JUDGMENT B.N. Mishra, J. - Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India has, in this writ petition, challenged the order, dated 5 April 1983 (annexure 10), passed by the Prescribed Authority (Under the Payment of Wages Act), Jhansi, respondent 1 whereby the prescribed authority refused to decide the issue as to whether respondent 2 was a workman" summarily as a preliminary issue, but he deferred the decision on the question until after evidence was led by the parties. 2. The facts may be briefly stated. Respondent 2 was working as a temporary civilian driver in the Armed Forces in the Supply Depot, Jhansi. On the post becoming surplus, services of respondent 2 were terminated. Thereafter some fire-engine drivers were required by the department to be recruited and as such respondent 2 was appointed as a temporary fire-engine driver. The appointment letter (annexure 1) was issued to the petitioner on 17 February 1964. Thereafter another appointment letter (annexure 2) was issued to the petitioner on 13 October 1964, appointing him as a civilian fire-engine driver in a temporary vacancy with effect from 13 October 1964, until further orders. Respondent 2 was discharged from service with effect from 11 October 1969 vide letter, dated 11 October 1969 (annexure 4). The letter of discharge further stipulated payment of one month's pay and allowances for the period 11 October 1969 to 10 November 1969, in lieu of one month's notice. Respondent 2 filed a civil suit against his order of discharge. The suit was dismissed by the lower Court whereupon respondent 2 tiled an appeal which was allowed in his favour. The petitioner filed a Second Appeal No. 301 of 1979 against the judgment of the appellate Court and it is pending disposal in this Court. In the meanwhile respondent 2 moved the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act praying for payment of wages to him. The petitioner appeared before the Prescribed Authority and filed its written statement. The petitioner also raised a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority. Copy of the preliminary objection is annexure 7 to the writ petition. The petitioner appeared before the Prescribed Authority and filed its written statement. The petitioner also raised a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority. Copy of the preliminary objection is annexure 7 to the writ petition. The petitioner also filed an application ride annexure 8 wherein it was prayed that before proceeding with the main application of respondent 2, the following issues may he decided as preliminary issues : "(1) Whether the application moved by Abdul Razzak under S. 15 of Payment of Wages Act is not (sic) maintainable ? (2) Whether the Prescribed Authority under the said Act has no (sic) jurisdiction to proceed with the said application ?" By the impugned order the Prescribed Authority, inter alia, held as follows : "So far as the question of maintain-ability of the application is concerned, it is admitted by the parties that Army Act is not applicable to the applicant, hence this issue depends on the evidence of the parties to the effect whether the applicant comes under the term of workman,' therefore, this issue cannot be decided summarily." It is this order of the Prescribed Authority which is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Prescribed Authority acted wrongly in refusing to finally decide the preliminary objection on the essential question as to whether respondent 2 was a " workman." Learned counsel for respondent 2 has, on the other hand, submitted that the Prescribed Authority acted in conformity with the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard and as such the impugned order should not be interfered with. In this context learned counsel appearing for respondent 2 relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in Maheswari (D.P.) v. Delhi Administration and others, 1984 I L.L.N. 1.], wherein it was held in Para. 1, at page 2 : "It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must, therefore, ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeying up and down. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeying up and down. It is also wroth while remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by spceial Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 4. Keeping in view the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above there can be no manner of doubt that the Prescribed Authority acted in the right manner in not deciding the preliminary objections as a preliminary issue but deferring a finding on that issue until after the evidence is recorded. The apprehension expressed in the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment regarding delay in disposal of disputes under the industrial law on the basis of all kinds of preliminary objections raised by the management, has been amply borne out by the delay in the final adjudication of the present dispute between the parties in this case. The application of respondent 2 was filed by him on 24 September 1980, the order impugned was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 5 April 1983, and evidence is yet to be recorded. The present writ petition was tiled by the petitioner on 13 April 1983, and further proceedings pending before the Prescribed Authority have been stayed by interim order, dated 13 April 1983, which was confirmed by order, dated 22 May 1984. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court the impugned order, dated 5 April 1983, must be upheld. 5. In the result this writ petition must; fail and is dismissed with costs. MI'+l interim orders stand discharged. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 50J. The Prescribed thorny shall nog proceed with the claim of respondent 2 and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible.