B. L. Hansaria, C. J. (Acting)-The petitioner is a company in­corporated in England owning and managing among other Koomsong Tea State at Doomdooma in the district of Dibrugarh. It is owner of land appertaining to Periodic Patta No. 1 covered by Dag Nos. 3, 9 and 14. It received a notice dated 19.5.76 in T. P. Conversion Case No. 45/75-76 requiring it to pay premium of Rs. 71, 342.00 under Rule 40A of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation for utilising an area of land totaling 428B OK 5Ls for special cultivation. This premium was demanded as the land was originally settled for ordinary cultivation. Subsequently, by a notice dated 5.12.78 the petitioner was asked to pay premium of Rs, 20,010.00. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that as most of the aforesaid land is being used for labour lines and roads it is not liable to pay the premium contemplated by Rule 40Aof the Settlement Rules which reads as below: “40A. The settlement holder of any land taken up for ordinary cultivation after the date of publication of Notification No. 3052-R, dated the 24th September 1931 in the Assam Gazette, and found to be under special cultivation, shall be liable to pay premium at the rate fixed by the State Government for that loca­lity. Premium shall be payable immediately and without reference to the period of settlement mentioned in rule 45. 3. The stand of the petitioner is that as the aforesaid land was used mostly for construction of labour lines and roads, the land cannot be said to be under 'special cultivation' but the same was used for a purpose ancillary to special cultivation. The question which falls for determination is whether the expression 'special cultivation as used in Rule 40A covers the use of land for purposes ancillary to special cultivation. 4. The contention of the learned Advocate General who has appeared for the State is that if Rule 40A is read in conjunction with Rule 40 there would be no manner of doubt that the words 'special cultivation' in Rule 40A not only cover the lard actually used for growing tea bushes but also embraces within its fold purpose ancillary to growing of tea which include construction of labour lines and roads also. This submission of the learned Advocate General is contested by Shri Baruah appearing for the petitioner. 5. This submission of the learned Advocate General is contested by Shri Baruah appearing for the petitioner. 5. Before we examine the validiiy of the rival content on we may quote Rule 40 of the Settlement Rules which is very relevant for our purpose : "40. In addition to the land revenue payable under rule 17 and the value of the timber assessed under rule 37, an applicant to whom a lease for special cultivation is granted shall be liable to pay premium. The rate of premium shall be fixed by the State Government from time to time for each locality. The premium shall be payable on or before the date of the issue of the lease unless the State Government otherwise direct." Together with this we have to note the definition of "special cultivation" given in Rule 1 (2) (a) of the Settlement Rules which is in the following language : "Special cultivation means cultivation which involve, either owing to the nature of the crop or owing to the process of the culti­vation, a much larger expenditure of capital per acre than is incurred by most of the cultivators in the State. Ordinary culti­vation means cultivation other than special cultivation." 6. If attention is confined to the defining Rule it would appear that it takes care of cultivation only which would include growing of tea bushes. But then the definition given cannot be taken to be the final word in this regard, inasmuch as the defining provision holds its field "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" as stated in the opening part of Rule 1 (2) of the Settlement Rules itself. We have to give the expression 'special cultivation' such a meaning for the case at hand which would advance the purpose behind granting of lease for special cultivation. In this connection if attention is paid to Rule 40 of the Rules it would be clear that the expression special cultivation as used therein does not cover the growing of tea bushes only or cultivating tea alone but would take within, its fold purposes ancillary thereto. Learned Advocate General is right in this regard in contending that while granting lease for special cultivation of which mention has been made in Rule 40 the area covered by tea bushes only is not contemplated inasmuch as purposes ancillary to special cultivation are integral part of special cultivation. Learned Advocate General is right in this regard in contending that while granting lease for special cultivation of which mention has been made in Rule 40 the area covered by tea bushes only is not contemplated inasmuch as purposes ancillary to special cultivation are integral part of special cultivation. They are so intimately connected that any effort to divide the same in two water tight compartments would be an exercise in futility. This is so because there are various statutes which requires a tea garden like the petitioner to cater to the various needs of the labourers engaged by the garden. In this connection we may refer to section 15of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 which require providing of housing facilities to every worker including his family. Similarly roads have to be constructed for using the land for growing of tea. We may point out here that the expression "purposes ancillary to special cultivation" has found currency after the same was used in the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1956 whose section 2(2Xa) has curved out an exception for the land held and utilised for special cultivation of tea and purposes ancillary thereto. By an amendment made to this Act in 1971 by Assam Act VIII of 1971 the purposes ancillary to special cultivation were defined to mean as many as 11 different purposes which include (I) land used for staff building including labour line and (2) land used for roads, bridges and drain within the tea estate. In fact these purposes are so very interwoven in the fabric of growing tea that the same cannot be separated from the act of planting tea bushes which cannot be viewed differently or in isolation from other purposes ancillary thereto. It is for this reason that the Land Ceiling Act has excepted the application of this Act not only to the land used for special cultivation strictly interpreted but to purposes ancillary thereto also. There can be no denial that the purposes ancillary to special cultivation are part and parcel of the business of running a tea garden. Because of this we are in agreement with the learned Advocate General that when Rule 40 of the Rules has spoken about granting of lease for special cultivation the same cannot be confined to the purposes of growing tea only but includes within its fold purposes ancillary thereto also. Because of this we are in agreement with the learned Advocate General that when Rule 40 of the Rules has spoken about granting of lease for special cultivation the same cannot be confined to the purposes of growing tea only but includes within its fold purposes ancillary thereto also. In this connection our attention has been invited by the learned Advocate General to Sonapur Tea Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Collector, (1989) 1 GLJ 97 wherein this Court observed that an interpretation which advances the objects of the Act should alone be accepted. This is what follows from what has been observed in State of Gujrat vs. Chaturbhuj, AIR 1976 SC 1697 (para 14) and Kameshwar Singh vs. Additional District Judge, AIR 1987 SC 138 (para 4). 7. While countering the submission of the learned Advocate General, Shri Baruah has urged that as the purposes ancillary to special cultivation are different from special cultivation as such, we may not read the words purposes ancillary to special cultivation in Rule 40A. It is contended by the learned counsel by referring to a number of decisions that this Court is not to supply omissions in a statute. This is what has been observed in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (12 Edn) page 33 and V. P. Sarathi's Interpretation of Statutes 20th Edn. page 210. Shri Baruah referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Baliram vs. Justice B. Lentin, AIR 1988 SC 2267 wherein in has been held that the Court cannot in the guise of interpreting the provision supply any cause omissus. In this very decision in para 29 it has however been observed that one part cannot be read in isolation but must take its colour from the context in which it appears. So doing, we find that the width of the expression special cultivation used in Rule 40 of the Settlement Rules cannot he read divorced from the meaning given to the expression 'special cultivation' for which premium is required to be paid as mentioned in Rule 40 of the Settlement Rules. 8. Keeping in view the provisions of Rule 40 of the Settlement Rules and the fact that the growing of tea bushes for running a tea garden and purposes ancillary thereto are absolutely intertwined, we are of the opinion that the expression special cultivation in Rule 40A of the Rules would cover the purposes ancillary thereto also. 8. Keeping in view the provisions of Rule 40 of the Settlement Rules and the fact that the growing of tea bushes for running a tea garden and purposes ancillary thereto are absolutely intertwined, we are of the opinion that the expression special cultivation in Rule 40A of the Rules would cover the purposes ancillary thereto also. 9 In the result we do not find force in this petition which is therefore dismissed. Y. I. Singh, J.-I agree