JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - This writ application arises out of a House Rent Control proceeding initiated by the opp. parties under' Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The opp. parties filed the aforesaid procteting against the present Petitioner praying to be put in Discission of the house in respect of which the Petitioner was a tenant on the ground that the house is necessary for his personal use and occupation. The House Rent Controller dismissed the said application on contest, but in appeal the Chief Judicial Magistrate reversed the same allowing the application for eviction of the Petitioner. The appellate order is under challenge in this writ application. 2. The case of the landlord in brief is that the present Petitioner is a monthly tenant in respect of a portion of a double-storeyed building situated in the town of Cuttack. He is a retired Chief Engineer and after his retirement he has been living in the first floor of the suit premises and requires the portion of the ground floor which is in occupation of the claimant for his own use and occupation. According to him, he finds some difficulty to be comfortably accommodated in the first floor of the suit premises and due to lack of space, he is also unable to pursue, his consultancy work which be intends to do after his retirement. He, had requested the tenant to vacate the premises much before his retirement and thereafter having failed to persuade him, the aforesaid proceeding was instituted. It has also been alleged that the present Petitioner is a habitual defaulter having not paid the rent from November, 1980 to February, 1982 for which he is also liable to be evicted. The present Petitioner admitted the tenancy, but denied all other allegations. His case is that the demand for evicting him from the disputed house is not bona fide, the real purpose being to put in a new tenant on higher rent. It has been specifically stated that, the family of the landlord consists of landlord himself and his wife and the number of rooms in the first floor is more than sufficient for their purpose. The allegation that be is a habitual defaulter has been denied. 3. It has been specifically stated that, the family of the landlord consists of landlord himself and his wife and the number of rooms in the first floor is more than sufficient for their purpose. The allegation that be is a habitual defaulter has been denied. 3. The House Rent Controller dismissed the petition at the landlord on a finding that neither there is bona fide requirement on his part nor the opp. party (tenant) is a defaulter in payment of rent. The landlord went on in appeal and the appellate authority while upholding the fending of the House, Rent Controller that the tenant is a wilful defaulter, allowed the appeal on the ground that the Petitioner has bona fide requirement of the house in question. The appellate Court did not accept the contention of the present Petitioner that the proceeding is not maintainable in the absence of the consent of other co-owners of the suit premises. The Petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order passed by the appellate Court mainly on the ground that the finding recorded by the appellate Court as regards the bona fide requirement of the landlord is perverse not supported by any evidence whatsoever. The question relating to the maintainability of the proceeding on the ground that all the co-sharers of the landlord have neither joined nor given their consent for initiation of the proceeding was rightly given up at the hearing of this case as this Court hall settled the position of law that the inclusive definition of 'landlord' in the Act brings within its sweep also a person who is, in fact receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the house, whether on his own account or on behalf of another, vide Nakula Apat and Anr. v. Ramaraman Khuntia and Ors. 39 (1973) C.L.T. 1145. 4. Thus the only question that was raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is as to whether the requirement of the house by the landlord is bona fide in view of the facts and circumstances available on record. v. Ramaraman Khuntia and Ors. 39 (1973) C.L.T. 1145. 4. Thus the only question that was raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is as to whether the requirement of the house by the landlord is bona fide in view of the facts and circumstances available on record. Section 7(4) of the Act provides that the landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself, any member of his fairly or, of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him. The expression "requires the house in good faith" used in Section 7(4) of the Act connotes something more than mere desire of the landlord though it may be much less than absolute necessity. The requirements as to evict a tenant must be honest and in good faith which implies absence of bad faith. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner relies on a decision reported in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others in support of the proposition that the approach to the problem should not be made to defeat the purpose of the Rent Control Act. It was a case where their Lordships examined as to whether the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises in question even though there is some vacant premises available, to him which he can conveniently occupy. According to their Lordships, the time honoured notion that the right of reentry of the landlord is unfettered and that he is the sale judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which led to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to crub and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act. the landlord can re-enter. In the facts of this case, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the landlord who is in possession of the entire first floor and a portion of the ground floor bas failed to establish that the premises which is under his occupation is not suitable or adequate for the purpose of his occupation or requirement. In the facts of this case, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the landlord who is in possession of the entire first floor and a portion of the ground floor bas failed to establish that the premises which is under his occupation is not suitable or adequate for the purpose of his occupation or requirement. There is no dispute that the object of the Act was to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants from the house occupied by them and in order to secure eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement a landlord has to establish that the premises in question is required by him bona fide. A mere desire on the part of a landlord has been held to be not sufficient to prove his bona fide requirement. In a decision reported in Variety Emporium Vs. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina which has been cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner it has been absented that a Rent Control Tribunal which has to deal with a human problem of great magnitude should regard it as a matter of no moment that an order of eviction will throw the tenant on the tract. In the said case, it has also been said that the Court dealing with the quest ion of eviction of a tenant has to have regard for all aspects of the matter before it and the forcible consequences of the order which it proposes to pass. Having made a reference to the case of Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad their Lordships also indicated that in appropriate case the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time upon it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould (the relief in the light of those events. Relying on the said decision the learned Counsel for the Petitioner bas argued that the appellate authority in this case has recorded, no finding as to whether the requirement of the landlord continues to exist on the date when the proceeding was disposed of. It has also been argued by the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the entire ground floor of the building has not been let out to the Petitioner and the Court below has not taken into consideration as to whether the requiring portion of the ground floor would satisfy the needs of the landlord. It has also been argued by the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the entire ground floor of the building has not been let out to the Petitioner and the Court below has not taken into consideration as to whether the requiring portion of the ground floor would satisfy the needs of the landlord. He has referred to Ext. 2 which is a building plan of the disputed premises to show that the space available in the first floor and the portion of the ground floor in occupation of the landlord is more than enough to meet the necessity of the landlord. Thus according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that nothing mere beyond the mere wish of the landlord has been established in justification for eviction of the Petitioner. The learned Counsel appearing for the landlord-opp. party No. 1 has brought to our notice that there is only one bed room and one drawing room in the first floor, besides some other small rooms which are used, for kitchen, store etc. which are unsuitable to be used as bed rooms. It was also agreed by him that one of the requirements of the land is that his son, who is married, is now staying in America and he is not being able to bring his wife during his occasional visits only for lack of accommodation in the house. Apart from the above requirement, it has been alleged that the landlord also requires the house in question for pursuing his consultancy work. In a counter filed in this case, the opp. party No. 1 has taken a further plea that he had a by-pass surgery in Chicago for which he is required to live in the ground floor to avoid climbing up and down to the first floor by the stair case, This aspect of the case has been denied by the rejoinder filed by the Petitioner. Since this plea was taken for the first time in this Court and there is no material in support of it, I do not think it appropriate to consider the same as a ground for eviction of the tenant in this proceeding. 5. As regards the other ground coming under the "requirement of the landlord in good faith" on which the eviction was sought for, it was strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the opp. 5. As regards the other ground coming under the "requirement of the landlord in good faith" on which the eviction was sought for, it was strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the opp. parties that all the circumstances having been taken into account by the appellate authority to come to a conclusion that the requirement of the opp. parties is bona fide, it is not for this Court as if a court of appeal, to go into the very same facts once again and take a different view by re-assessment of the evidence. In this connection the observation of their Lordships of the supreme Court in the case reported in M/s. Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (supra) where a similar contention was made, is relevant which says: It cannot be overlooked that three courts have held concurrently in this case that the Respondent bas proved that he requires the suit premises bona fide for his personal need. Such concurrence undoubtedly, has relevance on the question whether this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to review a particular decision. That jurisdiction has to be exercised sparingly. But, that cannot possibly mean that injustice must be perpetuated because it has been done three times in a case. The burden of showing that a concurrent decision of two or more Courts or Tribunals is manifestly unjust lies on the Appellant. But once that burden is discharged, it is not only the right but the duty of this Court to remedy the injustice. The attempt of this Court while hearing this case has not been to re-appreciate the evidence as if it were a court of appeal. But the point for examination is if the appellate authority who dealt with the matter has made an approach in accordance with law. The approach of the Court as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Hameedia Hardware Stores, represented by its partner S. Peer Mohammed Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar should be to see whether the landlord wants eviction of a tenant merely to satisfy his whim or his need is genuine and bona fide. The approach of the Court as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Hameedia Hardware Stores, represented by its partner S. Peer Mohammed Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar should be to see whether the landlord wants eviction of a tenant merely to satisfy his whim or his need is genuine and bona fide. Their Lordships have indicated that the Rent Control Law has been enacted for the purpose of giving protection to the tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of ensuring equitable distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in need of them. In order to prove that his claim is bona fide the landlord should establish that his requirement or need is genuine. 6. The learned lower appellate Court has placed reliance in a decision reported in Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal which lays down that the mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the house in occupation of the tenant for his own purposes is not decisive and it is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one. The burden of proving that he genuinely requires the premises for his use and occupation is entirely on the landlord which the court has to examine in the light of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned cases keeping in mind the consequence of an order of eviction which might throw the tenant to the street. The approach to the case by the learned court below does not appear to be in accordance with the aforesaid principles of law. 7. I, therefore, consider it to be a fit case which should be remanded to the lower appellate court for re-examination in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court to be disposed of afresh in accordance with law within four months from this day which I hereby direct, No costs. H.L. Agrawal, C.J. I agree. Ordered accordingly.