P. C. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANT 3 is the appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Balasore in Original Suit No. 94 of 1971-I in which the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 in this appeal) prayed for partition of the properties described in Schedules `kha' and `ga' of the plaint. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the genealogy given in the Schedule `ka' of the plaint, the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 are members of the same family having a common ancestor. Defendants 4 to 10 are purchasers from different co-sharers. The genealogy as given in Schedule `ka' of the plaint is extracted below for proper appreciation of the facts which are necessary for decision of this appeal. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the assertions made in the plaint, Dhruba and Baidyanath died long before the settlement of 1922-23 without leaving any heir and Janakiballava died about 35 years back leaving behind two sons, Umakanta (def. 1) and Ramakanta, their other two brothers having predeceased them. Defendant 3 is the son of defendant 1 and plaintiffs 1 to 4 and 6 are the daughters and plaintiff 5 is the son of Ramakanta, who died about 9 years prior to the suit. Lokanath had two sons, namely; Mohan and Fakira out of whom Mohan died leaving behind him his widow Tulari and Fakira died leaving behind his two sons Srikanta (D. 2) and Kalandi. According to the plaintiffs, Kalandi died unmarried prior to the settlement. As per the case pleaded by the plaintiffs whatever family properties were left at the time of settlement of 1922-23 the same belonged to defendant 2 and the father of defendant 1 and the same stood recorded in their names. The defendant 1's father Janakiballav and defendant 2 were all through living in separate mess and residence though their properties were not partitioned by metes and bounds and each of them was possessing properties more or less proportionate to their shares. The plaintiffs have alleged that when Janakiballav died 35 years 'back, his properties devolved upon defendant I and Ramakanta, their other two brothers, as already stated, having predeceased them. Janaki had purchased some properties as per lot Nos. 1 and 2 of schedule `gu' in the name of his first son Baishnab and the same stood recorded in his name in the settlement records. Janaki had purchased some properties as per lot Nos. 1 and 2 of schedule `gu' in the name of his first son Baishnab and the same stood recorded in his name in the settlement records. Defendant No. 1 and Ramakanta were living joint and defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the family. Out of the properties described in lots Nos. 3 to 10 of Schedule `ga' some were purchased in the name of both the brothers and some in the name of defendant No. I alone. The plaintiffs have alleged that irrespective of the purchase of the properties in individual names the entire `ga' schedule properties were possessed by the two brothers proportionate to their shares as the same were really the acquisition by the joint family. After the death of Ramakanta about 9 years prior to the suit, his widow Laxmi also died about 3 years thereafter and thus Ramakanta's interest in the properties devolved upon the plaintiffs in equal shares. The plaintiffs' demand for partition having been refused they have filed the present suit for the said relief. 3a. Defendant 1 disputed the genealogy given in the plaint saying that Baishnab was married by the time of his death and left behind his widow Sarada who has not been shown in the genealogy. He denied the plaint allegations and claims certain properties as his separate properties. Defendant 2 generally supported the plaint allegations and claimed that the entire suit properties were joint and are therefore liable for partition. Defendant 3, the present appellant, however, made out a case in his written statement that there was complete partition between Baishnab on one hand and his 3 other brothers on the other. He also asserted that Baishnab had married by the time of his death and left behind his widow Sarada. His further case was that Sarada sold certain properties for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/- on 8-8-1951 from out of her share in the properties to defendant 3, who has been in possession thereof with effect from the date of his purchase. Out of the properties so purchased, he has also sold some properties to some of the strangers who have been arrayed as defendants. As regards lots Nos. 8 to 10 of Schedule `ga', defendant 3 claims to have purchased the same by himself out of his own funds and claims the same as his separate properties. Out of the properties so purchased, he has also sold some properties to some of the strangers who have been arrayed as defendants. As regards lots Nos. 8 to 10 of Schedule `ga', defendant 3 claims to have purchased the same by himself out of his own funds and claims the same as his separate properties. ( 4 ) AFTER framing the necessary issues which arose out of the pleadings, the learned trial court recorded the following findings after consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary adduced by the parties :- (i) Baishnab died while joint with three brothers in the year 1939; (ii) Baishnab left behind Sarada as his widow and being a post 1937 Act widow she stepped into the shoes of her husband and became entitled to an interest in the properties of her husband as a limited owner; (iii) The transfer by way of sale in favour of the defendant 3 was invalid as:- (a) there was no legal necessity for Sarada to effect the transfer; (b) passing of consideration in the saledeed has not been proved; (c) the transfer of undivided share of her husband without the consent of the coparceners was not permissible; (iv) All the properties described in the plaint are joint in which defendant 2 got 1/2 interest, plaintiffs 1/4 and defendants 1 and 3 together 1 / 4 interest. ( 5 ) OUT of several grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has confined his challenge as to the legality of the finding in relation to the effect of the sale deed dt. 8-8-1951 executed by Sarada Dibya in favour of the appellant. ( 6 ) THE fact that Baishnab died while living joint with his three brothers in the year 1939 leaving behind his widow Sarada is not seriously challenged in this appeal. The consequence would be that Sarada being a post 1937 Act widow, her husband's interest in the joint family property, though undefined, vests immediately upon her and does not devolve on his brothers by survivorship. Under the said Act, she is conferred with the same right in the joint family property as any other coparceners subject of course to the restriction that her interest in the property would be limited. She thereby does not become a coparcener but enjoyed limited interest therein known as Hindu Women's Estate. Under the said Act, she is conferred with the same right in the joint family property as any other coparceners subject of course to the restriction that her interest in the property would be limited. She thereby does not become a coparcener but enjoyed limited interest therein known as Hindu Women's Estate. In the year 1951 Sarada has executed a sale-deed in favour of the present appellant in respect of certain properties. The learned trial court has found that she could not alienate her husband's undivided interest in the coparcenary without the consent of the coparceners. The aforesaid finding does not appear to us as correct. It has been decided in a decision reported in ILR (1949) 1 Cut 483 (Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Mohanty) that a post Act 1937 widow succeeds to her husband's estate without being a coparcener. The interest that devolves upon her becomes defined and definable in her hands, though it continues to be a part of the joint family estate. By interpreting sub-sec. (3) and sub-sec. (4) of S. 3 of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, their Lordships have observed that when a property devolves upon the widow on the death of her husband, her interest unlike a coparcener's interest can be predicted with certainty and, therefore, it carries with it the incident of transferability at the hands of the holder either limited or absolute. ( 7 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is as to whether there was legal necessity for Sarada justifying the transfer of her interest in the joint family properties. The position of law is well settled that unless legal necessity is found the sale deed executed by her husband will convey the life interest which Sarada had in the property and the property would revert back to the reversioners on her death. But once legal necessity is found to exist, the transferee would acquire absolute interest in the property though the transferrer herself was a limited owner. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, urged that even assuming that there was no legal necessity, the interest of the transferee in the property would still mature to that of absolute ownership by virtue of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to him the expression "any property possessed by a female Hindu. " occurring in sub-sec. According to him the expression "any property possessed by a female Hindu. " occurring in sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 should be given the widest possible meaning. He has relied on the decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 1963 (Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi) and AIR 1987 SC 1493 (Jabannatban Pillai v. Kunjitha Padam) in support of his contention. In the first noted decision of the Supreme Court (of the year 1979), it was held that the word "possessed" in sub-sec. (1) S. 14 would mean either actual or constructive possession or possession of any form recognised by law. In the event the widow transfers her limited interest in the property and puts the property in possession of the transferee she neither remains in actual possession nor can it be said that she was in constructive possession of the property. If the transfer was valid, she did neither own the property nor possessed the same on the date the Hindu Succession Act came into force. Thus, the aforesaid decision does not lay down that the limited interest of a widow would get enlarged by S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, even though she did neither own nor possess the property on the date of the Act. The other decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 1493 (supra) is also to the same effect. Their Lordships have clearly stated that the limited estate or limited ownership of a Hindu female would stand enlarged into an absolute estate or full ownership, if she having acquired the limited estate in the property before or after the commencement of the Act was in possession of the property at the time of the coming into force of the Act on June 17, 1956. The expression "possessed" occurring in the said sub-section has been interpreted in the sense of having a right to the property or control over the property. In other words, the possession of the widow within the meaning of S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act would also include the right to possess. Wherever the widow had transferred the property by the date when the Act came into force, she cannot have the right to possess. In other words, the possession of the widow within the meaning of S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act would also include the right to possess. Wherever the widow had transferred the property by the date when the Act came into force, she cannot have the right to possess. It, therefore, follows that Sarad a having transferred her ownership as a limited owner as well as possession in favour of the present appellant in the year 1951, she had no interest or possession in respect of the properties so transferred when the Act came into force and the transferees would not have the benefit of S. 14 (1) of the aforesaid Act. ( 9 ) DEFENDANT 1 in his written statement has not made out any case as regards the legal necessity of Sarada justifying the transfer which she made in favour of the appellant on 8-8-1951. There is practically no evidence to show that Sarada had any legal necessity in support of the transfer. The burden was on the transferee to plead and prove as regards the legal necessity in support of the transfer and that having not been done, it is bound to be held that the appellant did not acquire absolute interest in the property obtained by way of transfer from Sarada. ( 10 ) THE evidence of D. Ws. 2 and 3 would show that Sarada was an illiterate lady. D. W. 2 is defendant 3 himself and D. W. 3 is the attesting witness. The evidence of D. W. 3 is not sufficient to prove due execution of the sale deed by Sarada. He nowhere says that, Sarada understood the contents of the document before she touched the pen of the scribe signifying the execution of the document. Thus, there is no material on record to take a different view than what was taken by the learned trial court that there was no proof of proper execution of the sale deed. The evidence is equally insufficient to prove passing of consideration under the said sale deed. The result would be that the defendant No. 3, (the present appellant) could not acquire any title to the property conveyed under the aforesaid sale deed. ( 11 ) IN the result, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ( 12 ) MRS. A. K. PADHI, J.- I agree. The result would be that the defendant No. 3, (the present appellant) could not acquire any title to the property conveyed under the aforesaid sale deed. ( 11 ) IN the result, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ( 12 ) MRS. A. K. PADHI, J.- I agree. Appeal dismissed.