Judgment :- I. This appeal is against the judgment of the learned single judge dismissing the appellant's writ petition, O.P.No. 976 of I987. The relevant facts may briefly be stated as follows: The appellant was appointed as a Hindi Language Full Time Teacher in the L.M.S. Upper Primary School from 7-9-I982 to I5-11-I982. The said appointment was duly approved by the educational authorities. She came to be relieved from the said post with effect from I5-11-I982 for want of vacancy. As there was thus approved service to her credit and her services came to be terminated for want of vacancy, she became a protected teacher entitled to the benefit of R.51A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules, for short, the Rules When a vacancy of a Full Time Hindi Teacher occurred on the 16th August, I984 she was duly appointed to that post in recognition of the rights she had earned as a protected teacher. So far as the 2nd respondent is concerned, he was appointed as a Hindi Language teacher when the school in question had not been upgraded as Upper Primary School but had only the status of a lower primary school between I-9-1972 to 30-3-1973. The appointment was made by the Manager even though no post of a Hindi teacher was sanctioned in the said Lower Primary School. Hence the question of approving the said appointment by the educational authorities did not arise. Again the second respondent was appointed by the manager between 22-8-1973 and 30-10-1975 in the said school as Hindi language teacher. This appointment was also not against any sanctioned vacancy and the question of approving the said appointment did not arise. When such was the position, the 2nd respondent presented a petition on the 16th July, 1981 to the State Government to direct regularisation of his appointment as Hindi Language teacher, having regard to the fact that he had worked as Hindi language teacher on the strength of the appointment made by the manager during the two periods referred to above. The said representation was considered by the Govt. and an order, now produced by the Government as Ext. R(I)(a) bearing No.G.O (Rt)No. 4056/83/G.Edn. dated 28-II-I983, was passed. The Government felt that if the appointment of the 2nd respondent is approved, he could claim protection under R.51A of the Rules for appointment as Hindi Language Teacher in the L.M.S. U.P. School. The said representation was considered by the Govt. and an order, now produced by the Government as Ext. R(I)(a) bearing No.G.O (Rt)No. 4056/83/G.Edn. dated 28-II-I983, was passed. The Government felt that if the appointment of the 2nd respondent is approved, he could claim protection under R.51A of the Rules for appointment as Hindi Language Teacher in the L.M.S. U.P. School. The Government order, Ext. R(I)(a) reads thus: "In the petition read as first paper above, Sri. A. Baultus, formerly Hindi Teacher, L.M.S. L.P.S. Kodankara has requested Government that his appointment in the above school with effect from I-9-1972 to 30-10-1975 may be approved. Sri Baultus was appointed as a part-time Hindi Teacher in L.M.S. L.P.S. Kodankara initially with effect from 1-9-1972 to 20-10-1972. He was appointed in the school again with effect from 22-8-1973 and he continued there till 20-9-1975. According to R.3(2) (h) of Chapter II, K.E.R. L.P. schools having standard V attached to them are not eligible for the post of Hindi teachers. The above provision was included in the K.E.R. with effect from 5-6-1972. The school in which the petitioner was appointed was an L.P. school and he was appointed by the manager since the introduction of the above rule and hence the appointment of the teacher was not approved by the department. The petitioner has pointed out the case of one Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma who was appointed along with him on the same date i.e. on 1-9-1972 in the L.M.S.L. P.S. Muttakkad, another school under the same management and got her appointment approved by Govt. as per G.O.Rt. 3845/80/G.Edn. dated 29-I2-I980. He has therefore requested that his appointment may also be approved as in the case of Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma. Sri Baultus possessed S.S.L.C. Rashtra Bhasha Visarad, Rashtra Bhasha Praveen and Hindi Pracharak diploma, the qualifications required for HSA (Hindi) at the time of his appointment and hence he is better qualified than Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma. The only difference between them is that the latter continued in the school without approval and the former left the school as no post was sanctioned. Govt. have examined the matter in consultation with the Director of Public Instruction. The case of Sri. Baultus is more or less similar to that of Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma. Sri. The only difference between them is that the latter continued in the school without approval and the former left the school as no post was sanctioned. Govt. have examined the matter in consultation with the Director of Public Instruction. The case of Sri. Baultus is more or less similar to that of Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma. Sri. Baultus was having the prescribed qualification for appointment as Lower Grade Hindi teacher and hence he was better qualified than Smt. Lalitha Bai Amma. If his appointment is approved he will get a claim under R.51A Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. for appointment as Hindi teacher in the schools under the L.M.S. management. In the circumstances and also in view of the hardship involved in the case, Government are pleased to approve the appointment of Sri. A. Baultus with effect from 1-9-1972 by allowing a part-time post of Lower Grade Hindi teacher in the L.M.S. U.P.S. Kodankara from the academic year 1972-73 as a very special case in relaxation of rules in K.E.R. with effect from 1-9-1972. The Director of Public Instruction will take immediate steps to draw and disburse the salary of the teacher." This order was given effect to by passing another order by the Government as per Ext. P1 dated 21-1-1986. The said order makes it clear that two vacancies of full-time Hindi teachers occurred in the school, one on 31-7-1984 and the other on 16-8-1984, and if further notices that there were three persons who were entitled to protection under R.51A of the Rules, namely the 2nd respondent, the 3rd respondent and the appellant. On the ground that among the three persons, the 2nd respondent had a longer approved service, it is stated that he is entitled to be accommodated in the first vacancy occurring on 31-7-1984. So far as the 2nd vacancy is concerned, the Government having found that the approved service of the appellant and the 3rd respondent being identical, the 3rd respondent has to be preferred having regard to the statutory preference available in her favour, she being older in age than the appellant. Therefore the Government directed that the second vacancy occurring on 16-8-1984 should go to the 3rd respondent. as there was no other vacancy available, it follows that the appellant, though appointed on 16-8-1984 and though the said appointment was approved by the educational authorities, had to vacate the office. 2. Therefore the Government directed that the second vacancy occurring on 16-8-1984 should go to the 3rd respondent. as there was no other vacancy available, it follows that the appellant, though appointed on 16-8-1984 and though the said appointment was approved by the educational authorities, had to vacate the office. 2. It is in this background that the appellant approach this court for appropriate relief for quashing Ext. R(1) (a) and Ext. P1 and for consequential directions. The impugned order was produced for the first time in this appeal as Ext. R(1) (a) by the Government. But the appellant had prayed for calling for the records and for quashing the said order of the Government dated 28-11-1983. The learned single judge taking into consideration the service of the 2nd respondent from 1-9-1972 to 30-3-1973 and from 22-8-1973 to 30-10-1975 held that his service is longer than the service of the appellant and the 3rd respondent and that therefore the Government was justified in making the order Ext. P1 directing that in the two vacancies occurring on 31-7-1984 and 16-8-1984 the 2nd respondent and the 3rd respondent should be accommodated displacing the appellant. 3. In this appeal challenging the judgment of the learned single judge, the Government Pleader produced the order of the State Government dated 28-11-1983 bearing G. O. Rt. 4056/83/G. Ed as Ext. R1 (a). The appellant also has produced a copy of the said order along with her affidavit. The reason for the appellant not to produce a copy of the said order in the writ petition is that it was not served on the appellant. The appellant came to know that such an order has been passed only when reliance was placed on the same in Ext. P1. The order of the State Government Ext. P1 cannot be faulted if the order Ext. R(1) (a) is legal and valid. The appellant has prayed for quashing the said order in the writ petition, though a copy of the said order was not produced along with the writ petition. We will not therefore be justified in not examining the contentions of the appellant regarding the validity of the order Ext. R(1) (a). 4. The impugned order, Ext.R(1) (a) says that it has been made in relaxation of the rules in the Kerala Education Rules. We will not therefore be justified in not examining the contentions of the appellant regarding the validity of the order Ext. R(1) (a). 4. The impugned order, Ext.R(1) (a) says that it has been made in relaxation of the rules in the Kerala Education Rules. The specific provision invoked for that purpose has not been stated either in the order or in the counter affidavits of the first respondent or the second respondent. But the stand taken by the counsel for respondents 1 and 2 before us is that the said order has been made in exercise of the power conferred by R.3 of Chapter I of the Kerala Education Rules. The said rule reads as follows: "Where the Government are satisfied that the operation of any rule under these rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, the Government may dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule to such extent and subject to such conditions as they may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner." It is clear from this provision that the Government has been conferred the power to dispense with or relax the requirements of any of the Kerala Education Rules. Such a power can be exercised only when the Government is satisfied that the operation of the particular rule causes undue hardship. It is the hardship that is caused by the operation of a particular provision that is the condition precedent for exercise of the power of dispensation or relaxation. It follows that the beneficiary can only be a person who is governed by the rules. If he is not already governed by the rules, the question of hardship being caused by the operation of the rules does not arise. This court had occasion to examine the scope or R.3 in 1984 K.L.T. 75 between Gangadharan Nair and State of Kerala and others wherein it is stated that R.3 in Chapter I is, in a sense, a built-in safety valve to effectively protect the just claims of those in service, where the plain operation of the rules results in unjust hardship to them (underlining is ours). One of the essential requirements for invoking R.3 of Chapter I in favour of a particular person is that he should be in service and governed by the provisions of the Kerala Education Rules. One of the essential requirements for invoking R.3 of Chapter I in favour of a particular person is that he should be in service and governed by the provisions of the Kerala Education Rules. If by the exercise of this power rights of others are likely to be affected it follows that it cannot be exercised without giving such persons an opportunity of showing cause. 5. Now let us examine the impugned order, Ext. R(1) (a) in the light of the scope of R.3, Chapter I, which we have examined earlier. Apart from the fact that the impugned order came to be made without giving an opportunity to the appellant who is affected by the passing of the order under R.3 in favour of the 2nd respondent, the order does not disclose that the Government applied its mind to the question of hardship caused to the 2nd respondent by the operation of any of the Rules. The order does not say as to the operation of which particular rule it has dispensed with or relaxed in favour of the 2nd respondent. The order also does not say that the Government is satisfied that hardship is caused to the 2nd respondent by operation of the rule, which is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power under that rule. What has however been stated in the order is that if the appointment of the 2nd respondent is approved, he will get the protection under R.51A of Chapter XIV-A of the K. E.R. for appointment as Hindi Language Teacher in schools under the L. M. S. Management." In other words, the power under R.3 is invoked not on the ground that the operation of any rule has caused any undue hardship to the 2nd respondent but only with the avowed object of conferring some benefits on the 2nd respondent. R.3 cannot be invoked merely for the purpose of conferment of a benefit on a particular person who is not governed by the Rules. That a particular person will get certain benefits which he is otherwise not entitled to under the K. E". R. is not a ground on which the power under R.3 can be exercised. It is obvious that the Government has failed to apply its mind to the scope and ambit of its power under R.3 as also to the relevant facts. R. is not a ground on which the power under R.3 can be exercised. It is obvious that the Government has failed to apply its mind to the scope and ambit of its power under R.3 as also to the relevant facts. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent was not appointed to any post sanctioned under the K. E. R. It is also admitted that the appointment of the 2nd respondent on two occasions by the Manager was not in respect of any sanctioned vacancy under the K. E. R. It is also admitted that the appointment of the 2nd respondent was not approved by the educational authorities. It is therefore clear that the 2nd respondent was not in service and was not governed by the provisions of the K. E. R. As the 2nd respondent was not a person who was governed by the Kerala Education Rules, and his appointment was made outside the scope and ambit of the Kerala Education Rules, the State Government could not have invoked its power of dispensation or relaxation under R.3 of Chapter I in favour of the 2nd respondent. R.51A of Chapter XIV-A has been incorporated with the object of protecting teachers from arbitrary action of the Managers. The State Government cannot exercise the power of relaxation to bless the very arbitrary action to protect from which R.51A of Chapter XIV-A has been made. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that this is a case of total non-application of mind to the relevant facts and the scope and ambit of the power conferred by R.3. The impugned order has been made by the State Government only for the purpose of conferring some benefit on the 2nd respondent, which conferment is not permissible under the Rules even by invoking R.3. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the impugned order Ext. R(1) (a) is liable to be struck down. As the entire basis of the subsequent order Ext. P1 is the earlier order made by the Government as per Ext. R(1) (a), the said order also deserves to be quashed. As a result of quashing of these orders, what follows is that 3rd respondent becomes entitled to be accommodated in the vacancy of full-time Hindi Language Teacher in the vacancy that occurred on 31-7-1984 and the appellant entitled to be accommodated in the vacancy that occurred on 16-8-1984. R(1) (a), the said order also deserves to be quashed. As a result of quashing of these orders, what follows is that 3rd respondent becomes entitled to be accommodated in the vacancy of full-time Hindi Language Teacher in the vacancy that occurred on 31-7-1984 and the appellant entitled to be accommodated in the vacancy that occurred on 16-8-1984. As the appellant was in fact accommodated when her appointment was made on 16-8-1984 and as her appointment was also approved by the educational authorities, no further directions are required to be made other than quashing Exts. R(1) (a) and Ext. P1. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned single judge is set aside and the impugned orders Exts.R(1) (a) and Ext.P1 are hereby quashed. As the appellant has continued to function as Full Time Hindi Teacher on the strength of the interim order made by this Court during the pendency of these proceedings, she shall be entitled to be paid for the service she has rendered if the same has not been so far paid to her. No costs.