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1989 DIGILAW 93 (ALL)

B. S. Yadav, Civil Judge, Lalitpur v. Sumat Chand Jain

1989-01-18

B.L.YADAV, S.N.SAHAI

body1989
JUDGMENT B.L. YADAV, J. 1. THIS is a defendant's appeal against the order dated 6-8-1988 passed under Order 38 Rule 5 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, (for short the Code), by the Civil Judge, Lalitpur, directing the defendant not to transfer his property till he appears on 1-11-88 and shows cause as to why not the application of the plaintiff respondent for attachment before judgment could be allowed. 2. SRI V. S. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the impugned order was beyond the scope of Order 38 Rule 5 (3) of the Code and principles of natural justice were violated. Reliance was placed on Vishwanath v. Pirabhunath Misir, 1982 ACJ 119. Before coming to the point it is convenient to refer to the factual metrix a bit in detail. The plaintiff respondents have filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,53,000/- from the defendant appellant with pendente lite and future interest on 22-2-84 in the court of the Civil Judge, Lalitpur. The plaint was filed with insufficient stamp and an application was filed to grant some more time to enable the plaintiff to make good the deficiency. Till 30-5-88 from time to time opportunity was given to the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency. On 30-5-88 another application was filed under sections 148/149 of the Code for further extension of time, which was rejected. The plaint was also rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. On 1-7-88 an application under section 151 was filed for recalling the order dated 30-5-88. On 8-7-88 the application dated 1-7-88 was allowed. On 6-8-88 the plaintiff respondents filed an application under Order 38 Rule 5 of the Code for attachment before judgment, and on that date the Civil Judge passed the impugned order. Shorn of details the findings are that the plaintiffs' application was accompanied by an affidavit with the allegations that the defendant appellant was making efforts to dispose of his properties situate within the jurisdiction of the court and the notice sent to the defendant appellant has been received back without service with the indication that in State v. Mahendra Pratap Singh the plaintiff appeared in the Court of the District Magistrate. On this background 23-8-88 was the date fixed for showing cause and prima facie reliance was placed on the averments made by the plaintiff in his affidavit. On this background 23-8-88 was the date fixed for showing cause and prima facie reliance was placed on the averments made by the plaintiff in his affidavit. The defendants were directed to appear on 1-11-88 and to file objections. By that date the defendants were directed not to dispose of the property in suit. 3. EX Abundanti cautela, the statutory provisions of Rule 5 Order 38 are set out below:- "5. Where defendant may be, called upon to furnish security for production of property:- (1) Where, at any stage of the suit, the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him- (a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or (b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court, the Court may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security. (2) The plaintiff shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof. (3) The Court may also in the order direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified. (4) If an order of attachment is made without complying with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of this rule, such attachment shall be void." 4. THE elementary rule of interpretation is that it must be textual and contextual. All the provisions of the statute must be considered together and all the sub-sections or sections or rules have also to be read and construed together. In fact, every Chapter or Order of the Code has got a distinct connotation. All the rules of Order 38 appear to be somewhat inter connected. One need not be read in isolation. All the provisions of the statute must be considered together and all the sub-sections or sections or rules have also to be read and construed together. In fact, every Chapter or Order of the Code has got a distinct connotation. All the rules of Order 38 appear to be somewhat inter connected. One need not be read in isolation. In brief Rule 1 of Order 38 is that at any stage of the suit if the Court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant with intent to delay the plaintiff, or to avoid any process of the court or to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, has neither absconded nor is about to leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court or to dispose of his property or any part thereof, or he is about to leave the country, in such and similar other situations the court may issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show cause why he should not furnish security for his appearance. Rule 2 is that when the defendant fails to show cause, the Court may order him to deposit money and other sufficient property to answer the claim of the plaintiff. Rules 3 and 4 provide procedure on the application by surety to be discharged or where the defendants fail to furnish security. Rule 5 is the procedure for attachment before judgment. Rule 5 deals with a separate heading and power of the Court (i. e. attachment before judgment) and a distinct power of the Court to pass an order for attachment before judgment in two stages. The first is before the stage of showing cause when the notice to show cause has been issued. Till the defendant appears and shows cause as to why not the order for attachment before judgment may be passed, the Court may pass order for attachment. It is with the first stage that we are concerned in the present appeal. The first is before the stage of showing cause when the notice to show cause has been issued. Till the defendant appears and shows cause as to why not the order for attachment before judgment may be passed, the Court may pass order for attachment. It is with the first stage that we are concerned in the present appeal. Notices were issued to the defendant appellant to appear on a particular date fixed and an affidavit was filed by the plaintiff making out a ground that the intention of the defendant was to obstruct or delay the execution of decree to be passed in favour of the plaintiff, to dispose of whole or any part of the property or to remove whole or any part of the property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, the plaintiff wanted his prayer to be granted. The impugned order was passed as the Court was satisfied on the basis of the averments made in the affidavit that till the defendant appears and shows cause he should not dispose of the property in suit. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 38 gives the court a slightly distinct and separate power than other sub-rules. It is to be emphasized that sub-rule (3) is an additional jurisdiction of the Court that under such circumstances the Court may also direct additional attachment of the whole or any part of the property. Rule 5 has been enacted with a salutary object so that there may not be any attempt on the part of the defendant to defeat the realization of decree that may be passed in favour of the plaintiff and the same has to be kept in mind before passing the order. 5. IT may also be stated that in fact, attachment before judgment is an equitable relief and it has to be granted with a particular object. IT is also one of the modes of execution of decree as is evident from section 51 of the Code where the modes of execution have been provided and the execution court may, on the application of the decree holder, order the execution of decree: (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed, (b) by attachment and sale or by sale under attachment of any property. There is a U. P. Amendment by U. P. Act No. 24 of 1954 adding (bb) immediately after section 51 (b) to the following effect:- "(bb) by transfer other than sale, by attachment or without attachment of any property." 6. THE Legislature appears to have used in its wisdom the expression 'transfer other than sale'. In other words, transfer of a property can be effected in so many modes other than by actual sale. THE execution can be effected by attachment or even without attachment of any property. In the present case the U. P. amendment has also to be kept in mind. In that event the Court has to take into account whether the relief that could be granted to the plaintiff at the stage of execution of decree, can the same be granted while the plaint has been filed or even before the actual decree is passed. THE power under Rule 5 of Order 38 has to be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. In the present case as the defendants were opposing on the prior date also and the issuance of the order of attachment before judgment remained uncontroverted, there was no scope for the trial court to take a different view or to doubt the authenticity of the affidavit of the plaintiff. Consequently, it was open to the defendants to appear on the date fixed and to satisfy the Court that the impugned order must not be passed, nor there was any such object either to delay the execution of the decree or to defeat the decree or to frustrate the object of the suit. THE impugned order that has been passed by the trial court appears to be manifestly just and the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant are misconceived. It may further be added that other rules, namely, Rule 6 (1) is when the defendant appears but does not show cause or he fails to furnish security within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may pass a final order for attachment so as to satisfy any decree that may be passed in the suit. It may further be added that other rules, namely, Rule 6 (1) is when the defendant appears but does not show cause or he fails to furnish security within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may pass a final order for attachment so as to satisfy any decree that may be passed in the suit. Sub- rule (2) of Rule 6 is to the effect when the defendant has appeared and shown cause to the satisfaction of the Court, or he has furnished the required security, the Court shall pass a final order for the withdrawal of attachment or to pass such order as it may think fit. Rule 7 provides for the modes of attachment consistent with the provisions of Order 21 dealing with the execution of decree, particularly Rule 54 of Order 21 of the Code. Rule 8 is where the claim is preferred to the property attached before judgment. Rule 9 is when the attachment can be removed either the security having been furnished or the suit having been dismissed. Rule 10 is that attachment before judgment not to affect the rights of third parties not actually made parties to the suit. Rule 11 is that the property attached before judgment should not be attached again. Rule 11-A is to the effect that the provisions of the Code applicable to attachment made in execution of a decree shall, so far as possible, apply to an attachment made before judgment. Rule 12 is that nothing under Order 38 would authorize the plaintiff to apply to the Court for attachment of any agricultural produce in possession of the agriculturist or to empower the Court to order attachment of production of such produce. Rule 13 is that the provisions of Order 38 would apply to the Courts of Small Causes to make order for attachment of immovable properties. 7. COMING to the point about the violation of principles of natural justice, suffice it to say that it is evident from the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 that at the initial stage when the order is to be passed just on the basis of affidavit and satisfaction of the Court, it is not necessary that the defendant or the person against whom the order for furnishing security or for attachment is to be passed, has to be heard. A date has to be specified and on that date the defendant or the person concerned may appear and show cause as to why not the order passed without hearing the defendant may be recalled or the order of attachment before judgment may be withdrawn. The legislature has designedly employed the language under Order 38 Rule 5 so that the opportunity of hearing at the initial stage may be excluded. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified that the opportunity ought to have been given. Consequently it cannot be said that the impugned order which- was passed without hearing the defendant suffers from any mistake, nor it can be said that the said order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 8. AS regards the case Vishwanath v. Prabhunath Misir (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion that the same would not help the appellant. In that case also under para 4 it was held that merely issuing notices directing the defendant to either deposit the security or to show cause, why not the order of conditional attachment or attachment before judgment may be passed, there was no mistake. It has been expressly made clear that sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 confers additional jurisdiction on the Court to direct conditional attachment. This observation goes against the appellant. The aforesaid case is accordingly of no assistance to the appellant. In view of above, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.