JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. - In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged his removal from service. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Lineman on 29-8-1971 on temporary basis in the U.P. State Electricity Board. According t6 him he was promoted to the post of the Sub-Station Attendant vide an order dated 9-10-1973. He was absorbed on regular establishment with effect from 2-9-1974. The petitioner and his three colleagues became involved in a criminal case under S. 332 I.P.C. All of them were suspended on 7-4-1975. They were, however, acquitted in the said criminal case by the trial court on 2-11-1976. Whereas the three colleagues of the petitioner were re-instated on 6-1-1977, no such order of reinstatement with regard to the petitioner was passed. However on 6-5-1980 a notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why after acquittal in the afore said criminal case on 2-11-1976 he had been absent from the office after Dec. 1976. The petitioner gave a reply to the said notice on 16-5-1980. Holding that the explanation furnished by the petitioner was not satisfactory, the respondent No. I terminated the service of the petitioner vide his order dated 3-6-1980. 3. The main thrust of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioner could not be removed from service except after inquiry in which he had been informed of the charges against him and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and that because in this case no departmental inquiry was conducted, hence the order of his removal from service was bad in law. We find considerable force in the said submission. Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 empowers the U.P. State Electricity Board to make regulations with regard to the duties of the officers and other employees and their conditions of service. Exercising the said power the Board has framed the U.P. State Electricity Board (Officers and Servants) (Conditions of Service) Regulations 1975. Regulation 3(1) of the said Regulations provides that no officer and servant of the Board" shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." 4. Regulation 3(1) of the said Regulations provides that no officer and servant of the Board" shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." 4. In this case neither any specific charge had been framed against the petitioner nor any formal departmental inquiry was conducted against him. The respondent No. 1 had simply sent a notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why when he was acquitted from the criminal court on 2-1 1-1976 he has been absent from the duty after Dec. 1976. Anyway, when the petitioner furnished his explanation respondent No. 1 by his non- speaking order dated 3-6-1980 (Annexure No. 18 to the writ petition) and 4-6-1980 (Annexure No. 19 to the writ petition) terminated his services. It was not stated in the said orders as to how and why the explanation given by the petitioner was not satisfactory. Neither any inquiry was conducted nor any evidence was gathered with regard to the allegation made against the petitioner that he had been absent from duty after Dec. 1976. Such an order of removal from service was bad in law and cannot be sustained. 5. Otherwise too it may be observed that in the show cause notice dated 6-5-1980 the respondent No. I simply stated that the petitioner was absent after Dec. 1976 implying thereby that he had been presenting himself till Dec. 1976. In our opinion when six days thereafter, i.e. on 6-1-1977, the three colleagues of the petitioner had been reinstated, there was no question of keeping the petitioner under suspension and not to pass an order of his reinstatement on 6-1-1977 as was done with regard to his three colleagues. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted before us that the petitioner was a temporary employee, that therefore in view of the second proviso to regulation 3(1) the said regulation was not applicable to the petitioner and that he could be removed from his service without any formal departmental inquiry. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted before us that the petitioner was a temporary employee, that therefore in view of the second proviso to regulation 3(1) the said regulation was not applicable to the petitioner and that he could be removed from his service without any formal departmental inquiry. Clause (a) of the second proviso attached to regulation 3(1) of the aforesaid regulation; which provides for a departmental inquiry, being relevant, is re-produced below for ready reference : "Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) to an order of termination of service of a temporary officer or servant of the Board by the authority for the time being competent to make appointments to the post held by him or by any authority to which such authority is subordinate, whether the same be founded on any charges against him or on administrative ground or due to his services being no longer required provided that such charges, if any, are not mentioned in the order issued to him." 7. Obviously the said clause is applicable only when the services of a temporary servant are terminated and when the order of termination of service is simplicities order and no stigma or aspersion is cast in the same. This is not the case here. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged before us that the petitioner was a permanent employee and not a temporary employee. In support of his submission he has referred to us office memorandum (Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition) in which it was stated that the petitioner had been absorbed on a regular establishment with effect from 2-9-1974. Anyway, without going deep into the controversy it is clear that the order terminating the services of the petitioner was not a simpliciter order. The said order had cast stigma and aspersion on the petitioner. Annexure No. 18 is the order dated 3-6-1980 by which the services of the petitioner were terminated. It was stated in the same that the reply dated 16-5-80 submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory and, therefore, his services had been terminated. It may be noted that the petitioner had given his said reply dated 16-5-1980 to the notice calling upon him to show clause as to why he had been absent from office without leave. It was stated in the same that the reply dated 16-5-80 submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory and, therefore, his services had been terminated. It may be noted that the petitioner had given his said reply dated 16-5-1980 to the notice calling upon him to show clause as to why he had been absent from office without leave. The order of termination of the service of the petitioner has, therefore, to be read along with the notice sent to him and the explanation furnished by him. In our view the said order terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground that his reply to the accused that he had been absent from the office was not satisfactory could not be said simpliciter order of termination of services. It was an order casting stigma and aspersion and, therefore, cl. (a) of the second proviso attached to regulation 3(1) of the aforesaid Regulations was not applicable in the case of the petitioner. The order of termination of service of the petitioner was in fact an order of his removal from service, which, in accordance with the said regulation 3(1) could be passed only after a formal departmental inquiry, which was not conducted in this case. 9. Vide order dated 4-6-1980 (Annexure No. 19 to the writ petition) the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 1-1-1977. In our opinion the services of the petitioner could not be affected with- retrospective effect in any view of the matter. 10. In this case the petitioner had been suspended on 7-4-1975 and his suspension had not been revoked at any time meaning thereby that even on 3rd and 4th of June 1980 when his services were terminated, the petitioner was under suspension. In our view when the petitioner was under suspension and his suspension had not been revoked there was no question of his attending to any duty. Therefore, no charge could be levelled against him that during the period of suspension he had not attended the office or that he had abstained from the office without leave. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged before us that even during the period of suspension the petitioner should have attended office. Therefore, no charge could be levelled against him that during the period of suspension he had not attended the office or that he had abstained from the office without leave. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged before us that even during the period of suspension the petitioner should have attended office. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit the respondent No. I has stated that "as per rules of the service the petitioner should have attended the office to which he was attached during his suspension period". No such rules have been produced before us which may show that a servant of the Board during the period of his suspension was obliged to attend the office. Respondent No. 1 has also not produced any order which may have been passed that during the period of suspension the petitioner had to attend any officer. 12. The petitioner and his three colleagues were suspended from service because they had become involved in a criminal case under S. 332 I.P.C. All these four persons were prosecuted and the prosecution terminated in their favour on 2-11-1976. It is not a case where the acquittal of the petitioner and his three colleagues in the criminal case had not come to the notice of the Appointing Authority, i.e. respondent No. 1. The record shows that the respondent No. I did come to know that the aforesaid criminal case had ended in acquittal. Annexure No. 4 annexed to the writ petition is copy of a letter dated 15-11-1976 which respondent No. 1 addressed to the Superintendent Engineer Electricity Distribution Circle, Jhansi by which he was informed that all the aforesaid four persons, including the petitioner, had been acquitted of the charge levelled against them. Therefore, the instructions of the Superintendent Engineer were solicited. The contents of the said letter shows that the copy of the judgment delivered in the said criminal case was also sent to the Superintendent Engineer, along with the said letter. Annexure No. 5 of the writ petition is the letter dated 7-12-76 by which the Superintendent Engineer sent his reply to the Executive Engineer and advised him to take action after taking the opinion of the D.G.C. concerned. Annexure No. 5 of the writ petition is the letter dated 7-12-76 by which the Superintendent Engineer sent his reply to the Executive Engineer and advised him to take action after taking the opinion of the D.G.C. concerned. Annexure No. 6 of the writ petition is the opinion of the Prosecution Officer Banda in which he stated that there was no prospect of any State appeal being filed against the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. It appears that after the said advice the respondent No. 1, vide his order dated 6-1-1977, reinstated the three colleagues of the petitioner but did not pass any such order with regard to the petitioner. In our opinion when the fact of acquittal of the petitioner had come to the notice of the respondent No. 1, then he should have re- instated the petitioner along with his three other colleagues. We are of the view that when the petitioner had not been reinstated and his suspension order had not been revoked there was no question of the petitioner attending to his duty and office. The order terminating the service of the petitioner on the ground that he had been absent from the office and duty during the period of his suspension without leave was a' nullity. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged before us that the petitioner was workman governed by Standing Orders and that, therefore, his remedy was under the Industrial Disputes Act. In this respect it may be observed that the respondents have not specifically taken a ground that the petitioner was a workman. Anyway, the petitioner is undoubtedly governed by U.P. State Electricity Board (Officers and Servants) (Conditions of Service) Regulations 1975, which were statutory regulations framed) under S. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. In our opinion when there has been violation of the said statutory regulations, the petitioner could approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Besides, we are of the view that the removal of the petitioner from service in the garb of the order of termination was a nullity. Therefore, this Court has the power to grant the necessary relief to the petitioner. 14. In result, therefore, this writ petition is allowed with costs. The impugned orders DATED 1-6-1980 and 4-6-1980, by which the Cervices of the petitioner have been terminated, are hereby quashed. Therefore, this Court has the power to grant the necessary relief to the petitioner. 14. In result, therefore, this writ petition is allowed with costs. The impugned orders DATED 1-6-1980 and 4-6-1980, by which the Cervices of the petitioner have been terminated, are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to take the petitioner in service and to pay him emoluments to which he was entitled within a period of two months.