JUDGMENT B.N. Misra, J. - U.P. State Road Transport Corporation has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing the order, dated June 12, 1985 (Annexure-3) passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, v. Lucknow, whereby the order, dated March 10, 1977, passed by the petitioner terminating the services of respondent No.2 was set aside the respondent No.2 was held entitled to full pay, allowances with increments and other service benefits including the benefit of continuity of service and back wages. 2. The facts may be briefly stated. Respondent No.2 was working as a Conductor under the petitioner Corporation. According to the petitioner, respondent No.2 was appointed on December 7, 1965 although in his claim petitioner respondent No.2 had claimed that he was appointed on March 10, 1965. Respondent No.2 had also claimed that his appointment was against a clear vacancy and that he had been confirmed on the post of Conductor. The petitioner's stand in this regard is that respondent No.2 was working in a temporary capacity as a Conductor till March 10, 1977 and had not been confirmed. According to the petitioner, on an overall assessment of the work and conduct of respondent Not it was found that his services were not satisfactory. His services were accordingly terminated by as simple order of termination, dated March 10, 1977 (Annexure 1) on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. The order of termination was passed by the Assistant Regional Manager who was the appointing authority and as such competent to pass the order of termination. Thereafter, having failed to secure any relief from the departmental authorities, respondent No.2 filed a claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal, respondent No. I. The claim of respondent No.2 is that the impugned order terminating his services was not an innocuous order but had been passed by way of punishment on the ground of misconduct and as such without a proper departmental enquiry his services could not have been terminated. Parties had appeared before the Tribunal and filed written statements in support of their respective cases. The main question which arose for consideration before the Tribunal was whether the impugned order of termination, dated March 10, 1977, was an order of termination simpliciter or was an order of punishment on the ground of respondent No. 2's misconduct which had provided the foundation for the said order. The main question which arose for consideration before the Tribunal was whether the impugned order of termination, dated March 10, 1977, was an order of termination simpliciter or was an order of punishment on the ground of respondent No. 2's misconduct which had provided the foundation for the said order. After considering the respective cases of the parties and taking into consideration several decisions on the question, the Tribunal came to hold that the foundation for the impugned order of termination was the misconduct of respondent No.2 for which he could be suitably punished by way of dismissal or removal from service by following the correct procedure, but that it was not open to the Corporation to terminate his services by the so called simple order of termination. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the impugned order of termination, dated March 10, 1977, and directed that respondent No.2 should be deemed to be in continuous service and entitled to full pay, allowances with increments and all service benefits including arrears of salary. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the findings and the decision of the Tribunal mainly on the ground that the Tribunal failed to maintain the distinction between 'motive' and 'foundation'. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has, on the other hand, submitted that the alleged misconduct of respondent No.2 on December 19, 1976 was the foundation of the impugned order and, therefore, since respondent No.2 was not given any opportunity to explain his conduct with regard to the incident which took place on December 19, 1976, the order of terminating his services on the basis of that incident is bad in law. 4. At the outset I must point out a serious error in the judgment of the Tribunal wherein in paragraph 15, the Tribunal found that as respondent No.2 had been working against a clear vacancy since 1965 and his services and been transferred to the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, he had a lien on the post. As already noted, the Corporation has clearly asserted that the petitioner was working in a temporary capacity as a Conductor and had not been confirmed. Respondent No.2 no doubt claimed that he was confirmed in his post but this claim has not been substantiated. The Tribunal also has not given a categorical finding that respondent No.2 had been confirmed in his post. Respondent No.2 no doubt claimed that he was confirmed in his post but this claim has not been substantiated. The Tribunal also has not given a categorical finding that respondent No.2 had been confirmed in his post. It, therefore, follows that so long as respondent No.2 had not been confirmed in his post, no lien in the post could accrue in his favour. In this context learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravindar Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Nandloom Corporation Ltd. & Anr., 1987 (55) F.L.R. 884, wherein it was held: "The appellant was a temporary servant and had no right to the post. It has also not been denied that both under the contract of service as also the Service Rules governing him the employer had the right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice. The order to which exception is taken is expressly an order of termination in innocuous terms and does not cast any stigma on the appellant nor does it visit him with any evil consequences. It is also not founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the order is not open to challenge". 5. It is submitted on behalf of the Corporation that since respondent No.2 was a temporary servant and had no right to the post, his services could be terminated by virtue of Rule 3 of Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relies upon a decision of this Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal (V) & Ors. Writ Petition No.10325 of 1987, wherein in similar circumstances the decision of the Tribunal was set aside on the finding that the order of termination in that case was not passed as a measure of punishment. With respect I agree with the observations contained in the aforesaid judgment of this Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. With respect I agree with the observations contained in the aforesaid judgment of this Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1011, wherein it was inter alia, held: ....But the,entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order". Bearing in mind the dictum of the Supreme Court extracted above, the materials which led to the impugned order of termination may be referred to. Respondent No.2 joined service in 1965 and between 1965 and 1976 on one occasion he was found to have committed irregularity and on four occasion he was found carrying passengers without tickets. In respect of each of his acts of misconduct respondent No.2 had been punished. It also appears that there was an incident on December 19, 1976 and according to the petitioner, in course of checking it was found that respondent No.2 was carrying passengers in his bus without tickets along with unbooked luggage. Of course the records of the case do not indicate that any further enquiry had been held by the Corporation against respondent No.2 in regard to the incident on December 19, 1976. However, it appears that on overall assessment of the record of service of respondent No.2 spread over from 1968 till 1976, the Corporation decided to terminate the services of respondent No.2 in accordance with the Rules provided in Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. It is also urged by learned Counsel for respondent No.2 that the order of termination came in the month of March, 1977 while the last alleged act of misconduct had taken place three months earlier on December 19, 1976 and, therefore, that incident could not be said to be an attendant circumstance having bearing on the impugned order. This submission emphasises one part of the dictum of the Supreme Court referred to above but overlooks its other part wherein it has been held that the entirety of circumstances must comprise of preceding as well as attendant circumstances. This submission emphasises one part of the dictum of the Supreme Court referred to above but overlooks its other part wherein it has been held that the entirety of circumstances must comprise of preceding as well as attendant circumstances. Therefore, the acts of misconduct preceding the order of termination appear to be the basis on which the Corporation took its decision that instead of confirming respondent No.2 in his post, his services should be terminated in accordance with the relevant rules. On scrutiny of the impugned order of termination, it appears that it was passed not as a measure of punishment against respondent No.2 but as a simple order terminating his services. 7. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal, dated June 12, 1985 (Annexure-3) is set aside. The order, dated March 10, 1977, terminating the services of the petitioner is upheld. Parties will, however, bear their own costs. 8. With the disposal of the writ petition, all interim orders stand discharged.