JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. - The petitioner is a bidder of a tender in response to the auction notice contained in Annexure II attached with the writ petition relating to realisation of toll tax on a bridge situate on Utraula-Faizabad-AUahabad Marg between 227-228 Km. Another bidder of the tender in response to the notice contained in Annexure II attached with the writ petition is M/s. Upadhyaya & Company, village Saryan, Post Norantadiu, district Ballia which has appeared before this Court in this writ petition to contest the claim of the petitioner through an application for impleadment. Since the bid of M/s. Upadhyaya and Company has been accepted by the authorities concerned and the petitioner claims to be highest bidder, therefore, the real dispute is between the aforesaid two parties. The opposite-party 1 has contested the claim of the petitioner and has supported the claim of M/s. Upadhyaya and Company as will be evident from the various counter-affidavits filed in the present writ petition. 2. After amendment of the writ petition the main reliefs claimed by the petitioner are as below t - Firstly, to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 21-11-1989 passed by the opposite-party No. 2 ; Secondly, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Commissioner to confirm the highest bid of the petitioner and execute a lease in favour of the petitioner to realise the tolls over the Phaphamau bridge. Thirdly, that the operation of the order dated 24-11-1989 should be stayed and that the opposite-parties Nos. 1 and 2 be directed not to execute the lease in favour of M/s. Upadhyaya & Company. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at a great length. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the petitioners tender was submitted hardly 4 minutes later than the time prescribed in the notice, therefore, the contesting opposite-parties have patently erred in ousting the petitioner from consideration specially when the petitioners' bid is highest in the facts and circumstances of this case. 4. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the defects pointed out by the opposite-party No. 2 in his order dated 21-11-1989 are so minor that an opportunity should have been afforded to the petitioner to remove the defects, if any. 4. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the defects pointed out by the opposite-party No. 2 in his order dated 21-11-1989 are so minor that an opportunity should have been afforded to the petitioner to remove the defects, if any. In this connection it has been contended that the character certificate submitted by the petitioner is true even if it is not on the prescribed form, it cannot be ignored by the authorities concerned specially when the contents of the certificate are not denied by the contesting opposite-party through any of the counter-affidavits on record. It has also been stressed that the solvency certificate with the tender was a good certificate and it has been misread and mis-appreciated by the opposite-party No. 2. Therefore, the findings recorded by the opposite party No. 2 in the impugned order suffer from patent errors of law. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also emphasised that the Power of Attorney has been wrongly criticised by the opposite party No. 2 in the facts and circumstances of the case when photostat copy thereof had been filed. The authority could have demanded the original from the petitioner if they were not satisfied with the photostat copy. In short, it has been emphasised that the impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2, dated 21-11-1989 should be quashed. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also invited our attention to Rule 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Tolls Regulation, Levy and Collection Rules, 1980 which provides as below : - "If an auction bid/negotiated offer is not the highest one, the lower auction bid/negotiated offer can only be accepted after getting prior approval of the State Government." 6. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner the opposite-party No. 2 has accepted the bid of M/s. Upadhaya & Company which was less by Rs. 1,000 than the bid of the petitioner, therefore, it could not be accepted. The impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2 has failed to consider this aspect of the matter, it suffers from patent errors of law and deserves to be quashed. 7. The learned Counsel for the opposite-party No. 1 has replied the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and he has submitted that the impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2 does not suffer from any patent error of law. 7. The learned Counsel for the opposite-party No. 1 has replied the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and he has submitted that the impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2 does not suffer from any patent error of law. He has emphasised that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case. 8. According to the learned Counsel for the State the conditions mentioned in the auction notice attached with the writ petition (Annexure II) are mandatory conditions, rather conditions precedent to the acceptance of the tender, therefore, the opposite-party No. 2 was fully justified in the facts and circumstances of this case to reject the tender of the petitioner. He has also much emphasised that the petitioner has not come with clean hands before this court insofar as it has alleged that the tender was submitted in time and that the version about strike of junior engineers was not pleaded at the earliest, therefore, it is not a fit case for interference with the impugned order by this Court. The learned Counsel for M/s. Upadhyaya & Company has tried to refuse the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner on the ground that the conditions in the notice are mandatory in nature and that the opposite-party No. 2 was well within his right to discard the tender submitted by the petitioner in view of the conditions Nos. 9 and 14 of Annexure II attached with the writ petitioner. It has also been stressed by the learned Counsel for M/s. Upadhyaya & Company that in the facts and circumstances of this case the bid offered by M/s. Upadhaya & Company would be treated as highest bid because the petitioner's tender was defective and it was put in the tender box after the prescribed time by four minutes only. 9. A large number of authorities have been cited by the learned Counsel for the parties in support of their contentions. It is not necessary to deal with all the authorities cited at the bar. However, relevant authorities will be dealt with at appropriate places in this judgment. 10. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the delay of 4 minutes in filing the tender by the petitioner cannot be treated as fatal against him. However, relevant authorities will be dealt with at appropriate places in this judgment. 10. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the delay of 4 minutes in filing the tender by the petitioner cannot be treated as fatal against him. The learned Counsel for the opposite-parties have emphasised that the time fixed in the notice, contained in Annexure II, for submitting the tender is mandatory and condition precedent. According to them if the petitioner did not file his tender within the time prescribed, the opposite-party No. 2 has correctly discarded the tender filed by the petitioner. It is noteworthy that the opposite-party No. 2 in the impugned order dated 21-11-1989 has also observed that the tender filed by the petitioner beyond time could not be accepted, In our opinion, the observation of the opposite-party No. 2 in the impugned order is patently erroneous and unreasonable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In AIR 1946 All 416 - Dr. N. P. Chatterji and another v. Emperor, a learned Single Judge of this Court vide para 28 of page 23 Col. 1 has indicated as below : "...............The period of time provided for the submission of tender is not the period such as we find in the Limitation Act after which the rights of the parties are extinguished. It is only a measure of convenience and cannot be put at a higher level." 11. In the present case we find that the opposite-parties have acted unreasonably in rejecting the tender of the petitioner on the ground of delay. The time mentioned in the notice was 1130 as admitted by the parties and it is also admitted that the petitioner submitted this tender at 11.34 a.m. There were other two tenderers. If their papers were examined by the authority concerned it would have taken at least 4-5 minutes but sealing the box at 11.30 is highly objectionable and unreasonable in the facts and circumstances of this case. We think that on the ground of delay the petitioner's tender could not be rejected In AIR 1967 SC 1753 : G.J. Fernandes v. State of Mysore and others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the question of submission of delayed tender vide para 13 have observed as below though in different set of facts : - "......... . . . . The seven days' period given is not a period of limitation and it cannot be said that it was not open to the Executive Engineer to take into account the letter which came "few days later." 12. In our opinion, the conduct of the opposite-parties in discarding the tender of the petitioner on the ground of delay is not reasonable and smacks of arbitrariness. To our mind, one of the grounds given by the opposite-party No. 2 in the impugned judgment dated 21-11-1989, for excluding the tender of the petitioner from consideration due to delay is bad in law and on this ground alone the impugned judgment can be quashed. It is well known by now that if a Tribunal gives good reason as well as bad reason in its order, its order is liable to be quashed because it is difficult to say how far its mind was influenced by the ground which is not entertainable in law (see AIR 1955 SC 371). 13. The learned Counsel for the contesting opposite-parties have emphasised that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot examine the propriety of the findings recorded by the opposite-party 2. The Additional Chief Standing Counsel in his written arguments on points No. 2 has cited a large number of cases, such as 1989 (4) SCC Page 187; AIR 1989 SC 398; AIR 1971 SC 977 ; AIR 1970 SC 1334 ; AIR 1958 SC 398 ; AIR 1971 SC 1902 and AIR 1989 SC 1899 . It has been emphasised before us that this Court cannot sit in appeal against the impugned order, dated 21-11-1189. In this connection the learned Counsel for the opposite-party has placed reliance on the ruling reported in AIR 1989 SC 997 - State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Maharaja Dharmanand Prasad Singh etc, paras 14 and 28. In para 14 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated that the High Court should have abstained from examination of the legality or the correctness of the purported cancellation of lease which involved resolution of disputes on question of fact as well. In our opinion this case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case as no question of determination effect is involved. In our opinion this case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case as no question of determination effect is involved. We have indicated above that the impugned order, dated 21-11-1989 passed by the opposite-party No. 2 suffers from unreasonable approach and arbitrariness which are valid grounds in law for the exercise of writ jurisdiction by a High Court in Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. In para 24 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated as below : - ".......... When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into action of relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question would reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factor............" 15. In the present case we have indicated above that the authorities concerned have taken unreasonable attitude on the question of delay and their action is in the teeth of the decisions mentioned in AIR 1946 All 416 and AIR 1967 SC 1753 . Therefore, we are of the opinion that the mistake committed by the opposite-party No. 2 is in the decision-making process and amenable to interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 16. During the course of argument the learned Counsel for the opposite-parties have relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1974 SC 651 of Purxetoma Ramanta Quonim v. M. K T and of and others, and it has been emphasised that by merely giving bids the bidders not acquired any vested rights, therefore, the writ petition is not entertainable. It is note-worthy that in AIR 1977 All 527 : Ramdeo Singh v. Executive Engineer, P. W. D. and others, a Division Bench of this Court vide para. 4 has indicated that if a tenderer is aggrieved by the action of the public authority he can ask for a mandamus directing them to open the tender in accordance with the tender notice. The learned Judges has also made the following observations : .. 4 has indicated that if a tenderer is aggrieved by the action of the public authority he can ask for a mandamus directing them to open the tender in accordance with the tender notice. The learned Judges has also made the following observations : .. A somewhat similar question came up before the Supreme Court in K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 and it was hold that where a bid of a person in a public auction had been wrongly rejected, he would have sufficient interest to maintain a petition." 17. In the present case we are not impressed by the arguments of the learned Counsel for the opposite-parties that the present writ petition is not maintainable and this Court has no jurisdiction to look into the decisions as the opposite-parties in rejecting the petitioner's tender. In AIR 1981 All 139 - M/s. Yadav Medical Store v. The State of Uttar Pradrsh and others, a Division Bench of this Court has indicated in the Head-note (A) as belows :- "Since the functions of the State have multiplied enormously, the ambit of rule of law has also been enlarged. It has become necessary that the ubiquitous authority of the State manifested in myriad fields must also be subject to limitations. Consequently, even in the realm of administrative action some safeguards and restraints have been evolved and infringement of the same renders the action void." 18. According to the decisions of the Supreme Court the limitations upon an administrative action of the State have been put and the State and its instrumentalities are required to act fairly, honestly, reasonably and bereft of arbitrariness. Therefore, we think that in the present case the contesting opposite-parties have acted unreasonably and arbitrarily in discarding the tender of the petitioner on the ground of delay. 19. In the impugned judgment of opposite-party No 2 dated 21-11-1989 it has been mentioned that the character certificate of the petitioner's partners is not on the prescribed form. It has also been stated that solvency certificates regarding the petitioner's partners have not been issued by the District Magistrate as required through the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition. It has also been stated that solvency certificates regarding the petitioner's partners have not been issued by the District Magistrate as required through the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition. The opposite-party No. 2 has emphasised that the certificate relating to Vinod Kumar Yadav has been issued by the Tahsildar on 27-5-1989 and it has been attested by the Zila Adhikari on 29-8-1989 without any further inquiry. Therefore, the certificates are not strictly in accordance with the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition. It has also been stressed that the certificate is more than three months old therefore it does not conform the condition mentioned in the notice inviting tenders. Therefore, the petitioner's tender was defective. The opposite-party No. 2 has also mentioned that the signature of the petitioner's partner, namely Amrit Lal Yadav has not been attested by the Zila Adhikari therefore the petitioner's tender could not be accepted. Lastly, it has been pointed out by the opposite-party No. 2 that the petitioner had not attached the original power of attorney therefore the tender submitted on behalf of the petitioner was defective. 20. Regarding the above defects the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the conditions mentioned in the notice attached with the writ petition were only directory in nature and substantial compliance thereof should have been accepted by the opposite-party No. 2. It has also been stressed that even if the defects pointed out by the opposite-party No. 2 in his judgment dated 21-11-1989 are correct, the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to remove the defects, The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P. and another, AIR 1963 SC 1417 ; Dal Chand v. Municipal Corporation Bhopal and another, AIR 1983 SC 303 and M/s. Rubber House v. Ms. Excelsior Needle Industries P. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 and emphasised that the conditions mentioned in the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition are only directory in nature. Excelsior Needle Industries P. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 and emphasised that the conditions mentioned in the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition are only directory in nature. In this connection the learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention to the ruling reported in Sri Krishna Dutt Singh v. State of U. P. and others, 1986 UPLBEC page 515 and it has been stressed that a Division Bench of this Court has indicated in similar circumstances vide paragraphs 16 as below : "............ The proper course would be that the petitioner be permitted to participate in the auction subject to the furnishing of fresh solvency certificate." 21. In the present case, the auction took place on 23-9-1989 and the claims of the parties were decided by the opposite-party No. 2 on 21-11-1989. Really if the opposite-party No. 2 was not satisfied with the paper filed by the petitioner, he should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to furnish relevant documents strictly in accordance with the conditions mentioned in the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition. The opposite-party No. 2 has observed that the solvency certificate of Vinod Kumar was more than three months old. It appears that the opposite-party No. 2 has misread the aforesaid certificate. We have examined the original record and we find that the Zila Adhikari had counter-signed the solvency certificate on 29-8-1989. Therefore, the certificate by the Zila Adhikari bearing the date 29-8-1989 would be within three months. 22. As regards the character certificate of the partners of the petitioner, it is sufficient to observe that if the certificates were not on prescribed form, the opposite-party No. 2 should have asked the petitioner to furnish the character certificate in the prescribed form. 23. As regards power of attorney if the opposite-party No. 2 was not satisfied with the photostat copy he should have demanded the petitioner to produce the original one. The opposite-party No. 2 does not appear to have considered the question whether an opportunity for removing the defects should have been given to the petitioner or not. 23. As regards power of attorney if the opposite-party No. 2 was not satisfied with the photostat copy he should have demanded the petitioner to produce the original one. The opposite-party No. 2 does not appear to have considered the question whether an opportunity for removing the defects should have been given to the petitioner or not. Therefore, we think that in the ends of justice the opposite-party No. 2 should be asked to address itself to the question of giving fresh opportunity to the petitioner to supply necessary certificates in the light of the observations made in the aforesaid case reported in 1986 UPLBEC 515. 24. The learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party has cited a large number of rulings in support of his contention that if a thing is required to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that very manner and if it is not done the opposite-party No. 2 was fully justified in discarding the tender of the petitioner. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel in his written argument has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Hardwar Singh v. Begun Swnwani and others, (1973) 3 SCC 889 and Steel Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR. 1958 SC 315 and has contended that the conditions mentioned in the notice (Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition) are mandatory in nature and since the petitioner did not strictly comply with the conditions, his tender was rightly excluded from consideration by the opposite-party No. 2. The learned Counsel for the opposite-party has not cited any case relating to public auction notice. The cases relate to statutory provisions such as Income Tax Rules and the Government contracts contemplated by the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution. Therefore, they are not helpful in determining the controversy before us. Moreover, in the case cited by learned Counsel for opposite-parties and reported in Hardwur Singh v. Begum Swnwani and others, 1973 (3) SCC 889 , vide paragraphs 13 and 14, their Lordships have made the following observations : 13. "Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. "Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter ana consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (See Earl T. Crawford : Construction of Statutes, pp. 523-h). 14 Where a prescription relates to performatory of a public duty and to invalidate acts in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over the trusted with the duty, such prescription generally understood as mere instruction the guidance of those upon whom the duty imposed." 25. In the present case, in vie w of the above dictum as well as the observations made in AIR 1946 All 415 (supra), we think that the conditions mentioned in the notice contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition, cannot be treated so mandatory as minor defects in complying with the direction would disentitle the tenderer from offering bid. Here it would be proper to observe that the breach of the conditions mentioned in the auction notice would debar the tenderers or not would depend upon the facts of each case and the nature of mistake in submitting the papers by the tenderer. If the mistakes committed by the tenderer in submitting the papers are in clear violation of the conditions mentioned in the notice, it would be open to the authorities concerned to reject the tender. However, in this case the opposite-party No. 2 has not applied his mind to the question whether the defects pointed out in the impugned order by him are major defects or minor. The opposite-party No. 2 has really erred in answering the question of delay in submitting the tender by the petitioner as if he was contravening the provisions of the Limitation Act. Therefore, we have found above that the approach of the opposite-party No. 2 was unreasonable and against the decision of this Court as well as the highest court mentioned earlier. 26. Therefore, we have found above that the approach of the opposite-party No. 2 was unreasonable and against the decision of this Court as well as the highest court mentioned earlier. 26. It is no worthy that in the present writ petition the contesting opposite parties have not raised places regarding insolvency of the petitioner or they have not attacked the partners of the petitioner bearing good character. Therefore, we think that the ends of justice would be sufficiently met if the impugned judgment of the opposite-party No. 2, dated 21-11-1989 is quashed and the opposite-party No. 2 is directed to re-examine the claims of the parties after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to remove the defects if any pointed out in the impugned judgment dated 21-11-1989. 27. At this stage it is also proper to observe that if in the opinion of the opposite-party No. 2 the petitioner's tender is entertainable, the opposite-party No. 2 should give specific reasons why the petitioner's bid which would be highest may not be accepted. In this connection, the attention of the opposite-party No. 2 is directed to rule 8 of the Uttar Pradesii Tolls Regulation Levy and Collection Rules, 1980. 28. The Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has also emphasised in his written argument that the amendment application seeking prayer for quashing the order dated 21-11-1989 passed by the opposite-party No. 2 cannot be allowed in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He has cited a number of rulings mentioned in his note and reported in A K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 ; Suderalingam Chettiar and others v. S. Nagalingam Chettiar and others, AIR 1958 Mad 307 and Harish Chandra Bajpai and another v. Triloki Singh and others, AIR 1957 SC 444 others. It is sufficient to observe that the impugned order, cited 21-11-1989 has come into existence during the pendency of the writ petition. Therefore to shorten the litigation between the parties it was necessary in the ends of the justice to allow the amendment and after allowing the amendment we proceeded to hear the Counsel for the parties. The cases cited by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore to shorten the litigation between the parties it was necessary in the ends of the justice to allow the amendment and after allowing the amendment we proceeded to hear the Counsel for the parties. The cases cited by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the Supreme Court case it has been indicated that if the bar of limitation had creation, the new cause of action should not be allowed but that is not the situation in the present case. Therefore, we have allowed the amendment application moved by the petitioner challenging the impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2, dated 21 11-1 89. 29. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if any lease has been executed in favour of M/s. Upadhyaya Co. after the impugned order dated 21-11-1989 and during the pendency of the writ petition in this Court, it would remain ineffective and inoperative till the opposite party No. 2 redetermines the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above. 30. The learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel had emphasised that the solvency certificate tiled by the petitioner is not on the proper form. He has invited our attention to the prescribed form on the Excise Manual and the relevant provisions of the Act to demonstrate that the petitioner has tiled solvency certificate on a form which has been prescribed for the bidders residing in the district other than those in which they bid. According to the counsel the partners of the petitioner are residents of Allahabad and the auction took place in Allahabad therefore the solvency certificate is not on proper form. In this connection, it is sufficient to observe that the opposite-party No. 2 will deal with the contention of the parties in this regard in the light of the observations made in 1986 UPLBEC page 515. If the opposite-party No. 2 calls upon the petitioner to remove the defects, we think that the technical objections raised by the counsel during the course of argument would be sufficiently met. 31. If the opposite-party No. 2 calls upon the petitioner to remove the defects, we think that the technical objections raised by the counsel during the course of argument would be sufficiently met. 31. Since this court cannot act as an appellate court against the impugned order of the opposite-party No. 2 in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, we have pointed out the mistakes committed by the opposite-party No.2 in his impugned order dated 21-11-1989 and we think that by quashing the impugned order and asking the opposite-party No. 2 to redetermine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above, sufficient justice would be done between the parties. 32. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the opposite-party No. 2, dated 21-11-1989 is hereby quashed and we direct the opposite-party No. 2 to redetermine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above within two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. It is made clear that if any lease has been executed in favour of M/s. Upadhyaya & Company during the pendency of the writ petition in this Court, it shall remain suspended, ineffective and inoperative till the dispute between the parties is redetermined by the opposite-party No. 2 hereafter. There would be no order as to costs.