JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Elector of Municipal Board, Sardhana in process of assailing delimitation of Ward by State Government under S. 11-B, U.P. Municipalities Act, has raised the constitutional issue of immense impact, that the policy of reservation for scheduled caste in local bodies elections or elections under Zilla Parishad was debasement of right to vote thus violative of right of franchise and equal protection guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15, Constitution of India. 2. When delimitation of Wards was proposed by notification No. B. P. 2287 dated 4th June, 1987 dividing the Municipal Board in sixteen wards and reserving for scheduled caste Khewan and Mandi Khatikaman on percentage of population in the Municipal Board many objections were filed out of which the Executive Officer of the Board agreed with the objections that on basis of 1971 formed in one ward and the reserve ward should have been census Khewan and Jogiyan should have been No. 6. But the recommendation did not find favour with higher authorities as the percentage of scheduled caste population in these two wards was highest. That appears to be undisputed as is clear from chart showing delimitation of wards. It obviously was in accordance with sub-s. (2) of S. 9A of the Act which provides for reservation "in same proportion to the number of seats on the Board as the population of the scheduled caste in the Municipality bear to its total population as determined at the last census held under the provision of Census Act. S. 19(2)." Yet the attack was that the opposite parties acted arbitrarily in delimiting the wards on population instead of voters. It was illustrated by comparing the strength of scheduled caste voters in Ward Nos. 3 and 9 which appears to be more as compared to numbers 7 and 14. S. 19(2)." Yet the attack was that the opposite parties acted arbitrarily in delimiting the wards on population instead of voters. It was illustrated by comparing the strength of scheduled caste voters in Ward Nos. 3 and 9 which appears to be more as compared to numbers 7 and 14. True but does that vitiate delimitation of the wards under S. 11-A of the Act which reads as under : "11-A: Delimitation of Wards.- (1) For purposes of elections to a Board there shall be wards provided by order under S. 11-B. (2) The representation of each ward shall be on the basis of population of that ward as ascertained at the last census and shall as far as possible be in the same proportion as the total number of seats for the Municipality and its population." Validity of this Section or S. 9-A was not and could not be challenged, except feebly for lack of legislative competence. And rightly. as entry 5 in List II of the VII schedule is quite wide and "the phrase for the purposes of local Government in item 5 does not qualify and limit the scope of the opening expression local Government ............... The opening expression, 'local Government' in item 5 should be given its widest amplitude. It will enable State Legislature to make a law with respect to supersession of a local body.... for removing, terminating and suspending the members of local bodies..... carry on temporarily the administration of local body when the members have been asked to quit" Sarju Prasad v. State, AIR 1970 A11 571. "Entry 5 is very wide. Under that entry it is permissible for the State Legislature to make provision for nomination in the bodies Nagendra Nath Singh v. State, AIR 1982 All 226 . carry on temporarily the administration of local body when the members have been asked to quit" Sarju Prasad v. State, AIR 1970 A11 571. "Entry 5 is very wide. Under that entry it is permissible for the State Legislature to make provision for nomination in the bodies Nagendra Nath Singh v. State, AIR 1982 All 226 . Feeble attempt to bring in the concept of basic feature of the Constitution and the submission that policy of reservation being destructive of democratic system of Government visualised by Articles 84, 173, 325, 326 and 327 any legislation eroding or impinging it should be uprooted appears to be more academic than of substance as sovereign power of amending the Constitution may be tested on touches tone of basic feature and democracy may be the primary philosophy round which the structure of Constitution has been raised but, "the distinction between Constitutional law and ordinary law is that the validity of the Constitutional law cannot be challenged whereas that of ordinary law can be on touchstone of the Constitution". Validity or otherwise of any legislative enactment has to be tested on anvil of legislative power conferred by Chapter I of Part IX of the Constitution and the Legislative field carved out in the VII Schedule as an "ordinary law cannot be declared invalid for the reason that it goes against the vague conception of democracy, justice, political, economic and social, liberty of thought, belief and expression or equality of status and opportunity." See Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 . There can thus benodoubt that the width of entry 5 of list II of VII schedule extends to reserving seats as it relates to constitution of local bodies. Whether or not reservation is constitutionally valid is different aspect than the legislative competence as an Act may be validly enacted yet it may be liable to be struck down for infringing the rights guaranteed by Chap. III of the Constitution. The index of reservation in the Act is percentage of population. A criterion followed in Article 330 of Constitution as well. III of the Constitution. The index of reservation in the Act is percentage of population. A criterion followed in Article 330 of Constitution as well. Even in Wesberry v. Sanders, (1964) 11 Law Ed 2nd 481 on which reliance was placed, it was observed, "the history of Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Articles 1, 2 reveals that those who framed the Constitution meant that no matter what the mechanics of an election whether statewise or by districts, it was population which was to be basis of the House of Representatives." To same effect are observations of Warren Chief Justice in Reynolds v. Sims, (1964) 12 Law Ed 2d 506, "population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and controlling for criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies...We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the equal protection clause requires that seats in both houses of a bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." In fact in Reynold's case (supra) the argument that State can rationally consider factors other than population in apportioning legislative representation was rejected. Since statutory provision is not only clear and explicit but reasonable and fair the submission that delimitation should have been done on voters appears to be without substance. 3. Next attack on delimitation of wards, without any foundation in the petition, but inspired by American decisions, was that proportional disparity in population in some of the wards being more than half it amounted to contraction of value of votes in the larger constituency. This violated the doctrine of equality. Principle and rationale of the submission of the inherent philosophy underlying it may not and cannot be seriously disputed. As a democracy visualised to be ruled by, representative Government has undoubtedly to apportion the area from which a representative has to be elected in such a manner that the representative is elected more or less by same population. That is there should not be disparity in population of one constituency from other. Otherwise it frustrates the very basis of democratic representation. But it cannot be. done with arithmatical accuracy. In Wesbery's case (1964 11 Law Ed 481) (supra) it was observed." We do not believe that the framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote deducting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied members of inhabitants". But it cannot be. done with arithmatical accuracy. In Wesbery's case (1964 11 Law Ed 481) (supra) it was observed." We do not believe that the framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote deducting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied members of inhabitants". Although difference between structuring of constituencies or delimination of wards with wide dispartities in population has been disapproved and the American Courts have taken such structuring as violative of the right of equality of sending representative to participate in the governance of country but even there it has been ruled that principle can be adhered to "as nearly as practicable". Viewed in this perspective the claim of petitioner that delimination of wards was bad as Ward No. 2 had 1579 voters whereas Ward No. 13 had 753 appears to be based on very weak foundation since no such plea of discrimination was raised in the petition preventing opposite parties from placing facts which could have indicated if the disparity was inevitable or it was within the rule of, "as far as practicable." But there can be no doubt that structuring of constituencies or delimitation of wards in such a manner that it me, (sic) thus contracts the value of some votes and expand that of other" may be difficult to sustain. And-in absence of valid and proper explanation for disparity it may be liable to be struck down. 4. Failure on the issue of arbitrainess in delimination of ward necessitates adjudication of the vital issue touching upon policy and practice of reservation for scheduled caste in elections other than for Parliament and Legislature. Since there is no specific provision like Chapter XVI of the Constitution nor any analogous provision like Article 330 or 334 for local elections it generated debate at bar on purpose and extent of sub-Art. (4) added to Article 15 of Constitution. When an occasion like this arises and the judiciary is called upon to discharge its responsibility of reviewing legislative provisions or administrative action recourse is often taken to remote and antique theories of interpretation or it is justified on dynamism and progress. When an occasion like this arises and the judiciary is called upon to discharge its responsibility of reviewing legislative provisions or administrative action recourse is often taken to remote and antique theories of interpretation or it is justified on dynamism and progress. But law should, normally, be interpreted and understood either from the language employed by legislation to convey its sense as "the ultimate resort must be determined upon the actual words" of (Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia 55 CLR 1 (43), from the back ground or objective of its enactment and not by pushing it forward or backward or punctuating it with individual philosophies. That is why one of the dangers of judicial activism is said to be that it may result in administration of `justice without law.' Therefore, where the language of provision is clear and explicit it should be given full pay without distorting or supplying any supposed error or omission. 5. However, the magnitude of attack the fall out of which if accepted may be wide- spread implies dispassionate but careful analysis of Constitution to get a feel of the purpose and objective of reservation for scheduled caste in political sphere as well. To begin with the Preamble, "which is meant to embody in a very few and well defined words, key to the understanding of the Constitution," it resolved to secure to all the citizens justice, social economic and political. This resolution or declaration was not mere expression of romantic words as the architects of the Constitution endeavoured to make it reality by adding a Chapter on Fundamental Rights and took a step further by requiring every State action to be inspired by the directive principle narrated elaborately in Chapter IV. The anxiety to secure social, economic and political justice symbolises modern thinking on human values. Legally or constitutionally it conveys uplift of society and promotion of individual and social welfare by rule of law. The word social justice itself is of very wide import. As observed by Searman in his book English law, the new dimension, "social justice by which todays society means justice in depth not only penetrating and destroying the inequalities of sex, race and wealth but also supporting the weak and the exposed." It contemplates equal benefit equal advantages and equal share to all. As observed by Searman in his book English law, the new dimension, "social justice by which todays society means justice in depth not only penetrating and destroying the inequalities of sex, race and wealth but also supporting the weak and the exposed." It contemplates equal benefit equal advantages and equal share to all. This has found expression in Article 14 when the State has been prohibited from denying any person equality before law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Its intensity has been aggravated further by prohibiting discrimination by Article 15 against any citizen on ground of religion, race, castes, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 17 effaced the social scar in our society by abolishing untouchability. Similarly the provisions prohibiting traffic in human being or exploitation of labour or guaranteeing equal pay for equal work or avoidance of concentration of wealth in few hands may have economic importance but are certainly a step in aid of attaining social justice. The chapter providing for reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in Parliament or State Legislature is a part of socio-political justice. Political justice has not been defined or explained by political theorists. But the word politics or political means the "service of government" or "pertaining one relating to policy or the administration of government". Since the essence of democracy is administration of Government and formulation of policies by the people it involves participation. That is why some modern thinkers describe it as "participatory democracy" which at its minimum means registering as a voter. But in its broiler and wider meaning it visualises political participation which," refers to those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and directly or indirectly in the formation of public policy. These activities typically include voting ....... competing for public and party office- (Internation Encyclopedia of the Social Science Vol. 12 p. 252). Both these rights and the right of participation have been adequately provided for and amply safeguarded in various provisions of the Constitution. These activities typically include voting ....... competing for public and party office- (Internation Encyclopedia of the Social Science Vol. 12 p. 252). Both these rights and the right of participation have been adequately provided for and amply safeguarded in various provisions of the Constitution. Although in modern thinking and working of democracies elective or nominative, economic, social and political justice appear to be interwoven, yet each has a separate and distinct connotation which may overlap in advanced society, but when the constitution was framed and the democracy was horn in our country it was the political justice or equality through grant of adult suffrage to the rich or poor, literate or ignorant, higher or depressed caste which we ensure first and it was through representative Government of the people not only at Centre or State but even in local bodies that the development of the society economically and socially was conceived of. Therefore, the founding fathers made special provision in Part XVI to ensure participation of even those who but for the constitutional protection would have been deprived of the cherished and basic right of participation and the right to ameliorate their economic and material condition. 6. Absence of any provision reserving seats for scheduled caste/scheduled tribe, however, in local elections occasioned the submission by Sri S.P. Gupta, the learned Senior advocate that the Constitution makers having done away with hateful communal representation could not be deemed to have intended to introduce it in different shape leaving the door open for revival of it by other fundamentalist in course of time. Much emotion was displayed in highlighting evils of reservation its perpetuation resulting in division of the society amongst privileged and unprivileged and run and race frenzy for inclusion in list of scheduled caste. But the apprehension, expressed though with deep concern, ignored that communal representation and reservations for certain period to infuse political awareness in a class which was subdued and depressed for generations cannot be equated. It was rightly pointed out by Sri S.G. Bhatnagar, the learned Advocate General, that reservation for limited duration for scheduled casts was a national commitment. But the apprehension, expressed though with deep concern, ignored that communal representation and reservations for certain period to infuse political awareness in a class which was subdued and depressed for generations cannot be equated. It was rightly pointed out by Sri S.G. Bhatnagar, the learned Advocate General, that reservation for limited duration for scheduled casts was a national commitment. Observations in Janardan Paswan v. State, AIR 1988 Patna 75 (FB) that, by reservation in favour of scheduled casts and scheduled tribe, they have been placed by the founding fathers, "on a favoured footing electorally", and have "an edge over the rest of, the citizonary," is, with profound respect being uncharitable to history of depressed class. Race conscious legislations or Government orders have been upheld even by American Supreme Court some of which shall be referred later. Such decisions have been justified not as showering favouritism but, "as morally right as well as historically valid in view of the pro Negro purpose - of Civil War. Supporters of race conscious affirmative action saw it as nothing more than an expression of traditional principle of compensation for damages a more apt description perhaps was reparations a term drawn from International Law which in the affirmative action context implied that blacks as the recipients of compensatory awards". (The American Constitution, its origin and development by Alfred H. Kelly, VI Edition). 7. With this background the principal thrust of the attack namely, violation of right of franchise, a basic right under the Constitution, inspired by the decision of the Full Bench in Janardhan Paswans case (supra) may be adverted to. The attack positively was that reservation resulted in denial or debasement of right of franchise which was sine qua non for democratic society and negatively on the Constitutional prohibition not to discriminate on ground of race or caste. The attack positively was that reservation resulted in denial or debasement of right of franchise which was sine qua non for democratic society and negatively on the Constitutional prohibition not to discriminate on ground of race or caste. Prior to discussing the meaning of right of franchise and its debasement as expounded in Janardhan Paswan's case which in fact was the foundation on which the petitioner attempted to raise the structure of invalidity of Section 9A it may be stated at the outset that the attack cannot be brushed aside on strength of a Full Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in C. Satyanarayan Reddy v. State of A.P., (1987) 1 Andh Pra LT 665 which has over simplified the issue by concluding that since reservations in local elections was not prohibited it should be taken as permitted. Chapter XVI is exception to the Constitutional scheme of universal audit franchise and join electorates or weightage for minorities. It could not be inferred. In 1912 AC 571 (583), (Attorney General Ontario v. A.G. of Canada, it was held, "In the interpretation of the Constitution founded upon a written organic instrument if the text is explicit, the text is conclusive alike in what it directs and what it forbids". In R. v. Burah, (1878) 5 Ind App 178 the Privy Council observed, "the Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it and it can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers...... When a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded must of necessity, determine that question and the only way in which they can properly do so is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively, the Legislative power was created, and by which,' negatively, they are restricted." It was reiterated and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Keshava Nand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 . To infer conferment of power by implication on principle that it was not prohibited was thus contrary to the primary principle of interpretation of Constitution. 8. Since the Constitution is representative oriented, right to elect the representative is a basic right which cannot be denied. Nor can a person be excluded or prevented from exercised such right. To infer conferment of power by implication on principle that it was not prohibited was thus contrary to the primary principle of interpretation of Constitution. 8. Since the Constitution is representative oriented, right to elect the representative is a basic right which cannot be denied. Nor can a person be excluded or prevented from exercised such right. In Wesbary v. Sanders, 1964-11 Law Ed 2d 481 (supra) it was observed, "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which as good citizens we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined". In the Constitution it has been brought out clearly and forcefully by Article 325, the scope and effect of which has been succinctly summed up by Sandhawalia, C.J. in Paswan's case (AIR 1988 Patna 75) (FBI (supra) in following words : "In the light of the aforesaid detailed provisions of our Constitution, there hardly can remain any doubt that the founding fathers were not only deeply solicitous of the right of franchise, but equally guaranteed the same by constitutional protection. Equality of franchise thus lies at the heart of a free democratic system of Government. To ensure the same, the Scheme of the provisions of the Constitution first guarantees the larger right of franchise and its equality as also provides in considerable detail for the exercise thereof. It provides in express terms firstly for direct election to the House of the people in Parliament and to the Legislative Assemblies in the State. Secondly, it mandates that the said direct election is on the basis of adult suffrage with a constitutional right for citizens above 21 years to be registered as voters barring limited grounds of disqualification, if expressly prescribed by law within the prescribed parameters. Thirdly, it provides a constitutional guarantee that the right of franchise is not to be denied by any law on the basis of race, religion, casts or sex or any one of them." 9. Does the right of franchise stands debased or diluted due to reservations of scheduled caste in local election. In Websters comprehensive dictionary one of the meanings of franchise is a political or constitutional right reserved to or vested in the people the right of suffrage. Does the right of franchise stands debased or diluted due to reservations of scheduled caste in local election. In Websters comprehensive dictionary one of the meanings of franchise is a political or constitutional right reserved to or vested in the people the right of suffrage. The New Oxford Illustrated Dictionary Volume I defines it as right of voting at public elections. Wharton's Law Lexicon described it as the right of voting. This right of franchise or the right to chose representative by way of adult suffrage has been described by American Courts as system of one person one vote. The idea underlying it is political equality. In Wesbary v. Sanders, 1964-11 Law Ed 2d 481 (supra) Justice Black relying on the passage that in elections of representatives, "Not the rich more than the poor not the learned more than the ignorant, not the naughty heirs of distinguished more than the humble sops, of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The elections are to be the great body of the people of the United State" evolved the principle of one person one vote. It was observed, "The concept of we the people 'under the Constitution visualises no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualification." How was this right debased or diluted was explained by C.J. Warren in Reynold's case (1964-12 Law Ed 2d 506) (supra), "undeniably the Constitution of the United States protests the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in State as well as in federal elections. A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear......... The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise" ........... It could hardly be gainsaid that a Constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited from voting for members of their State legislature. It could hardly be gainsaid that a Constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited from voting for members of their State legislature. And if a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly he contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavoured areas had not been effectively diluted" ....... Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race". 10. Our Constitution too visualises political equality by providing for equality in voting booth irrespective of status, education, race or religion, but the ratio of American decisions relating to disparities in restricting or delimitation resulting in diminishing the value of votes does not even remotely touch the policy of reservation. Any attempt to allow political participation may he valid or invalid depending on erosion of right of equality guaranteed by Articles 14 and 15 but the debasement of one man one vote developed by American Courts by providing same number of representative for an area with ten times more population can have little bearing on the issue except that political inequality due to legislative enactment or administrative action may he amenable to writ jurisdiction as "The right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection" (Wesbery v. Sanders, 1904-11 Law Ed 2d 481) (supra). It may not be out of place to mention that even in America the jurists and Judges raised a great commotion and there was "boisterous talk of it Constitutional amendment". But it was obviated, probably, because the Court in subsequent decisions deviated by distinguishing in congressional distributing and legislative re-apportionment's. The disparities as a result of legislative districting were held not to establish prima facie invidious discrimination. These deviations were further upheld if the were, "designed to effectuate a substantive policy deemed legitimate by the Court." (American Constitutional Law by Tribe). Further race conscious preferential treatment has been upheld by the American Courts. These deviations were further upheld if the were, "designed to effectuate a substantive policy deemed legitimate by the Court." (American Constitutional Law by Tribe). Further race conscious preferential treatment has been upheld by the American Courts. In the case of Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, (1978) 57 Law Ed 2nd 750 the celebrated reverse discrimination case from which opinion of Powerll, J has been extracted in extenso by Sandhawalia C.J. in Paswan's case (AIR 1988 Patna 75) (FB) (supra), the other Judges who constituted the Bench including the Chief Justice, Burger upheld the power of State to redress the effects of social discrimination by legislation in favour of certain groups on the basis of a racial classification, "The traditional conception of equal protection thus clashed with the group disadvantage interpretation of the equal protection principle advanced by egalitarian refors", Justice Brennan, in partially concurring opinion, called attention to this fact in observing that the "central meaning" of the Courts opinion, "that Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any group but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice". This principle was further extended in United Steel workers of America v. Webber, 99 Supreme Court, in private industry then in Fullilove v. Lunick, 100 Supreme Court Report 2758 in awarding federal contracts, "In any event, the Constitutional significance of Bukke, Webber and Full love was profound previously, despite this group orientation of American polities, constitutional rights had always been interpreted in an individualistic framework. Now, however, the Supreme Court recognised it conception of constitutional liberty and right that depended on recial and ethnical degnity". (The American Constitution by Kelley). 11. Thus racial discrimination for group or class in order to effectuate State policy have been viewed with different vision even by American Courts. Apart from it the right of equality as enshrined in our Constitution has been given different dimensions by the Supreme Court. It has not countenanced any dilution and deviation of this right irrespective of its source. The venom of discrimination has been squeezed from invidious act legislative or executive affecting individual or society. Therefore, it is not the ratio of American decisions only on rights of political participation but the applicability of rule of equality as developed by our Courts which can he decisive of the attack made by petitioners on policy of reservation. The venom of discrimination has been squeezed from invidious act legislative or executive affecting individual or society. Therefore, it is not the ratio of American decisions only on rights of political participation but the applicability of rule of equality as developed by our Courts which can he decisive of the attack made by petitioners on policy of reservation. The existence or exercise of the right of franchise like any other right constitutional, statutory or administrative, has to be within the broad field of equality carved out by Article 14 of the Constitution, the twin facets of which are right to equal treatment and right to be regarded as equal. In a society of unequals it is the interaction of these two manifested through legislative or executive action which endeavours to achieve the objective. The former is recognition of the right which every one has in a society committed to the ideal of Government by the people. It does not visualise any distinction in political participation due to economic, educational, racial, religion, or sex etc. That is why in representative democracies the political equality as achieved by the "Principle of arithmetical equality - one man one vote". The grant of equal right in voting, as has been done by our constitution, irrespective of status, education, race, religion, caste or sex, the Constitution guarantees equal treatment visualised by Article 14, any attempt to curtail this right shall be violative of the right of equality. Similarly the right to be treated as equal contemplates that every person has the right to same benefits as are available to others, therefore, the Government should endeavour to put everyone at par by bridging the social and economic gap by legislative or executive measures, and by classifying such persons or group for preferential treatment necessitated by historical, geographical or any valid reason supported by rationality. The theory of rationality in relation to legislative or administrative action visualises legitimate correlation between end and means. That is any classification which is found on intelligible differentia and has a reasonable nexus to objective sought to be achieved is within permissible limits. Tested on this anvil can the provisions he said to be bad? The provision attempts to achieve political participation in local self government, of a class which was denied its due for centuries. Sentiments apart, compensatory discrimination for group or class was approved even by American courts. Dr. Tested on this anvil can the provisions he said to be bad? The provision attempts to achieve political participation in local self government, of a class which was denied its due for centuries. Sentiments apart, compensatory discrimination for group or class was approved even by American courts. Dr. Ambedkar while addressing the Conference in 1930 pleaded emotionally. "We hold that the problem of depressed classes will never be solved unless they get political power in their own hands". And when Poona Pact was made in consequence of Gandhiji fast unto death it was recognised that there shall be no disabilities to anyone on the ground of his being a member of the depressed class in regard to any elections to local bodies. Every endeavour shall be made to secure fair representation of the depressed classes. This found expression in S. 9 U.P. Municipalities Act. This historical background has been narrated as even though Article 14 forbids class legislation but it permits reasonable classification even for historical reasons. Mohan Lal v. Sawai Man Singhji, AIR 1962 SC 73 , provided it was not suspect and bore reasonable and just relation to the matter in respect of which it was made. What then is the objective of Section 9A which was amended in 1978 and provides for reservation of scheduled castes? It was obviously to give full play to the Constitutional scheme of political participation even to depressed classes at the grassroots to it group or class which is identifiable. It perpetuates objective of participation in self Government in proportion to the population. Since the provision attempts to achieve political participation for it limited duration that is forty years of it group or class as, "scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are not a caste but it large backward group deserving of social compassion" (State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490 ) who but for reservation may have been deprived from political equality it satisfies the requirements of a classification being based on intelligible differentia and has it reasonable nexus sought to he achieved by the Act. It thus satisfies the test of Article 14 as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is also not arbitrary in the light of what has been described in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 as the new dimension of Article 14. 12. It thus satisfies the test of Article 14 as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is also not arbitrary in the light of what has been described in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 as the new dimension of Article 14. 12. Grant of voting- right irrespective of status, caste, education resulted in equality at polling booth. Any deviation or dilution in this right may not be countenanced. And in the legislative or executive actions breeds discrimination for instance by objectionable disparity on delimitation of wards it may be struck down. But the right to caste vote or to choose representative of one's own choice does not extend either to be elected as, "the right to stand as a candidate is not a common law right" Jamuna Prasad v. Lachhi Ram, AIR 1954 SC 686 or to claim that candidate or representative should be as desired by any voter or elector. So long the right to caste vote is maintained in favour of a candidate who is entitled to contest in accordance with provisions of a Statute creating right it cannot be urged that right to franchise has been debased or diluted. 13. Right of voting is only an aspect of political participation which is the foundation of democratic system. Participation is an ingredient of every polity large or small. Whether the society is an oligarchy or a democracy, someone must make political decisions and appoint, uphold and remove leaders........Therefore, the right to participate is an essential element of democratic government. Inseparable from such other attributes of democracy as consent of accountability, majority rule, equality and popular sovereignty. Indeed the growth of democratic Government is in part measured by the extension of suffrage and the correlative rights, hold office and to associate for the political purpose...... From Aristotle to John Dewey, political philosophers, have extolled popular participation as a source of vitality and creating energy as a defence against tyranny and as a means of inacting the collective wisdom". (International Encyclopedia of the Social Science). This has been achieved by providing for reservation of scheduled castes and nomination of minorities. It was a step to grant equality to a group which but for this would have been precluded from participating as equality can be denied also when Government fails to ,classify between persons who but for classification would have been deprived of equal benefit. This has been achieved by providing for reservation of scheduled castes and nomination of minorities. It was a step to grant equality to a group which but for this would have been precluded from participating as equality can be denied also when Government fails to ,classify between persons who but for classification would have been deprived of equal benefit. Therefore, the legislative action to distinguish between the two and provide for measures to grant equality to the other a distinguishable group cannot be said to be against doctrine of equality. 14. Since sweep of Article 14 is very wide it extends to political rights as well as was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nain Sukh Das v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 SC 384 . The Hon'ble Court held, "The Constitutional mandate to the State not to discriminate against any citizen on the ground 'interalia", of religion clearly extends to political as well as to other rights." therefore, any legislative or executive action in respect of a political right shall be invalid if it infringes right of equality. But what is political right was not gone into by the Hon'ble Court as the petitioners were not found entitled to any relief under Article 32, of the Constitution, Political right appears to be participation in governance either by direct election of the head of the executive or by electing representatives from amongst whom the leader or head may be selected. "Equality in political rights is seen first of all in the slow but still far from universal recognition that certain difference between individuals are irrelevant as grounds of discrimination. Examples are differences of sex, religion, property. race or colour' (Morrie Gainsberg - On Justice in Society). And this right has been secured by Article 325 of the Constitution by directing that, no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll (electoral roll) or claim to be included in any special roll for any such constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them. Granville Austin in his book. The Indian Constitution Cornerstone a nation,' observed, "The members of the Constituent Assembly had one predominant aim when framing the legislative provisions of the Constitution : to create a basis for the social and political unity of the country. Granville Austin in his book. The Indian Constitution Cornerstone a nation,' observed, "The members of the Constituent Assembly had one predominant aim when framing the legislative provisions of the Constitution : to create a basis for the social and political unity of the country. They chose to do this by uniting Indians into one mass electorate having universal, adult suffrage, and by providing for the direct representation of the voters in genuinely popular assemblies". The right to participate in administration or governance of the country appears to he the political right. Any legislative attempt to curtail this right on ground of religion, caste, etc., shall he violative of Article 15(1). But what is this right ? Is it right to be elected or to elect a candidate of one's own choice or to participate in election process ? Election according to Roger Scrution, in his book Dictionary of political thought means. "The process whereby an electorate chooses, by voting, officers either to act on its behalf, or to represent it in an assembly, with a view to Government or administration. The elements of an election are : rule of eligibility for candidates, rules for membership of the electorate, voting procedures, and officers empowered to enforce them (such as the `returning officer' in UK Law), laws relating to practice and designed, e.g. to prevent corruption, intimidation, and excessive expenditure or unfair advertising". In International Encyclopedia of social science political participation, as seen earlier, refers to those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers directly or indirectly in the formation of public policy. But the right to elect representative or participation in elective process is not a fundamental right. The basic structure of the Constitution may be election of representative through competitive process and the philosophy of democracy may visualise freedom of choice yet the right can be exercised within perephery of the field carved out by the Constitution. Since the Constitution itself recognised the necessity due to political and social compulsion to provide for reservation of scheduled caste in Parliament and State assemblies similar provision in Sate enactment for providing representation in Local bodies cannot be struck down for violating democratic ideals of the Constitution. Since the Constitution itself recognised the necessity due to political and social compulsion to provide for reservation of scheduled caste in Parliament and State assemblies similar provision in Sate enactment for providing representation in Local bodies cannot be struck down for violating democratic ideals of the Constitution. Further S. 13C of the Act, "A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat on a board, unless - (a) in the case of a seat reserved for the Scheduled castes he is a member of any of these castes and is an elector for any ward in the Municipality; (b) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for any ward in the Municipality", does not deprive anyone of participating in the election process rather ensures even the right to contest by anyone, residing in a ward reserved for scheduled caste from any other ward. Thus any possible challenge or denial of this right has been obviated. 15. Having dealt with political and electoral right which too are within the broad spectrum of Article 14 the issue that survives is if the policy of reservation resulting in denial of feedom to choose one's own candidate or representative as, "essence of democratic, election is freedom of choice" (Encyclopedia Britanica), violative of Article 15(1) as the State is prohibited from showering favoured treatment on any individual or class on ground of caste. For better appreciation it appears appropriate to extract Article 15 which reads as under : "15(1). The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, he subject to any disability, liability restriction or condition with regard to - (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and place of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public, (3) nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children, (4) nothing in this article or in cl. (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes". Prior to adverting to scope of cl. (4), its extent and reach, it may not be out of context to state that there should be no misgiving about the aid and assistance that can be taken of the object and reasons while interpreting a constitutional provision or construing a Statute. For the latter it is now firmly settled from series of decisions beginning from Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 till date, that objects and reasons are not admissible as an aid in construction of a Statute and the limited extent to which they can be referred is to ascertain the purpose of enactment, the conditions prevailing which led to amendment and the immediate evil or mischief which was sought to be remedied. Same ratio should hold good while considering it constitutional provision. The purpose of introducing cl. (4) by first constitutional amendment in wake of Supreme Court decision in State of Madras v. Smt. Chempakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226 was to pave the way for advancement of backward and scheduled caste. It was brought out clearly in the object and reasons attached to the amending bill which read as under: "It is laid down in Article 40 as a directive principle of State policy that the State should promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and protect them from social injustice. In order that any special provision that the State may make for the educational, economic or social advancement of any backward class of citizens may not be challenged on the ground of being discriminatory, it is proposed that Article 15(3) should be suitably amplified". The avowed purpose was to obviate any challenge to it Legislative enactment or administrative action on ground of it being discriminatory if it was for educational, economical or social advancement of backward classes. But this objective as discernible from object and reasons cannot be pressed either for broadening or narrowing the meaning of the words used in cl. (4). The avowed purpose was to obviate any challenge to it Legislative enactment or administrative action on ground of it being discriminatory if it was for educational, economical or social advancement of backward classes. But this objective as discernible from object and reasons cannot be pressed either for broadening or narrowing the meaning of the words used in cl. (4). That has to be considered on its own and, "interpreted broadly and liberally in favour of those on whom the rights have been conferred" (Dwarka Das Srivastava v. Sholapur Spinning Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 ). From the very language it is clear that it carved out an exception from the basic and broad field of concept of equality guaranteed by the Constitution one of the facets of which is forcefully expressed in clause (1) by prohibiting the State not to discriminate against any citizen on ground of caste etc. (State of A.P. v. U.S. Balaram, AIR 1972 SC 1375 ; State of A.P. v. P. Sagar, AIR 1968 SC 1379 ; R. Chitra Lekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 ; M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 ). What is striking in the clause is the use of the word advancement' which on the one hand governs the subject, namely, the backward class and scheduled caste and tax the other, the object of making special provision. The Legislature deliberately appears to have avoided use of the word `advancement' as was originally proposed in the bill which read" or for the education, economic, and social advancement of any backward class of citizens", so as to give it full play and widen its ambit and scope by including in it any measure, educational, social economic, political, electoral etc. To limit the field of operation to educational, and social advancement alone shall be doing violence to the language of the statute. Some misgiving appears to be prevailing as has been highlighted by Sandhawalia, Chief Justice in Patna Full Bench, due to change in the language in the bill as originally proposed and the one which was adopted in shape of Article 15(4). But if the word `advancement' would have been used as proposed it would have definitely narrowed and restricted the scope within which this class could have -operated but the provision as it stands is undoubtedly couched in wide phraseology. But if the word `advancement' would have been used as proposed it would have definitely narrowed and restricted the scope within which this class could have -operated but the provision as it stands is undoubtedly couched in wide phraseology. Observations to the contrary in Janardan Paswan's case (A.I.R. 1988 Pitt 75) (supra) based on object and reason and the dropping of the word `economic' from the original draft is to be dissented with profound respect. The bench put a very narrow construction of cl. (4) in confining it to reservation in educational institutions alone. In fact the dropping of the word `economic' from the original draft and the use of word advancement in the beginning and in the end clearly indicated that the Parliament intended to use it in wide sense rather than in narrow sense. Nor it is possible to agree on the inference drawn by the Full Bench between the difference in language between cl. (3) and cl. (4). Therefore, in absence of any indication explicit or implicit to confine the protection guaranteed by this clause in social and educational filed only it would be contrary to principle of interpretation and construction to restrict it. That is why the Hon'ble Court in Nain Sukh Das ( AIR 1953 SC 384 1 (supra) observed, "this constitutional mandate to the State not to discriminate against any citizen on ground 'inter alia' of religion presumably extends to political as to other rights and any election held after the Constitution in pursuance of such it law, subject to cl. (4), must be held as being repugnant to Constitution. It is true that "a case is an authority only for that it actually decides and not for what may logically follow from it" (Sriniwas General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1246 ), or "that it judgment is only an authority for what it really decides not for any passing observation therein" Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) AC 495 yet such observations which were really not necessary for purposes of the decision and go beyond the occasion and, therefore, have no binding authority have "persuasive value" AIR 1983 SC 1246 . Therefore even if it is assumed that the decision in Nainsukh Das case (supra) is not binding as the Hon'ble Court having held that the petition was not maintainable and it was not law declared under Article 14(4) of the Constitution the observations made therein that even political rights could be subject-matter of the Legislative or administrative action under cl. (4) of Article 15 have persuasive value and cannot he brushed aside. This is irrespective of the conclusion arrived earlier extending the ambit of Article 15(4) to the Legislations effecting even political or electoral rights arrived at on the clear and unambiguous language of the Statute. Since S. 9A of the Act attempts to advance the objective of granting representation to scheduled caste in the local elections in proportion to their population it is protected under Article 15(4) of the Constitution. The apprehension of perpetuation of reservation appears to he without any basis as once Chap. XVI is repealed and the policy of reservation is given up the occasion to reserve seats in local bodies shall disappear. For it legislative or executive action to be within protective canopy of Article 15(4), it has to be for advancement of the class mentioned in it. Once the Parliament takes a decision to repeal Chap. XVI or to give up extension it shall amount to a decision by the people that the occasion for advancement of the group or class has come to an end. Therefore, it shall no more furnish foundation for making reservation by taking recourse to Article 15(4). 16. For reasons stated above the provision for reservation of seats fur scheduled caste in local bodies specially in S. 9A. U.P. Municipalities Act, cannot be struck down as violative of any constitutional guarantee or principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 or 15 of the Constitution nor can delimitation of wards be said to be arbitrary and against principle of one person one vote. Consequently the petition fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.