JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J.—Five persons were tried by the Special Judge, Simla, for offences under sections 420, 468, 465, 471 and 120-B I. P. C and section 5 (1) (2) punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (briefly the "Act"). Of them, Shri T. R. Seth and Shri Balwant Singh were public servants. They were acquitted by the learned Special Judge on April 30, 1988. The State of Himachal Pradesh has approached this Court in appeal against that order of acquittal. 2. It is said that a truck with registration No. HPA ? 788 met with an accident near St. Bedes College, Simla, on September 6, 1982, while it was on its way from Thanadhar to Parwanoo FIR. No 36 of 1982 was lodged the same night under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. The truck was not insured with any Insurance Company. The allegation is that after obtaining the attested copy of the K. I. R., accused Muni Lalinformed the Assistant Manager of the New India Assurance Company Limited, Chandigarh, through letter dated September 4, 1982, (Ex. PW 21/3) that his truck No. HPA 6288 had met with an accident on September 6, 1982. This was done after altering the figure in the F. I. R from HPA 1788 to HPA 6288. The body of the application is stated to have been written by accused B. S. Mehta. Truck No. HPA 6288 was insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, Chandigarh. Accused Surinder Chaudhary conducted the survey of the accidented truck and submitted a false survey report assessing the loss to *he extent of Rs 17,653.10 P. Several documents are stated to have been manipulated and forged by accused Muni Lal B. S. Mehta and Surinder Chaudhary in order to prefer the claim. Muni Lalpreferred the claim with the Insurance Company at Chandigarh. 3. cused T. R. Seth was an Administrative Officer in the Insurance Company at Ropar. He carried out the technical scrutiny of the bogus truck accidental claim. Accused Balwant Singh, an assistant in the Insurance Company at Chandigarh, registered and processed the claim. It is said that T R- Seth and Balwant Singh were a party to the conspiracy to cheat the Insurance Company, alongwith the remaining three accused, namely . He carried out the technical scrutiny of the bogus truck accidental claim. Accused Balwant Singh, an assistant in the Insurance Company at Chandigarh, registered and processed the claim. It is said that T R- Seth and Balwant Singh were a party to the conspiracy to cheat the Insurance Company, alongwith the remaining three accused, namely . S. Mehta, Surinder Chaudhary and Muni Lal A bill for the amount claimed was got sanctioned from the Deputy Manager of the Insurance Company at Chandigarh. 4 The prosecution was launched after sanction had been obtained for the prosecution of the two public servants, T. R. Seth and Balwant Singh. The sanction order were proved as 11/A and Ex PW l./B The prosecution adduced oral and documentary evidence m support of its case before the Special Judge. After going through the evidence the learned Special Judge felt that no case of any complicity of T. R^ Seth and Balwant Singh in the entire episode was made out. He also felt that the sanction for the prosecution of these accused persons was not in accordance with law. The conclusion recorded by the Special Judge in regard to these two persons was that they were entitled to honourable acquittal. 5 In respect of the three accused persons, namely, B. S. Mehta, Surinder Chaudhary and Muni Lal, the learned Special Judge was of the oSion that the evidence clearly showed that they were gu.lty of the offences with which they were charged. To borrow the words of the Special Judge- it has been proved beyond hilt that accused B. S. Mehta. Surinder Chaudhary and Muni Lal entered into a conspiracy to cheat the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. by forging certain documents and by using: as genuine certain documents". In view, however, of the fact that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution of the public servants stated to have conspired with these accused persons, the learned Special Judge recorded an order of acquittal in respect of all the five accused persons. 6 The Special Judge could only take cognizance of the offence if there . was avalid sanction as contemplated by section 6(1) of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Special Judge is dependant upon the existence of a valid Sot This is clear from what the Supreme Court has said in State of w£ Bengal v. Manumal Bhutoria and others, 1977 Cr. LJ 1164. was avalid sanction as contemplated by section 6(1) of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Special Judge is dependant upon the existence of a valid Sot This is clear from what the Supreme Court has said in State of w£ Bengal v. Manumal Bhutoria and others, 1977 Cr. LJ 1164. The grant of sanction is a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. Mohd Iqbal Ahmed V. State of Andhra Pradesh, air 1979 SC 677 The absence of a valid sanction thus has to result in the acquittal of the accused persons the basis that the entire trial, without a proper sanction in respect of the public servants, was void. Behari Lal Gupta v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1984 Cr. LJ 1309 ; Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh. ILR 1987 HP 273. 7 In Rattan Singh, the Special Judge Simla, had come to the conclusion that the sanction was not valid. He felt, on that account, that conviction could not be recorded by him under sections 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) ?d)r ad with section 5 (2) of the Act However, he convicted the accused under actions 409 467 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code on his view "hatno2o? was needed for prosecuting a person for these offences. This Court said that the Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Simla, had no jurisdiction to convict the accused-appellant under any provision of the Indian Penal Code as well because the whole trial was null and void. The order of conviction was set aside. In the last paragraph of the judgment, the observations which the learned single Judge made were these: The present appeal is accepted. This judgment will not debar the State from proceeding against the appellant in any manner which may be permissible under law". 8. What has been urged by Shri M. S, Chandel, learned Assistant Advocate General on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh in the present appeal is that the learned Special Judge should not have proceeded to record any conclusion on the guilt or otherwise of the various accused persons, for he had come to the conclusion that the sanction was invalid. Instead, he should have directed that the case be sent to the proper court for trial de novo in respect of the offences and the offenders about whom no sanction was necessary in law. Since the Special Judge did not do so, it was urged, that an observation to that effect be made by this Court in regard, atleast, to B. S Mehta, Surinder Chaudhary and Muni Lal accused-respondents. 9. In Ramautar Mahton v. The State, AIR 1961 Patna 203, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court said that where the Special Judge comes to the conclusion that there was no valid sanction under section 6 of the Act for. an offence under section 5 (2) thereof, he had no jurisdiction to try the offence under section 409 I P. C, as well. Where he comes to the conclusion that there was no valid sanction, he should hold that the entire proceedings before him with regard to the offence were null and void. He could not pass any order either of acquittal or of conviction 10. Shriram v. The State, AIR 1966 Raj. 191, was a case in which a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court took the view that the absence of a valid sanction would result in a situation that a Special Judge would be incompetent to try the accused persons even under section ^09 I P.C. In that situation, the trial had to be commenced ab initio by a competent court. The proceedings before the Special Judge became non est. 11. The question whether a fresh trial of the accused was barred under section 403 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 where the required sanction under section 6 of the Act for the prosecution was not obtained, came up before the Supreme Court in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi v The State of Bhopal and another, AIR 1957 SC 494. A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the trial was not barred. It was on account of the fact that in the absence of a sanction, or of a proper sanction, the first trial cannot be said to have been before a court competent to hear and determine the case and to record a verdict of conviction or acquittal. This decision was relied upon by the Patna and Rajasthan High Courts in Ramautar Mahton and Shriram. 12. This decision was relied upon by the Patna and Rajasthan High Courts in Ramautar Mahton and Shriram. 12. The Supreme Court noticed the decision of the Privy Council in Yu of alii Mulla v. The King, AIR 1949 PC 264, in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi. It said (in paragraph 5 of the report):— "......The Privy Council decision is directly in point, and it was there held that the whole basis of section 403 (1) was that the first trial should have been before a Court competent to hear and determine the case and to record a verdict of conviction or acquittal ; if the Court was not so competent, as for example where the required sanction for the prosecution was not obtained, it was irrelevant that it was competent to try other cases of the same class or indeed the case against the particular accused in different circumstances, for example if a sanction had been obtained." 13. The legal position is clear. Once a sanction is found to be invalid, the first trial becomes void ab initio. It does not preclude a fresh trial of the offenders in respect of the offence for which no sanction is needed. It also does not bar a fresh trial of the offenders after obtaining a proper sanction again. The fresh trial of the offenders, thus, does not depend upon an observation of the nature made by this Court in Rattan Singh. 14. The absence of a valid sanction has the effect of wiping out the proceedings held before the Special Judge who should, normally, go into the question of the validity of the sanction in the first instance on the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecution in that respect. If he finds that the sanction is not valid, he should hold so and refrain from expressing any opinion in regard to the guilt or otherwise of the accused persons. But, as in the present case, even if the Special Judge expresses his opinion on the question of the culpability of the accused persons before him, the opinion is of no use. But, as in the present case, even if the Special Judge expresses his opinion on the question of the culpability of the accused persons before him, the opinion is of no use. For, as observed by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramautar Mahton, the moment the Special Judge came to the conclusion that there was no valid sanction "he should have held that the entire proceeding before him with regard to the offence under section 5 (2) was null and void. That being so, he could nrt have passed an order either of acquittal or of conviction. 15. The position in law being what it is, the observation that it would be open to the State to proceed against the accused in any manner which may be permissible under law is nothing but a surplusage. If so advised, the State can proceed against the accused persons afresh in accordance with law. For doing so, it does not have to depend upon an observation to that effect from the Court. The apprehension, which the learned Assistant Advocate General expressed during his submissions, that in the absence of any observation from the Court, the prosecution usually would not bring the offenders to trial again may be borne out of his long experience as a Counsel appearing for the State before the Courts. Yet, it would not be fair, nor proper, for this Court to commend the making of an observation of the nature expected by the learned Assistant Advocate General. It may impliedly be taken to be a suggestion from the Court by the prosecution to recommence the proceedings against the offenders, as it were, at the instance of the Court The decision whether the offenders should face a proper trial is primarily to be made by the State itself, which is under an obligation to act in accordance with law. That decision should not be dependant upon any observation by a court of law which is basically charged with the duty of trying a case brought before it by the State and deciding it on the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecuting agency. 16. That decision should not be dependant upon any observation by a court of law which is basically charged with the duty of trying a case brought before it by the State and deciding it on the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecuting agency. 16. Since the order of the Special Judge, under challenge, does not preclude the State from bringing the offenders before the Court for trial in a manner which may be permissible, under law, I find no reason to grant leave to appeal against the judgment of the Special Judge, as prayed. Leave refused.