of innocuous order thus at page 2232 of AIR 1974 SC : "In some cases the rule of guidance has been stated to be "the substances of the matter', and the 'foundation' of the order. When does 'motive' trespass into 'foundation' ? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance' ? When the court says so. When does 'motive' trespass into 'foundation' ? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance' ? When the court says so. These 'Freudian' frontiers obviously fall in the work a day world .." 8. Brief facts of the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and another, 1984 Lab IC 348 SC are : Anoop Jaiswal having been selected by the Union Public Service Commission in the Indian Police Service was undergoing training as a probationer at the Police Academy, Hyderabad. He failed to attend the ceremonial drill. The delay was enquired into and the appellant was considered to be one of the ring leaders, who was responsible for the delay. The appellant furnished explanation, but the same was not found worth accepting. Thereupon, the director without holding an enquiry into the alleged misconduct recommended to the Government of India that the appellant should be discharged from the service. On the basis of such report, the Government of India passed the order of discharge against the appellant, which was innocuously worded. For searching out an acid test for determining the question as to whether a given order amounts to termination simpliciter or an order by way of punishment, the Supreme Court in this case extensively relying on the case : Parshotam Lal Dhingra case (supra) and Shamsher Singh case (supra), observed in paragraph 13 on p. 349 : "Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read alone with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution." 9. What follows from the above reproduced material is that for deciding the question as to whether an order is termination simpliciter or punitive in nature, the court must find out the sparking point of the termination order. If the cause, substance or foundation of the order is misconduct, then the innocuously worded order terminating the services will be one that has been passed by way of misconduct requiring the compliance of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. But if the basis or foundation of such order is not misconduct, then it will amount to termination simpliciter. 10. Applying this test to the case in hand, the irresistable conclusion that can be reached at is that the petitioner was summarily dismissed from the post of Senior Marketing Inspector in the garb of the order of termination simpiciter. The question is whether the respondent No. 3 would have passed the termination order (Annexure "1"), if there were no shortage of 20 bags of wheat. The shortage in the wheat has a direct nexus with the termination order and without that the respondent No. 3 would not have taken such a drastic step. So the shortage in wheat was the sparking point of the situation culminating in the discharge order (Annexure "1"). The order Annexure "1" having been based on the foundation of misconduct, without applying the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, deserves to be quashed. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the termination order, dated 23-10-1971 and the Service Tribunal's order, dated 1-11-1977 (Annexures " 1" and "2" respectively) are quashed and the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. On the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.