JUDGMENT Dr. R.R. Misra, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit in which the relief claimed was for an injunction and declaration that the order of termination dated 11th July 1980 is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff. 2. Admittedly the service of the plaintiff appellant have been terminated with effect from 19th July 1980 and the plaintiff has himself admitted that he no longer continues in employment. Therefore, it has been rightly stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that the relief regarding injunction is no longer available and has accordingly not been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant. 3. The only point that survives for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration that his service have been illegally terminated by the order dated 11th July 1980. The trial court had decreed the suit but on appeal the lower appellate court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 4. Admittedly the plaintiff was given an adhoc appointment as Routine clerk on 30 August 1977 by the Vice Chancellor. This appointment was for consideration of and was ultimately approved by the Executive Council on 15th March 1978. A copy of the said letter has been filed as Ext. 3 in the case. The probation of the appellant continued and ultimately probation order dated 11th February 1980 a copy of which has been filed at Ex. AI the suit was passed placing the plaintiff appellate on probation for a period of one year with effect from 1st October 1979. It is within this period of one year that by another order dated 11th July 1980 the services of the appellant have been terminated with effect from that day after giving one month salary in advance. A copy of the termination.order has been filed as Ex. A-2 in the case and it states that the services of the plaintiff as an adhoc employee has been terminated. Besides saying that find that no further facts are mentioned in the said termination order. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. A copy of the termination.order has been filed as Ex. A-2 in the case and it states that the services of the plaintiff as an adhoc employee has been terminated. Besides saying that find that no further facts are mentioned in the said termination order. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. His first contention is that the plaintiff Appellant become a confirmed employee on 15th March 1978 because the intimation letter dated 10th July 1978 addressed to the plaintiff after that the Executive Council of the University has in its meeting dated 15th March 1978 been states to regularise the service of the plaintiff as Routine Clerk. Great emphasis has been laid by the learned Counsel for the appellant upon the word "regularise". He seeks to interpret this word by saying that regularisation is against a permanent vacancy. Therefore, the plaintiff become a confirmed employee by virtue of the said intimation letter dated 10th July 1978. Sri R.P. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the University vehemently disputes the said proposition. 6. On a consideration of the rival submission, find that on the fact of this case originally the Vice Chancellor has given on adhoc appointment letter and the Executive Council of the University had only notified or approved the said action of the Vice Chancellor in its meeting dated 15th March 1978. Besides the said Notification he further rights flow to the plaintiff under the said resolution of the University. To my mind, all that had happened in the case is that the adhoc appointment so made by the Vice Chancellor was notified or approved by the Executive Council in its meeting dated 15th March 1978 and the appellant continued to be on probation. We have fortunately on record a copy of the probation order dated 11th February 1980 also which seeks to place the plaintiff on probation of one year with effect from 1st October 1979. Therefore, on the facts of this case the position that emerges is that the services of the appellant could be terminated up to 30th September 1980 without assigning any reason. 7. Second submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that on the facts of this case an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the plaintiff before terminating his service. 7. Second submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that on the facts of this case an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the plaintiff before terminating his service. Under the Second proviso to sub-clause (3) of Statute 2.06 of the Bundelkhand University as framed and as was in force on the material date, the order of termination of service of a temporary employee could be passed even if that order that is based on any change, if such order does not disclose on its face that it was passed on such basis. In the present case I have already stated above that the termination order does not disclose on its face that it was passed on the basis of any charge. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has during the course of his submission also relied upon the fact that on 10th July 1980 a letter was addressed to the appellant asking for reply on the basis of certain complaints against the appellant that he had committed some forgery/fraud. In this letter the reply of the plaintiff was sought to be received by 13th July 1980. Hence the contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that prior to the receipt of the reply of the plaintiff, the services of the plaintiff could not be terminated. On the facts of this case as they are, in may opinion since the services of the plaintiff have been terminated on 11th July 1980 only, it cannot be said that the said termination of services is based on the basis of the letter dated 10th July 1980. In these circumstances, in my opinion when the services of the appellant were terminated within the probationary period and without any indication of the fact that they were based on any charge, no opportunity of hearing was necessary to be afforded to the appellant. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, has got no force. 9. Lastly Sri R.P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the University, has submitted that under the law the plaintiff is not entitled to seek declaration sought for by him. In support of his submission he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Shivraj Singh v. Devi Mai Asha Ram Paliwal Educational Association, Sikarpur, Bulandshahr and others, 1986 U.P. Local Bodies & Educational Cases page 20). In support of his submission he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Shivraj Singh v. Devi Mai Asha Ram Paliwal Educational Association, Sikarpur, Bulandshahr and others, 1986 U.P. Local Bodies & Educational Cases page 20). Having given by anxious consideration to the facts of this case, I find that the said objection raised on behalf of the respondent her got force as has been hold by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir & Others, AIR 1981 SC 122 : 1981 U.P.L.B.E.C. 34 (SC) a declaration for continuous service cannot be granted if the order of termination was wrongful. In these circumstances and for the aforesaid objection also I find that the lower appellant court was right in law in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff appellant. 10. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.