JUDGMENT S.K. DHAON, J. 1. THE U. P. Public Services Tribunal dismissed the claim petition of the petitioner. THE Tribunal, on 18th October, 1988, rejected the review application made by the petitioner. Keeping in view the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the Tribunal held that the fresh documents sought to be filed by the petitioner in the review proceedings could not be taken into account as the petitioner had failed to show that the documents were not in his knowledge during the relevant period when the petition was pending before it or the same could not be produced inspite of the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner. THE order rejecting the application for review is being impugned in the present petition. 2. FOR the petitioner it is urged that the Tribunal misdirected itself in applying the provisions of rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code while disposing of the application for review. Reliance is placed upon sub-sections (1) and (5) of section 5 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). For disposing of the contention of the learned counsel sub-section (1) (a) and the relevant provisions of sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Act may be extracted:- "(1) (a) The tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act of 1908), or the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, subject to the provisions of this section and of any rules made under section 7, the tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its sittings and deciding whether to sit in public or in private." "(5) The tribunal shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under this Act, have, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters is (g) review its decision." Section 7 contains the usual rule making power and the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Rules, 1975 have been framed. However, none of the rules have any bearing on the present controversy. 3. IT is well settled that no Court or Tribunal can revise or review its orders or reopen the case unless such a power is conferred by the Statute. There may be an express provision giving a right to review or such a right may flow by necessary implication. The right to get an order of an adjudicatory authority reviewed or revised is a substantive one and not a matter of procedure. Thus, finality is attached to an order and it can be reopened only in accordance with an express or implied statutory provision, if any. In certain situations an adjudicatory authority has an inherent jurisdiction to revise or review its order, but such a power is confined to a limited class of Gases, some of such cases are those where an order is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice an order is obtained by practising fraud upon the court or the Tribunal. 4. SECTION 5 makes it clear that the provisions as contained in the Code shall not bind the Tribunal in proceedings before it. The legislature mandates that it shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. It also authorises the Tribunal to formulate its own rules or procedure. The power given to a Tribunal to form its own rule or procedure is hedged in with the condition that the rules so formed should conform to the principles of natural justice. The concept of natural justice embraces a twin ideal. The first is that the authority deciding the matter should be free from bias. The second is that a person affected by a decision has a right to be heard to put it in a nutshell, the principles of natural justice secure a fair hearing. 5. I have already emphasised that a right to claim a review is a substantive right. Such a right is neither a part of the concept of natural justice nor does it flow from the principles of natural justice. It is also now well settled that the requirement of natural justice can be modified by the statute. 6. 5. I have already emphasised that a right to claim a review is a substantive right. Such a right is neither a part of the concept of natural justice nor does it flow from the principles of natural justice. It is also now well settled that the requirement of natural justice can be modified by the statute. 6. IN sub-section (5) of the Act it is clarified that the Tribunal for the purposes of holding an inquiry shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the code while trying a suit in respect of certain matters, including reviewing its decision. A perusal of the matters catalogued in sub-clauses (a) to (j) will show that they are not exhaustive of the powers of the civil court as contained in the code while trying a suit. Only some of the powers exercised by a civil court while trying a suit have been bodily lifted from the code and put into sub-section (5). Therefore, the provisions of the code alone shall govern the matters mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (j). It follows that in the matters of review the powers vested in a civil court under the code and no other power will have to be looked into. Section 114 in the Code is the substantive section and rule 1 of Order 47 supplies the details of procedure. IN fact the provisions as contained in rule 1 of Order 47 are definitive of the limits within which review is permitted. In rule 1 of Order 47 only three grounds are enumerated for reviewing order. They are (1) discovery of a new or important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made, or (2) some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or (3) for any other sufficient cause (which have been interpreted to be analogous to the other reasons specified above). 7. 7. TO get over the hurdles created by the provisions of rule 1 of Order 47 the learned counsel urged that even while exercising the power of review the Tribunal was under an, obligation to be guided by the principles of natural justice and it failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law, when it felt that it was tied down by the three conditions enumerated in rule 1 of Order 47. Emphasis is laid on the words "subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) as used in sub-section (5). This submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason first, the words" "the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the code while trying a suit" as used in sub-section (5) clearly negative the idea that the power of review as contained in the code can be supplemented by taking recourse to the provisions of sub-section (1) wherein principles of natural justice have been mandated to be the guiding factor of the Tribunal. It will be seen that in the matters enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (j) of sub-sec. (5) the mode or the procedure to be adopted for exercising powers as laid down in the code have not been made applicable, confining ourselves to the case of a review, Rule 1 of Order 47 confers a right in any person considering himself aggrieved to apply for review of a judgment or an order provided if the three aforementioned conditions exist. Rule 3 deals with the form of the application for review. Rule 4 gives the power to the court to reject an application for review summarily. It also provides that where the court is of the opinion that an application for review should be granted it shall do so only after previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order a review of which has been applied for. The procedure to be applied by a civil court while considering and granting an application for review has not been made applicable in the case of the Tribunal under the Act. Nonetheless, some procedure has to be followed by the Tribunal before considering and accepting an application for review. The procedure to be applied by a civil court while considering and granting an application for review has not been made applicable in the case of the Tribunal under the Act. Nonetheless, some procedure has to be followed by the Tribunal before considering and accepting an application for review. For finding out such a procedure one has to refer back to sub-section (1) of section 5 and find out whether rule has been framed under section 7 with regard to a review application and whether any rules have been formulated by the Tribunal for regulating own procedure in so far as the consideration of the review application is concerned. If there is neither any rule framed under section 7 nor any regulation framed by the Tribunal, then the procedure in consonance with the principles of natural justice has to be followed by the Tribunal before accepting an application for review. This envisages the issue of the notice to the opposite party and an opportunity of hearing etc. This is the precise purpose for which the words contained in sub section (1), upon which the learned counsel has relied upon, find place. 8. THIS petition has no merit. It is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.