JUDGMENT : B. L. Yadav, J. 1. This petition under article 226 of the constitution of India is directed against the order dated 19-8-1987 passed by the additional commissioner, agra division, agra, cancelling the allotment of land made in favour of the petitioners under section 27 of the u. P. Imposition of ceiling of land holdings act (for short the act), and the order dated 11-4-1988, passed by the additional commissioner, rejecting the restoration application filed by the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that in village kunjera, tahsil and district mathura, certain land was declared as surplus under the act in pursuance of the proceedings conducted against the original tenure holders and the question arose for settlement of that land declared as surplus. The settlement was made in favour of petitioners under section 27 (2) of the act. An objection was filed by respondent nos. 4 to 6 with the allegations that the petitioners were not proper persons with whom the settlement could have been made, nor they were preferential claimants in view of the provisions of section 198 of the up za and lr act, hence the allotment of land made in favour of petitioners may be cancelled. The parties led evidence and the lease in favour of petitioners were cancelled by the impugned order dated 19-8-1987. It is against these orders the present petition has been filed. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioners were afforded no opportunity of hearing and the matter was decided exparte without hearing them. Under section 27 (4) of the act there was a mandatory provision that a notice may be served on the person in whose favour such settlement has been made, but no such notice was served on the petitioners. In the instant case even though the petitioners filed objections, but when the matter was disposed of by the impugned order, the petitioners were not aware of the date fixed and by the exparte order the allotment has been cancelled. Hence the impugned order may be quashed. 3. Learned standing counsel, on the other hand, urged that the expression 'he may after notice to the person' under section 27 (4) indicates that it is directory, otherwise also while dismissing the restoration application the petitioners were given opportunity of hearing and that being post decisional hearing was sufficient. Hence the impugned order may be quashed. 3. Learned standing counsel, on the other hand, urged that the expression 'he may after notice to the person' under section 27 (4) indicates that it is directory, otherwise also while dismissing the restoration application the petitioners were given opportunity of hearing and that being post decisional hearing was sufficient. Both the parties have, however, agreed that the petition may be disposed of finally on merits as the counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. 4. Restoration application was filed by petitioner 2 bhagwat, which was dismissed in default on 4-2-1988. Another restoration application was filed by pooran, petitioner no. 1 making averments in favour of allottees including bhagwat, petitioner no. 2. The additional commissioner has taken the view that as no restoration was filed by bhagwat, rather it has been filed by pooran, petitioner no. 1, that cannot be said to be restoration application. In such matters statutory hearing is provided under section 27 (4) that the allottee shall be given notice before any order for cancellation of allotment is made. The relevant statutory provision of section 27 (4) of the act is set out below : "27 (4). The commissioner may of his own motion and shall on the application of any aggrieved person enquire into such settlement and if he is satisfied that the settlement is irregular he may after notice to the person in whose favour such settlement is made to show cause- (i) cancel the settlement and the lease, if any, and thereupon, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or in any instrument, the rights, title and interest of the person in whose favour such settlement was made or lease executed or any person claiming through him in such land shall cease, and such land shall revert to the state government ; and (ii) direct that every person holding or retaining possession thereof may be evicted, and may, for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary." A bare reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that the provision is mandatory and it is not directory as it pertains to the rights of allottees and the opportunity of hearing. In such matters there are catena of decisions that where the rights of parties are involved, in that event the expression 'may' has to be considered as 'shall'. In such matters there are catena of decisions that where the rights of parties are involved, in that event the expression 'may' has to be considered as 'shall'. It was consequently obligatory on the part of additional commissioner to have afforded hearing to the petitioners and other allottees before passing the order of cancellation of lease in their favour. 5. I am of the view that the basic principle in respect of interpretation of section 27 (4) of the act is that the provision created a duty on the part of commissioner to provide an opportunity of hearing to the allottees. What is to be ascertained is the mode for compelling the performance of such duty. The main point to be ascertained is whether section 27 (4), particularly the expression 'he may after notice to the person in whose favour such settlement is made', is mandatory or directory, i.e. Absolute or discretionary. The practical difference between a provision being absolute or discretionary is that if a provision is directory, courts cannot interfere to compel performance, whereas if the provision is mandatory, disobedience entails legal consequences. No doubt, the meaning of expression 'may' whether directory or mandatory, has been the subject of constant and conflicting interpretation. 'May' is usually permissible or enabling expression, but there are cases in which for innumerable reasons as soon as the person is within the statute, i.e. The commissioner under section 27 (4), is entrusted with the power, it becomes his (i.e. Commissioner's) duty to exercise it. -see sheffield corporation v. Luxford, (1929) 2 kb 180; border r. D. C. V. Roberts, (1950) 1 kb 716. 6. Where the word 'may' has been used in connection with the jurisdiction to be exercised by a court of law or authority in connection with the right of a party to the litigation, in that connection the word 'may' is to be read as 'must'. As a conventional courtesy the word 'may' is used in a statute, in such matters where the power is to effectuate a legal right, the word 'may' is mandatory. In the present case the word 'may' has been used in connection with the legal rights of the allottees, and the jurisdiction was to be exercised by the commissioner, it was just out of legislative courtesy that the word 'may' was used under section 27 (4) of the act. In the present case the word 'may' has been used in connection with the legal rights of the allottees, and the jurisdiction was to be exercised by the commissioner, it was just out of legislative courtesy that the word 'may' was used under section 27 (4) of the act. In fact, it is to be read as 'shall' or 'must.'-see punjab s. R. M. Service v. Regional transport authority, collector v. Habeebullah din, air 1967 j. And k. 44; ambica quarry works v state of gujarat, air 1987 sc 1073 ; b. P. Khemka private ltd. V. Birendra kumar bhowmick, air 1987 sc 1010 . It is accordingly manifest that the expression 'he may after notice to the person in whose favour such allotment is made', has been expressed by the legislature in a mode of legislative courtesy, but as it is in connection with the rights of allottees, hence it is just out of sheer respect that the word 'may' has been used, but it is mandatory and conveys the meaning as 'must' or 'shall'. 7. As all the petitioners have a joint cause of action against the order of cancellation dated 19-8-1987, hence even though the restoration application was filed by pooran only, making averments in favour of the petitioners (allottees), there was no irregularity. The additional commissioner appears to have taken arbitrary and an eccentric view in rejecting the restoration application. Under the circumstances, as the rights of petitioners, the allottees, are at stake, and the mandatory requirement is that allotment can be cancelled only after serving a notice on the persons in whose favour such a settlement has been made, the addl. Commissioner must have afforded opportunity of hearing and only thereafter he could have passed the order cancelling the allotment. Under the circumstances, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 8. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 11-4-1988 and 4-2-1988 are hereby quashed. The addl. Commissioner, agra division, agra, respondent no. 1 is directed to dispose of the application for cancellation of lease in favour of the petitioners afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. As the matter has dragged on for too long, the matter may be disposed of by 30th april, 1990. There shall be no order as to costs.