This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of criminal proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh and the order dated 12. 9. 80 passed in the said case framing charge under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. 2. The facts of the casein brief may be stated thus. On March, 1977 the petitioner, who was the President of the District Congress Committee (D. C. C. in short), Dibrugarh was allotted an Ambassador Car bearing No. WMC 7307 by the All India Congress Committee (A. I. C. C. in short) for use in the said D. C. C. The car was being used as such. However, on 21. 3. 78, the petitioner left Congress and joined Janata Party. The allegation is that after leaving Congress and ceasing to be the President of the D. C. C. the said car was not returned to the D. C. C. despite repeated reminders. A complaint was filed by the President of the D. C. C., Dibrugarh. Shri Sonaram Phukan, the successor in office and in the complaint, it was alleged that though the petitioner ceased to be a member of the Congress Party and the President of the D. C. C, Dibrugarh, he did not hand over the car to the complainant who was the duly elected Vice-President of the said Committee took away the car and since then had been using it dishonestly as if the car was his own in spite of repeated requests to return the same. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations process was issued under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code by the Magistrate. The Magistrate examined two prosecution witnesses. One was the complainant himself Sonaram Phukan, and the other Prodush Choudhury, an office bearer of the D. C. C. Both of them hi their evidence narrated the background of the petitioner, the various posts he was holding and that as he left the Congress Party he ceased to be the President of the D. C. C. Both these witnesses deposed that as the petitioner did not return the car, they were asked by A. L C. C. to take legal steps against the petitioner for not returning the car the market value of which was Rs 40,000/-. On the basis of the aforesaid statements made by the two prosecution witnesses in. their deposition the-learned -Magistrate .held that a prima- facie case under section 406c of the Indian Penal Code Was established against the petitioner and framed charge under that section. The charge was in the following language : "In March 1977 you being the President. of D. C. C., Dibrugarh were entrusted with Ambassador Car No. WMC 7307 by A. I. C. for use of the said D. C. C. and on 21. 3. 78 you left the Congress and defected to the Janata Party-without,returning 'the said car to the D C. C.; Dibrugarh and thus you committed criminal breach of trust of that car and thereby committed, an -offence punishable, under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge". The aforesaid has been challenged. 3. Heard Mr. P. C. Kataki, senior counsel and Mr. R. Gogoi, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. R. Gogoi, who argued the case, submitted that from a bare reading of the evidence of the two prosecution witnesses, it will be clear that the essential ingredients of an offence under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code were totally absent and the charge was framed by the Court without applying its "judicial mind in regard to the existence-of the said essential ingredients. Mr. Gogoi's submission, in other words, is that even if the statements made in -the deposition of the two witnesses are taken on their face value, no case is made out of an offence under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It was pointed out that in order to bring a particular act within the purview of section 406, it is necessary not only to establish misappropriation but also to prove that it was dishonest. Misappropriation per se will not attract section 406 unless it is dishonest. It was submitted that the expression 'dishonestly' used in "section 406 cannot be-ignored by the Court while deciding whether the ingredients of an offence were present or not, because that is one of the most essential ingredient. My attention' was drawn to the ,cross -examination: of 3%W. 1 and P.W. ?. It was submitted that the expression 'dishonestly' used in "section 406 cannot be-ignored by the Court while deciding whether the ingredients of an offence were present or not, because that is one of the most essential ingredient. My attention' was drawn to the ,cross -examination: of 3%W. 1 and P.W. ?. wherein it was stated by the witnesses that there was some dispute regarding split Of the Congress Committee between two factions of the party and matters were pending in Court regarding, ownership and rights over the properties. It was submitted by [Mr. Gogoji that the most the .dispute may be a civil dispute and if the parties so desire they may approach the civil Court for recovery of the. car, but there is no ease for filing of a complaint in criminal Court for offence under section 4 to 6 of the Indian Penal Code. I have considered the submissions -of the learned counsel. I have, also perused the complaint, the evidence of the two witnesses, and the impugned order framing charge against the petitioner. ... 4. It appears that the allegation in short is; that the-car allotted to the petitioner in his capacity as the President of the D. C. C., Dibrugarh was not returned by him after he ceased to be the President of the D.C.C.-and joined another party, despite repeated reminders and it was decided to take legal action for recovery of the said car. Filing of complaint, in the criminal Court, it appears/ was probably advised and action was taken accordingly. 5. I have gone, through the provisions of section 405 of the Indian Penal. Code which lays down the essential ingredients of an offence of criminal breach of trust. In order to constitute an offence under this section, it must be dishonest misappropriation, by a person in whom confidence is placed as to the custody or management of the property in respect of which the breach of trust is charged. There must be an entrustment; there must de misappropriation or conversion to one's own use or use in violation of any legal direction or of any legal contract. Over and above, the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. There must be an entrustment; there must de misappropriation or conversion to one's own use or use in violation of any legal direction or of any legal contract. Over and above, the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. Thus, from a reading of the section and perusal of the essential requirements thereof, it is clear that dishonest intention is a necessary ingredient of an offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Misappropriation simpliciter would not attract the provisions of the said section. It is well settled that every offence of criminal breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the complainant may seek its redress for damages in the civil Court, but every breach of trust, in the absence of metis fea, cannot legally justify a criminal prosecution, 6. In the instant Case, on a pensal of the facts as well as the order of the learned Magistrate it appears that this aspect of the definition was completely lost sight of. I do not find, in the evidence as well as in the impugned order framing charge a word about dishonest intention. 7. It is well settled that framing of a charge is serious matter and the Court has to apply its judicial mind before framing a charge. Section 245 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure provides that if upon taking all the evidence for prosecution under section 244 the Magistrate considers; for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted. would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate Should discharge him. It is only when the Magistrate is of the1 opinion 'that there is ground for presuming the accused has committed an offence triable under that Chapter which in his opinion can be adequately punished by him, he should frame a charge against the accused. To come to the conclusion either way under section 245 or 246 there must be material on record and the conclusion must be supported by reasons It may be observed that the order framing a charge seriously affects a person's liberty and, therefore, it is the duty of the -Court to consider judicially 'whether the material warrants the framing -of-the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. In this connection, the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, AIR 1977 SC 1489 may be referred to. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court also held that in exercising power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Section 561-A of the old Code)the High Court can quash a proceeding if it comes to a decision that allow­ing the proceeding to continue will be abuse of the process of the Court or ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that "a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be admi­nistered according to laws made by the legislature.” The above legal position has also been reiterated in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, (1989) 1 SCC 692, dealing with the power of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding at the initial stage it was observed ; "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court ... to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest, of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court ... to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest, of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is so on basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ulti­mate conviction is bleak an I, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while 'taking into consideration the special facts of case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 8. Applying the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where the proceeding before the criminal Court should be quashed. In a case of criminal breach of trust, as observe earlier, it is both civil and criminal wrong. There are situations where though it is preceded by civil wrong, it may or may not amount to cri­minal offence. The facts of the instant case clearly demonstrate that it is a case of the former type and not the latter. The facts, as alleged, if proved, may constitute a civil wrong and not a criminal offence; 9. In view of what is stated above, the proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh including the order dated 12.9. 80 are quashed. 10. This petition is accordingly allowed.