JUDGMENT 1. 1. All the above mentioned forty four writ petitions filed against the Rajasthan State Bridge Constructions Corporation are being decided by this common order. 2. Rajasthan State Bridge Constructions Corporation Ltd. (for short, hereinafter "the Corporation") is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and, according to the petitioners in these forty four writ petitions, is a fully controlled Rajasthan State Government undertaking set tip for the constructions of various kinds of buildings, bridges, road, canals and other constructions. Petitioners were employed in various capacities like Junior Engineers. Operators, Electricians, Helpers, Site Supervisors, Store-munshies, Mistries etc. by the Corporation at its various units or work sites on daily wage basis at different rates. At the initial stage of its establishment, it is alleged. the work load of the Corporation was to the extent of Rs. 10 crores in the year 1978 which is said to have increased to the tune of Rs. 100 crores lately and in Kota Circle only, work worth Rs. 40 crores is stated to be in progress. Four Units at following sites were carrying on construction works undertaken by the Corporation in Kota Circle. namely : Unit No. I -Engineering College. Soya-been Plant etc. Unit No. II -Abti Bridge, Police Quarters, Chandra-bhaga Jalrapatan, Kasimpura etc. Unit No. III-Thermal and Swimming Pool, Chambal Project etc. Baran Unit-Anta Project, Mangrol Project, Kali Sindh Project, Parwati Bridge etc. Apart from the works in Kota Division, the Corporation has also undertaken "uric us works at Jaipur and has also advertised in the year 1988 for workers and staff in daily Hindi News papers in connection with new construction works. 3. First Civil Writ Petition No. 716/1988 was filed on March 25, 1988 by the Rajasthan Pul Nigam Workers Union and Surya Prakash Singh. It was alleged that the Union was formed by the workers of the Corporation working in different places of the Rajasthan State in various units of the Corporation in order to sponsor their genuine demands before the management of the Corporation for their welfare, better status and to protect their legal and legitimate rights. It was alleged that because of raising the demands, the Corporation had started victimising the daily rated workmen and terminated the employment of five workmen, who were appointed on various dates in the years 1982, 1984 and 1986. with effect from March 31, 1988. 4. It was alleged that because of raising the demands, the Corporation had started victimising the daily rated workmen and terminated the employment of five workmen, who were appointed on various dates in the years 1982, 1984 and 1986. with effect from March 31, 1988. 4. The petitioners state that the Corporation is engaged in construction work on different places and it does not make any difference whether work has been completed on one site or the other as it goes on running on other sites. if on one site the work is going to be completed or has completed, then on other site the new work is started. In some of the writ petitions, it has been alleged that on completion of work on a particular site or Unit. the workmen have been transferred to other sites or Unit where the construction work is in progress or is to start. 5. However, the Corporation is victimising these daily rated workmen by terminating their employment on the ground that the construction work at a particular site has completed or is going to complete. Respondents, it is pleaded have flouted the mandatory requirements of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, hereinafter, "the Act") in as much as it had neither given any notice-less to speak three months' notice-to the petitioners nor any pay in lieu of' notice period and nor had obtained the approval of the State Government. Petitioners have also said that even otherwise the orders terminating their services are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as that they have been passed arbitrarily and in disregard of the rule of "last come first go". The Corporation also did not publish and circulate the seniority list of workmen before effecting retrenchment of the petitioners as required by Rules 76 to 78 of the Industrial Disputes Rules Lastly, the petitioners averred that the Corporation is an industrial establishment and the action of the Corporation in not snaking these daily rated employees permanent and not providing them the regular pay scales amounted to 'unfair labour practice". 6. The petitioners have prayed for the quashing of the orders of their termination of services and for their re-instatement and also for a direction to the Corporation to pay to them salary by fixing them in the regular pay scale of the posts on which they were working. 7. 6. The petitioners have prayed for the quashing of the orders of their termination of services and for their re-instatement and also for a direction to the Corporation to pay to them salary by fixing them in the regular pay scale of the posts on which they were working. 7. In some of the writ petitions, the respondents filed replies and in others arguments were advanced adopting the stand taken by them in those petitions in which replies have been filed by them. In substance, the stand taken by the Corporation was that the appointment was for a specific work only on daily wages. All the construction works undertaken by the Corporation were of' temporary nature for a specified period and units were abolished on completion of the work of respective units. It was denied that casual workers were shifted from one site to another site. As the Corporation his adopted the need-based pattern, its Resident Engineers are free to appoint, terminate and retrench the workmen from time to time as per need and requirement. Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not applicable in present m utters Seniority list has been published project wise and retrenchment orders have also been made on the basis of the seniority list. The Corporation has adopted uniform policy and no discrimination has been practised. Charge of unfair labour practice has also been denied. The Corporation has detailed the works undertaken by it in Kota Division in the reply filed by it in Civil Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1983 (M. S. Chauhan's case) and about their completion or nearing completion. The turn-over statement of the Corporation from 1984-85 to 1987-88 in relation to various works undertaken at Kota has also been detailed. 8. In some of the writ petitions, the petitioners, submitted additional grounds in writing stating that they had come to know that provisions of Chapter V-B (which contained Section 25-N) of the Act hive been repealed by an Amending Act in the year 1988 They have, therefore, further attacked the validity of the termination of their services on ground of contravention of Section 25-F of the Act. It was also pleaded that proper calculation of the compensation amount had not been made and the compensation amount calculated was not in accordance with Section 25-F (h) of the Act. 9. Mr. M.R. Calla, learned counsel for the respondents. It was also pleaded that proper calculation of the compensation amount had not been made and the compensation amount calculated was not in accordance with Section 25-F (h) of the Act. 9. Mr. M.R. Calla, learned counsel for the respondents. raised a preliminary objection that all these fourty-four writ petitions are for the enforcement of rights or obligations created by or under the Industrial Disputes Act and for that the respective petitioners have alternative, adequate and efficacious legal remedy available to them under that At and the petitioners should have availed of and exhausted the alternative remedy by seeking reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act of the industrial dispute raised by then through the medium of the appropriate Government. The respondents have further stated in their replies that the petitioners hive raised m my questions which involve disputed question, of fact which would need evidence to be taken. 10. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents needs consideration. Reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Basant Kumar Sarkar v. The Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 1260 . The Eagle Rolling Machine Mills Ltd. was under the management of M's Bird & Co. Ltd. through a General Manager and the appellants were their workmen. The appellants were getting satisfactory medical benefits of a very high order free of any charge, Respondent No. 1, maintained a well furnished hospital with provision for 60 permanent beds for the workman their families and their dependants. The main grievance made by the appellants was that as a result of Section 1(3) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. that the appellants had taken to be content with medical benefits of a less satisfactory nature. By a Notification issued on August 22, 1960 by respondent No. 3 under Section 1(3) of the said Act, it had appointed August 28, 1960 as the date on which some of the provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. By a Notification issued on August 22, 1960 by respondent No. 3 under Section 1(3) of the said Act, it had appointed August 28, 1960 as the date on which some of the provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. In pursuance of this Notification the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. I informed the appellant on August 25, 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upto the extent admissible under the said Act would cease to he provided to insurable persons from the appointed day and not by the arrangements which had been made earlier by respondent No. I in that behalf. That was the genesis of the writ petitions and the nature of the dispute between the parties. Patna High Court had rejected the plea and the writ petitions were dismissed. The appellant came before the Supreme Court. One of the contentions advanced before the Supreme Court was that on account of the above notifications, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. I Company had issued notices giving effect to the notification and intimating to the appellants that by reason of the said notification. the medical benefits which were being given to them in the past would be received by them under the relevant provisions of the Act. Before the High Court, the argument urged was that respondent No. I Company were not entitled to curtail the benefits under the Scheme. The High Court had held that the question as to whether the notices and circulars issued by respondent No. I Company were invalid, could not be considered under Article 26 of the Constitution and that was matter which could be appropriately raised in the form of a dispute by the appellants under Section. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. With regard to this, Gajendragadkar CJ observed : "It is true that the rower conferred on the High Court tinder Article 226 are wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these power can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which they seek to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would. Chatterjee that even these power can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which they seek to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would. confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which was available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notice and circulars is to take recourse to section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act or seek relief, if permissible, under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act." Reliance may next he made to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantram Wadke and others. AIR 1975 SC 2238 , wherein Untwalia J , speaking for the Court, observed : "But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act, the remedy provided uno flatu in it is the exclusive remedy. The Legislature in its wisdom did not think it fit and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the rights and obligations created under the Act." The question for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobile's case (supra) was regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court in :elation to the rights or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act for which the remedy was provided in that Act itself and in answer to that question, it was laid down that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was, by necessary implication. barred. His Lordship Untwalia J., also observed that, it does not follow........ that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer." 11. Bhagwati J., in Nirmla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal and Others. AIR 1957 SC 329 , observed : "There is no warrant for the suggestion that such discretion will be exercised by the appropriate Government arbitrarily or capriciously or so as to prejudice the interests of any of the parties concerned ........... We are of opinion in that there is no substance in the contention urged before its that the relevant provisions of the Act and in particular Section 10 thereof are unconstitutional and void as infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution." 12. Three Full Bench decisions on the point may also be noticed. Three Full Bench decisions on the point may also be noticed. Prem Chand Jain, Acting C.J. in Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab and another, 1983 Lab I.C. 1763 stated : "I fail to understand as to how will it cease to he a remedy simply because the matter of reference depends upon the opinion of the Government .....Thus the remedy provided to a workman giving him right to claim a reference under Section 10 of the Act for the redress of his grievance is certainly an alternative remedy and does ordinarily bar the filing of a writ petition." 13. S S. Sandhawalia C.J., in Dinesh Prasad and others v. State of Bihar and others (1985)1 LLJ 343 , speaking for the Full Bench, stated: "Even a bird's eye view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder can leave little manner of doubt that this statute fashions new industrial rights for the workmen and spells out specific remedies for the enforcement thereof........It is manifest that these rights under the Act are by and large the creatures of the statute and granted by the mandate of the Legislature .......Therefore, on the well-established two flatu rule the right and remedy are irrevocably married and are not to be divorced from each other." 14. The majority judgment of G M. Lodha and K.S. Sidjhu JJ, in Bhannwar Lal etc. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Another. 1984 RLR 619 . answered question No. 6 as follows : "The cumulative effect of Sections 10 and 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is that normally, they create a bar to the entertainment of a writ petition for relief against contravention of provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act. but that bar is subject to the exceptions made in para 170 of the current judgment. but that bar is subject to the exceptions made in para 170 of the current judgment. Thus, this Court can entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the termination of services in exceptional cases specified in paragraph 170 of this judgment but not normally." The two exceptions carved out in Bhanwar Lal's case (supra) were mentioned as under : "Further, in above two categories of cases, if the Government refuses to make a reference either by not passing an order in a reasonable time, normally, two months in individual cases and fifteen days notice in cases involving several employees, together, or refuses to refer by an express order then, this Court can always interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Again, in case, the validity of any statutory provisions or rules, regulations having force of statute is challenged on the ground of violation of constitutional provision then, the applicants can file a writ directly without insiste,tce of reference........" 15. In Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antrim Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 SC 556 , his Lordship Ramaswamy J., speaking for the court, laid down the law as under:- "It is a well established proposition of law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant he should be required to persue that remedy and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true tit it the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. But as observed by this Court in Rasheed Ahmed v. Manicipal Board (AIR 1960 SC 163) , the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such a remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition unless there are good grounds therefor. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of remedy before a writ is granted is a rule of self-imposed limitation, a rule of policy and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, therefore. in exceptional cases issue a writ in its writ discretion notwithstanding the. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of remedy before a writ is granted is a rule of self-imposed limitation, a rule of policy and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, therefore. in exceptional cases issue a writ in its writ discretion notwithstanding the. fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted .......................There are at least two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under Article 226 for issuing appropriate writ for quashing them on the ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. In the second place, the doctrine has no application in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice." 16. Dealing with order of "mandamus" in Halsbury's Laws of England (Further-1973 Edition) Column 1, page 135 at para 126, it has been stated:- "The Court will, as a general rule, and in the exercise of its discretion, refuse an order of mandamus, when there is an alternative specific remedy at law which is not less convenient, beneficial and effective." 17. It would further be useful to refer to Krishna Iyer J., in the specific context of the Industrial Disputes Act, in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industrial Staff Union (1976-1 LLJ 274) when he observed : "But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, other to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a China shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extra-ordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and it potent drug should be judiciously administered........It is held that the suitor must exhaust the remedies under the Act before seeking relief in the writ jurisdiction. unless the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry out for interference by the writ court at the very threshold." 18. The mentor of law is justice and it potent drug should be judiciously administered........It is held that the suitor must exhaust the remedies under the Act before seeking relief in the writ jurisdiction. unless the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry out for interference by the writ court at the very threshold." 18. It cannot be accepted that because the remedy provided by section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a remedy as a m trier of right, it is no alternative remedy. Similar argument was rejected by their Lordship; of the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal & ors. ( AIR 1957 SC 329 ) , and in Premier Automobiles case, AIR 1475 SC 2238 . It was vocally pronounced that "it does not follow from all this that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer." Gajendragadkar CJ., clearly said that. "there is no scope for the argument that the appropriate Government would be in a position to discriminate one party and the other. There is no warrant for the suggestion that the discretion will be exercised by the appropriate Government arbitrarily or capriciously or so as to prejudice the interests of any of the parties concerned." 19. It is true that the power of the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act is administrative power and not a judicial or quasi-judicial power. Law laid down in Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Saugh and another v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1989 SC 1665 would very well safeguard the interests of the "aggrieved" against executive arbitrariness. In this case, Dutt J., observed : "It is now well settled that while exercising power tinder Section 10 (1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by Section 10 of the Act. It is true that in considering the question of making a reference under Section 10 (1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended", as urged by Mr. Shantz Bhushan. It is true that in considering the question of making a reference under Section 10 (1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended", as urged by Mr. Shantz Bhushan. The formation of opinion as t. whether an industrial dispute ,,exists or is apprehended" is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits .......In considering the question whether a reference should be made or not, the Government have held that the convoy drivers are not workmen and, accordingly, no reference can be made, thus the dispute has been decided by the Government which is, undoubtedly not permissible. There can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute. Whereas, in the instant case, the dispute is whether the persons raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same cannot he decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative function under Section 10 (I) of the Act. As has been held in M. P. Irrigation Karmachari Sangh's, case (AIR 1955 SC 860) there may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Further the Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and the Court will always. he vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the power of the Tribunal for adjudication of the valid disputes, and that to allow the Government to do so would be to render Section 10 and Section 12 (5) of the Act nugatory. As the Government has persistently declined to make a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act. we think that we should direct the Government to make such a reference. As the Government has persistently declined to make a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act. we think that we should direct the Government to make such a reference. In several instances, this Court had to direct the Government to make a reference under Section 10 (I) when the Government had declined to make such a reference and this Court was of the view that such a reference should have been made (see Sankari Cement Atal Thozhiladar Munnetra Sangam v. Government of Tamilnadu (1983) 1 Lab L. J. 460 , Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1985 SC 915 ) , M. P. Irrigation Karmachari Singh v. State of M. P. ( AIR 1985 SC 860 ) , Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1984 SC 1619 ) ." 20. The entire matter has been dealt with by rile in detail in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 625 of 1989 Mahendra Nath Sharma v. Co-operative Societies and Another and other connected writ petitions, decided on October 26, 1959. 21. In these forty-four writ petitions, the petitioners have complained of violation of Section 25-N of the Act by the respondents. Sub-section (I) of Section 25-N of the Act reads as under : "(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until, (a) the workman has been given three months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may he specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority has been obtained on an application made in this behalf." By virtue of Section 25-S of the Act, the provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-D, 25-FF, 25-Fl and 25-J in Chapter V-A apply, so far as may be. also in relation to an industrial establishment to which the provisions of this Chapter apply. also in relation to an industrial establishment to which the provisions of this Chapter apply. It may be mentioned that provisions of Chapter V-B of the Act apply to an industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. It is pertinent to note that section 25-N uses the words --industrial establishment" and not the word "industry" as used in Section 25-F. rite expression "industrial establishment" for the purpose of Chapter V-B has been defined by Section 25-L of the Act as meaning : (i) it factory as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948); (ii) a mine as defined in Clause (j) of Section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952); or (iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951) Clearly, the establishment in the instant case is neither it mine nor a plantation. One of the question that would come for consideration before Section 25-N can be said to be applicable would be whether the establishment in question is a "factory" ai defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Factory, according to Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 means ,any premises including the precincts thereof-(i) wherein ten or mare workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. This is essentially a question of fact to be determined whether there is any premises including the precincts thereof in any part of which manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on. Without that, it is not possible to hold that the establishment or undertaking in the instant case is 'factory" as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948). Without that, it is not possible to hold that the establishment or undertaking in the instant case is 'factory" as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948). It is true that by virtue of Section 25-S of the Act, the provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-D, 25-FF, 25-G, 25-J in Chapter V-A apply in relation to industrial establishment to which the provisions of Chapter V-B apply, but the question ultimately rests on the determination whether the establishment or undertaking in the instant case is an -industrial establishment" within the meaning of the expression as defined in Section 25-L of the Act or not. 22. If Chapter V-B would not apply, then the petitioners would fall back on Section 25-F of the Act contained in Chapter V-A relating to retrenchment of workmen. It would in that connection fall for consideration whether it would be a case of an undertaking closing down and would be governed by the provision, contained in Sections 25-FFA and 25-FFF of the Act. It would then be very relevant to consider whether the construction work in each unit or at each site is an undertaking" by itself or there is functional integrality so as to make all construction work, undertaken (whether completed, continuing or to be undertaken in future), for all purposes, parts of one establishment and that the workmen were mutually transferable from one unit or work to the other. In this respect, law laid down in Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, Bombay and others (1987) 1 LLJ 427 would govern the matter. In that connection, prove,o (b) to Section 25-FFA and Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-FF of the Act would have also to be taken into account. The provision contained in the former reads as under : "Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to- ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... .... ... (b) an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canal, dams or for other construction work of project." The latter provision states : "(2) Where any undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges. roads, canals, dams or other construction work is closed down on account of the work within two years from the date on which the under- taking had been set up. roads, canals, dams or other construction work is closed down on account of the work within two years from the date on which the under- taking had been set up. no workmen employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under Clause (h) of Section 25-F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two tears, he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months." 23. It may be noticed that in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, 1980 II LLJ 72 , it was la-d down that if the termination of service of a workman in a given case falls either tinder Section 25-FF or under Section 25-FFF of the Act, it Mould not be a termination falling under Section 25-F of the Act. The Supreme Court has observed in Santosh Gupta's case (supra) that after the enactment of Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF retrenchment included every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in Section 25-F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act as Sections 25-FF and 25-FFF. Hence, if the case is one of genuine closure then the question of applying Section 25-G of the Act which is applicable to a case of retrenchment would not arts:. 24. It would appear from the above discussion that the rights and obligations which the petitioners, in all these forty four writ petitions, are seeking to enforce owe their creation to the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 and for the enforcement of them conciliatory and adjudicator' machinery is completely, provided in the Act itself. The alternative remedy provided in the At is adequate and equally efficacious. Various matters also do necessitate findings of fact on certain material questions. This Court would not, therefore, go beyond self-imposed limitations, rules of policy and discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 126 of the Constitution. There are no exceptional circumstances in these cases justifying entertainment of these writ petitions without asking the petitioner to first exhaust the alternative remedy provided by the Act itself. 25. On this ground alone, all these forty four writ petitions are refused to be entertained and are disposed o, accordingly.Petitions not entertained. *******