—Order— —The Consumer Unity and Trust Society, Jaipur, the Complainant before the State Commission, Rajasthan in Complaint Case No. 1 of 1988 on its file, has preferred this appeal against the order of the State Commission dated January 3, 1988 Annexure 1 rejecting the said complaint petition on the ground that it is not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called "the Act"). 2. The complainant (appellant), which is a registered consumer association filed the said complaint dated August 19, 1988 on behalf of one Smt. Sushila Devi, wife of Shri Brajmohan Pareta, resident of Lakheri, District Bundi. Smt. Sushila Devi underwent an abdominal Tubectomy operation at the Government Hospital, Kota as part of the family planning programme. Unfortunately, she developed serious complications after the surgical operation as a result of which she has been reduced to the condition of a physically invalid person unable to move out of her hospital bed and suffering continuous physical pain as well as great mental agony which is shared by her husband and the whole family. It was alleged in the complaint that what was a simple surgery had resulted in such serious complications to the patient, on account of the negligence on the part of the Civil Surgeon, Kota who performed the operation and also due to lack of proper post operative care and attention. The complaint impleaded the State of Rajasthan through its Secretary, Health Services (Family Welfare), Government of Rajasthan and Dr. B. L. Gochar as opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 respectively in the petition. The prayer in the petition was for the award of an amount of Rs. 9,31,000/- to the aggrieved patient and her husband as compensation for the loss and injury suffered by the patient and also for directions being issued to the State Government for extending continued proper medical treatment to Smt. Sushila Devi and for payment of all bills relating to the purchase of medicines etc. required for her treatment in the hospital. 3. The State Commission considered as a preliminary issue the question of maintainability of the complaint petition. required for her treatment in the hospital. 3. The State Commission considered as a preliminary issue the question of maintainability of the complaint petition. After discussing the said point in elaborate detail with reference to the definitions of the expressions "complainant", "consumer" and "service" contained in Section 2(1) of the Act the State Commission held that since neither Smt. Sushila Devi nor her husband had "hired" any services for consideration for the purpose of performing the operation for sterilization, neither of them can be considered as a "consumer" and since a complaint can be made by a consumer and/or a Consumer Association, only for and on behalf of a consumer, the present complaint filed before the State Commission was not maintainable under the Act. The correctness of this conclusion has been challenged before us by the appellant in this appeal. 4. Having regard to the great general importance of the question raised in this appeal and the seriousness of the consequences that will follow from a decision thereon, we have given our very anxious and careful consideration to all aspects that are germane in determining this crucial point. Since the determination of the question essentially turns on the interpretation of the words used in the different clauses of the definition section of the statute in the light of the well recognized legal principles, we thought it necessary and proper to request Shri C. S. Vaidyanathan, learned Advocate of the Supreme Court to assist this Commission as Amicus Curiae. In response to the said request Shri Vaidyanathan took great pains to investigate thoroughly the legal and juristic aspects of the matter and addressed arguments before us on 1.9.1989 with his usual ability and erudition. He also submitted a written note of his arguments. 5. Before we proceed to set out the submissions made by the Counsel and discuss them on merits, it would be advantageous to first notice the relevant clauses contained in the definition section of the Act. 6. Section 2(l)(d) gives the definition of the word "consumer". Subclause (i) thereof covers only transactions of purchase of goods and hence the said sub-clause is not relevant for our purpose and it is only sub-clause (ii) with which we are concerned. 6. Section 2(l)(d) gives the definition of the word "consumer". Subclause (i) thereof covers only transactions of purchase of goods and hence the said sub-clause is not relevant for our purpose and it is only sub-clause (ii) with which we are concerned. Under that sub-clause "consumer" means any person who— "hires any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person;" 7. The next definition which is of relevance of present context is that to the word "service" contained in clause (o) of Section 2(1). That is in the following terms :— "service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provisions of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;" 8. Having noticed the material definitions we have next to see who it is that is competent to file a complaint under the Act. This matter is dealt with in Section 12 which reads :— "12.; A complaint, in relation to any goods sold or delivered or any service provided, may he filed with a District Forum by— (a) the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or such service provided; (b) any recognized consumer association, whether the consumer to whom the goods sold or delivered or service provided is a member of such association or not; or (c) the Central or the State Government." The provisions of Section 12 have been made applicable to State Commissions by Section 18 of the Act. From the definition of the expression "consumer" contained in Section 2(l)(d)(ii) of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that in order that a person should fall within the scope of that definition, it is essential that :— (i) he should have hired any services; (ii) that the hiring of services must be for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment. 9. Turning to the definition of "service" what one finds is that while it will take in service of any description which is made available to potential users, any service rendered free of charge is expressly excluded from the scope of the said definition. So too is a contract of personal service but since we are not concerned in this case with any such contract, it is unnecessary for us to deal with that aspect. 10. It was emphatically submitted before us by Shri Vaidyanathan that a hospital established by the Government, whether it be the Central Government or the State Government, are funded from the consolidated funds of the Government of India/the State Governments concerned and under the Constitution these consolidated funds comprise the revenues which are raised in the form of direct taxes as well as indirect taxes. It was pointed out by Counsel that every person who is a resident of India pays taxes, if not directly at least indirectly since, excise duty, custom duty, sales-tax etc. are levied on almost each and every single item of goods that a person has necessarily to purchase for ones day-to-day requirements. 11. Dealing with the question whether payment of tax can be regarded as payment of consideration for service, the submission of Shri Vaidyanathan was that tax being a burden or charge imposed by the legislative power on persons or property to raise money for public purpose, it is to be regarded as "the enforced proportional contribution of persons and property levied by the authority of the State for the support of the Government and for all public needs." In substantiation of this submission our attention was invited by Counsel to certain observations contained in 84 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 30. Counsel also relied on the observations of the Supreme Court of India in Jagan-nath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa (1) that "tax is a common burden and the only return which the tax-payer gets in the participation in the common benefits of the State". 12. Shri Vaidyanathan laid stress on the fact that in the relatively recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. (2), the Supreme Court has deviated perceptibly from the dictum that had earlier been laid down in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shiru Mutt ( 1954 SCR 1005 )(3)and has categorically observed that "it is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax." Our attention was also drawn by the learned counsel to a still later pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in"Judgements Today—1989 (3) SC 422"where the aforesaid observation contained in 1983 (3) SCR 843 (supra) has been extracted and followed. According to the submission of Counsel, the legal consequence that follows from the aforesaid dicta of the Supreme Court is that tax has to be regarded as a compulsorily extraction in return for which the tax payer gets the opportunity to avail of the common benefits including such benefits as medical services provided in the Government hospitals. According to Counsel, the resultant position that emerges is that the medical services provided by the Government hospitals are paid for by the tax-payers and hence it would not be correct to say that such services provided by the Government hospitals are not services render for consideration. 13. Another line of argument advanced by Shri Vaidyanathan was that India being a Welfare State as envisaged in the Preamble to the Consti-tution and especially in view of the provisions of Articles 14,21,23,24,38,39,41, 42, 43, 45 and 47 of the Constitution, the State is expected to play a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens and its duties include the provision of basic education, Health services etc. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in Nakharas case ( 1983(1) SCC 305 at pp. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in Nakharas case ( 1983(1) SCC 305 at pp. 325 and 328)(4) that the basic framework of socialism is to provide a decent standard of life to the working people and provide security from cradle to grave. Reliance was also placed by Counsel on the observations contained in Bandhwa Mukhti Morcha ( 1984 (3) SCC 161 at pages 183 and 184)(5) that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 includes also the right to live with human dignity and includes the protection of health and strength of the residents in India and opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner. Our attention was invited to the Directive Principles of State Policy incorporated in Articles 41, 42 and 47 of the Constitution wherein the State is directed to make effective provisions for securing their right to procure public assistance in case of sickness and disablement, provision of maternity relief and for improvement of public health. On the basis of these provisions contained in the Constitution, it was forcefully urged before us that the State, which expression includes the Governments at the Central and at the State levels, is under a constitutional obligation to provide proper health care to all the residents of this land. 14. Dealing with the words "hires any services" occurring in Section 2(l)(d)(ii), it was urged by Shri "Vaidyanathan that the expression hire has been used therein in the sense of "avail" or "use". According to him the definition should be understood as stating that "consumer" means "any person who avails or uses any service.. " In this context Counsel reiterated his earlier submission that payment of taxes constitutes valid consideration to satisfy the requirement of the definition that the service must have been hired for "con-sideraion". As a further limb of the argument it was also urged that even assuming that the person actually avails himself of the service in the Government hospital has not paid any taxes he is in the position of a beneficiary of the services which have been paid for by other taxpayers. As a further limb of the argument it was also urged that even assuming that the person actually avails himself of the service in the Government hospital has not paid any taxes he is in the position of a beneficiary of the services which have been paid for by other taxpayers. In making this submission, the Counsel was, obviously seeking to rely on the last part of the definition of "consumer" contained in Section 2(l)(d)(ii), which states that the said expression includes "any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned persons." 15. Making his submissions about the exclusion clause contained in Section 2(1)(o) which defines "service", it was contended by Counsel that the expression "service free of charge" is not necessarily to be construed as mean-ing only service free of remuneration or mandatory reward". Relying upon a passage in 40 Corpus Juris Secundum page 402, it was submitted by Shri Vaidyanathan that the expression "charge" has several meanings including "duty, burden or obligation". Proceeding further on this line of reasoning it was urged that Government in a welfare State is charged or burdened with a duty or obligation to provide medical/health service to the people and hence the service rendered by the Government hospital cannot be regarded as "service free of charge" so as to fall within the exclusion clause contained in Section 2(l)(o). Stress was laid down on the fact that while the word used in Section 2(l)(o) is "charge", the expression used in Section 2(l)(d) is "consideration* and when the Parliament has thus used two different expressions in the statute, it should be deemed to have used them to convey different meanings. Hence argued Counsel, it would not be right to equate the expression "charge" with "consideration". 16. Lastly, it was submitted by Shri Vaidyanathan that having regard to the fact that the Act is a measure of social welfare legislation intended to confer the benefit of expeditious and effective redressal of grievances of consumers, its provisions should be liberally construed in such a manner as will advance the object and purpose of the statute and will suppress the mischief sought to be remedied. 17. 17. Having given our best consideration to the learned arguments advanced by Shri Vaidyanathan, we feel that there are complex issues of both law and equity which arise in connection with the interpretation of the words "consumer", and "hiring of services for a consideration" within the meaning of the Act, which need to be spelled out before coming to a final determination of the intention of Parliament in regard to the scope and coverage of the Consumer Protection Act. We proceed to set out these conflicting considerations below. 18. It is, of course, true—as argued by Shri Vaidyanathan—that while construing the provisions of a legislative enactment the general rule of interpretation is that the language used in the statute should be so interpreted as to promote the object and purpose of the Act provided that the words used are legally susceptible of conveying such a meaning. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that the intention of Parliament has to be gathered from the words actually used in the statute and when the language used is clear and unambiguous it is the duty of the Court of authority construing the statute to duly give effect to the words contained in the particular provision of the enactment in accordance with their natural, plain and grammatical sense. Another equally established principle of interpretation is that when a word used in a statute has more than one meaning that meaning should be adopted which is appropriate to the context and setting in which the word appears in the particular provision of the enactment having due regard also to the general scheme of the enactment. 19. It is in the light of the principles enunciated above, that we have to proceed to determine the question that has arisen for our decision in this case namely, whether a person who goes to receive medical treatment in a Government hospital is a "consumer" as defined in Section 2(l)(d) of the Act and whether the facility of medical treatment offered in the Government hospital constitutes "service" as defined under section 2(1)(o) of the Act. 20. 20. On a strict reading of the provisions of the Act as a whole it would be seen that in enacting the statute the intention of Parliament was to provide protection and relief to four categories of consumer namely : (i) persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of any unfair trade practice adopted by any trader; (ii) persons who have purchased goods for consideration which are found to suffer from one or more defects; (iii) persons who have purchased goods for which the trader has charged a price in excess of the price fixed by or under any law for the time being enforced or displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods. (iv) persons who have hired any services for consideration when the services, provided are found to suffer from deficiency in any respect. 21. These categories of consumers alone have been conferred the right to approach the redressal forums constituted under the Act and provisions have been made enabling those forums to grant them cheap, speedy and efficacious remedies to set right their grievances. It is in the context of this general scheme of the Act that we have to interpret the, definition of the expression "consumer" contained in sub-clause (ii) of clause-(d) of Section 2(1). In order to satisfy the said definition, a person should have "hired any services for a consideration". The ordinary connotation of the expression hire is "to acquire the temporary use of a thing or the services of a person in exchange for payment" (Collins English Dictionary) "to procure the use of services of, at a price: to grant temporary use of for compensation" (Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary). 22. This is the ordinary, plain, grammatical meaning of the expression "hire" as popularly understood and it would appear reasonable to assume that it is only in this sense that the word has been used in sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(l)(d) of the Act. If Parliament had intended to treat any person who avails himself of any services as a consumer, one should have expected the opening words of sub-clause (ii) to be "avails himself of any services." Instead, Parliament has used the expression "hire" in the contra-distinction with the expression "avail of" occurring in the subsequent part of the same sub-clause. If Parliament had intended to treat any person who avails himself of any services as a consumer, one should have expected the opening words of sub-clause (ii) to be "avails himself of any services." Instead, Parliament has used the expression "hire" in the contra-distinction with the expression "avail of" occurring in the subsequent part of the same sub-clause. The use of two distinct expressions in different parts of the same sub-clause is an indication that they were not meant to convey the same meaning. 23. Now, we come to the important question whether the direct and indirect taxes paid to the State by a citizen constitute "consideration" for the services and facility provided to a citizen by the State. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of India in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra) that "a tax is the compulsory extraction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for service rendered". 24. In Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Trichaur v. State of Kerala and Ors. ( 1982(1) SCR 519 )(6), the Supreme Court after considering various decisions including the one cited above distinguished "fee" from "taxes" in these words :— "Fees are the amount paid for a privilege, and are not an obligation, but the payment is voluntary. Fees are distinguished from taxes in that the chief purpose of a tax is to raise funds for the support of the Government or for a public purpose, while a fee may be charged for the privilege or benefit conferred, or service rendered or to meet the expenses connected therewith. Thus, fees are nothing but payment for some special privilege granted or service rendered". The same principle has again been restated by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Baroda v. Babubhai Himatlal reported, in Judgements Today (1989(3) SC 437)(7). The identical view was again reiterated, by the Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v. Andhra Pradesh 8c Ors, (supra) where the Court observed thus : "The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest. If the element of revenue for general purpose of the State predominates, the levy becomes a tax." 25. In the light of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court the legal position must now be taken to be well settled that unlike a "fee", a "tax" in its true nature is a levy made by the State for the general purposes of Government and it cannot be regarded as payment for any particular or special service. While, it is undoubtedly true that the Government in a welfare State is under a duty to provide various forms of facilities to citizens and the expenditure incurred thereon will have to be met from out of the consolidated funds of the State, it cannot be said that a tax levied for the general purposes of the State continues "consideration" for any specific facility, benefit or service provided by the State. 26. It follows from the foregoing discussion that the contention advanced by Shri Vaidyanathan that the payment of direct or indirect taxes by the public constitutes "consideration" paid for hiring the service rendered in the Government hospitals cannot be accepted as corrected. 27. As against the above weighty arguments, there is the consideration, as argued by Shri Vaidyanathan, that consistent with the Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined in the Constitution, the Government of India has constituted Diverse Schemes of health and medical facilities, available to the general public in Government hospitals. It is also pertinent to note that some schemes of health insurance have been instituted by the Union Government, a few State Governments and autonomous bodies, whereby members of the public making a regular contribution are entitled to free medical facilities in Government hospitals. The Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) is of this category. We are informed by counsellor the appellant—, though we do not have it on record—that some such scheme is in operation in Rajasthan also. It is understood that similar schemes are in operation in some Central Universities for staff and other people. A Government employee—or any other individual—making a regular contribution to the CGHS is entitled to (otherwise free) medical facilities available in "an appropriate Government hospital to which his case may be referred by the nearest dispensary to which he may normally report for ordinary ailments. A Government employee—or any other individual—making a regular contribution to the CGHS is entitled to (otherwise free) medical facilities available in "an appropriate Government hospital to which his case may be referred by the nearest dispensary to which he may normally report for ordinary ailments. Can such an individual contributing to the CGHS be said to be a "consumer" of medical facilities available in a Government hospital, within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act? Does the payment by way of a regular monthly contribution constitute "consideration" ? The fact that the CGHS contribution does not cover the full cost of the hospital facilities provided may not be conclusive of the matter. An arrangement such as the CGHS Scheme is part of the overall framework of organisation of basic social and economic amenities provided by a Welfare State. In this context, the principles outlined by the Supreme Court, in Sreenivasa General Traders & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra) are relevant. In that judgment, the Supreme Court reiterated that in order to establish the quid pro quo concept, it is not necessary to establish exactly that the amount collected is spent on the services rendered. The authority collecting the fee (in the instant case, the regular contribution) must show that it is rendering a service in lieu of the fee; that it is giving some special benefit to the payer of the fee. The quantum of fee collected and the expenses on the services rendered must have a mutual relationship, by and large: the relationship between the levy and the service rendered is one of general character not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there would be a "reasonable relationship" between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. 28. It is in this sense that the" Supreme Court has observed that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not a sine qua non of a fee. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court have to be applied in judging the character of the regular contributions, by way of an insurance premium payment, for medical facilities available from Government hospitals under the CGHS and similar schemes. 29. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court have to be applied in judging the character of the regular contributions, by way of an insurance premium payment, for medical facilities available from Government hospitals under the CGHS and similar schemes. 29. The question would arise whether, in the above context, a Government employee, or any other individual contributing to the CGHS is or is not a "consumer" of facilities availed by him in a Government hospital. 30. There are, in most Government hospitals, separate "paying wards" where affluent patients seek admission, as contrasted with the "general ward" where a poor patient is treated. Can we say that a patient in a "paying ward" in a Government hospital is a "consumer" within the meaning of the Act, but not an ordinary patient admitted to a general ward? That would be patently iniquitous. 31. The above considerations are weighty, and need to be kept in mind while considering the scope of the terms "consumer" and "hiring for a consideration" in the Consumer Protection Act. And yet, we have to be cognizant of the implications and consequences of such a wide and flexible interpretation of the terms "consumer" and "hiring for a consideration". Our discussion started with the premise that in a welfare State, it is the responsibility of the Government to provide adequate medical, health care and other facilities to all citizens. Such, indeed, has been the endeavour of all Governments to provide adequate medical, health care and other facilities to all citizens. Such, indeed, has been the endeavour of all Governments, at the Centre and in the States, ever since the inception of a planned programme of development. It is possible, indeed it is likely, that by opening up the definition of the term "consumer" to all users of Government hospitals, we may invite a flood of irresponsible litigation, especially since the forum of the National Commission as well as the State Commission and the District Forum is available free of cost to all complainants. In attempting to be fair to a few, we may thereby create a situation in which the attention of the hospital authorities, of the concerned Government would be diverted by a spate of possibly spurious and avoidable litigation. In attempting to be fair to a few, we may thereby create a situation in which the attention of the hospital authorities, of the concerned Government would be diverted by a spate of possibly spurious and avoidable litigation. In the result, while some deserving people may benefit through access to a cheap and quick redressal of their grievances, there could be unwelcome change in the approach of doctors and hospital authorities to the treatment of patients, and as a result there is likely to be a general deterioration of medical facilities and services in Government hospitals. It is an admitted fact that the resources available to the State are limited and that within these resources, the State is endeavouring to do its best to provide reasonable services to the people. If there are occasional lacunae, the remedy is not in demoralizing those providing the requisite services not in diverting their attention from the provision of such services to a spate of irresponsible litigation—which could easily result from the wider and more flexible interpretation of the terms "consumer" and "hiring for a consideration" in the Consumer Protection Act. This type of interpretation would, in the event, become counter productive and would defeat the very purpose of the legislation. 32. We are also mindful of the fact that in case of demonstrable "negligence", recourse is always possible to a civil suit in an ordinary court of law It is not as if a patient would be totally deprived from seeking justice. 33. In considering any economic or social legislation, we need to attach primary importance not to the letter of the law but to the spirit behind it, to attempt to interpret the intention of the legislature. It is in this wider context that we are inclined to accept the stricter (and legal) definition of the terms "consumer" and "hiring for a consideration" in the Consumer Protection Act. We must endeavour to ensure the legislation does the greatest good to the greatest number, which we accept as the obvious intention of Parliament. 34. It is for this reason that we are unable to uphold, the argument advanced by Shri Vaidyanathan that the expression "free of charge" occurring in Section 2(1)(o) which defines "service" should be understood to mean free of "obligation". , 35. 34. It is for this reason that we are unable to uphold, the argument advanced by Shri Vaidyanathan that the expression "free of charge" occurring in Section 2(1)(o) which defines "service" should be understood to mean free of "obligation". , 35. The short point remains: how do We treat the contributors to the CGHS and those who occupy beds in "paying wards" in Government hospitals. In our opinion, the contribution to the CGHS should be taken to be in lieu of free treatment in the diverse dispenaries, as well as the free provision of medicines from these dispensaries. Where cases are referred by the dispensaries to a Government hospital, the facilities are provided by a Welfare State free of charge, same as to out patients and others admitted to these hospitals. In regard to "paying wards", we feel that these payments are specifically related to special rooms/beds for which the separate charge is made; the medical facilities available in a Government hospital are common to all patients, inclusive of those in the pay wards, without discrimination. 36. In the light of what we have stated above, the conclusion is inevitable that persons who avail themselves of the facility of medical treatment in Government hospitals are not "consumers" and the said facility offered in Government hospitals cannot be regarded as service "hired" for "consideration". Hence no complaint under the Act can be preferred either by any such person or by a consumer association on his behalf. The view taken by the State Commission, Rajasthan upholding the preliminary objection raised by the opposite party before it is, therefore, perfectly in accordance with law and it has only to be affirmed. We accordingly dismiss this appeal. 37. We would, at this juncture, like to emphasize two points. First, in the light of the two possible interpretations of the scope of the Act which we have indicated in the foregoing, we feel that while we continue to be governed by the interpretation we have accepted, this is a matter where the Parliament, if it so wishes, can review the matter and amend the Act suitably so that there is no ambiguity between the intent of the law and its interpretation. It is, therefore, open to the Government to enact any classificatory amendments to the extant legislation. It is, therefore, open to the Government to enact any classificatory amendments to the extant legislation. In the absence of any such legislation, the only possible interpretation would be the one finally adopted by us, in the light of the varied considerations outlined earlier. 38. Secondly, while rejecting the appeal, and upholding the judgement of the State Commission, we would like to emphasize that in a Welfare State like ours it is the imperative duty of the State to take adequate and necessary steps to ensure that proper medical care and attention is made available to the people. We have to take note of the sad reality that the conditions obtaining in many of our State-run hospitals are far from satisfactory in many respects and people are often unable to get from the hospitals the prompt, competent and courteous medical care that a citizen in a Welfare State is entitled to expect. While declining to exercise jurisdiction in cases such as the present one on ground based on our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the definition Section of the Act, we consider it necessary to record our deep and anxious concern about the inadequacies in the existing system of health care and to express our hope and expectation that effective steps will be urgently taken by the Governments concerned to remedy whatever defects and shortcomings are found in the existing system of medical care provided in the Government hospitals so that the common people of this country may soon be in a position to obtain excellent medical treatment and courteous care and attention from all those hospitals. 39. Before taking leave of this case, we must also record our profound gratitude to Sri C. S. Vaidyanathan, Advocate for the very valuable assistance he rendered to this Commission as amicus curiae. SEPARATE JUDGMENT OF Y. KRISHAN, MEMBER 1. The appeal is against the order of the Consumer Disputes .Redressal Commission (State Commission) Jaipur. 2.1 A preliminary objection has been taken to the maintainability of the. appeal. SEPARATE JUDGMENT OF Y. KRISHAN, MEMBER 1. The appeal is against the order of the Consumer Disputes .Redressal Commission (State Commission) Jaipur. 2.1 A preliminary objection has been taken to the maintainability of the. appeal. The Respondent has maintained that no service was rendered for a consideration, the treatment in hospitals having been given free and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable before this Commission, 2.2 The appellant, on the other hand, maintains that, in true sense the hospitals do not render service free of charge and that the taxes paid by the citizens out of which the hospitals are financed, constitute the consideration for the hospital services. 2.3 Before examining the merits of the above case, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objections, the very maintainability of the appeal before the consumer grievance redressal organisation. 2.4 I concur with the conclusion reached in the judgement of the Honble President; Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal before this commission but for reasons which are substantially different. Further there certain amount of confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of many legal experts whether taxes paid by the citizens constitute a consideration for the services rendered by the State._ This misunderstanding appears to have been strengthened by certain observations of the Honble Supreme Court of India regarding the difference between taxes and fees when read out of context. It is considered appropriate to examine in depth whether there is any direct nexus between taxes levied and the services rendered by the State especially in a welfare State and in the context of the States obligations under the Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in the Constitution. It is also expedient that any misunderstanding in these matters ought to be dispelled so that the consumers have a clearer appreciation of their rights under the Consumer Protection Act and that they can seek relief at the appropriate fora. Also taxes are levied not only by the State but also by other authorities viz. local bodies. Therefore, it would be expedient to examine thoroughly how far taxes can constitute consideration for services rendered by taxing authorities both from the point of view of law and its interpretation as well as from the wider aspect of the obligations of the citizen and the State in a welfare any socialist society. local bodies. Therefore, it would be expedient to examine thoroughly how far taxes can constitute consideration for services rendered by taxing authorities both from the point of view of law and its interpretation as well as from the wider aspect of the obligations of the citizen and the State in a welfare any socialist society. Likewise it will be essential to determine the capacity in which government provides medical aid under the Contributory Health Service Schemes whether as an employer or as State, the scope of the scheme and the conditions governing it. Hence, this separate order. 3. Two fundamental issues arise from the preliminary objection in this case: whether Government/State hospitals, which provide free medical service to. the patients, would constitute a person who had rendered service to the consumer free and hence cannot be deemed to have rendered a service as defined in Section 2(l)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act and the patients or beneficiaries are not "consumers" as defined in Section 2(J)(d) of the same Act; or whether the taxes, direct or indirect, paid by the citizens constitute the consideration and that, therefore, the rendering of medical treatment or service without charge does not make it a service rendered without consideration. In other words, the appellant maintains that the taxes paid by the citizens are a quid pro quo for the various services which the State provides to the community such as protection of life and property, security, education, sanitation, medical care, etc. and that they are provided free to the persons who avail of them does not render the service as having been provided without consideration. 4. At the request of the Commission for assistance, Shri C. S. Vaidya-nathan, Advocate, Supreme Court of India appeared before the Commission on 1st of September, 1989 and expounded at length the legal position on the preliminary issues regarding maintainability of the petitions/appeal. The learned advocate submitted that :— (i) Consumer Protection Act is a beneficial legislation and hence it has to be interpreted liberally and positively so that the aims and objects of the Parliamentary legislation are fulfilled and promoted to the maximum extent possible; the National Commission must endeavor to eschew narrow and negative construction of the provisions of the Act or of the phrases used therein as will defeat the purpose of the legislation. (ii) That it is the obligation or duty of the Welfare State to provide such services to the community. Only when there is no obligation to provide a service can it be deemed to be provided free if there is no charge? The term free of charge should be interpreted as free of an obligation. (iii) That this obligation has been elevated to the status of a con-s titutional and hence mandatory obligation under the Directive Principles of Constitution viz. Article 41 (right to Education and to public assistance in old age, sickness and disablement, etc.).. Article 47 (to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health) and Article 48(A) (Protection and improvement of environment, etc.). (iv) For discharging these and other obligations, the State raises funds by levying taxes on its citizens. It follows, therefore, that, in the ultimate analysis, these services are not rendered free of gratis. It was, therefore, argued that these taxes constitute the consideration for the services provided by the State. (v) If it is accepted, as ought to be, that the taxes paid by the community are a consideration for the services rendered by the State to the community or its citizens, such services would fall urder the definition of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act even though no charge was levied at the time of rendering the service to a particular individual or a member of that community, (vi) According to the learned Advocate only charitable or philanthropic organisation rendering free service is excluded under Section 2(l)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act but not State which is not a charitable Institution. 4.2 We also heard on the 11th Decebmer, 1989 the advocates and counsel for the complainants and respondents in similar cases before us wherein the identical preliminary objection on maintainability has been raised by viz; S/Shri H.D. Shourie for the Common Cause, S.M. Mathur for the C.U.T.S., Rajasthan, Jaipur, Mrs. Anantha Chari for Mrs. Mable Roosevelt and Shri G. Prakash on behalf of the State of Kerala, they made submissions on the question of maintainability of the Petitions and the appeal. Anantha Chari for Mrs. Mable Roosevelt and Shri G. Prakash on behalf of the State of Kerala, they made submissions on the question of maintainability of the Petitions and the appeal. The Petitioners and the appellant traversed more or less the same ground as was covered by Shri Vaidyanathan; they submitted that in a democratic, welfare State, it is the obligation of the State to provide certain essential services to the public such as medical care, education, etc. and that taxes are raised from the citizens who are the beneficiaries of these services lor discharging this obligation and that it was not essential that an individual must pay lor such services separately at the time of availing them; they have already paid for these services collectively by way of taxes. As such they contended that the condition of hiring is fulfilled. It was argued that the services of the doctors or the hospital facilities were hired by the Government on behalf of the citizens in consideration of the taxes collected by the State. Shri Mathur further added that in the case of the employees of the Government of Rajasthan, all Government servants are required to pay a nominal amount every month for availing of medical services provided by the State. This constituted consideration leading to hiring of the State medical services. This point, however, had not been placed by the appellant here before the State Commission of Rajasthan. The Counsel for the State of Kerala emphasised that every transaction, to attract the Consumer Protection Act, must be a commercial transaction or have an element of profit motive. Be has also clarified that in the case of the treatment of the Petitioners (Mrs. Roosevelt) husband, there is no charge for the treatment in The hospital, only patients having certain level of income are required to pay for any diagnostic tests such as x-rays, blood test, etc. and this charge is nominal. 5. The first and the foremost question, therefore, to be considered is :— "Do the taxes paid by the citizen constitute consideration for the service ostensibly rendered gratis by the State to its citizens?" 6. Nature of taxes in Welfare State Taxation in socialist societies and Welfare States is designed to tax the affluent sections of the society so as to provide services to the economically weaker and backward sections of the society. Nature of taxes in Welfare State Taxation in socialist societies and Welfare States is designed to tax the affluent sections of the society so as to provide services to the economically weaker and backward sections of the society. Earnings and property are taxed to achieve distributive justice. Haves are taxed so that the have-nots can be provided with the essentials for sustenance of life. 6.2 Taxation may also be resorted to curb consumption of socially undesirable consumer goods like liquor, opium, tobacco, etc. 6.3 Taxation, therefore, is an instrument of reducing economic disparities, avoiding concentration of wealth in few hands and providing certain essential services vital to the welfare of the community, free or at a nominal charge to those who might not be otherwise able to afford the same. It is also intended to curb undesirable consumption. Such services have larger economic and social objectives and are not narrow acts of "give and take" or "services for a consideration". 6.4 The nature, of taxation becomes clearer if we examine it in the context of fees. The distinction betweena "tax" and a "fee" has been often considered by the Supreme Court of India and their observations are very valuable for distinguishing between the two. In its landmark judgement Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Laxmindra Tirath Swamiar (supra) the Honble Supreme Court of India has observed as under— "a tax is the compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not "payment for services rendered". " ..A fee may generally be defined as a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some Governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service-. .". The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege." In the Chief Commissioner of Delhi ft. Anr. v. DCM (1978 (2) SCC 3671(8), the Honble Supreme Court of India observed that a legal fee must satisfy two conditions:— (i) There must be an element of quid pro quo, that is to say, the authority levying the fee must render some service for the fee levied, however, remote the sources may be; (ii). Anr. v. DCM (1978 (2) SCC 3671(8), the Honble Supreme Court of India observed that a legal fee must satisfy two conditions:— (i) There must be an element of quid pro quo, that is to say, the authority levying the fee must render some service for the fee levied, however, remote the sources may be; (ii). That the fee raised must be spent for purposes of the imposition and should not form part of the General Revenues of the State. In K.K. Puri v. State of Punjab ( 1980 (1) SCC 416 )(9), the Honble Supreme Court of India had an occasion to observe. "a fee is charged for a special service rendered to individuals by some Governmental agency. The levy of fees, thus, must be proved to a quid pro quo for the services rendered to him". 6.5 The question came up for consideration again by the Honble Supreme Court in "Southern Pharmaceuticals 8c Chemicals, Trichur v. State of Kerala & Ors." (supra). While elaborating the distinction between a tax and a fee, the Supreme Court cited with approval its earlier decisions (Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Laxmindra Tirath Swamiar, Shriur Mutt), (supra) (Jagannath Ramanujdas v. State of Orissa (supra) and (Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay) (1954 SCR (1055))(10). In brief, it reiterated that a fee is a return or consideration for service rendered and that there is no element of quid pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority in case of a tax. Again in its Judgement Srinivas General Traders & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (supra) the Honble Supreme Court observed "It is also increasingly realized that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax". While noting that the traditional view that there must be a quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change, it reiterates that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege. In a fee there is and must always be correlation between the fee collected and services intended to be rendered. These observations of Supreme Court have to be read in proper context. The emphasis is on the words "always", "necessarily", "quid pro quo in strict sense" and "every tax". In a fee there is and must always be correlation between the fee collected and services intended to be rendered. These observations of Supreme Court have to be read in proper context. The emphasis is on the words "always", "necessarily", "quid pro quo in strict sense" and "every tax". In other words, every tax need not be without a quid pro quo and every fee need not always have a quid pro quo. As the Honble Supreme Court has observed there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions and are aspects of taxation as distinct from a tax. Whether a levy is a tax or a fee depends not merely upon the use of the terms tax or fee but the actual nature of the levy. The mere nomenclature will not determine the true character of the levy or imposition. In their latest judgement, (The Municipal Commissioner of the City of Baroda v. Babu Bhai Himmat Lal, (supra) the Honble Supreme Court has cited with approval their observations on this point in Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur vs. State of Kerala (supra) and Sreenivas General Traders & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra). For a fuller understanding of the issue, it may be worthwhile to state that the Honble Supreme Court in their judgement in Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals & Ors. v. State of Kerala (supra) had set out the differences between tax and fee as under :— (i) The essence of taxation is compulsion being imposed under statutory power. (ii) Imposition is for public purpose "without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax". In other words, "levy of tax is for the purpose of general revenue" and "there is no element of quid pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority." (iii) Tax is a part of the common burden and is regulated with reference to the capacity of the tax-payer to pay. . (a) Fee, on the other hand, "is a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some Governmental agency"; (b) It is based on the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the service, though, there may be no exact correlation between the expenses incurred and the quantum of fees collected. (c) The fees are uniform without reference to the ability of different recipients (of service) to pay. (c) The fees are uniform without reference to the ability of different recipients (of service) to pay. In Sreenivas General Traders & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.(l),the Supreme Court,however,reiterated that in order to establish the quid pro quo concept, it is not necessary to establish exactly that the amount collected is spent on the services rendered. The" authority collecting the fee must show that it is rendering a service in lieu of the fee; that it is giving some special benefit to the payer of the fee. The quantum of fee collected and the expenses on the services rendered must have a mutual relationship, by and large: the relationship between the levy and the service rendered is one of general character not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there would be a "reasonable relationship" between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. It is in this sense that the Supreme Court has observed, that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not a sine qua non of a fee. In short, the Supreme Court, in series of Judgements, has maintained the distinction between tax and fee and that the underlying difference is the absence of quid pro quo in a tax and its presence in a fee. 6.6 It would be evident from the observations of the Honble Supreme Court cited above that in the case of a fee levied there is a definite correlation between the service rendered and the levy imposed and this is wanting in the case of a tax. Whereas, a tax is for general purpose, fees is for specific purpose, and is a quid pro quo for that purpose. This distinction is important because only a "fee, as distinct from a tax, can be deemed to be a consideration for the special service or benefit rendered. In the case of a fee, it is the special benefit or privilege accruing to an individual which is the reason for payment, whereas in the case of a tax a particular advantage, if it exists at all, is an incidental result of State action. 6.7 Thus tax is an imposition made for a public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. 6.7 Thus tax is an imposition made for a public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. There is no element of quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority levying the tax. 6.8 It would be amply clear from the above that there is no nexus between the taxes paid to the State and the services rendered by the State from the proceeds of those taxes. There is no identification of the service or services which a State is bound to render to the citizen in lieu of the taxes paid by him. There is, thus, no relationship between tax on the one hand and the welfare services provided by the State on the other. 6.9 Again, a consideration is a valid consideration only if it is given freely. But, taxes are a compulsory levy being collected under the authority of law. They are an imposition and are not paid voluntarily and freely. Hence, taxes levied by the State and paid by citizens can never acquire the character of consideration or a quid pro quo, and for which the State optionally provides certain services free of charge. Again such services are not those desired by tax payer but what the State considers as desirable in the interests of the public in general. So, there is no element of free will between the parties either in payment of taxes or in provision of services. . 7. Apart from the macro considerations, a micro consideration of the Act leads to the conclusion that :— (a) it is the intention of the Act to exclude goods and services rendered free of charge; and (b) to limit it to such transactions of supply of defective goods and deficient services in which there is consideration as commonly understood. 7.1 What is consideration? Section 2(l)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act defines a consumer, inter alia as one who hires any services for a consideration. 7.1 What is consideration? Section 2(l)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act defines a consumer, inter alia as one who hires any services for a consideration. Section 2(d) of the Contract Act defines consideration as under :— "when at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or abstains from doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise." In the cases under consideration, the relationship is between the Government which renders the services (free medical treatment) and the patient. The Government or the State is the promisee and the beneficiaries or the patients as tax payers, are the promisors. There is no identification of the service which the State is bound to render to the citizen in lieu of the taxes paid by him or by other members of the community. There is no consensus in idem. The element of "desire" on the part of the promisor is also wanting in this relationship between the State which renders the service and the public or the citizens who avail of that service. In fact, in the absence of a direct nexus between the taxes paid by the promisor and the service rendered by the promisee, the element of desire of the promisor to be fulfilled by the promisee cannot exist. Hence, there is no consideration between the State which provides the welfare services free or without charge and the beneficiaries who may happen to be the tax payers. The absence of this nexus also robs the transaction of the character of "reciprocal promise" which is an ingredient of an accepted proposal and which also constitutes the essential nature of consideration. Again, generally speaking, consideration is an ingredient of an agreement or a contract. In other words, a consideration must exist for giving rise to a contract or agreement between two parties. In the case of State and Citizen, there is no agreement or contract obliging the State to provide certain services and for the beneficiaries to pay for the same in the form of taxes. 7.2 What is "service"? "Service" has been defined in Section 2(l)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act and has also been referred to in Sections, 2(l)(d)(ii) and 2(1)(g). 7.2 What is "service"? "Service" has been defined in Section 2(l)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act and has also been referred to in Sections, 2(l)(d)(ii) and 2(1)(g). Reading these three sub-sections together, it is evident that service must be for a consideration. This is reinforced by the use of the term "hire" in Section 2(l)(d)(ii). 7.3 Hiring "Hiring", inter alia, involves letting of things or services for rent or for wages. It is a payment for labour or for the use of goods. In economic parlance, it is in the nature of rent and wages. "Hiring" is, thus, a species bailment and reward is an essential ingredient in hiring. Hiring creates a legal right in the hirer against the hirer for the latter to render the service for which the former had paid the hire. Taxes paid by citizens cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be called "hiring" of services rendered by the Government. Thus, the services as defined in Section 2(l)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act must be a service hired by a consumer as defined in Section 2(l)(d)(ii) of that Act and to attract the provisions of the said Act, it must suffer from a deficiency defined under Section 2(1)(g). 8. State and person A State is a corporate body and hence a legal person who can sue and be sued and has got legal rights and duties. State in article 298 of the Constitution will be one such person. But, so far as the services rendered by the State in implementation of the Directive Principles of the Constitution are concerned, the State cannot be deemed to be a person as envisaged in the Act. State has been specially defined in Article 12 of the Constitution for purposes of Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles) and includes instrumentalities of State. In Part III of the Constitution, the State is distinct from the persons/citizens who enjoy Fundamental Rights and which can be enforced against the State. It is for their welfare that the State has to implement the Directive Principles. Consequently, the State in providing any service free to the citizens in implementation of the Directive Principles as Welfare State cannot be deemed to be a person as envisaged in the Act. 9. It is for their welfare that the State has to implement the Directive Principles. Consequently, the State in providing any service free to the citizens in implementation of the Directive Principles as Welfare State cannot be deemed to be a person as envisaged in the Act. 9. Will the finding that non-paying patients are not consumers under the Consumer Protection Act and hence not eligible for the benefits of the Act lead to Constitutional Discrimination against such patients? 10. It has been argued that whereas on the above, the non-paying patients are ineligible to claim relief under the Consumer Protection Act, the paying patients can seek relief under the Act inasmuch as the service is not rendered to them free of charge. This is considered as amounting to denial of equality before law to poor patients and is thus violative of Article 14. We doubt if this involves any unfair discrimination between paying and non-paying patients. In the first instance such a distinction is based on reasonable classification. Again paying wards provide better medical services than general non-paying wards. As such, the hospitals would be justified in making a levy from the patients who wish to avail of superior facilities. Again hospitals may levy a charge from patients having certain level of income on the principle that they can afford to pay and with this money, hospitals can provide better services to the free or non-paying patients. This, however, cannot deny to the paying patients of any legal rights they have under other laws by virtue of their having purchased, or brought these services. 10.1 Therefore, purely on legal grounds also, this appeal is not maintainable before this Commission and is dismissed without costs. 10.2 As regards contributory health service schemes, this question was not examined in the original petition before the State Commission of Rajas-than (CUTS v. State of Rajasthan) nor was this considered in appeal in depth; only the attention of the Commission was invited to this aspect orally on the hearing on the 11th December, 1989. The question whether contribution under a Contributory Health Service Scheme would constitute consideration for medical service provided by hospitals, dispensaries and doctors and leading to hiring of medical services or is a perquisite given by employers to their employees or _workmen, is left open for determination as and when this is raised in future. The question whether contribution under a Contributory Health Service Scheme would constitute consideration for medical service provided by hospitals, dispensaries and doctors and leading to hiring of medical services or is a perquisite given by employers to their employees or _workmen, is left open for determination as and when this is raised in future. Prima facie contributory health service schemes are run by Governments in their capacity of employers and not as State and hence the contribution under the schemes would not constitute a consideration for medical or hospital services provided by the State and cannot result in hiring of those services. 11. Before I handover this order, we record our appreciation for the valuable services rendered by the learned Advocate Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan and other counsel to the National Commission. Appeal dismissed. 12. Pronounced on 15th December. 1989.