JUDGMENT : N. N. Mitbal, J. 1. The order under challenge in this appeal was passed by the court below rejecting the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction against respondent No. 2. 2. The facts, stated briefly, are that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are real brothers having migrated from the area now constituting Pakistan as evacuees. In 1954 Govt. of U. P. with a view to rehabilitate the evacuee brothers granted plot No. 18 situate in Darbhanga Castle compound having an area of 1853 sq. yards by deed dated ? ) jointly to them. For the purposes of this appeal the parties do not dispute that for the sake of convenience both the parties had raised residential houses on different portions of the said land. The houses are assigned municipal nos. 100 and 101. Defendant No. 1 now lives in house no. 100 and plaintiff in house No. 101. It is alleged that there also had been some sort of family arrangement between them in 1977 but as there is some dispute regarding this matter it would be better if we leave that matter here as nothing really turns on that controversy so far as decision of this appeal is concerned. Admittedly respondent No. 1 is elder of the two brothers and hence the title deed of the land which was executed by the State of U. P. in 1954 jointly in their names appears to have remained with him. As compared to the plaintiff apparently God has been more kind to the defendant No. 1 who became quite affluent over the years. For his expanding business, defendant No 1 approached respondent No. 2 for a loan and the Bank agreed to advance upto rupees thirty lacks against security which included half portion of the plot of land jointly acquired by the evacuee brothers from the State of U. P. in 1954. The defendant No. 1 accordingly equitably mortgaged the land of his share by deposit of title deeds. The plaintiff has felt aggrieved by this use of the joint title deed by defendant No. 1 exclusively for his benefit which is now the bone of contention between them. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 had no right to utilise the common title deed of plot No. 18 in which he too had one half share for raising the loan from defendant No. 2. 3. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 had no right to utilise the common title deed of plot No. 18 in which he too had one half share for raising the loan from defendant No. 2. 3. Defendants do not deny that the loan has been sanctioned on the security of property of defendant No. 1 which also includes equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. The defendants, however, contended that only that portion of plot No. 18 as is underneath house No. 100 belonging to defendant No. 1 has been so mortgaged leaving the remaining land of that plot which is under plaintiff's house No. 101. 4. According to the defendants, the plaintiff can have no cause for any grouse as his interest in the land is safe and beyond the scope of equitable mortgage. In the absence of any prejudice, the plaintiff had no cause to complain or to bring the suit. The Bank has also clarified that it had no intention at all to proceed against that portion of plot No. 18 which is under House No. 101 and that the same does not form part of security under the equitable mortage executed in its favour by defendant No. 1. 5. The main submission of Sri Murlidhar for the appellant is that in view of the fact that in 1954 the State of U. P. had transferred the entire land constituting plot No. 18 to both by a common deed, the defendant No. 1 alone cannot claim any right in that document of title so as to make exclusive use thereof. The fact that the title document stands in the name of both the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, he further urged, it could not legally be used for raising any loan from defendant No. 2. We cannot accept the submission that this document of title is the joint property of the parties, as at the most, the title deeds are mere evidence of title and not property perse. Title deeds have always been regarded as merely accessories to the estate but by themselves they cannot be termed as property though the documents may create title in immoveable property yet these themselves cannot be styled as property. Title deeds have always been regarded as merely accessories to the estate but by themselves they cannot be termed as property though the documents may create title in immoveable property yet these themselves cannot be styled as property. It is, however, not necessary for us to examine this aspect any further at this stage, as this may have to be decided on merits at the trial of the suit. Any expression of opinion at this stage is likely to cause prejudice to the rights of the parties. From the copy of the plaint we find that the plaintiff has only claimed a declaration that the equitable mortgage by deposit of original title deed in question was illegal etc. and for injunction to restrain defendants No. 2 and 3 from disbursing the sanctioned loan to defendant No. 1 on its basis. No relief with respect to the document itself has been claimed though it was initially in possession of defendant No. 1 and later in deposit with defendant No. 2. The sanction of loan to defendant No. 1 is an internal matter of the Bank and it can always advance loan to a party with or without security subject to their internal rules of governance. The court cannot scrutinise whether the loan was sanctioned on a proper security until the matter is in issue in a suit before it. In the present case, the suit as framed, no relief as such has been claimed with respect to the document itself. 6. Being an equitable relief, it is essential for the court to satisfy itself as to the existence of a serious question to be tried in the suit which on existing facts makes the plaintiff's claim highly probable; that interference by the court is necessary for protecting the plaintiff's rights against injury of an irreparable nature and that by withholding the injunction greater mischief or inconvenience is likely to be caused than by granting it. Even assuming that the plaintiff had an argueable claim yet the allegation in the plaint or in the affidavit in support of the application for interim relief do not satisfy the other two essential conditions i.e. irreparable injury and balance of convenience. In the instant case we find no material as will show how any irreparable injury was likely to be caused to the plaintiff. In the instant case we find no material as will show how any irreparable injury was likely to be caused to the plaintiff. If loan is advanced to defendant No. 1 how can plaintiff suffer any loss particularly when his share of land has not been equitably mortgaged. Also we get no indication as to what kind of injury the plaintiff is likely to suffer which cannot be compensated in terms of money should the injunction be refused. 7. The plaintiff had made no allegation that he had ever approached any Bank for a loan and had been denied by it or that the defendants had refused to cooperate with him if he sought loan for the reason that the original title deed was equitably mortgaged with defendant No. 2 at the instance of defendant No. 1. In the absence of such an allegation, we fail to see how any irreparable injury was likely to be caused to plaintiff. On an overall consideration of the matter we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to satisfy the requisite conditions for grant of temporary injunction. 8. We are purposely not expressing opinion on the merits of the case lest it may prejudice the parties at the trial. We have, therefore, confined ourselves to matters that are relevant for grant of temporary relief to the plaintiff. Having given our careful thought to the facts and circumstances of the case we find that the plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie the three requirements which are necessary before temporary injunction can be granted by the court. 9. The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.