ORDER K.L. Shrivastava, J. 1. By this application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short 'the Code') the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 939/79 pending in the Court of the IInd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore. 2. Circumstances giving rise to the petition are these. On the F.I.R. lodged on 17-1-1978 by Shri S.P. Mishra the then D.I.G. Police. Indore, a crime under Sections 506 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 61 of the Police Act was registered against the petitioner. According to the F.I.R. the petitioner had addressed a letter dated 10-1-1978 to the informant which constituted the offences in question. 3. At the conclusion of the investigation, the police prosecuted the petitioner by filing a challan on 21-8-1978. Charges were framed against him on 20-9-1979 and by the end of 1980 only one witness had been examined and further proceeding in the case has been held-up for want of report of the handwriting expert. 4. The petitioner had earlier also moved an application under Section 482 of the Code and on that Misc. Cr. Case No. 1976/87, this Court had on 18-12-1987 ordered that the connected case be disposed of by the end of March 1988. 5. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the continuance of the proceedings is violative of the fundamental right of speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the petition deserves dismissal. 7. The point for consideration is whether the petition deserves to be allowed. 8. Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads thus: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 9. Speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice and delay constitutes denial of it. In the decision in Hussainara Khatoon's case. AIR 1979 SC 1310 the Apex Court of the country, while interpreting Article 21 of the Constitution has pointed out that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. Reasonably expeditious trial is thus an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Reasonably expeditious trial is thus an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision in Sheels Barse's case, 1986 C.Cr.J. (SC) 249 wherein it has been held that the fundamental right of speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and that the consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial implicit in Article 21 would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right The decision in Gajraj Singh's case, 1988 JLJ 483 may also be usefully perused. 10. Courts exist for doing justice between the contending parties. It is no doubt in the interest of the society that guilty persons are brought to book but they have also to ensure that those accused are not subjected to prolonged periods of anxiety. In the decision in Madheshwardhari's case, 1986 Cri.L.J. 1771 : AIR 1980 Pat 324 it has been pointed out that in all criminal prosecutions the right to speedy public trial which has a wide amplitude, is now inalienable fundamental right of the citizen under Article 21 and is available in all criminal prosecutions irrespective of the nature of the offence involved. 11. As pointed out in the decision in Marietta Gandhi's case, AIR 1978 SC 597 the law depriving a person of his personal liberty must also be tested with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution which is in these words: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The principle of reasonableness is an essential element of the equality or non-arbitrariness and pervades Article 14. Therefore, the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must also answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. To hear a person before condemning him accords with reason. Observations in paragraph 20 of the decision in T. V. Vatheeswaran's case AIR 1983 SC 361 (2) are also pertinent. 12. The decision in Sheikh Salim's case, 1985 MPLJ 65 : 1985 JLJ 28 relates to bail. To hear a person before condemning him accords with reason. Observations in paragraph 20 of the decision in T. V. Vatheeswaran's case AIR 1983 SC 361 (2) are also pertinent. 12. The decision in Sheikh Salim's case, 1985 MPLJ 65 : 1985 JLJ 28 relates to bail. Pointing out that the highly-prized right of personal liberty has been recognized in Articles 17, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, it has been observed that the significance and sweep of Article 21 is deep and wide enough to cover the question of bail. With reference to the provision in Section 49-B(ii) of the Excise Act, 1915 (for short 'the Act') which provides that no application for bail of a person accused of an offence under Section 49-A of the Act shall be allowed if opposed by the prosecution, it has been held that the opposition has to be on just, fair and reasonable grounds and that in accordance with the principle of natural justice opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the accused on his application for bail. 13. In the decision in State of Bihar vs. Umashankar, AIR 1981 SC 641 the High Court's order quashing the proceedings was maintained though the delay to some extent was also attributable to the accused persons who had resorted to revision petitions. 14. In the decision in Madheshwardhari's case (supra) in respect of offences, except capital offence, outer limit of seven years for concluding investigation and original trial has been accepted. In a capital crime despite delay there may be justification because of the heinousness of the offence to carry the trial to its original conclusion. But in cases involving minor offences there can be no justification in subjecting accused persons to a long-drawn trial to their great harassment and hardship. 15. The decision in V. K. Agrawal's case, 1988 Cri.LJ. 1167 : AIR 1988 SC 1106 deals with the provision in Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in relation to offences under the Customs Act (Act No. 52 of 1962) and the Gold (Control) Act (Act No. 45 of 1968) and therein it has been held that in case of a serious economic offence which undermines the entire economy of the Nation, delay would be no ground for not proceeding further with the matter. 16. 16. What period would amount to such a delay as to give rise to the presumption of grave prejudice to the accused and establish infraction of the Constitutional right of speedy trial held implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution may have to be determined with reference to the facts of each particular case. In a given case delay may itself be held as defeating justice irrespective of the question of default and apportionment of the blame in the matter. In this connection the decision in S. Guin's case, AIR 1986 SC 289 may usefully be perused. 17. In the instant case, it has to be remembered that as pointed out in paragraph 4 above this Court had on 18-12-1987 ordered that the case should be disposed of by the end of March 1988. In this context, looking to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the case, the conclusion is irresistible that there is infraction of the petitioner's constitutional right of speedy trial and continuance of the criminal proceedings in question is wholly unwarranted. 18. In the result, the application is allowed. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 939 of 1979 pending in the Court of the IInd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore are quashed.