JUDGMET : G. D. Dubey, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, issuing a temporary injunction against the appellant and restraining the appellant from selling plot no. 113/11 and the building constructed thereon in Navyug Market, Ghaziabad to any other person except the plaintiff-respondents or to give possession to the said third person transferee till the disposal of the suit. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit before the lower court seeking relief of prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing the property in question to any outsider for any consideration except to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged that they are closely related with each other and the defendant. The Ghaziabad Development Authority had invited tenders for commercial-cum-residential plot. The defendant and the plaintiffs had submitted their tenders. After the tenders were accepted by the Ghaziabad Development Authority, the plaintiffs were allotted plot no. 113/12 and the defendant was allotted plot no. 113/11. It was alleged that at the time of submitting the tenders and getting the lease deed executed in favour of the respective parties in respect of the plots in question mentioned above, it was agreed between the parties that if any one of them intends to sell his plot then the same will be sold to the other party. It was also agreed that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant shall be entitled to dispose of or sell the plots or the building standing thereon to any other outsider. In pursuance of this agreement, constructions were raised on two plots in such a manner that from the very appearance it transpires that the constructions are one and not separate. The defendant appellant being an old lady and having only one daughter (who is married) had intended to sell her property for Rs. 7, 50,000/- to plaintiff no. 1 with the consent of plaintiffs 2 and 3 and also of her daughter. In consideration thereof the defendant received Rs. 25000/- on 1-6-1988 and Rs. 1,25,000/- on 30-6-1988. In respect of these money transactions, the defendant had issued receipts on chit of papers. The plaintiffs having great faith in defendant accepted the said receipts on plain papers just as a token of receipt of the money. In consideration thereof the defendant received Rs. 25000/- on 1-6-1988 and Rs. 1,25,000/- on 30-6-1988. In respect of these money transactions, the defendant had issued receipts on chit of papers. The plaintiffs having great faith in defendant accepted the said receipts on plain papers just as a token of receipt of the money. It was also agreed that the amount of rupees six lacs would be paid to the defendant at the time of execution of the sale- deed, which was decided to be executed upto 30th May, 1989. Prior to that date the defendant was to get all legal permission i.e. permission of Ghaziabad Development Authority, Income-tax certificate etc THE defendant is alleged to have fallen under the influence of one Dharampal son of Sri Shyam Lal who has animosity against the plaintiffs. The defendant was given some allurement and thus is intending to sell her property to the outsider Dharampal. On these facts, the prayer had been made for issue of a temporary injunction against the defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant had contested the matter. She admitted that she had purchased a plot from Ghaziahad Development Authority after submitting a tender as advertised by the said Authority, she also admitted that the constructions were raised on the portion of land taken on lease by her and plaintiffs 2 and 3. She, however, stated that the constructions were made separate. There were separate stair-cases and toilets. The tenants i. e. Canara Bank and Export Inspection Agency had made some alterations in the building in accordance with their requirements. It was stated that the constructions on one portion of the land belonged to the defendant-appellant are not dependant on the constructions made on the land belonging to plaintiffs 2 and 3. The defendant denied that she had ever agreed at the time of submitting tender to Ghaziabad Development Authority or at any later time that she will sell the property only to plaintiffs 2 and 3 and none else. She denied that it was ever agreed with the plaintiffs that she will sell her property to the plaintiffs for Rs. 7,50,000/-, She also denied to have received a sum of Rs. 25,000/.- and Rs. 1,25,000/- on 1-6-1988 and 30-6-1988 respectively. She stated that she had asked the export inspection agency and other tenants to give rent separately as plaintiff no. 1 was not depositing the rent realised from them in an account. 7,50,000/-, She also denied to have received a sum of Rs. 25,000/.- and Rs. 1,25,000/- on 1-6-1988 and 30-6-1988 respectively. She stated that she had asked the export inspection agency and other tenants to give rent separately as plaintiff no. 1 was not depositing the rent realised from them in an account. Consequently, she had to cancel the power of attorney in favour of plaintiff no. 1. The defendant also contended that the plaintiffs had no concern with the property. 3. The learned Civil Judge came to conclusion that the plaintiffs had a prima facie case. He found some substance in the contention of the plaintiffs regarding the contract between the parties conferring a pre-emptive right in favour of the plaintiffs. He also found prima facie that the defendant had received two amounts as mentioned above. The lower court also held that balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs, for the house was constructed in such a manner that it cannot be partitioned and any transfer will complicate the matters. On these two observations, the impugned order was passed. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that there is no evidence on record about the time, place and manner of execution of the alleged agreement. There is no mention in the said agreement as to what was the price to be offered and whether the price offered by a third party was to be the price paid by either of the parties. IT was further urged that, from a reading of the plaint, it transpires that the first agreement regarding creation of pre-emptive right was created in 1968 and the contract for agreement to sell was arrived at between the parties in 1988. IT was urged that none of these contracts are in writing. IT was urged that none of these agreements were enforceable. Therefore, the lower court, it was urged, had erred in issuing the injunction order. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that even oral contracts are enforceable by way of suit for specific performance of contract. It was further urged that the first contract relating to the concurrent right of preemption was a valid right. It was also urged that by the second alleged oral contract, the price and time for sale, and the name of vendee was fixed. It was further urged that the first contract relating to the concurrent right of preemption was a valid right. It was also urged that by the second alleged oral contract, the price and time for sale, and the name of vendee was fixed. It was, therefore, urged that the lower court was fully justified in believing the case of the plaintiffs and holding that they had prima facie case. It was also urged that the plaintiffs were offering very reasonable price and balance of convenience lay in their favour for the present structure of the house in question is such that if a stranger purchases it then there will be a complication. As regards the third ingredient of "irreparable loss" for grant of temporary ' injunction, learned counsel urged that this too was in favour of the plaintiffs. Elaborating this contention, learned counsel urged that the original intention of the parties was that the land should remain in the family of the parties. Since the constructions were built in a composite manner as to give one entity to the building constructed on two plot nos. 113/11 and 113/12, any intrusion of third person as a purchaser would affect construction and also the benefits to the plaintiffs of user of the two buildings as one entity. 5. The plaintiff-respondents have pleaded their agreement in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the plaint. In paragraph 3, it was stated that, at the time of submitting the tender and getting the lease deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs and defendant, the parties had agreed that if either of the party will intend to sell their plots or after raising the constructions of the building, that will be sold out either to the parties. It was further urged that this agreement was finalised between the parties as a pre-emptive right and none of the parties were entitled to sell the plots or the building standing thereon to other outsiders except the plaintiffs to defendant or defendant to the plaintiffs. 6. The second agreement pleaded in paragraph 5 of the plaint alleged that defendant appellant being an old lady having only one married daughter intended to dispose of her property standing on plot no. 113/11 demanded Rs. 7,50,000/- from plaintiff no. 1. This paragraph further stated that plaintiff no. 6. The second agreement pleaded in paragraph 5 of the plaint alleged that defendant appellant being an old lady having only one married daughter intended to dispose of her property standing on plot no. 113/11 demanded Rs. 7,50,000/- from plaintiff no. 1. This paragraph further stated that plaintiff no. 1 with the consent of plaintiffs 2 and 3 and with the consent of the daughter of the appellant agreed to purchase for the said consideration. It is noteworthy that in none of the two paragraphs the exact details of the contract i.e. The date, time and place when the first contract of establishing a pre-emptive right and the subsequent contract fixing the price was arrived at. It is noteworthy that the defendant and her daughter Smt. Bhawna Tyal have emphatically stated in their affidavit that they neither made any agreement as alleged in the paragraphs of the plaint nor Smt. Bhawna Tyal had written in the undertaking specifying that her mother had agreed to sell the disputed building to plaintiff No. 1 and that she will not raise any objection to sell in future. 7. The plaintiffs have annexed the alleged copies of two receipts of Rs. 25,000/- dated 1-6-1988 and Rs. 1,25,000/- dated 30-6-1988 and undertaking of Smt Bhawana Tyal dated 15th July, 1988 to the affidavits given in support of the petition for temporary injunction. From these documents, it transpires that at the best the oral agreement must have taken place before 1st of June, 1988 when the alleged advance of Rs. 25,000/- was given to the appellant. Here too in paragraph 5 of the plaint, which is paragraph 7 of the affidavit accompanying petition for injunction, the plaintiffs have not stated as to when the agreement had taken place and the appellant had agreed to sell her land and building to plaintiff No. 1. In this respect also, the trial court ought to have asked the plaintiffs to furnish better particulars. We would like to draw the attention of the lower court to rule 5 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under :- "5. Further and better statement, or particulars. In this respect also, the trial court ought to have asked the plaintiffs to furnish better particulars. We would like to draw the attention of the lower court to rule 5 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under :- "5. Further and better statement, or particulars. A further and better statement of the nature of the claim or defence, or further and better particulars of any matter stated in any pleading, may in all cases be ordered, upon such terms, as to costs and otherwise, as may be just." 8. It is advisable that the Courts should use this provision effectively where they find that the pleading of any party does not contain the necessary details which are required for fair determination of the matter before them. By way of the pleadings in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the plaint, the plaintiffs had left sufficient scope for themselves. By this lacuna they could have introduced any date, time and place at the time of evidence and thus springing a surprise to the defendant. Particularly if the matter where the lower court was putting a restraint on the defendant-appellant in exercise of her right of transfer of her land then it was necessary for the trial Judge to come to the conclusion whether the alleged oral contract had taken place. The plaintiffs should have been pinned down to their pleadings. Learned counsel for the respondents has cited a case in K. Sriramulu v. Aswatha Narayana, AIR 1968 SC 1028 . It was observed by the Supreme Court that an oral agreement may be a binding bargain and can be enforced against the person making such oral contract if it is otherwise valid and according to law Tn this case, there was an allegation that on a particular date (6th July, 1952) a meeting had taken place between the male partners at the house of a certain person and at that meeting an agreement had been arrived at between them that they would sell to him their shares at a particular rate of per share In this case, there was a specific pleading about the alleged agreement. It was not a case of the instant nature where the plaintiff is totally silent about the date, time and place of agreement between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant. 9. It was not a case of the instant nature where the plaintiff is totally silent about the date, time and place of agreement between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant. 9. In the present matter, several important questions arise for determination. Firstly whether the first contract of pre-emption was binding. It has been argued from the side of the appellant that such a contract was a restrictive agreement and offending the rule against perpetuity. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited a case in Sant Ram v. Labh Singh, AIR 1965 SC 314 wherein it was stated that pre-emption on ground of visinage by custom places unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold and to dispose of property guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution IN this case, reliance has been placed on a case in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath, AIR 1962 SC 1476 which too has been cited by learned counsel for the appellant. Reliance has also been placed on a case in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 . Learned counsel for the respondents had, on the other hand, cited cases in Aulad Ali v Syed Ali Athar, AIR 1927 All 170, Ram Baran v Ram Mohit, AIR 1961 Cal 153 and Mangi Ram v. Jyoti Prasad, 1977 ALJ 441 in support of his contention that an agreement of pre-emption is still enforceable in the Courts of law. The lower court has to decide in the light of the case laws cited above and those which may be cited before him on the above aspect regarding validity of the oral contract of pre-emption. IN this respect, he has first to satisfy himself that the alleged contract had taken place and in that continuation he was also to satisfy that prima facie it was an enforceable contract. 10. The second question was whether the alleged contract in paragraph 5 of the plaint was almost a new contract or a continuation of the first contract contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint. If it was a new contract, then the bar of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act may come in the way of the respondents. We intend to clarify at this stage that this may not be considered as a finding of this Court. If it was a new contract, then the bar of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act may come in the way of the respondents. We intend to clarify at this stage that this may not be considered as a finding of this Court. According to paragraph 3 of the plaint, the alleged agreement of pre-emption was between the purchasers of two plot Nos. 113/11 and 113/12. THEy were plaintiffs 2 and 3 on one hand and the defendant- appellant on the other hand. The plaintiff No. 1 was not a purchaser of either of two plot Nos. 113/11 and 113/12. In this way, an important question arises about the very validity of the alleged contract between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant. In this continuation, another question will arise whether defendant-appellant is bound by the said oral contract between her and plaintiff No. 1 in view of the alleged contract of pre-emption. At this place, it is noteworthy that the plaintiffs have pleaded that the second contract had taken place between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant with the consent of plaintiffs 2 and 3. No such pleading has been made in paragraph 3 of the plaint or any paragraph of the plaint by which this Court may come to the conclusion that there was any contract between the parties that plaintiffs 2 and 3 had contracted with the defendant and that the defendant would be bound to transfer her property to any one of the nominees of plaintiffs 2 and 3. The learned trial Judge has believed the version of the plaintiffs as if the affidavit of D. K. Jain plaintiff No 1 was a sacroscant document and every word of it was worthy of reliance This was not a very simple question. In view of the points elucidated above by us, the whole matter was couched in a very complex manner concealing some very material facts. In such a circumstance, the lower court could not have come to the conclusion on the material placed before it that the plaintiff No. 1 had a prima facie case. 11. From the pleadings of the plaintiffs, it was clear that at the best the status of plaintiff No. 1 was that of a prospective vendee contracting for sale. In such a circumstance, the lower court could not have come to the conclusion on the material placed before it that the plaintiff No. 1 had a prima facie case. 11. From the pleadings of the plaintiffs, it was clear that at the best the status of plaintiff No. 1 was that of a prospective vendee contracting for sale. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act shows that a contract of sale itself does not create any interest or charge on such property. In such a state of law, plaintiff No. 1 had only the right to get his contract enforced. If the defendant-appellant transferred her interest in the property in contravention of the oral agreement, then the purchaser would be purchasing at his own risk. If ultimately a decree is passed, then the purchase by the third person would be subject to the said decree. Hence, there appears to be no balance of convenience at the present in favour of plaintiff No. 1. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 do not appear to be a contracting party. At the most, as alleged in paragraph 5 of the plaint, they were the consenting parties to the alleged contract for sale. Therefore, their status was more or less of proforma plaintiffs. The decree could not be passed in their favour. Moreover, at the present, the plaintiffs are not seeking any relief for specific performance of their contract. We have been informed during the course of arguments that an application for amendment of plaint is pending before the lower court and by this amendment the relief of specific performance of Contract Act is sought to be introduced in the plaint. Till such amendment has been made, this Court cannot take notice of it. 12. The lower court has not considered the third aspect of the matter whether plaintiff No. 1 would suffer an irreparable loss. There is no finding on this point. However, on the materials placed before the lower court, there was no justification for issue of a temporary injunction. The application, as it stood before the lower court, deserved to be rejected. Consequently, the appeal must be allowed and the judgment and order of the lower court should be set aside. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the lower court are set aside. The application for temporary injunction is rejected. The application, as it stood before the lower court, deserved to be rejected. Consequently, the appeal must be allowed and the judgment and order of the lower court should be set aside. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the lower court are set aside. The application for temporary injunction is rejected. However, we intend to clarify that this order would not come in the way of the plaintiffs to obtain a fresh order of injunction if they are able to make out a case for injunction in the light of the submissions which have been made above. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.