SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is not merely a member but the Vice-President of the Agricultural produce Marketing Committee, Bellary and seeks herein to challenge an order made by the Deputy Commissioner, bellary on the 13th April, 1987 as per annexure-C herein declaring that he is disqualified to be a member of the a P M. C. under S 16 (2) (g) read with s. 17 (2) of the Karnataka Agricultural produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 ('the Act' for short ). ( 2 ) HE has obtained an interim order on this court staying the impugned disqualification. Subsequently one Kehsava reddy said to be the President of the agricultural Produce Committee (herein- after called 'the committee') got himself impleaded as party alongside the Deputy commissioner of Bellary who alone was party respondent initially. However, the matter has been exclusively contested by r-1, the Deputy Commissioner followed by the other members of the committee of management of the said institution who had sought to intervene alleging that the petitioner and second respondent are hand-in-glove with each other and that respondent No. 2 while making a pretence of opposing the petition is likely to support the petitioner and to ensure that a just decision is reached in this proceeding and to assist a just decision being reached and recorded they have accordingly sought to intervene in the matter and have been allowed to intervene. ( 3 ) PRINCIPALLY the matter has been contested by the members of the committee along with the Deputy Commissioner who is the first respondent. ( 4 ) THE facts that have led up to this controversy is within a narrow compass and admits of a brief narration. On a complaint having been lodged against the petitioner alleging that his son who was living with him had obtained a contract work from the society resulting in Rs. ( 4 ) THE facts that have led up to this controversy is within a narrow compass and admits of a brief narration. On a complaint having been lodged against the petitioner alleging that his son who was living with him had obtained a contract work from the society resulting in Rs. 5000/- and odd being paid to the petitioner's son and that in consequence the petitioner had become disqualified to continue as a member under the provisions of the Act and should therefore be removed from the committee, the Deputy Commissioner before whom the complaint was made, issued a show- cause notice to the petitioner as per annexure-A and in reply there the petitioner denied the allegations made namely of the contractor-son being joint with him and alleged that his son is living separately with his brother and they are not the members of the joint family To this effect he filed an objection statement and was heard through his counsel by the deputy Commissioner who, however, held that on the factum of the admitted relationship between the petitioner and the son who obtained the contract work for the society, there is little gain-say in denying that he was atleast indirectly interested in the work done and had consequently incurred the disqualification under S. 16 (2) (g) read with S. 17 of the act. It is the legality and correctness of this order which is precisely in challenge in this writ petition. ( 5 ) TO start a complaint is made that adequate opportunity was not given to the petitioner to make out a case of total disinterestedness in the contract work in virtue of the son being a separated member living away from the father There, however, seems to be little substance in this complaint because although the matter had been pending before the Deputy commissioner for quite some time the petitioner had not offered to lead any evidence or produced proof in support of his allegation that he and his contractor- son were not joint. In this court some documents have been produced to show that there was a division between him and his son and that the son was residing separately from the father. In this court some documents have been produced to show that there was a division between him and his son and that the son was residing separately from the father. The electoral roll produced to illustrate the separate residence of the son does not really bear out any such state of affairs and the zerox copy of an unregistered palupatti produced, although of the year 1982, inspires little confidence since it is a document whose existence can be contrived at any moment. If it was available before there was little reason not to produce it before the Deputy Commissioner. It is not his case that he was not given any opportunity to produce the same. Hence, I do not find any justification to permit the petitioner to rely upon the same in these proceedings in which evidentiary matters are not to be put in issue. ( 6 ) THE petitioner being a Hindu prima facie under the Hindu law he is presumed to be joint with his son. Reference in this connection may be made to the following illustration adumbrated in hindu Law by Mulla : (15th edition at page 303 ). " (1) Presumption that a joint family continues joint : generally speaking, 'the normal state of every Hindu family is joint. Presumably every such family is joint in food, worship and estate. In the absence of proof of division, such is the legal presumption ' In other words, 'given a joint Hindu family the presumption is, until the contrary is proved, that the family continues joint'. The presumption of union is the greatest in the case of father and son. " (emphasis supplied) therefore, it becomes clear that the normal state of a Hindu family being joint, in the absence of proof to the contrary such a state has always got to be presumed and it does appear to me the instant case is no exception. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary by the petitioner, the question whether the petitioner had incurred the disqualification which he has now been held to have incurred by the Deputy Commissioner under the impugned order has to be examined in the light of the statutory provisions. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary by the petitioner, the question whether the petitioner had incurred the disqualification which he has now been held to have incurred by the Deputy Commissioner under the impugned order has to be examined in the light of the statutory provisions. Reference in this connection may be made to S. 16 (2) (g) of the Act :"disqualification for membership : without prejudice to any other disqualifications provided in this Act,- (2) a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as or for being a member of the market committee- (g) if, save as hereinafter provided, he has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any work done by the order of the market committee or any contract of employment with, or under, or by, or on behalf, of the market committee ;"i may also advert to proviso to S. 16 (2) which enacts circumstances under which the member does not incur disqualification under (g) by reason of his-" (A) having a share in any joint stock company or a share or interest in any association registered under the karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, or in any co-operative society which shall contract with or be employed by or on behalf of the market committee. "reference in this connection may be made to S. 16 (3) which reads : (3) a person shall be disqualified for being a member of the market committee as a representative of any institution if he, or a firm of which he is a partner or a body corporate (other than a co-operative society) in which he is a Director, or a joint family of which he is member, does business as a trader, commission agent, broker, importer or Exporter. " ( 8 ) THE question for consideration herein is whether by virtue of his relationship with his son with whom he must be presumed to be joint the petitioner can be said to be atleast indirectly interested in the work done by the under this order, of the market committee. We may exclude from consideration the question whether the petitioner had any share in the work done for admittedly there is no direct proof. Question is whether he did not have anyinterest at all in the work even indirectly. We may exclude from consideration the question whether the petitioner had any share in the work done for admittedly there is no direct proof. Question is whether he did not have anyinterest at all in the work even indirectly. Herein the relationship between the petitioner and the man who did the contract work for the committee being admitted as being father and son and being Hindus they are presumed to be members of a joint family, it is difficult to postulate that the petitioner was not even indirectly interested in the work. The species of interest sufficient to disqualify a member is indicated by the statute itself under clause (3) of S. 16 (2 ). The law, however, provides certain exception against incurring disqualification in circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of S. 16 (2) (3) in that if the person has a share in a joint-stock company or a share or interest in any association registered under the Societies Act or any Co-cperative Society contracts with or be employed by or on behalf of the market committee ; or holds debenture or is otherwise concerned in any loan raised by or on behalf of the market committee. But if the association is as close as one who is the member of a joint family who does business as a trader with the co-operative society, then without more the member stands disqualified. ( 9 ) IT is needless to add that a joint family is not confined to father and children but includes several others far removed in propenuity or relationship. But even so the law regards by the very fact of the member of the committee being a member cf the joint family doing business or trade with the committee as intimate enough to incure disqualification, it is clear that the object or intendment of the statute is to preclude continuance of a person as a member of the committee if somebody else in the joint family is associated with the committee, then by ties of such relationship alone such a person must forefit the office. This appears to be the scheme of the Act and, therefore, in the circumstances there is no escape for the petitioner from being disqualified because his son took a contract with the committee of the society and stood to gain monitorily. 9. But, then, Mr. This appears to be the scheme of the Act and, therefore, in the circumstances there is no escape for the petitioner from being disqualified because his son took a contract with the committee of the society and stood to gain monitorily. 9. But, then, Mr. Patel, D. Karigowda, counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that if what is established is mere relationship of the petitioner with the contractor, being his son that in itself is not sufficient to disqualify the petitioner from continuing as a member of the committee. Reliance in this connection is placed on a decision of Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1339 (Gulam Yasin v. Sahebrao Yeshwantrao ). That is a case in which a person's candidature for election to the Municipality was discarded on the ground that his son was employed with the municipality. To keep that person out of the poll fray on the aforesaid ground reliance had been placed on S. 16 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berer municipalities Act which under clause (1) of S 15 provided that no person shall be eligible for election, selection or nomination as a member of a Committee, if such person had directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract with, by or on behalf of the Committee, while owning such share or interest. In that case the high Court in a writ petition had declared the appellant before the Supreme Court as ineligible for seeking election in view of the disability resting on the foregoing ground of the son being an employee. Before the Supreme Court it was successfully contended that regard being had to the scheme of the Act, mere relationship would not by itself be a bar for contesting the elections. This argument eventually found favour with the court which upheld the appellant's nomination taking the view that interest or share in any contract etc. as referred to in S. 15 of the Act when not referable mere to relationship but what was essentially to be established as a disqualifying factor was the factum of the disqualified candidate having some interest that was pecuniary, material or of a similiar nature and an interest of that category alone would result in the incurring of disqualification even if such interest was indirect. That was a case in which the appellant had produced material which indicated that though the father and sen were living under the same roof they were messing s parately and otherwise had no dealings or connections whatsoever with one another. ( 10 ) THE learned Chief Justice Mr. Gajendragadkar who rendered the judgment, in fact took notice of this position and had highlighted the distinction between an undivided joint Hindu family and a joint family of o her persons. Mostly on facts the Supreme Court being satisfied that between the appellant and his son, barring the propenlity factory there was nothing else that would indicate the father having had in the son's employment with the municipality any interest, particularly monitory or some gainful connection thereof, the court had chosen to uphold the appellant's right to contest the election I may in this connection excerpt the dictum of the court succintly an stated in the head note :"in order to incur disqualification, with the clause requires is 'interest or share in any contract'. It may either be a share or an interest; and if it is an interest, the interest may be direct or indirect. It cannot mean mere sentimental or friendly interest; it must mean interest which is pecuniary, or material, or of a similiar nature If the interest is of this latter category, it would suffice to incur disqualification even if it is indirect. The clause also requires that the person who incurs disqualification by such interest must 'own such share or interest'. Even on a liberal construction of the clause, it is clear that the interest or share must be in the contract itself. "that it would have made essential difference of the person involved was member of a Hindu joint family is made clear by the statement at para 5 :"there is no doubt that the appellant and his sons, being Mohamedans, cannot be said to be members of an undivided family in the sense in which that expression is used in regard to hindus. It is in the light of these facts that we have to decide the question as to whether the High Court was right in holding that the appellant was disqualified under S. 15 (1) of the Act. It is in the light of these facts that we have to decide the question as to whether the High Court was right in holding that the appellant was disqualified under S. 15 (1) of the Act. "while it becomes clear that the principal adumbrated in the case referred to supra that disqualification of a member could be inferred if the member had some pecuniary or material interest of that kind and not if the interest obtaining was anything other than those which fell into the said category and in particular if the interest was only sentimental or friendly, the disqualification arising under the statute would not be attracted, the decision itself is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Herein there is a finding of the Deputy Commissioner that the petitioner and his son were joint. That finding has got to be accepted and i have accepted in notwithstanding the challenge there to indicating reasons therefor. The petitioner and his son being Hindus and treated herein as members of an undivided joint Hindu family the father cannot deny atleast an indirect interest in the beneficial assignment awarded to the son by the committee. By remaining joint with the son, there is little gain-say in denying that the father had atleast an indirect interest in the contract work. This inference which appears to be inescapable in the facts and circumstances of the case is sufficient to hold that the petitioner has incurred the statutory disqualification adumbrated in S. 16 (2) (g) of the Act. This is also the view of the deputy Commissioner which has, therefore, to be upheld, ( 11 ) NO other point arises for consideration in this petition and, therefore, it is I dismiss the writ petition holding it to be untenable. Rule discharged. No costs. Writ petition dismissed. --- *** --- .