JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated September 23, 1982 passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal partly allowing the claim petition of Shyamlal, the respondent No. 3, and setting aside the order dated March 23, 1978 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division (upon an appeal filed by the petitioner) and declaring Shyamlal to have continued on the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent as before. The Commissioner had by the aforesaid order set aside the resolution dated July 10, 1971 passed by the Municipal Board, Shamli, annulling the order passed by the President of the said Board dismissing Shyamlal from service. As a result of the Commissioner's Order the petitioner who was reverted pursuant to the resolution of the Municipal Board dated July 10, 1971 stood reinstated to the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent. 2. These are the essential facts. Shyamlal aforesaid was appointed as a clerk in 1956. On December 31, 1960 the services of one Mittra Sain who was working as Head Clerk were terminated A.N. Gupta who was at that time Toll and Octroi Superintendent in the Board was appointed in place of Mittra Sain as Head Clerk and in the vacancy of A.N. Gupta, Shyamlal was promoted and appointed as the Toll and Octroi Superintendent. Mittra Sain approached the State Government against the termination on his services by way of a representation which was allowed on July 26, 1964. A direction was issued to the Board to reinstate him on his post of Head Clerk. Pursuant thereto, the Board passed a resolution reinstating Mittra Sain as Head Clerk and sending A.N. Gupta to his original post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent and Shyamlal to the post of Clerk. Neither A.N. Gupta nor Shyamlal, however, joined the posts to which they had been transferred/reverted in consequence of reinstatement of Mittra Sain. Shyamlal then filed a civil suit No. 38 of 1965 for a declaration that the order of his reversion passed by the Municipal Board was null and void. This suit was decreed by the trial court on September 23, 1967. Shyamlal then filed a civil suit No. 38 of 1965 for a declaration that the order of his reversion passed by the Municipal Board was null and void. This suit was decreed by the trial court on September 23, 1967. The Municipal Board filed an appeal against this decree and prayed for an interim relief for stay of the operation of the decree passed by the trial court which was granted subject to an undertaking given on behalf of the Board that the salary of Toll and Octroi Superintendent shall be deposited in the executing court. 3. Meanwhile due to the absence of A.N. Gupta who had failed to join the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent after the reinstatement of Mittra Sain, the petitioner was appointed in his place as Toll and Octroi Superintendent on November 26, 1965 and as Shyamlal too had not joined the post to which he had been reverted disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the President of the Board under Section 74. Eventually by an order dated June 17, 1969 the President dismissed Shyamlal from service. Thereupon the Board withdrew the aforesaid appeal predictably as the same together with the suit had became infructuous after Shyamlal had been dismissed from service. After the dismissal of Shyamlal from service, the petitioner was confirmed on his post as Toll and Octroi Superintendent by an order dated January 1, 1970 Shyamlal did not challenge the order of dismissal passed against him either by way of an appeal or otherwise by way of a writ petition. Instead he appears to have approached the Board which passed a resolution dated December 10, 1971 annulling the order passed by the President on June 17, 1969 dismissing Shyamlal from service. The Board further directed that Shyamlal had to be reinstated as Toll and Octroi Superintendent and the petitioner be reverted to his original post from which he had been promoted as Toll and Octroi Superintendent. In pursuance of this resolution the President of the Board passed an order dated July 12, 1971 reverting the petitioner from the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent to his original post of Octroi Inspector. In pursuance of this resolution the President of the Board passed an order dated July 12, 1971 reverting the petitioner from the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent to his original post of Octroi Inspector. This order was challenged by the petitioner by way of an appeal before the Commissioner Meerut Division who allowed the same by his order dated March 22, 1978 setting aside the aforesaid order dated July 12, 1971 on the ground that Board's resolution dated July 10, 1971 on the basis of which the above order was issued was null and void. 4. The above order of the Commissioner was successfully challenged by Shyamlal by way of a reference before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal as mentioned above. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner, firstly, on the ground that inasmuch as Shyamlal had not been given any opportunity of being heard in the appeal filed by the petitioner the same was void ad initio inasmuch as it directly affected his rights and, secondly, on the ground that with the dismissal of the appeal of the Board, the decree passed by the trial court in suit No. 38 of 1965 became final and binding on the Board was consequently the order of dismissal passed against Shyamlal was void and ineffectual in law. On these findings the Tribunal allowed the claim petition of Shyamlal, set aside the order passed by the Commissioner dated March 22, 1978 and declared Shyamlal to have continued substantively on the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent as before. 5. The above order of the Tribunal was assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner broadly on two grounds: First, that the resolution passed by the municipal Board on July 10, 1971 was completely null and void as the Board had not been invested with any power of appeal, review or supervision against the order passed by the President under Section 74 of the U.P. Municipalities Act under which Shyamlal had been dismissed: Second, that the Tribunal committed a patent error in holding that in view of the decree passed in suit No. 38 of 1965 the order of dismissal passed against Shyamlal could have no legal effect. 6. Both these contentions seem well founded and must, therefore, be sustained. 7. I begin with the first point. 6. Both these contentions seem well founded and must, therefore, be sustained. 7. I begin with the first point. In order to appreciate the submissions, it will be convenient to extract here Section 74 (as it stood at the relevant time) as this provision was subject of considerable debate at the Bar. It reads thus: "74. Appointment and Dismissal of Permanent Superior staff:- Subject to any provisions to the contrary contained in Sections 57 to 73, servants on or drawing a monthly salary exceeding Rs. 50 or in a city Rs. 75 shall be appointed and may be dismissed, removed or otherwise punished, or the services of a probationer may be terminated, by the Presiding Officer, services to the right of appeal, except in the case of the termination of the subject of a probationer, to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that an appointment on a monthly salary of Rs. 250.00 or over in the case of cities and of Rs. 100.00 or over in the other cases shall be subject to the approval of the Board. 8. Sections 57 to 73 are not attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as these provisions are concerned with the power to appointment and punishment of various categories of officers and employees like Executive Officers, Medical Officers of Health and Secretaries etc and their respective powers, functions and duties. The appointment and dismissal of Toll and Octroi Superintendent is thus regulated exclusively by Section 74 of the Act and this legal position was not disputed by the learned counsel for contesting respondent Shyamlal. Under Section 74, upon its plain terms, the power of dismissal vests in the President and this power is subject only to the right of appeal to the Prescribed Authority. Under Rule 3 of the U.P. Municipal Servants Appeal Rules, 1957 framed under Section 296(2)(A) read with Sections 74 and 76 of the Act, the appeal from an order of dismissal passed by the President of the Board lies to the Commissioner of the Division and not to the Board. There is no other provision under which the Municipal Board was authorised to review the orders passed by the President under Section 74 of the Act. There is no other provision under which the Municipal Board was authorised to review the orders passed by the President under Section 74 of the Act. The Board could not hence arrogate to itself the right to sit in appeal over the decision passed by the President in the exercise of his undoubted jurisdiction under Section 74 of the Act. As a matter of jurisdiction, therefore, the resolution passed by the Board setting aside the order of dismissal passed against Shyam Lal and directing his reinstatement was completely null and void: 9. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent, however, submitted that under Section 74 of the Act the President acts as a delegate of the Board and consequently, the Board could examine the propriety and legality of the order passed by the President. I am unable to agree. In my opinion, the President does not act as a delegate of the Board while exercising power under Section 74 of the Act. The President derives his power directly from the statute, namely, Section 74. The power of dismissal contemplated under Section 74 is not vested in the Board unlike several other provisions under which the power of dismissal has been specifically conferred under the same chapter on the Board itself. Thus under Section 58 the power of punishment, dismissal or removal of Executive Officers has been vested in the Board itself. Again under Section 67 the power to punish and dismiss Secretaries vests in the Board. The same is the case with the power of punishment and dismissal of Special Officers of Technical Departments appointed under Section 68 of the Act which vests in the Board. In contrast, therefore, Section 74 furnishes an exception in that in the case of permanent superior staff of the category specified thereunder, the power of dismissal or removal or other punishment has been conferred by the Legislature on the President. It will, therefore, be wrong to assume that the President acts as a delegate of the Board under Section 74. 10. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the General Clauses Act in support of the contention that inasmuch as the power of appointment of the permanent superior staff drawing a salary of Rs. 250/- or over in the case of cities and Rs. 10. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the General Clauses Act in support of the contention that inasmuch as the power of appointment of the permanent superior staff drawing a salary of Rs. 250/- or over in the case of cities and Rs. 100 or over in other cases is subject to the approval of the Board, the power of dismissal of a member of the permanent superior staff covered by Section 74 must also be deemed under the General Clauses Act to be vested in the Board. 11. I cannot agree. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act cannot be pressed in aid inasmuch as the legislative setting in which Section 74 of the Act appears clearly betrays an intention to the contrary. As noticed above, wherever the Legislature intended that the power of punishment including dismissal of an Officer should be exercised by the Board, it has specifically said so. The power of punishment of Executive Officers, Medical Officers of Health, Secretaries, Special Officers etc. for example, is conferred exclusively in the Board. It is hence impossible to hold that under Section 74 the President acts as a delegate of the Board. It must also be remembered that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular way it must be done in that particular manner or not at all. No authority need be cited for this proposition. 12. Confronted by this obvious difficulty, Sri K.N. Tripathi learned counsel for the respondent advanced what might in the first flush appear to be an ingenious argument but which does not, in my view, bear a close scrutiny. He contended that the decree dated September 23, 1967 declaring the reversion of Shyamlal void having become final by the withdrawal of the appeal filed by the Board, the purported order of dismissal by the President on September 17, 1969 could have no legal effect. The Board's resolution, it was urged, does not neither more nor less, than merely reiterate this legal position. 13. The argument suffers from a basic fallacy. It may be recalled that the suit was directed against the order of reversion and not against the order of dismissal. Indeed the suit was filed long before the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Shyamlal. 13. The argument suffers from a basic fallacy. It may be recalled that the suit was directed against the order of reversion and not against the order of dismissal. Indeed the suit was filed long before the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Shyamlal. The issue, therefore, whether the order of reversion of Shyamlal was proper or not could have no relevance to the validity of the disciplinary proceedings. Nor could the controversy relating to the reversion of Shyamlal survive after the very relationship of master and servant between the Board and Shyamlal had ceased with the dismissal of the latter. The decree passed by the civil court could hence be of no avail as against the order of dismissal. Indeed the very substratum of the suit and the decree, namely, the continuance in service of Shyamlal had disappeared with his dismissal. The decree passed in that suit was hence of no relevance to the validity of the order of dismissal. Further, the resolution specifically directed reinstatement of Shyamlal and reversion of the officers affected thereby. It would, therefore, be a fallacy to characterise the Board's resolution as purely declaratory in nature. 14. That brings me to the second contention which indeed already stands answered by the discussion immediately preceding. As found above the decree passed in suit No. 38 of 1965 could not nullify the order of dismissal passed by the President in the exercise of his undoubted jurisdiction in the proceedings which were altogether independent and separate from the subject-matter involved in the suit. The withdrawal or dismissal of the appeal filed by the Board subsequent to the dismissal of Shyamlal hence had no bearing on the validity of the order of dismissal passed against Shyamlal. As mentioned above with the dismissal of Shyamlal there was a complete severance of master and servant relationship between the Board and Shyamlal. The Tribunal thus failed to appreciate the true legal effect and import of the decree passed in the civil suit. For the same reason, the Tribunal was also wrong in holding that the petitioner's appointment having been made during the pendency of the suit, the same was subject to the result thereof and consequently with the dismissal of the Board's appeal, the petitioner's appointment and confirmation was rendered void and ineffectual in law. For the same reason, the Tribunal was also wrong in holding that the petitioner's appointment having been made during the pendency of the suit, the same was subject to the result thereof and consequently with the dismissal of the Board's appeal, the petitioner's appointment and confirmation was rendered void and ineffectual in law. The petitioner's appointment was in the vacancy caused by the failure of A.N. Gupta to join upon his revision from the post of Head Clerk to the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent while the petitioner's confirmation on that post on January 1, 1970 took place after the dismissal of Shyamlal from service. The petitioner's appointment and confirmation could not therefore, be invalidated by the dismissal of the Board's appeal. 15. Another error committed by the Tribunal lies in the assumption that there was nothing to indicate that Shyamlal had been dismissed from his post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent. Shyamlal having been dismissed from service it is difficult to appreciate how it could be legitimately argued that in spite of such dismissal his appointment as Toll and Octroi Superintendent was left untouched. 16. Sri K.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for Shyamlal made an attempt to submit that the order passed by the President dismissing Shyamlal was itself void inasmuch as under the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules 1966 a Toll and Octroi Superintendent could be dismissed only by the State Government and cot by the President of the Board. The argument was, however, not perused after it was successfully demonstrated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the post in question was not within the purview of the aforesaid Rules at the time when the President took action inasmuch as at that time the posts of Toll and Octroi Superintendent or Tax Superintendent in Class II, Municipal Board were not included among Palika Centralised Services mentioned in Rule 3 such posts came within the purview of the aforesaid Centralised Services only subsequently by means of a notification issued in 1983 vide The Uttar Pradesh Palika (Centralised) Services (Eleventh Amendment) Rules 1983. 17. The Tribunal was, however, right in taking the view that Shyamlal having neither been impleaded nor heard in the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner, the latter's order passed in favour of the petitioner could not be sustained in law. 17. The Tribunal was, however, right in taking the view that Shyamlal having neither been impleaded nor heard in the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner, the latter's order passed in favour of the petitioner could not be sustained in law. Upon that ground no doubt the Commissioner's order would be liable to be quashed. The question, however, is whether in view of this court's conclusion that the resolution dated July 10, 1971 as well as the consequential order passed by the President dated July 12, 1971 directing the reversion of the petitioner and reinstatement of Shyamlal were completely null and void this Court should set aside the order of Commissioner. It is plain that if the Commissioner's order is quashed, the resolution of the Board dated July 10, 1971 as well as the order passed by the President consequent thereto would stand restored in spite of the conclusion reached by this Court that both these are a complete nullity. In this peculiar situation, therefore, I refrain from quashing the order of the Commissioner. I, however, endorse the ultimate conclusion of the Commissioner that the Board's resolution as well as the order passed by its President dated July 12, 1971 were both void, though not for the reasons given by the Commissioner but on the grounds mentioned hereinabove. 18. To sum up, this court holds that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal dated September 9, 1982 is manifestly unsustainable in law and, therefore, liable to be quashed. The order passed by the Commissioner dated March 22, 1978 is, however, left untouched for the reasons stated above. The resolution dated July 10, 1971 passed by the Board as well as the order passed by the President consequent thereto on July 12, 1971 were null and void. The petitioner is hence liable to be reinstated as the Toll and Octroi Superintendent. 19. The question, however, is whether Shyamlal can be suitably adjusted in spite of the foregoing conclusions. By means of a supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner it has been brought to the notice of this court that there are at present two posts in the same cadre: (i) Toll and Octroi Superintendent, and (ii) Tax Superintendent. One of these posts is presently occupied by one O.P. Gupta allegedly on ad hoc basis. By means of a supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner it has been brought to the notice of this court that there are at present two posts in the same cadre: (i) Toll and Octroi Superintendent, and (ii) Tax Superintendent. One of these posts is presently occupied by one O.P. Gupta allegedly on ad hoc basis. The post of Toll and octroi Superintendent shall have to go to the petitioner as a result of the success of this petition. If, therefore, the appointment of O.P. Gupta was not on a permanent basis but under some ad hoc arrangement, or if no one else is presently entitled to that post, the same may be made available to Shyamlal. For, right from 1965 he was drawn into litigations for the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent and indeed on two occasions his claim met with success first, in the civil suit, and, again by the resolution of the Board dated July 10, 1971 whereupon he even worked on that post for nearly seven years until the Commissioner set aside the Board's resolution. Further, he was also confirmed on that post on July 2, 1964 albeit during the pendency of the representation of Mittra Sain. 20. In this view of the matter, it will be in fitness of things if he is adjusted against the post of Tax Superintendent. The Municipal Board and the other authorities concerned with the appointment of this post may, therefore, make an earnest endeavour to adjust Shyamlal against that post. 21. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, II Lucknow dated September 23, 1982 is quashed. The petitioner shall stand reinstated to the post of Toll and Octroi Superintendent of the Respondent-Municipal Board with the benefit of continuity of service. The respondent No. 3 Shyamlal may be adjusted against the post of Tax Superintendent provided the conditions mentioned above exist. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.