JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This group of petitions is being disposed of by a common judgment as the controversy involved therein is identical. The petitioners are directed against a notification dated 7-10-1989 issued by the State Government in the purported exercise of powers under C/s. 7, 8 and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966 imposing a condition in respect of Khandsari Units. The condition imposed is that these units will not commence sugarcane crushing operations before the 25th December, 1989. The various petitioners who are licenced khandsari units contend that the notification is liable to be struck down as being beyond the jurisdiction of the State Government and at any rate the condition imposed (hereunder places as unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to engage in the manufacture of khandsari sugar from sugarcane juice in their units, thereby violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 2. The case of the petitioners is that they are engaged in the business of manufacturing khandsari sugar by open pan process and for that purpose they were granted yearly licence under the U.P. Khandsari Sugar Manufactures Licencing Order 1967. In the licence issued to them this year, however, a condition was imposed stating that they will not start crushing sugarcane before the 25th December, 1989, even though under the aforesaid Licencing Order of 1967 the licencing year means the period beginning first of October in any year and ending on 30th September following year. On enquiry, it was revealed that this was done in pursuance of a telex dated 22-9-1989 issued by the State Government directing that a condition be imposed in the licenses of the khandsari units for the current year, i.e. 1989-90 that they will not commence, crushing operations before the 25th December. 3. Challenging the above telex dated 22-9-1989, these petitioners and others filed writ petitions in this Court which were entertained and an interim order was granted staying the operation of the offending condition referred to above. Aggrieved by this interim order the Sugar Mills approached the Supreme Court which stayed the operation of the interim order. Subsequently, when the circular was replaced by the notification dated 7-10-1989, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court as having become infrutuous. Thereafter fresh petitions were filed in this Court challenging the notification. 4. Aggrieved by this interim order the Sugar Mills approached the Supreme Court which stayed the operation of the interim order. Subsequently, when the circular was replaced by the notification dated 7-10-1989, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court as having become infrutuous. Thereafter fresh petitions were filed in this Court challenging the notification. 4. It is in the background that these petitions have come up for admission before us. As the crucial date, namely, the 25th December, 1989 is drawing close we decided to dispose of these petitions finally after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri S. P. Gupta and Shri Sudhir Chandra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Sugar Mills who were permitted to intervene in these proceedings as well as of the learned Standing Counsel for the State. It is apparent that the matter is one of urgency for both the parties in view of the fact that the ban imposed on the khandsari units will automatically stand lifted after the 25th December, 1989 when they would be free to engage in crushing operations for the rest of the season. 5. The first and the principal contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that impugned notification is without jurisdiction. The ground urged was that the State Government has no power to curtail the licensing year prescribed by the U.P. Khandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order 1967 (the Licencing Order of 1967 for short). That power it was urged if at all belongs to the Licensing Authority under the licensing Order 1967. 6. We are unable to agree. In order to appreciate the contention, it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant statutes. In the exercise of the powers conferred under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government made an order called the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966. Cl. 6 of this Order provides. inter alia. that the Central Government may by order notified in the official Gazette reserve any area where sugarcane is grown for factory having regard to the crushing capacity of the factory as well as of the availability of sugarcane in the area. Under Cl. 7, the Central Government is authorised to make an order directing that the power crushers or a khandsari units shall not be worked except and in accordance with the licence issued by the Central Government. Under Cl. 7, the Central Government is authorised to make an order directing that the power crushers or a khandsari units shall not be worked except and in accordance with the licence issued by the Central Government. The next important provision is Cl. 8 of this Control Order which provides : "Power to issue Directions to Producers of Khandsari Sugar. Power Crushers Khandsari Units, Crushers and Co-operative Societies. The Central Government may from time to time by general or special order, issue directions to any producer or khandsari sugarcane or owner of a power-crusher, khandsari unit or crusher or the agent of such producer of owner or a co-operative society, regarding the purchase of sugarcane or sugarcane juice, production maintenance of stocks, storage, price, packing, payment disposal, delivery and distribution of sugarcane, gurgul, jaggery and rab or khandsari sugar of the period of hours to be worked". Under Cl. II the Central Government is empowered to delegate all or any of its power conferred upon it under the Control Order 1967 on State Government or any Officer or authority of the State Government. Acting under this clause. the Central Government had delegated its powers under C/s. 6. 7. 8 and 9 on the State Government. Exercising powers under this delegation the State Government made an order called the Uttar Pradesh Khandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order 1967 (the Licensing Order of 1967, for short). Under this Order licensing year means the period beginning on the first day of October in any year and ending on the filth September the next following. Then there is all important Cl. 4 which provides: "Period for which licences are to be issued-- A license granted or renewed under this Order shall be subject to the conditions prescribed in the form of license set out in Schedule I and be valid for the entire licensing year or any part thereof as indicated in the licence by the Licencing Authority." In the First Schedule of this order. the conditions subject to which licence is granted have been prescribed. 7. The impugned Notification dated 7-10-1989 has been issued by the State Government under Cis. 7, S and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966. As the entire submissions of the learned counsel have centered round this notification, the same is being extracted here in extenso : "Notification Miscellaneous No. 982 S/Ohi-U-Anu-1/89 Dated : Lucknow : October 7, 1989. 7. The impugned Notification dated 7-10-1989 has been issued by the State Government under Cis. 7, S and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966. As the entire submissions of the learned counsel have centered round this notification, the same is being extracted here in extenso : "Notification Miscellaneous No. 982 S/Ohi-U-Anu-1/89 Dated : Lucknow : October 7, 1989. Whereas, the power to regulate the manufacture of Khandsari Sugar by open Oab process including bets exercised by the Central Government under Cis. 7, 8 and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 has been delegated to the State Government under Cl. I of the said order vide Ministry of Food and-Agriculture (Department of Food) Government of India, Notification No. GSR- 1127/KSS COM/Sugarcane, dated July 16, 1966. Government of India, Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies. New Delhi vide GO 4- 12/ 89-SPY(D.II) dated 14-9-1989 has directed to all sugar producing States that where ever necessary Khandsari units/power crushers operating in the reserved areas of the Sugar factories may not be allowed to commence crushing operations before 1st January, 1990. Since the 90% Khandsari units in the State are established in the reserved areas of Sugar Mills. So now, therefore, in exercise of the powers delegated to the State Government as aforesaid, the Government of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to make the order under Cl. 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Khandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order 1967 the period of crushing season shall be from 25th December, 1989 till 30th September, 1990. By Order (Karnail Singh) Special Secretary." 8. Sri Rishi Ram who led the arguments for the petitioners submitted that inasmuch as the notification purports to curtail the licensing year or period prescribed under the licensing Order of 1967. the same must be struck down as incompetent as it is only the Licensing Authority which could legally exercise that power. 9. We cannot accept the argument. The power of the State Government to make an order under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966 to restrict the period of crushing of khandsari unit is an independent power not controlled or hedged in by the jurisdiction of the Licensing Authority to curtail the licensing year in terms of Cl. 4 of the Licensing Order of 1967. The State Government has not issued the notification under the licensing Order of 1967 or under Cl. 4 of the Licensing Order of 1967. The State Government has not issued the notification under the licensing Order of 1967 or under Cl. 4 therein but in the exercise of its plenary legislative functions conferred upon it under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order to issue a direction to any khandsari unit or owner of a power crusher regarding purchase, disposal, delivery and distribution of Sugarcane and even the period and working hours of khandsari units and power crusher etc. This power has nothing whatsoever to do with the duration of a licensing year. The fact that Khandsari unit holds a license granted to it under the Licensing Order of 1967 which is valid for the period mentioned in the licenses does not entitle the unit to insist on unrestricted supply of sugarcane throughout that period. The license is subject to the restrictions which may be imposed under other legislations like the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966 as well as the U.P. Restriction on Sugarcane Purchase Order 1966 which has also been made under Cls. 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966. Under this Purchase Order a person who holds a license under the Licensing Order of 1967 is enjoined to obtain a permit and the Cane Commissioner has been authorised to restrict, having regard to the availability of sugarcane and the requirement of the sugarcane of a Sugar Factory for which the area has been reserved both the period as well as the working hours of the khandsari units. 10. We, however, need not dilate on this matter further as the question whether under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control), Order, the State Government can impose a condition such as has been imposed in the present case, namely, that the Khandsari units and power crusher shall not engage in crushing operations prior to a particular date falling within the licensing year is no longer res integra. It stands concluded by two decisions of the Supreme Court, which is directly in point, in the case of M/s. Laxmi Khansari v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 . In this case the Cane Commissioner of Uttar Pradesh acting as a delegate of the Central Government had issued a notification under Cl. It stands concluded by two decisions of the Supreme Court, which is directly in point, in the case of M/s. Laxmi Khansari v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 . In this case the Cane Commissioner of Uttar Pradesh acting as a delegate of the Central Government had issued a notification under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order directing that no owner of a power crusher or a Khandsari unit shall in any reserved area of any Sugar Mill work the power crusher or Khandsari unit prior to December 1, 1980. Their Lordships held that under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order such a direction could be issued, that is, a temporary suspension of the working of the power crusher or khandsari units could be lawfully effected under Cl. 8 and that such a temporary suspension of the working of the khandsari units or power crushers did not amount to revocation, partial or total of the license granted to the petitioners under Licensing Order. The validity of the notification was upheld notwithstanding the fact that the khandsari units held a license which was operative for/entire season. Their Lordships also rejected the contention that Cl. 8 did not contemplate a complete prohibition of the production of an article but only contemplated a mere regulation of the period or working hours of the units (See paragraph 64 of the aforesaid judgment). 11. The next contention was that the impugned notification purports to amend Cl. 4 of the Licensing Order of 1967 by merely defining or redefining the crushing period as extending from 25th December, 1989 to 30th September, 1990 which could not legally be done as the terms "period of crushing" or "crushing season" do not find mention in the Licensing Order. In the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 the term "crushing season" has been defined as the period beginning on the 1st of October in any year and ending on the 15th July next following. That definition could not be amended by the State Government by means of a notification issued under the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1956. 12. We regret the argument suffers from a basic fallacy. The impugned notification does not directly or indirectly attempt to amend the provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act 1953. Nor does it purport to define crushing season. 12. We regret the argument suffers from a basic fallacy. The impugned notification does not directly or indirectly attempt to amend the provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act 1953. Nor does it purport to define crushing season. It merely imposes a restriction on the period of crushing and provides that it shall be from 25th December, 1989 till 30-9-1990. Such a condition could be validly imposed by the State Government in the exercise of its undoubted- powers conferred upon it under Cls. 7. 8 and 9 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order. Indeed, the State Government need not have made any reference at all to Cl. 4 of the Licensing Order 1967 in the impugned Order, appears to have been made as it talks of conditions of licence and the object behind the impugned notification was to impose a restriction on the licence holders that they will not commence crushing prior to 25th, December. This will be apparent by reading the impugned notification and the G.O. dated 14-9-1989 issued by the Central Government together. So read there will be no manner of doubt that when the notification stated that under Cl. 4 the crushing season shall be from 25th December, 1989 till 30-9-1990 it meant neither more nor less that the Khandsari units and power crusher shall not commence crushing operations prior to 25th December, 1989 which direction could clearly be issued without amending the Licensing Order of 1967. 13. Referring to the provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act 1953 and the U.P. Restriction on Sugarcane Purchase Order 1966 etc. Sri Sunil Ambawani learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that the scheme emerging from these legislations do not envisage issue of any general direction operative throughout the State prohibiting khandsari units and power crushers from carrying on crushing operations for any specified period. On the contrary, it is argued, such a power can be exercised only after assessment of the requirements of sugarcane grown in any particular area reserved or assigned for any sugar Mill as well as the availability of sugarcane in that area. The impugned action is hence liable to be struck down in this very ground. 13A. We regret our inability to accept the contention. There may be a variety of circumstances which may legitimately warrant issue of an order of general application. The impugned action is hence liable to be struck down in this very ground. 13A. We regret our inability to accept the contention. There may be a variety of circumstances which may legitimately warrant issue of an order of general application. Examples of such contingency are a National crisis arising from drought pervading the entire State or otherwise resulting in fall of sugar production and sugar reserves maintained by the State becoming depleted and the like. We see absolutely no reason why such an Order having application throughout the State or Country for that matter cannot be passed to meet the crisis. The argument need, however, not detain us in view of the fact that a similar notification issued by the Cane Commissioner in 1980 under materially identical circumstances, namely, the Country facing an acute shortage of sugar, and order issued by the Cane Commissioner under Cl. 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order was upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Laxmi Khandsari (supra). That was also an instance of a general order. The decision, in our opinion, completely concludes this part of the controversy. 14. That takes us to the next ground of challenge to the notification urged by Sri Ambwani. It was argued that it places an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioner to do business which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In considering this aspect we must remember that sugar is an essential commodity and the impugned action has been taken obtensibly to augment sugar production so that sugar is, made available to the consumers at a reasonable price. The other thing which must be borne in mind is that the impugned notification does not have the effect of ousting the Khandsari units altogether. It merely, suspends their right to engage in crushing operations fora limited period, i.e. only up to 25th December 1989, where after they would be free to continue their operations for the rest of the season which extends up to 30th September 1990. It is hardly necessary to remind that the considerations which are taken into account in judging the validity of regulatory measures adopted by the State in regard to an essential commodity are materially different from those which maybe relevant in the case of other commodities or businesses. 15. It is these perspective that we proceed to examine the contention. It is hardly necessary to remind that the considerations which are taken into account in judging the validity of regulatory measures adopted by the State in regard to an essential commodity are materially different from those which maybe relevant in the case of other commodities or businesses. 15. It is these perspective that we proceed to examine the contention. 16. The impugned notification has been issued in pursuance of a Central Government Order dated 14-9-1989 (referred to in the notification). A copy of that G.O. was produced before us. The G.O. dated 14-9-1989 issued by the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, the Government of India, states that the consumption requirement of sugar has outstripped its production during the last several years causing a heavy strain on sugar stocks and its availability. So much so that the Government has had to import sugar during several seasons. This gave rise to speculative tendency and hoarding etc. leading undue rise in prices of sugar, a specially in the last few months.' Concerned efforts must, therefore, be made to augment sugar production to bridge the gap between production and the requirements. The G.O. I further states that for giving a boost to sugar production it was imperative that sugar factories are enabled to crush maximum sugarcane necessitating earmarking of adequate quantities of sugarcane and preventing diversion of reserved sugarcane to Gur and Khandsari units. With these objects the G.O. suggested certain measures to the Sugar producing States such as : (i) Avoidance of unhealthy competition amongst manufacturers of sweeting agents and ensuring regular and adequate supplies of sugarcane to the sugar factories; (ii) clear demarcation of reserved area for each sugar factory; (iii) requiring sugar factory to draw all its registered sugarcane within its reserved areas fist before embarking on purchase of auditional supplies of sugarcane from other areas; (iv) barring the existing Khandsari units from encroaching beyond their assigned areas; (v) wherever necessary Khandsari units/power crushers operating in the reserved areas of the sugar factory may not be allowed to commence crushing operations before 1st January 1990. 17. The G.O. ended with a request to the State Government to implement these suggestions vigorously so that sugar production be maximised in the coming season. 18. 17. The G.O. ended with a request to the State Government to implement these suggestions vigorously so that sugar production be maximised in the coming season. 18. It was on the basis of these suggestions that the State Government issued the impugned notification but instead of fixing 1st January 1990 as 'the date of commencement of crushing operations for the khandsari units/power crushers, the State Government fixed 25th December 1989. 19. We think that this G.O. of the Central Government clearly warranted a review of the policy by the State Government, U.P. being undeniably one of the largest sugar producing States of country. This Court can lawfully take judicial notice of the unprecedented price rise in sugar and of the fact that huge quantities of sugar were imported by the Government for meeting the demand. The need for augmenting production of sugar and building sugar reserves in the country and the further need for ensuring adequate and regular supply of sugarcane to sugar mills can, therefore, hardly be over-emphasised. 20. Further in the case of M/s. Laxmi Khandsari, (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the economics of Sugar Industry of the country in considerable depth and came to the conclusion that Khandsari units and power crushers were in an advantageous position (sic) and therefore, were able to purchase sugarcane at a much higher price thereby out competing the sugar mills (set paragraph 38 of that judgment). The Supreme Court further found that the consumption of sugar produced by the factories was by far considerably larger than demand for Khandsari and Gur etc. Another finding was that the recovery of Sugar from sugarcane in the case of sugar factories was much higher than that of khandsari units and consequently the requirement of sugarcane by sugar factories was considerably larger. For these reasons it was essential that the sugar factories who were unlike khandsari units and power crushers subject to both excise duty and levy apart from other State controls like compulsion to pay statutorily fixed minimum price for sugarcane stood in need of being assigned a continued an adequate supply of sugarcane. The Supreme Court further held that the impugned action was hence necessary to prevent diversion of sugarcane to khandsari units and power crushers and therefore, the restriction placed by the Cane Commissioner was reasonable being calculated to serve larger public interest. 21. The Supreme Court further held that the impugned action was hence necessary to prevent diversion of sugarcane to khandsari units and power crushers and therefore, the restriction placed by the Cane Commissioner was reasonable being calculated to serve larger public interest. 21. We are of, the opinion that having regard to all these facts and circumstances, the restriction imposed by the impugned notification barring the khandsari units and power crushers from doing crushing operations before 25th December 1989 was perfectly reasonable and it bears a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, namely, to reduce the shortage of sugar and ensure a more equitable distribution of the commodity. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that the current year is going to witness bumper crop and therefore, there was no need to exclude the crushers. It is not possible to pronounce on the correctness of this assertion without calling for a counter-affidavit from the State which having regard to the fact that major part of the period for which the restriction was to apply has already run out and to the further fact that though the notification was issued on 7-10-1989 the petitioners did not choose to challenge the same unit the end of November, does not seem feasible. It would not the right and proper to postpone the hearing of this petition so as to enable the respondents to file their counter-affidavits. Only 19 days are left now when the ban will stand lifted. Further it is not possible to assess on the material furnished by the petitioners to what extent would the allegations made by the petitioners in this behalf affect the validity of the decision of the Government. For all these reasons we would proceed on the basis of the presumption of constitutionality of the impugned legislative measure and dispose of the petition on that on the broad facts noticed by us herein above justifying the issue of the notification. 23. This brings us to the contention whether the impugned notification is liable to be struck down on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 23. This brings us to the contention whether the impugned notification is liable to be struck down on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. The contention need no however, detain us as in the case of Laxmi Khandsari, (supra), the Supreme Court has negatived that plea on the ground that an order made under the Sugarcane (Control) Order is essentially legislative in character and therefore, it rules out the requirement of a hearing. Sri Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for one of the petitioners, however, sought to invoke the principles of natural justice by relying on the words "wherever necessary Khandsari Units/Power Crushers..........may not be allowed to commence crushing operations before 1st January 1990". He argued that the expression "wherever necessary" necessarily implies an assessment of local requirements and consequently some hearing should have been allowed to the Khandsari Units before taking the impugned action. We do not think that the expression "wherever necessary" has the effect of altering the basic character of the impugned action which was as mentioned above legislative. If the action was legislative in character, the State Government could form an opinion as to the need for such an action on the material collected by it without inviting any hearing from the parties affected by the proposed legislative measure. 24. Sri Rishi Ram also submitted that the impugned notification can have no application where the power crushers or khandsari units desired to crush sugarcane grown by it. He submitted that to prevent the khandsari units to crush even such sugarcane would he plainly unjust and unreasonable. 25. The contention stands negatived by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Laxmi Khandsari, (supra) in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the judgment (at page 890). Their Lordships observed thus: "A very attractive argument was submitted before-us by Mr. Gupta appearing for some of the owners of power crushers. It was submitted that so far as the petitioners represented by him we concerned, the were growing sugarcane in their own fields and had installed power crushers in their own land though the said land fell within reserved area. It was argued that the petitioners fell in a separate category and Government could not compel them to sup sugarcane to the mills instead of using the sugarcane grown by them in their own crushers. It was argued that the petitioners fell in a separate category and Government could not compel them to sup sugarcane to the mills instead of using the sugarcane grown by them in their own crushers. An apparent snag in this argument is that if in the larger public interest it becomes necessary to compel the sugarcane growers to supply sugarcane to the mills at a particular rate in order to meet a national crisis, no person can be heard to say that his rights, are taken away in an unjust or discriminatory fashion.......Personal or individual interests must valid to the larger interests of the community. This is exactly the philosophy behind the passing of the Act of 1955. Merely because the petitioners are growing sugarcane in their own fields and own power crushers, therefore, they cannot be treated as a class separate from the other owners of power crushers situated within the reserved area of the mills." 26. The other submission raised by Sri Rishi Ram was that the preamble of the notification under challenge clearly shows that the intention of the State Government was to rope-in only those khandsari units which are established in the reserved areas of sugar mills and not those falling outside. No doubt. the preamble of the impugned notification does seem to lead support to Sri Rishi Ram's contention. But in the operative portion of the notification the State Government has not excepted the Khandsari units power crushers which are located Outside the reserved areas of Sugar Mills. That being so it is not possible to hold that the impugned notification exempts khandsari units lying beyond the reserved areas. Further in the C.O. dated 14-9-1989 issued by the Central Government the recommendation is that the sugar factories should be required to draw all its registered sugarcane within its reserved areas before purchasing additional supplies of sugarcane. Sri S.P. Gupta appearing for the Sugar Mills submitted that it is not that the Sugar Mills do not and cannot purchase sugar from outside the reserved areas and it is for this reason that the State Government has applied the ban to all the khandsari units. 27. We express no opinion on the contention of Mr. Gupta. Sri S.P. Gupta appearing for the Sugar Mills submitted that it is not that the Sugar Mills do not and cannot purchase sugar from outside the reserved areas and it is for this reason that the State Government has applied the ban to all the khandsari units. 27. We express no opinion on the contention of Mr. Gupta. Be that as it may, on the language of the operative portion of the notification as it stands, no case for grant of any relief in respect of khandsari units/power crushers operating outside the reserved areas has been made out. These units and crushers are, however, left free to approach the State Government for clarification of the impugned notification and if they do so the State Government should consider and dispose of their representations at the earliest. We should not, however, be taken to have expressed any opinion on whether a case for clarification exists. That is a matter which the State Government shall consider. 28. Another submission advanced by Sri Rishi Ram was that the impugned notification should be held not to apply to manufacture of Gur We do not agree with this contention. The ban is on crushing for any purpose whatsoever prior to the 25th of December 1989. The circumstances adverted to here in- above as justifying the imposition of the ban vis-a-vis khandsari units and power crushers apply with equal validity to those engaged in the manufacture of both. As mentioned, the chief aim was to prevent diversion of sugarcane into channels other than sugar factories for it limited period so as to give a boost to sugar production with a view to ensure equitable distribution of sugar to consumers throughout the country. 29. Sri Rishi Ram, lastly submitted that the offending condition was inserted in the license of the petitioners in pursuance of the aforesaid telex dated 22nd September 1989 and consequently when the telex was rescinded the conditions, must also be deemed to have been deleted from the licence. The submission is devoid of any substance. The condition complained of operates in virtue of the notification by its own force. 30. Sri R.H. Zaidi submitted that the impugned notification suffers from the vice of discrimination and is hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged that the Sugar Mills have been shown an undue favour as the ban does not apply to them. The condition complained of operates in virtue of the notification by its own force. 30. Sri R.H. Zaidi submitted that the impugned notification suffers from the vice of discrimination and is hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged that the Sugar Mills have been shown an undue favour as the ban does not apply to them. The submission has no merit' and indeed stands answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Khandsari (supra). Their Lordships held that there was a solid distinction between Sugar Mills and crushers and the distinction was real and rational. There was hence no question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 42 to 56 of the judgment in M/s. Laxmi Khandsari, (supra)). 31. Another submission raised by some of the learned counsel was that under the proviso to S. 3(1)(b) of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act 1961, a khandsari unit has been given the option to pay tax on the quantity of sugarcane on an assumed basis. In cases where such an option has been exercised on the basis of assumption that the sugarcane would be made available to the petitioners throughout the season, to impose a ban subsequently denying them the right to do the crushing operations for a part of the season would be plainly unjust and unreasonable. We find no merit in the argument. The provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act cannot control 'the power of the State Government to issue the appropriate direction with regard to the period of crushing under the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966. 32. Lastly, some of the petitioners submitted that in the case of Bajaj Hindustan Sugar Mills which was lying closed, the U.P. Government has by an order dated 11-11-1989 exempted the khandsari units from the operation of the impugned Government Order whereas the Sugar Mills in the reserved area in which the petitioners' units are situate are also lying closed but the petitioners have not been similarly exempted. 33. The submission raises a question of fact as to whether the Sugar Mills in whose reserved areas the petitioners units are located are lying closed or not. 33. The submission raises a question of fact as to whether the Sugar Mills in whose reserved areas the petitioners units are located are lying closed or not. If, however, those Sugar Mills are lying closed, the appropriate remedy of the petitioners would be to approach the Government by way of representation for similar exemption and if they do so the Government may dispose of the representation expeditiously, if possible, within a week of the submission of the representation. 34. With these observations, the petitions are dismissed. The interim orders, if any, stand discharge.