Judgment :- 1. The first respondent in O.P. (Testamentary) 24/88, filed under S.192 and 193 of The Indian Succession Act is the revision petitioner. Respondents 1 and 2 are the petitioners whereas respondents 3, 4 and 5 are the respondents in the O. P. 2. The petition has been allowed by the order under challenge. 3. Facts relevant and essential for the disposal of the question arising for consideration, lie in a narrow compass. The revision petitioner is the mother of late Thomas (the husband of the 1st respondent) respondents 3, 4 and 5. The property in dispute was set apart to late Thomas under Ext. Al, the settlement deed executed by the mother. It is seen from Ext. A1 that the property was put in the possession of late Thomas and therefore it can be presumed that he has been in possession of the same until his death. The property presently is in the possession of the revision petitioner. 4. This was the state of affairs when respondents 1 and 2 moved the above testamentary O.P. for recovery of possession from the mother who, according to the petitioners, had seized possession on the death of Thomas. The court below after considering the various aspects of the case has allowed the application and directed the petitioner to deliver possession of the property to respondents 1 and 2. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the court below, in not conducting the enquiry contemplated under S.193 before summons to the petitioner and respondents 3 to 5 were issued, has committed an error of jurisdiction warranting interference with the order under challenge. In support of this contention he relied on two rulings; one of this court in Kunhilakshmi v. Mrs. R. Rugmini (A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 47) and the other of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vikram Singh v. Krishna Singh (A.I.R. 1979 M. P. 145). Quoting the principle laid down by this court in Kunhilakshmi's case with approval the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed that any order passed under S.192 to 194 without following the procedure prescribed under S.193 is liable to be declared bad in law. In view of the fact that no such enquiry was conducted in this case before the summons was issued, the learned counsel submits, the order is liable to be discharged. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition. 6. In view of the fact that no such enquiry was conducted in this case before the summons was issued, the learned counsel submits, the order is liable to be discharged. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition. 6. But on the facts of this case I am inclined to hold that this question does not arise for consideration. What are those facts? They are: That the petitioner had lodged a Caveat on 19-2-1988 prior to the filing of the testamentary O.P. is beyond dispute. It should in this connection be remembered that the essential requirement for filing a Caveat is the existence in the caveator of a right to be heard. That means no order against the caveator should be passed unless he is heard or is given an opportunity to present the case before any order is passed. It is also relevant in this context to bear in mind that when once the caveat is lodged it becomes the duty of the court to serve a notice of the application on the caveator. To put it differently the issue of a notice to the caveator is a condition precedent for the court to pass any order affecting the caveator. The petitioner under these circumstances must be held to have had the benefit of a hearing before the order was passed. Before the petitioner was directed to file his counter, the court below in fact has conducted the requisite enquiry and therefore it cannot be said that the order passed by the court below is bad for want of compliance with the procedure prescribed under S.192 to 194. 7. Coming to the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues, the respondents are not entitled to get possession of the property because deceased Thomas at the time of his death was not enjoying any right, leave alone possessory right, over the property that could be said to have been inherited by respondents 1 and 2, The property in fact belongs to the family headed by the petitioner. That it is so can be seen, the learned counsel argues, from O.S.57/88, the suit for partition instituted by one of the brothers, pending before the Munsiff's Court, Thodupuzha. This property is one of the items shown in the schedule attached to the plaint. That it is so can be seen, the learned counsel argues, from O.S.57/88, the suit for partition instituted by one of the brothers, pending before the Munsiff's Court, Thodupuzha. This property is one of the items shown in the schedule attached to the plaint. It is unnecessary for me to pronounce upon these aspects in this proceeding; but at the same time it has become necessary to take judicial notice of one fact namely that this property has been in the possession of Thomas by virtue of Ext. A1 settlement deed till his death, as disclosed by the recitals in that document. A reference in this connection to the recitals in Ext. B1 plaint is also profitable. No doubt the revision petitioner has disputed the said possession of late Thomas. 8. It was only after taking into account these aspects of the case the court below passed the order under challenge. 9. I am therefore of the view that there is little scope to interfere with the order. The C.R.P. fails. Accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs.