JUDGMENT : 1. - This second appeal filed by the landlord arises out of a suit filed by him for eviction relating to a shop situated in Johari Bazar at Jaipur. The said premises belonged to Shivnarain Bairathi. The plaintiff appellant is the daughter's son of Shivnarain Bairathi and it is claimed that he was adopted by Shiv Narain Bairathi as his son. The premises were originally let out to one Hardayal Singh. On 3rd August, 1951 Ratan Chand Lunia, defendant-respondent executed a Kirayanama (Ex. 1) whereby he took on lease the premises from Hardayal Singh on the game rent i.c. Rs. 80/- per month, which was being paid by Hardayal Singh. The said Kirayanama was followed by Kirayanama (Ex. 2) dated 1st December, 1954 executed by the defendant-respondent in favour of Shiv Narain Bairathi and the plaintiff-appellant, who was minor at that time. Under the said Kirayanama also the rent was Rs. 80/- per month Another Kirayanama (Ex. 3) dated 25th January, 1958 was executed by the defendant-respondent in favour of Shiv Narain, Bairathi and the appellant whereunder also the rent was Rs. 80/- per month. A fresh Kirayanama (Ex. 4) was executed by the defendant respondent on 1st September, 1962. It was in favour of Shiv Narain Bairathi only and it was operative for a period of three years from 1st September. 1962. The rent for the premises remained the same, namely, Rs. 80/- per month. The said rent-note (Ex. 4) was a registered document. An agreement (Ex 5) was, entered into between Shiv Narain Bairathi and the appellant on the one side and the defendant respondent on the other on 1st September. 1965 whereby it was agreed that certain alterations would be made in the suit premises and thereafter the rent would be increased from Rs. 80/- per month to Rs. 101/- per month. The said agreement was an unregistered document. There is a dispute between the parties with regard to one of the terms of the said agreement relating to the liability for the cost of the proposed alterations. According to the document (Ex. 5) produced by the plaintiff- appellant the said cost was to be borne by defendant respondent whereas according the typed copy of the said agreement Ex. A-5) produced by the defendant-respondent the said cost was to be borne by Shiv Narain Bairathi and the appellant. According to the document (Ex. 5) produced by the plaintiff- appellant the said cost was to be borne by defendant respondent whereas according the typed copy of the said agreement Ex. A-5) produced by the defendant-respondent the said cost was to be borne by Shiv Narain Bairathi and the appellant. The case of the defendant-respondent, however is that the said agreement dated 1st September, 1965 was never given effect to Shiv Narain Bairathi died on 19th November, 1966 leaving behind his wife Smt. Bhonri Devi, his daughter, Smt. Kamla Devi and the plaintiff-appellant. On 20th May, 1967 Smt. Bhonri Devi and Smt. Kamla Devi executed a deed of release (Ex 15) whereby they relinquished their rights in the property belonging to Shiv Narain Bairathi including the suit premises and recognised the plaintiff-appellant as the sole and exclusive owner of the said property. The plaintiff--appellant gave a notice dated 19th September, 1967 terminating the tenancy of the defendant-respondent, and thereafter, on December 9, 1967, he filed the present suit for eviction against the defendant-respondent. In the said suit, the plaintiff appellant sought eviction of the defendant-respondent on the grounds of (i) default in payment of rent for a period exceeding six months, (ii) sub-letting of the premises in breach of the terms of the rent-note and; (iii) reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the premises by the plaintiff appellant. The unit was contested by the defendant-respondent who disputed the validity of the adoption of the plaintiff-appellant by Shiv Narain Bairathi. The defendant respondent denied that he had committed any default in payment of rent or had sub-let the premises or that the premises were required reasonably and bonafide for the personal necessity of the plaintiff-appellant. The defendant-respondent asserted that he had taken the premises on rent from Shiv Narain Bairathi in August, 1951, and that he has been in possession since 1951 and that in January. 1958 Shiv Narain told him that he has no son and that he was intending to adopt the plaintiff appellant and, therefore, in accordance with the desire of Shiv Narain Bairathi he defendant) had executed a rent note for three years in favour of Shiv Narain and the plaintiff on 25th January, 1958 but the rent was being paid by Shiv Narain Bairathi only. In the written statement it has been further stated that after the expiry of the said rent note a fresh rent note was executed for a further period of three years and the same was executed only in favour of Shiv Narain Bairathi as desired by Shiv Narain Bairathi and at that time Shiv Narain told the defendant that earlier he was thinking of adopting the plaintiff but he has dropped that idea and, therefore, the rent note was executed only in favour of Shiv Narain Bairathi. 2. The plaint was allowed to be amended by the trial court by orders dated 24th September, 1968 and 6th July, 1976. The defendant filed amended written statement to the amended plaint and also sought amendment of the written statement. The plaintiff also filed a replication and the defendant filed a reply to the same. 3. The Addl. Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur by order dated March 21, 1969 framed 13 issues. By orders dated 3rd February, 1975 and 4th October, 1976, additional issues Nos. 14 to 17 and 18 to 20 respectively were framed. 4. The Addl. Civil Judge (Small Causes) Jaipur City. Jaipur by his judgment and decree dated 27th November, 1979 decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The Addl. Civil Judge has held that the plaintiff -appellant is the adopted son of Shiv Narain Bairathi. Issue No. 3 with regard to the subletting the premises was decided against the plaintiff. As regards issue No. 5 relating to the reasonable and bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiff the Addl. Civil Judge held that it was not established that the suit premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiff for personal use. With regard to issue No. 18 relating to comparative hardship, the Addl. Civil Judge found that the defendant-respondent would suffer greater hardship as compared to the plaintiff. As regards default in payment of rent, the Addl. Civil Judge found that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent in as much as the rent for the period from June, 1967 to December, 1967 was sent on 30th December, 1967 and on the date of the filing of the suit the rent for the period of six months, from June, 1967 to November, 1967 had fallen due and, therefore, the defendant was liable to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent. The Addl. The Addl. Civil Judge, further held that the defendant is estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiff and is also liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title, since the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff. 5. The said judgment and decree of the Addl. Civil Judge was reversed in appeal by the Addl District Judge No. 7., Jaipur City, Jaipur by his judgment and decree dated 25th February, 1982. The Addl. District Judge affirmed the findings recorded by the Ad 1. Civil Judge with regard to the subletting and reasonable and bona fide personal necessity and comparative hardship. As regards the default in payment of rent, the Addl. District Judge held that there was proper and valid tender of the rent upto May, 1967 to Smt. Bhonri Devi and in respect of the period subsequent to May, 1967, it could not be said that there was a default in payment of ran for the period of six months because the rent for the month of November, 1967 could be paid upto 15th of December, 1967 and the suit was filed prior to 15th December, 1967 and therefore, it could not be said that on the date of the filing of the suit the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months. As regards denial of title, the Addl. District Judge while affirming the findings recorded by the Addl. Civil Judge that the defendant was estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff, held that no decree on the ground of denial of title could b. passed in favour of the plaintiff because no such plea was raised by the plaintiff in the plaint and in the absence of such a plea a decree for eviction could not be passed on the ground of denial of title. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Addl. District Judge, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 6. I have heard Shri S.C. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant. in support of the appeal and Shri S.M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Addl. District Judge, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 6. I have heard Shri S.C. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant. in support of the appeal and Shri S.M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. The plaintiff appellant is seeking the eviction of the defendant on four grounds, namely, (i) subletting of the premises, (ii) reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff, (iii) default in payment of rent for a period of six months; and (iv) denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendant. On the first two grounds, namely, subletting and reasonable and bonafide personal necessity both the courts have found in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. On ground, Nos. (iii) and (iv) the courts below have differed. The trial court has decided in favour of the plaintiff on both these grounds, while the first Appellate Court reversed the said findings and decided the same against the plaintiff. In view of the contentions that were urged by the learned counsel for the parties, by order dated 5th December, 1988, the following questions were referred by me for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court : '(1) Whether the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act in the absence of specific pleading, issue and evidence in that regard and for that purpose the ground set out in Section 13 (I) (f) of the Act stands on a different footing from the other grounds of eviction contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act? (2) Can a tenant be said to have committed default in payment of rent on the first day after the expiry of the month even though in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 19-A of the Act, the rent can be paid upto 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable? (3) Does the decision of this Court in Prem Lal v. Jadav Chand hold good after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yeshodai Ammal ?" 8. (3) Does the decision of this Court in Prem Lal v. Jadav Chand hold good after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yeshodai Ammal ?" 8. The Division Bench of this Court, after considering the matter has , answered the said three questions as under:- "Q. No. 1:-The landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act, in the absence of specific pleading and issue, if the parties went to trial on that ground and when no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant. Although, the ground set out in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act does not stand on a different footing from the other grounds, still, the ground mentioned in Section 13(1) (f) of the Act can be examined on merits in the aforesaid situation. Q. No. 2:-If the tenant has committed default in payment of rent on the first day after the expiry of the month for which rent is payable under the contract. the payment of rent upto the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable under Sub-section (1) of Section 19A, would not save him for the purposes of clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Q. No. 3:-The decision of this Court in Premlal's case (supra) does not hold good after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal's case (supra) to the extent indicated above." 9. After the aforesaid decision by the Division Bench of this Court (reported in 1989(1) RLR 475 ), the learned counsel for both the parties made further submissions in the light of the answers that have been given to the three questions referred to the Division Bench. 10. I will first take up grounds Nos. (iii) and (iv) on which there is difference of opinion between the Trial Court and First Appellate Court. 11. As regards default in payment of rent the case of the plaintiff as yet out in the plaint, is that defendant had paid rent for the premises upto December. 1965 and that no rent had been paid by him after December. 1965 and the rent for the premises is payable @ Rs. 101/- per month. 11. As regards default in payment of rent the case of the plaintiff as yet out in the plaint, is that defendant had paid rent for the premises upto December. 1965 and that no rent had been paid by him after December. 1965 and the rent for the premises is payable @ Rs. 101/- per month. The defendant has, on the other hand, claimed that under agreement dated 1st September, 1965 certain alterations were to be made in the premises and after the said alterations were completed the rent was to be increased from Rs. 80/- to Rs. 101/- per month and it was agreed that for that purpose a separate rent-note would be executed and no separate rent- note as contemplated was executed after 1st September. 1965 and, therefore, the rent for the premises continued to be Rs. 80/- per month The case of the defendant is further that he had paid rent for the premises upto December, 1967 and the said rent was paid by him in the following manner : (i) Rs. 180/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi wife of late Shri Shiv Narain towards rent upto March,1966 on 27th May,1986 (sic 1966) vide voucher Ex. A-3. (ii) Rs. 400/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards rent for the period from April, 1966 to August, 1966 by money order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A-180 which was received by Smt. Bhonri Devi vide receipt Ex. A-181. (iii) Rs. 480/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards rent for the period from 1st September, 1966 to 28th February. 1967 by money Order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A--182 which was received vide receipt Ex. A-183. (iv) Rs. 240/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the period from 1st March, 1967 to 31st May. 1967 by money per sent vide postal receipt Ex. A-184 which was received vide receipt Ex. A-185. (v) Rs. 160/- was remitted to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the months of June and July, 1967 by Money Order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A-18 but the same was refused by Smt. Bhonri Devi vide endorsement on the Money Order coup en Ex. A-189 dated 25th August, 1967. (vi) Rs. 560/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the period from Ist June. 1967 to 31st December, 1967 by Money Order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A-18 but the same was refused by Smt. Bhonri Devi vide endorsement on the Money Order coup en Ex. A-189 dated 25th August, 1967. (vi) Rs. 560/- paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the period from Ist June. 1967 to 31st December, 1967 by Money Order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A--186 dated 30th December, 1967 which was received by Smt. Bhonri Devi vide receipt Ex. A-187 dated 6th January, 1968. 12. Shri Agrawal has urged that after the death of Shiv Narain Bairathi on 19th February, 1966, the plaintiff, as the Karta of the joint family was entitled to receive the rent for the suit premises and the payment of rent of the premises by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Devi could not be said to be a valid and proper discharge of his liability. It has also been submitted by Shri Agrawal that even if it be assumed that there was a valid discharge of liability by the payment of rent to Smt. Bhonri Devi, the said payment could only be made for the period upto 20th May, 1967, the date of the execution of the Release Deed by Smt. Bhonri Devi and Smt. Kamla Devi and there could be no valid discharge of liability by payment of report to Smt. Bhonri Devi in respect of the period subsequent to 20th May, 1967 and that since there was no tender of the rent for the month of May, 1967 the liability for payment of the rent for the month of May, 1967 has not been discharged by the defendant. The submission of Shri Agrawal is further that on the date of the filing of the suit i.e. on 9th December, 1967 the rent for period from 1st June, 1967 to 30th November, 1967 had fallen due and that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months and that the Addl. District Judge has erred in holding that the rent for the month of November, 1967, could be paid upto 15th December, 1967 and that on 9th December, 1967 the date of the filing of the suit the defendant had not committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. District Judge has erred in holding that the rent for the month of November, 1967, could be paid upto 15th December, 1967 and that on 9th December, 1967 the date of the filing of the suit the defendant had not committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. Shri Agrawal has urged that the provisions contained in Sub-section (i) of Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as -the Act') have no bearing on the question of liability to pay the rent and that in the present case the rent for the month of November, 1967 became payable on l;t December, 1967 and that on 9th December, 1967, the date on which suit has been filed, the rent for the month of November, 1967 had also fallen due. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on M/s. Pruthi Brothers v. Manglawati, and (2) Ammachi v. Pathumuthu Umma . Shri Agrawal has also urged that even if it be assumed that the rent for the month of November, 1967 could be paid upto 15th of December, 1967 there was default in payment of rent for more than six months by the defendants for the reason that the rent which had been tendered by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the period upto May, 1967 was @ Rs. 80/- per month whereas the rent was payable @ Rs. 101/- per month. In this regard Shri Agrawal has contended that even though the defendant had not executed a fresh rent note in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965 but he had started paying rent @ Rs. 101/- per month as per the terms of the said agreement with effect from 1st November, 1965. 13. Shri Mehra, on the other hand, has contended that the rent for the premises was Rs. 80/- per month and not Rs. 101/- per month as claimed by plaintiff appellant and that there was valid discharge of the liability by the defendant in paying the rent for the period upto May, 1967 inasmuch as the said rent was accepted by Smt. Bhonri Devi was entitled to accept the same, being one of the heirs of deceased Shiv Nara in Bairathi. 101/- per month as claimed by plaintiff appellant and that there was valid discharge of the liability by the defendant in paying the rent for the period upto May, 1967 inasmuch as the said rent was accepted by Smt. Bhonri Devi was entitled to accept the same, being one of the heirs of deceased Shiv Nara in Bairathi. Shri Mehta has also urged that a tenant can be evicted on the ground of default in payment of tent only if it is found that he has committed wilful default and that in the present case it cannot (sic can) be said that defendant has always been ready and willing to pay the rent and had not committed intentional default in payment of rent. In this regard Shri Mehta has also urged that no intimation was given to the defendant with regard to the execution of the Deed of Release dated 20th May, 1967 and even in the original plaint there is no mention of the execution of the said deed and that reference to the said deed was incorporated in the plaint by way of amen dement introduced in 1968 and, therefore, it could not b^ said that the tender on 30th December, 1967 of rent by the defendant to Smt Bhonri Devi for the period upto 31st December, 1967 was not a valid and proper tender. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Heels Shoe Company v. Mrs Mumtaz Begum (l983 U. J. (S C.) 342) and Kameshwar Singh Srivastava v. IV Add] District Judge, Lucknow & Ors. (1987 (1) U.J. (S. C.) 268) . Shri Mehta has also urged that in view of the fact that the defendant had tendered the rent for the premises for the months of June and July, 1967 to Smt. Bhonri Devi by money order sent vide postal receipt Ex. A-188 and since the said money order was refused by Snit. Bhonri Devi vide money order coupen Ex. A-169, it was not necessary for the defendant to again tender the rent for the premises or to deposit the same and a increase for eviction cannot be passed against the defendant on the ground of default in payment of text under Section 13 (1) (a) of the Act. Bhonri Devi vide money order coupen Ex. A-169, it was not necessary for the defendant to again tender the rent for the premises or to deposit the same and a increase for eviction cannot be passed against the defendant on the ground of default in payment of text under Section 13 (1) (a) of the Act. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Smt. Anandkaewas Bai, ( 1988 (I) RLR 208 . Shri Mehta has also urged that Section 13-A of the Act was amended by Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Ordnance, 1975 promulgated on 29th September, 1975 which was replaced by Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment) Act, 1976, and that under the amended provisions of Section 13A of the Act a right was given to the tenant to move an application within 30 days from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance and the Court was required to determine the amount of arrears upto the date of the order as also amount of interest @ 6% and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time as may be fixed by the Court and on such payment being made the proceedings shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default. Shri Mehta has urged that in accordance with the amended provisions of Section 13A of the Act the defendant had submitted an application under Section 13A of the Act on 20th October, 1975 but the said application was rejected by the Trial Court by order dated 20th December, 1975, on the ground that the defendant had disputed the title of the plaintiff. Shri Mehta has urged that the said order dated 20th December, 1975 rejecting the application of the defendant was not a valid order in as much as Section 13A is applicable in a case where the tenancy has been disputed. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ganesh Narain v. Ranchhod Das & Another. 14. The first question which calls for consideration is with regard to the rate of rent which was payable by the defendant for the premises in respect of the period subsequent to 31st December, 1965. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ganesh Narain v. Ranchhod Das & Another. 14. The first question which calls for consideration is with regard to the rate of rent which was payable by the defendant for the premises in respect of the period subsequent to 31st December, 1965. There is no dispute that under the rent note (Ex 4) dated 11th September, 1962, the rent of the premises was Rs. 80/- per month. The case of the plaintiff, however, is that the said rent was increased to Rs. 101/- per month by agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st Sept. 1965. Both the courts below have considered the terms of the said agreement (Ex. 5) and have held that under para 3 of the said agreement it was provided that in view of the alterations referred to in the said agreement being carried out, the defendant would raise the rent of the premises from Rs. 80/- per month to Rs. 101/- per month and for that purpose he would execute a separate rent note and after getting it registered hand over the same to the parties of the first part, namely. Shiv Narain Bairathi and the plaintiff Laloo Narain. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff that no fresh rent-note was executed by the defendant in pursuance of the said clause. Both the courts blow have found that in the absence of a fresh rent now having been executed by the defendant it cannot be said that the rent for the premises has been increased from Rs. 80/- per month to Rs. 101/- per month. I am in agreement with the said finding. In view of the terms of pars 3 of the agreement (Ex. 5) and in the absence of any fresh rent-note being executed by the defendant it cannot be said that the rent for the premises has been increased from Rs. 80/- per month to Rs. 101/- per month. 15. I may now examine whether after the execution of the said agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965, the defendant had started paying rent (a) Rs. 101/- per month from 1st November, 1965. In this connection it may be stated that the case of the plaintiff is that although in the agreement (Ex. 101/- per month. 15. I may now examine whether after the execution of the said agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965, the defendant had started paying rent (a) Rs. 101/- per month from 1st November, 1965. In this connection it may be stated that the case of the plaintiff is that although in the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965, the amount of rent to be paid is mentioned as Rs. 101/- per month, the amount of rent actually ray has was Rs. 100/- per month, and Rs. 101/- was mentioned only because it is an auspicious figure and further that the defendant had paid the rent m Rs. 100;- per month for the months of November and December, 1965. In this regard, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has invited my attention to Ex,. A-173 to Exs A-179. The said documents are debit vouchers prepared by the defendant. Ex. A-173 is a debit voucher dated 17th December, 1965 for payment of Rs. Rs. 10/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent for the month of November, 1965. Ex. A-174 is debit voucher dated 19th December, 1964, For payment of Rs. 40/- paid to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent Ex. A-175 is debit voucher dated 30th December, 1965 for payment of Rs. 20/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent Ex. A-1761, debit voucher dated 13th January, 1966 for payment of Rs. 40/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent for the month of December, 1965. EA. A-177 is debit voucher dated 21st January, 1966 for payment of Rs. 40/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent for the month of December. 1965. Ex. A-178 is debit voucher dated 10th February, 1966 for payment of Rs. 20/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent for the month of January, 1966. Similarly Ex. A-177 is debit voucher dated 12th February, 1966 for payment of Rs. 20/- to Shiv Narain Bairathi towards rent for the month of January, 1966. A perusal of the said vouchers shows that in respect of the month November, 1965 the debit voucher No. Ex A-173 dated 17th December, 1965 alone mentions that a sum of Rs. 40/- was being paid towards the rent for the month of November, 1985. Debit vouchers Ex. A perusal of the said vouchers shows that in respect of the month November, 1965 the debit voucher No. Ex A-173 dated 17th December, 1965 alone mentions that a sum of Rs. 40/- was being paid towards the rent for the month of November, 1985. Debit vouchers Ex. A-174 and A-175 dated 19th December, 1965 and 30th December, 1965 do not mention that the amounts paid under the said vouchers were towards rent for the month of November, 1965. It cannot, therefore, be said that the payments made tinder the three debit vouchers Exs. A-173, A-174 and Ex. A-17 totalling a sum of Rs. 100/- were towards rent for the month of November, 1965. Moreover, in respect of the month of December, 1965 there are debit vouchers Exs. A-176 and Ex. A-177 for Rs. 40/- each which mention that the said vouchers relate to payment of rent for the month of December, 1965. These vouchers indicate that for the month of December, 1965 a sum of Rs. 80/- was paid as rent. As regards the month of January, 1966 there are debit vouchers Nos. A-178 and A-179 for Rs. 20/- each only. The position is, however, clarified by the debit voucher Ex. A-3 dated 27th May, 1966 for Rs. 180/-. In the said voucher it is mentioned that Rs. 60/- had already been paid as the rent for the month of January, 1966 and Rs 20/- is the balance amount towards rent for the said month and Rs. 160/- was being paid as rent for the months of February and March, 1966. The said voucher bears the thumb impression of Smi. Bhonri Devi. The voucher Ex. A-3 thus shows that the sum of Rs. 20/- which was paid vide debit voucher Ex A-175 dated 30th December, 1965 was not towards the rent for the month of November, 1965 but was subsequently adjusted against the rent for the month of January, 1966 and thus the rent which was paid by the defendant for the months of November and December, 1965 was @ Rs. 80/- per month and not Rs. 100/- per month as claimed by the plaintiff fumy opinion therefore, both the courts below have rightly held that even after the execution of the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965 the rent for the premises continued to be Rs. 80/- per month and not Rs. 100/- per month as claimed by the plaintiff fumy opinion therefore, both the courts below have rightly held that even after the execution of the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st September, 1965 the rent for the premises continued to be Rs. 80/- per month and the defendant was liable to pay rent @ Rs. 80/- per month only. 16. The next question which needs to be considered is whether there has been a valid discharge of liability of the defendant with regard to the payment of rent. It has been found by both the courts below that the rent for the premises for the period upto May, 1967 was tendered by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Devi and she had accepted the same. It has been urged on behalf o" the appellant that the said tender of rent to Smt. Bhonri Devi was not a valid tender in asmuchas Smt. Bhonri Devi was not entitled to receive the rent and the plaintiff alone was entitled to receive the rent and therefore. there is no valid discharge of his liability to pay the rent by the defendant. In my view, there is no substance in the afore- said contention. Admittedly Shiv Narain Bairathi was the landlord in respect of the premises and after the death of Shiv Narain Bairathi on 19th February, 1966 his rights devolved on his heirs. Smt. Bhonri Devi, being the widow of Shiv Narain Bairathi, was an heir of Shiv Narain and, therefore, she became the landlord and she was entitled to tensive the rent for the premises. In this connection it may also be mentioned that a sum of Rs. 400/- towards the rent for the period from 1st April, 1966 to 31st August, 1966 was sent by the defendant to Smt Bhonri Devi by money order and the receipt of the said money order bearing the thumb impression of Smt Bhonri Devi is Ex. A-181. The defendant has adduced evidence to show that the thumb impression of Smt. Bhonri Devi on the money order Ex. (........ illegible). The Addl District Judge has found that the thumb impression of Smt. Bhonri Devi on the money order receipt Ex. A-181. The defendant has adduced evidence to show that the thumb impression of Smt. Bhonri Devi on the money order Ex. (........ illegible). The Addl District Judge has found that the thumb impression of Smt. Bhonri Devi on the money order receipt Ex. A-181 has been attested by the plaintiff and has held that the plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that the rent for the premises was being paid by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Devi and he did not raise any objection against the said payment. It is not permissible for the plaintiff to turn and say that Smt. Bhonri Devi as not entitled to receive the rent for the premises and payment of rent by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Devi was not a valid discharge of his liability. 17. As regards the contention urged by Shri Agrawal that in view of the deed of release dated 20th May, 1967 Smt. Bhonri Devi was not entitled to receive the rent for the month of May, 167 and, that there was no valid discharge of the liability for the payment of rent for the month of May, 1967, it may be stated that no notice was given by Smt. Bhonri Devi or the plaintiff to the defendant with regard to the execution of the Deed of Release dated 20th May, 1967 and in the original plaint no reference has been made to the said deed. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendant was aware of the execution of the said deed of release dated 20th May, 1967. The defendant could legitimately proceed on the basis that Smt. Bhonri Devi who had received the rent for the earlier months was entitled to receive the rent for the month of May, 1967 also. Since Smt.Bhonri Devi accepted the money order for Rs. 240/- towards rent for the period from 3st March, 1967 to 31st May, 1967 vide money order receipt Ex. A-185 it cannot be held that the said payment by the defendant to Smt. Bhonri Davi was not a valid discharge of his liability for payment of rent upto May, 1967. 18. I will now examine the question as to whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent for the months of June to November, 1967 and has thereby incurred the liability for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. 18. I will now examine the question as to whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent for the months of June to November, 1967 and has thereby incurred the liability for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. In this context it may be mentioned that Section 13 (1) (a) postulates that the tenant should be ready and willing to pay the rent and further that the tenant should have neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. In M/s Heels Shoe Company v. Mrs. Mumtaz Begum , the Supreme Court has held that a decree for eviction could not be passed in the circumstances even though the tenant may have committed default in payment of rent if there has been no wilful default on his part. In the present case, the defendant had sent the money order for Rs. 260/- to Smt. Bhonri Devi for the rent for the months of June and July, 1967 vide postal receipt Ex. A-188 dated 23rd August, 1967 and the same was refused by Smt. Bhonri Devi as per endorsement contained on the money order coupen Ex. A-189. Thereafter, the defendant again remitted a sum of Rs. 560/- by money order to Smt. Bhonri Devi towards the rent for the period from June to December, 1967 vide postal receipt Ex. A-18 dated 30th December, 1967 and the same was accepted by Smt Bhonri Devi vide money order receipt Ex. A-187 dated 6th January, 1968. This would show that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the rent for the premises. 19. The Addl. District Judge has found that the defendant had not committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months for the reason that in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 19A of the Act, the rent for the month of November, 1967 could be paid upto 15th December, 1967 and on 9th December, 1967 (the date of the filing of the suit), it could not be said that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. Shri Agarwal has challenged the correctness of the said finding recorded by the Addl. Shri Agarwal has challenged the correctness of the said finding recorded by the Addl. District Judge and has submitted that since the tenancy for the suit premises, was a monthly tenancy and rent for the month of November, 1961 fell due on 1st December, 1967 and on the date of the filing of the suit, i.e. on 9th December, 1967, the rent for the month of November, 1967 had fallen due and the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for six months i. e. from June to November, 1967. Shri Agarwal has placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hanuman Das and others v. Sanwal Ram, 1982 RLR 916 and has submitted that the said decision has not been overruled by the Division tench of this Court in the order dated 21st August, 1989. Shri Agarwal has urged that under the terms of the rent note the tenancy of the defendant was a monthly tenancy and therefore, rent was payable on the first day of the next month under the terms of the contract of tenancy and that in the present case the rent for the month of November, 1967 was payable on the first of December, 1967 and since the said rent was not paid on 1st December, 1967, the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. In this regard Shut Agarwal has also urged that in any event the defendant did not pay the rent for the month of November, 1967 by 15th December, 1967 and he cannot take the protection of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 19A of the Act and it must be held that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967 upto 9th December, 1967, the date of the filing of the suit, and that the Addl. District Judge was not right in holding that on the date of the filing of the suit the rent for the month of November, 1967 had not lallan due and default had not been committed in respect of the same. District Judge was not right in holding that on the date of the filing of the suit the rent for the month of November, 1967 had not lallan due and default had not been committed in respect of the same. Shri Mehta, on the other hand, has urged that under the teems of the contract as contained in the rent-note (Ex 4) only the monthly nature of the tenancy has been mentioned but the contract does not specify the date with regard to the payment of rent and in the absence of any stipulation in the contract with regard to the period for payment of rent, the rent could be paid by the 15th day of the next month as prescribed in Sub- section (1) of Section 19A of the Act. Shri Mehta has submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 21st August, 1989 has disapproved the decision in Hanuman Das and others v. Sanwal Ram and has held that in cases where the contract does not fix the time for payment of rent, the rent is to be paid or tendered by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable and the tenant can be said to have committed default in payment of rent only if he has failed to pay or tender the rent by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. The submission of Shri Mehta is that since the rent for the month of November, 1967 was to be paid upto 11th December, 1967 it cannot be said that on the date of the filing of the suit, i.e. on 11th December, 1957 default had been committed in the payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. 20. The submission of Shri Mehta is that since the rent for the month of November, 1967 was to be paid upto 11th December, 1967 it cannot be said that on the date of the filing of the suit, i.e. on 11th December, 1957 default had been committed in the payment of rent for the month of November, 1967. 20. In my order dated December 5, 1988, whereby I had referred the three questions for consideration by the larger bench, I had expressed my disagreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in Hanuman Das and others v. Sanwal Ram In that order I had expressed the view that normally the rent for the premises in a case of a monthly tenancy is to be paid on the first day after the expiry of the month of the tenancy and that this rule can be altered by contract or by statute and that the contract of the tenancy may prescribe the day by which the rent may be paid and in that event the rent is payable upto that date and the rent does not become due before that date and that similarly the statute may prescribe the period within which the rent may be paid and thereupon the rent could be paid within the period prescribed and the rent would become due only after the expiry of the said period. I have also expressed the view that Sub-section (1) of Section 19A of the Act is a statutory provision which lays down that every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable and that as a result of this provision the normal rule with regard to payment of rent has been altered and in cases where the contract is silent with regard to time for payment of rent, the rent must be paid by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable and the tenant can be said to have committed default in payment of rent only if he fails to pay or tender the rent within the said time limit. On that view of the matter, I felt that the correctness of the decision in Hanuman Das and others v. Sanwal Ram required to be considered by a larger bench and the following question (No. 2) was referred by me for consideration by the larger bench : Can a tenant be said to have committed default in payment of rent on the first day after the expiry of the month even though to view of section (1) of Section 19-A of the Act, the rent can be paid upto 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable ?" While dealing with the said question the Division Bench in the order dated 31st August, 1989, has observed : The learned Single Judge was right in expressing his disagreement with the aforesaid view in Hanuman Dass v. Sanwal Ram (supra) and the learned Judge was also right in observing that the effect of Section 19A(l) is that the general rule with regard to the payment of rent in the case, where the contract does not fix the time of such payment, stands modified and in such case, the rent is to be paid or tendered by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable and a tenant can be said to have committed default in payment of rent only if he has failed to pay or tender the rent by the fifteenth day of the month next following the mouth for which it is payable." In view of the said decision of the Division Bench it must be held that in cases where the contract does not prescribe the time for payment of rent, the rent is to be paid or tendered by the month next following the month for which it is payable and a tenant can be said to have committed default in payment of rent only if he fails to pay or tender the rent by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. In cases where the time for payment also is prescribed under the contract the rent would have to be paid or tendered within the period and the tenant would be said to have committed default in payment of rent if be fails to pay or tender the rent by the day that is prescribed in the contract. 21. The question which requires consideration is as to whether the contract of tenancy in the present case prescribes the time for payment of rent. Shri Agarwal has urged that in the contract of tenancy as evidenced by the various rent notes, viz, Ex. I dated 3rd August, 191, Ex. 2 dated 1st December, 1954, Ex. 3 dated 25th January, 1958. Ex. 4 dated 11th December, 1962, the tenancy has been described as a monthly tenancy which implies that the rent was payable on the first day of the next following month. Shri Agarwal, however, has not been able to point out any term in the said rent notes providing that the rent shall be paid on the first day of the next following the month. In my view the mere fact that in the rent-note the tenancy has been described as a monthly tenancy does not, by itself, mean that the rent is to be paid on the first day of the next following month. Since there is no express provision in the rent-notes fixing the time for payment of rent this is not a case where the contract provides the time for payment of rent and, therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Section 19A(1) of the Act the rent was payable upto the 15th day of the next following month and the defendant respondent could he held to be a defaulter in payment of rent for a particular month if he had failed to pay or tender the rent by the 15th day of the next following month. In that view of the matter it must be held that the rent for the month of November, 1967 was payable upto 15th December, 1967 and the defendant can be held to be defaulter in respect of the rent for the month of November, 1967 only if he had failed to pay or tender the rent for the said month till 15th December, 1967. The defendant respondent could not, therefore, be held to be a defaulter in respect of payment of rent for the month of November, 1967, on 9th December, 1967, the date of the filing of the suit. On 9th December, 1967, the defendant respondent could be said to have committed default in the payment of rent for the months of June to October, 1967, i.e. for five months. The Addl. District Judge was, therefore, right in holding that on the date of the filing of the suit the defendant respondent had not committed default in payment of rent for six months. 22. Shri Agrawal has, however, urged that even if it be held that on the date of the filing of the suit the defendant respondent had not committed default for payment of rent for six months. the said default was committed by the defendant-respondent on 16th December, 1967 inasmuch as the defendant- respondent had failed to pay the rent for the month of November, 1967 till 15th December, 1967. The submission of Shri Agrawal is that the aforesaid sub-sequent fact with regard to the default in payment of rent for a period of six months committed by the defendant-respondent after the filing of the suit can be taken into consideration and a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent under Section 13 (1) (a) can be passed against the defendant-respondent. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Dayal v. Maji Devdiji, 1954 RLW 157 . In that case a suit had been filed for recovery of the money on the basis of two Hundies. It was found that neither of the two Hundies had become mature for payment on the date on which the plaintiff had filed the suit and the suit was, therefore, premature. The said Hundies had matured for payment during the pendency of the suit and the question for consideration was as to whether this subsequent event could be taken into account and relief could be granted to the plaintiff on that basis. The said Hundies had matured for payment during the pendency of the suit and the question for consideration was as to whether this subsequent event could be taken into account and relief could be granted to the plaintiff on that basis. This Court after noticing the general rule that the rights of the parties to a suit must be regulated with reference to their state at the date of the institution of the suit and a suit must be tried in all its stages on the date of its commencement and the relief claimed in the suit should be confined to the matters existing at that day, observed that there are exceptions to this rule and it is open to the Court, in exceptional cases, to take into consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the suit and grant relief on that basis where the relief as claimed originally in the suit may have become inappropriate by reason of altered circumstances and where this may appear necessary to shorten unnecessary litigations between the parties or tend to subserve the substantial interests of justice. In that case this Court found that the objection with regard to the suit being premature was not raised by the defendant before the trial court and it was also not raised in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court and that if the objection had been taken at the earlier stage before the trial Court it would have certainly been possible to either apply for amendment of the plaint or in any case apply for permission to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one. This Court further observed that if the suit was thrown out on the ground of its being premature the only remedy to the respondent plaintiff would be to bring a fresh suit upon a cause of action which arose sometime in 1949 and such a suit would run a great risk of being dismissed on the ground of limitation and no one could predict with safety that the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be given to the plaintiff. In these circumstances it was held that the Court can take into consideration the subsequent events to the filing of the suit and give relief to the plaintiff on that basis. In these circumstances it was held that the Court can take into consideration the subsequent events to the filing of the suit and give relief to the plaintiff on that basis. At the same time this Court has observed that no adoption has been permitted by this Court but for the very special circumstances of that case. 23. Shri Mehra has argued that the aforesaid decision in Ramdayal v. Maji Devdiji was decided in the special facts and circumstances of that case and it cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Shri Mehta has also placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 that where possession is sought for personal requirement, it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. Shri Mehta has submitted that the said observations are equally applicable to a suit of eviction filed on the ground of default in payment of rent and that the cause of action for such suit, namely, default in payment of rent for six months, must exist on the date of the institution of the suit. Shri Mehta has also urged that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff appellant in the present case in as much as he can file a fresh suit for eviction on the ground of such default. Shri Mehta has also urged that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff appellant in the present case in as much as he can file a fresh suit for eviction on the ground of such default. It was urged by Shri Mehta that in respect of suits based on the ground of default in payment of rent a special protection has been afforded to the tenant under Section 13 of the Act inasmuch as he can deposit the amount of the arrears of rent as determined by the Court and if the plaint if appellant is permitted to agitate this ground for eviction, although the said ground was not available to the plaintiff appellant on the date of the filing of the suit, the defendant respondent would be deprived of the statutory protection which would be available to him if the plaintiff is required to file a fresh suit for eviction on this ground and in these circumstances the plaintiff appellant should not be permitted to seek the eviction of the defendant respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent which is said to have been committed by the defendant-respondent after the filing of the suit. In my view the said contention urged by Shri Mehta needs careful consideration but in the present case I do not think it necessary to go into the same because I find that the rent for the months from June to December, 1967 was sent by money order for Rs. 560/- to Smt. Bhonri Devi vide postal receipt Ex. A-126 dated 30th December, 1967 and the same was accepted by Smt. Bhonri Devi vide money order receipt Ex. A-187 dated 6th January, 1987. Smt Bhonri Devi as the wife of Shiv Narain, the deceased landlord after the death of Shiv Narain in February, 1966 the rent was being paid to Smt. Bhonri Devi and she had been receiving the same. On behalf of the plaintiff appellant it is claimed that after the execution of the Deed of Relinquishment on 20th May, 1967 by Smt Bhonri Devi and her daughter Smt. Kamla Devi in favour of the plaintiff appellant the rent was payable to plaintiff appellant alone. It is not the case of the plaintiff appellant that any notice about the execution of the need of Relinquishment dated 20th May, 1967 was given to the defendant-respondent. It is not the case of the plaintiff appellant that any notice about the execution of the need of Relinquishment dated 20th May, 1967 was given to the defendant-respondent. In the original plaint also no reference was made to the said deed. Reference to the said deed was only made in the plaint when it was amended in pursuance of order dated 24th September, 1968. This would show that at the time when the defendant-respondent remitted Rs. 560/- to Smt. Bhonri Devi by money order on 30th December, 1967 he had no knowledge about the execution of the deed of relinquishment dated 20th May, 1987 (sic 1967) executed by Smt. Bhonri Devi and Smt. Kamla Devi in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. It cannot be said that the said payment by the defendant respondent to Smt. Bhonri Devi was not made in good faith under the bonafide belief that she was entitled to receive the same. The defendant respondent can invoke the protection of Section 50 of the Transfer of Property Act. In view of the said payment of the rent for the months from June to December, 1967 by the defendant-respondent to Smt. Bhonri Devi which amount was accepted by Smt. Bhonri Devi it cannot be said that the defendant respondent has committed default in payment of rent in respect of this period. In my view, therefore, the plaintiff-appellant cannot seek a decree for eviction against the defendant respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. Since I am of the view that there was no default in payment of rent I do not consider it necessary to deal with the submissions of Shri Mehta that the defendant respondent was entitled to the protection of Section 13-A of the Act. 24. I will now take up the ground of eviction based on denial of title under Section 13 (l) (f) of the Act. Section 13 (1) of) permits the eviction of a tenant if the tenant has renounced his character as such or has denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. Section 13 (1) of) permits the eviction of a tenant if the tenant has renounced his character as such or has denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. In the present case in the plaint the plaintiff has not sought eviction of the defendant on this ground and there is no averment in the plaint that defendant has renounced his character as a tenant or has denied the title of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has not waived his rights or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The plaintiff had filed a replication dated 23rd August, 1968 wherein he raised the plea that the defendant is estopped from disputing that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit shop and that he is the tenant of the plaintiff. In view of the said plea raised by the plaintiff in the replication the trial Court framed Issue No. 20 as to whether the defendant was estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiff. The Trial Court decided the said Issue No. 20 in favour of the plaintiff appellant. While dealing with Issue No. 13 relating to relief the trial Court held that the plaintiff appellant is entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant on the ground of denial of title The Addl. District Judge, on appeal, has agreed with the finding recorded by the trial Court on Issue No 20 and has held that the defendant is estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff in view of the fact that in the rent note (Ex. 3) executed by him the defendant had accepted the plaintiff as the owner of the house along with Shiv Narain. The Addl. District Judge has, however, held that since there was no averment in the plaint that defendant is liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title a decree for eviction could not be passed in favour of the plaintiff appellant on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. 25. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the said finding recorded by the Addl. 25. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the said finding recorded by the Addl. District Judge and has submitted that even though there was no specific averment in the plaint in this regard a decree for eviction on the ground of denial of title had been rightly passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff appellant and the Addl. District Judge was in error in setting aside the said decree. In this regard Shri Agrawal has drawn a distinction between the ground of eviction set out in clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act and other grounds of eviction contained in other clauses of Sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 and has submitted that in so far as clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 is concerned a decree for eviction can be passed even though there is no specific pleading in the plaint in that regard. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mool Chand & Anr. v. Ishwarlal & Anr., (1975 WLN 164) , Shri Kishan & Ors. v. Khem Chand, (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 320 of 1970 decided on January 25, 1982) , Basanta and another v. Mandir Shri Sitaramji Maharaj and others (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 206 of 1984 decided on January 8, 1986) and Noor Mohammad v. Nathu Lal (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 8 of 1982, decided on September 15, 1987). Shri Agrawal has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in (11) Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Shama Rao and others, ( AIR 1956 SC 593 ). 26. Shri S. M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the defendant, has on the other hand, supported the judgment of the Addl. District Judge and has submitted that in the absence of specific averments in the pleadings in that regard no decree for eviction could be passed against the defendants on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act can be passed and the Addl. District Judge was right in setting aside the decree passed by the Trial Court. District Judge was right in setting aside the decree passed by the Trial Court. In this regard Shri Mehta has laid emphasis on the language used in clause (f) of Sub-section (1) sub Section 13 of the Act and has submitted that in order to make out a case for eviction on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act it is necessary for the plaintiff landlord to establish (i) that the tenant his renounced his character as such or has denied the title of the landlord and (ii) the landlord has not waived his rights or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The submission of Shri Mehta is that if a plea for eviction under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act had been raised in the plaint the defendant would have answered it by saying (i) that he has not renounced his character as such or denied the title of the plaintiff or by saying (ii)that the plaintiff had waived his rights or condoned the conduct of the defendant. Submission of Shri Mehta is that by permitting no the plaintiff to raise this contention even though there is no pleading to that effect would cause serious prejudice of the defendant. In support of his aforesaid submission Shri Mehra hay placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Bhinwa Ram v. Satyanarain, Shri Mehta has also pointed out that the appellant has filed another suit for eviction from the suit premises on the ground of denial of title and the same is pending trial. 27. In view of this conflict in the decisions of the learned Single Judges of this Court referred to above I referred for consideration of the larger bench the question whether the landlord can seek eviction of tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (I) (f) of the Act in the absence of specific pleading, issue and evidence in that regard and for that purpose the ground set out in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act stands on a different footing from the other grounds of eviction contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act. The said question has been answered by the Division Bench, by its order dated August 21, 1989, and the learned Judges have held that the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act in the absence of the specific pleading and issue if the parties went to trial on that ground and when no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant. The learned Judges have also observed that although the ground set out in Section 13 (1) (f) does not stand on a different footing from the other grounds still the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act can be examined on merits in view of the aforesaid situation. 28. This matter has also been considered by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Majati Subbarao v. V.P.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by Lrs. (1989 III SVLR (C) 358) , in relation to the provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. A decree for eviction had been passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of denial of landlord's title by the tenant in the written statement filed in the shit for eviction based on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises. It was argued before the Supreme Court that in order to constitute a ground for eviction the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction and the denial of title in the course of eviction petition would not constitute a ground for eviction. The Supreme Court rejected the said conclusion and held that it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately. The Supreme Court rejected the said conclusion and held that it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately. The Supreme Court has approved the observations of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Sada Ram & Others v. Gajjan Shiama ( AIR 1970 P&H 511 ) that to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement. In this case the Supreme Court has also considered the question as to whether the failure on the part of the plaintiff to amend the plaint to incorporate the ground of denial of title would preclude him from seeking relief on that ground. The Supreme Court, while agreeing that normally this would have been so, held that in the facts of that case the trial court had framed in issue as to whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title to the schedule property including the suit premises was bona fide and that the parties went on trial on this clear issue and the appellant in that case had full knowledge about the ground alleged against him. 29. In view of the aforesaid position in law it must be held that the Addl. District Judge was not right in setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the trial Court only on the ground that in the absence of specific pleading in the plaint with regard to the denial of title, a decree on the ground of denial of title for eviction under Section 13 (1) could not be passed. 30. District Judge was not right in setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the trial Court only on the ground that in the absence of specific pleading in the plaint with regard to the denial of title, a decree on the ground of denial of title for eviction under Section 13 (1) could not be passed. 30. Shri Mehta has, however, urged that in the present case, the plaintiff appellant should not be permitted to agitate this ground for the reason that the defendant respondent was not aware that the plaintiff-appellant is seeking eviction on the ground of denial of title and no issue in that regard was framed by the trial court and the parties did not go to trial on that basis. In my view the said contention urged by Shri Mehta cannot be accepted because I find that in para 2 of the replication dated 22nd August, 1968 the plaintiff appellant had raised the plea that the defendant respondent is estopped from raising an objection that the plaintiff is not the owner of the Shop and the defendant is not his tenant and on 4th October, 1976 the trial court had framed Issue No. 20 as to whether the defendant is estopped from challenging the proprietary right of the plaintiff. The parties have adduced evidence on this issue. The said issue with regard to the defendant being estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff indicates that the defendant respondent was aware that the plaintiff had raised objection to the defendant's denying his title and the question of denial of title was a matter which was to be enquired into during the course of trial. It is, therefore, not a case where the defendant respondent was not aware of the case which he was required to meet. The defendant respondent had full knowledge that he was required to meet the case with regard to his right to deny the title of the plaintiff appellant and he must have known the consequences flowing from such denial of title. The defendant respondent had full knowledge that he was required to meet the case with regard to his right to deny the title of the plaintiff appellant and he must have known the consequences flowing from such denial of title. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that it cannot be said that the failure on the part of the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as to raise the specific plea with regard to the defendant being liable to eviction on the ground of denial of title his resulted in prejudice to the defendant respondent so as to preclude the plaintiff appellant from raising this matter. 31. The next question which arises for consideration is whether a case for eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of denial of title is made out in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this context it may be mentioned that issue No. 20 has been decided against the defendant-respondent by the trial court. The trial court has held that in the rent-notes Ex. 2 and Ex. 3 and the agreement Ex. 5, which have been admitted by the defendant-respondent, the defendant-respondent has acknowledged the plaintiff as his landlord and it is not open to him to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the premises and is estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff. The said finding on Issue No. 20 was not challenged by the defendant-respondent in his appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Shri Mehta has urged that the failure on the part of the defendant respondent to challenge the finding recorded by the trial court on Issue No. 20 before the Addl. District Judge would not preclude him from challenging the said finding before this Court because the said finding of the trial court on Issue No. 20 cannot be supported in law. In this connection the submission of Shri Mehta is that in the rent-note Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962, Shiv Narain alone has been mentioned as the landlord and the plaintiff is not mentioned as the landlord. The said rent-note is a registered instrument and it could only be modified by a registered document. The subsequent agreement Ex. In this connection the submission of Shri Mehta is that in the rent-note Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962, Shiv Narain alone has been mentioned as the landlord and the plaintiff is not mentioned as the landlord. The said rent-note is a registered instrument and it could only be modified by a registered document. The subsequent agreement Ex. 5 dated 1st September, 1965 is an unregistered document and it does not have the effect of modifying the rent note Ex.4 and, therefore, the only operative Lease Deed is the rent note Ex.4 where under Shiv Narain alone is mentioned as the landlord and the plaintiff is not mentioned as a landlord. As regards the earlier rent-notes Ex. 2 and 3 wherein the plaintiff has also been mentioned as the landlord along with Shiv Narain the submission of Shri Mehta is that at the time of execution of rent-note Ex. 2 dated 1st December, 1954, the plaintiff was a minor and further that the name of the plaintiff was included in the rent notes Ex. 2 and Ex. 3 only on the basis of a representation by Shiv Narain that he was going to adopt the plaintiff and that subsequently at the time of execution of rent-note Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962, Shiv Narain stated that he had dropped the idea of adopting the plaintiff and, therefore, the name of the plaintiff was excluded from the rent-note. Shri Mehra has also urged that the name of the plaintiff in the earlier rent-notes Exs. 2 and 3 is of no consequence in as much as the lease evidenced by those rent-notes came to be surrendered when the rent note Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962 was executed and as a result of the execution of the said rent-note there was a novation of the contract and after the execution of the said rent-note Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962, the lease is to be governed by the terms of the said rent-note whereunder Shiv Narain alone was the landlord and, therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was the landlord of the defendant at the time of the filing of the suit and the defendant is estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff. 32. 32. Shri Agrawal, on the other hand has urged that ever since 1954 when the defendant-respondent executed the rent-note Ex 2 dated 1st December, 1954 and again in 1958 when the rent-note Ex 3 dated 25th January, 1958 was executed by the defendant-respondent Shiv Narain and the plaintiff have been shown as the landlords and that in the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st December, 1965 also which was executed by the defendant-respondent, Shiv Narain and the plaintiff are described as the landlords. As regards the omission of the name of the plaintiff from the rent-note Ex, 4 dated 11th September, 1962, Shri Agrawal has urged that the case of the plaintiff-appellant is that at the time of the execution of the said rent-note has was out of Jaipur and, therefore, his name could not be mentioned in the sale document because he could not sign it. 33. While dealing with Issue No. 1, the trial court has dealt with this question and has held that on 25th January, 1958, the defendant took on rent the suit premises from the plaintiff and his father, Shiv Narain Bairathi. The trial Court did not accept the case of the defendant-respondent that the name of the plaintiff was mentioned in the rent-note Ex. 3 dated 25th January, 1958 on the basis of representation by Shiv Narain that he intended to take the plaintiff in adoption. The trial court has found that defendant-respondent had not examined any of the witnesses of the said rent-note E. 3. The said finding of the trial court has been affirmed, in appeal, by the Addl. District Judge who has held that the failure to mention the name of the plaintiff in the lease-deed Ex. 4 dated 11th September, 1962 does not mean that the status of the plaintiff as the landlord came to an end. The Addl. District Judge has referred to the explanation offered by the plaintiff in his statement as P.W. 1, about the absence of his name in the rent-note Ex. 4 i.e., since he was out of Jaipur on that date and he could not his signatures on the document, therefore, the said document was executed only between Shiv Narain and the defendant. In view of the said finding recorded by the two courts below accepting the explanation for non-mention of his name in the lease dead Ex. 4 i.e., since he was out of Jaipur on that date and he could not his signatures on the document, therefore, the said document was executed only between Shiv Narain and the defendant. In view of the said finding recorded by the two courts below accepting the explanation for non-mention of his name in the lease dead Ex. 4 not much weight can be attached to the absence of the name of the plaintiff in the rent-note Ex. 4. Keeping in view the fact that the name of the plaintiff has been mentioned as the landlord in the earlier rent-notes Exs. 2 and 3 and the subsequent agreement Ex. 5 it must be held that the plaintiff was also the landlord of the defendant-respondent. Having accepted the plaintiff-appellant as his landlord in the agreement (Ex. 5) dated 1st December, 1965 it is not open to defendant respondent to assert that the plaintiff-appellant is not his landlord. In my view, therefore, there is no legal infirmity in the findings recorded by both the courts below that the defendant-respondent is estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff-appellant. 34. The next question which needs to be considered is as to whether the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff. In this context it may be mentioned that the law is well settled that in order that the landlord may be able to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of denial of title the denial must be clear and unequivocal. (See : Mohd. Amir v. Municipal Board Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923 , Kundanmal v. Gurudutta, 1989(1) SCC 147 . 35. Shri Mehta has urged that in the present case the defendant-respondent has never renounced his character and status as a tenant and all that he has done is that he has disputed the plaintiff appellant having become the landlord of the premises after the death of Shiv Narain and that this is not a case of denial of title but only of disputing the derivative title of the plaintiff appellant and it does not entitle the plaintiff to seek eviction of the defendant-respondent. In my view, the said contention of Shri Mehta that the defendant-respondent has only disputed the derivative title of the plaintiff appellant cannot be accepted. In my view, the said contention of Shri Mehta that the defendant-respondent has only disputed the derivative title of the plaintiff appellant cannot be accepted. This is a case where the plaintiff appellant was recognised as his landlord by the defendant because here the defendant has described the plaintiff appellant as his landlord in the rent-note Ex. 2 and Ex. 3 and the agreement Ex 5 which were executed during the life time of Shiv Narain. There is, therefore, no question of derivative title after the death of Shiv Narain. In view of the said documents wherein the defendant has accepted the plaintiff as his landlord it was not open to the defendant to dispute the status of the plaintiff as his landlord and deny the title of the plaintiff. 36. I may now examine as to whether there is clear and unequivocal denial on the part of the defendant-respondent of the title of the plaintiff-appellant. I find that such clear and unequivocal denial is established from the pleadings as well as from the statement of the defendant Ratan Chand recorded during the course of trial. In para 1 of the original plaint, the plaintiff has stated that the defendant had taken on rent the suit premises from the plaintiff and his adopted father Shiv Narain Bairathi. and had executed a rent-note in favour of the plaintiff and his father. In the original written statement dated 27th February, 1968, the defendant while admitting that he had taken the suit premises on rent stated that he never took the shop on rent from the plaintiff. In para 5 of the original plaint, the plaintiff, after referring to the agreement dated 1st September, 1965, has stated that in that agreement the defendant had accepted himself as the tenant of the plaintiff and his father Shiv Narain and having taken the shop on rent on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/- and has accepted the relationship of landlord and tenant. In the written statement dated 27th February, 1968, the defendant has denied the averments contained in para 5 of the plaint. In para 10 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that the father of the plaintiff died on 19th February, 1966 and thereafter demand for payment of rent @ Rs. 100/- was made several times by the plaintiff but the defendant did not pay the same. In para 10 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that the father of the plaintiff died on 19th February, 1966 and thereafter demand for payment of rent @ Rs. 100/- was made several times by the plaintiff but the defendant did not pay the same. In his written statement dated 27th February, 1968 in reply to the said averments the defendant admitted that Shiv Narain Bairathi, the owner of the shop. died on 19th February, 1966 but he did not admit the rest of the contents. He asserted that he had paid the rent upto December, 1967 to Smt. Bhonri Devi, widow of Shiv Narain Bairathi and also stated that the plaintiff has no right to demand the rent. In para 14 of the plaint the plaintiff had stated that since the defendant had committed 23 defaults in payment of rent and as more than 6 defaults had been committed the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of rent bona fide and reasonable personal necessity, violation of the terms of the lease deed and sub-letting a portion of the premises in his written statement dated 27th February, 1988 in reply to the said averments, the defendant has denied the same and has claimed that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek eviction of the shop and that he has no right to file the suit. 37. In his statement dated 28th August, 1978 the defendant respondent Ratan Chand as D.W. 1 has stated : 1958 esa oknh ds gd esa yht&MhM fy[ks tkus ds ckotwn eSa oknh dk VkbZVy fMukbZ djrk gwa D;ksafd f'koukjk;.k ds dgus ls oknh dk uke fy[kk FkkA 38. From the pleadings referred to above and the statement of the defendant-respondent Ratan Chand as D W.1 the conclusion is inescapable that the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff in clear and unequivocal terms. This means that although defendant has not induced his character as a tenant he has denied the title of the plaintiff whom he had accepted as his landlord earlier. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to seek eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. 39. This means that although defendant has not induced his character as a tenant he has denied the title of the plaintiff whom he had accepted as his landlord earlier. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to seek eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. 39. I may now take up the ether grounds of eviction on which both the courts have concurrently found against the plaintiff, viz., subletting and bonafide personal necessity. 40. As regards subletting the case of the appellant is two-fold. One is that the defendant had sub-let the part of the premises to Rajasthan Photographers Association and the other is that he had sub-let the part of the premises to Kishan Pen Wala. With regard to the Rajasthan Photographers Association the case of the defendant is that he is the Honorary Secretary of the said association and in that capacity he had put a signboard of the Rajasthan Photographers Association on the suit premises. The trial court has found that merely placing of the sign board of Rajasthan Photographers Association does not constitute sub-tenancy. The Addl. District Judge hay affirmed the said finding of the trial court. As regard, the Kishan Pen Wala, the defendant produced a letter (Ex. A-2) dated 7th December. 1971 addressed by the plaintiff to the defendant wherein it is stated that the Kishan Pen Wala had approached him (plaintiff) and that he has no objection to has (Kishan Pen Wala) sitting. The defendant has examined Kishan Pen Wala as D.W. 20 and he has prove the said document and the signatures of the plaintiff on the same The defendant has also examined Krishancharan D.W. 23, handwriting expert, to prove the signatures of the plaintiff on the said document. Both the courts below have accepted the testimony of Kishan Pen Wala D.W 20 and have found that the letter (Ex. A-2) was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant and on that basis they have held that Kishan Pen Wala was sitting on a part of the premises with the consent of the plaintiff and it could not be said that the defendant had sublet the part of the premises without the consent of the plaintiff. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has sought to challenge the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below in this regard. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has sought to challenge the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below in this regard. I have carefully considered the findings recorded by both the courts below and I do not find any ground for interference with the same in second appeal. 41. The only other ground left is of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff appellant. The case of the appellant, as set out in the plaint, is that he carries on the profession of Vaidya in a rented shop in Gopal-ji- ka-Rasta and that the said premises are insufficient for his needs and that he requires the suit premises for the purpose of properly carrying on his profession as Vaidya. The trial court has found that the plaintiff is permanently employed in the Rajasthan University and that he only sits in the shop at Gopalji ka Rasta for carrying on the profession of Vaidya on part-time basis. The trial Court has also found that the plaintiff has not produced any material to show the number of of patients who are visiting his shop and as to how the existing premises are not sufficient for the plaintiff to carry on his profession as Vaidya. Before the trial court it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that he would also sell medicines and that the said premises are more suitable for that purpose. The trial court has held that such plea has not been raised by the plaintiff in the plaint and the only need which has been set up in the plaint is that the plaintiff wants to carry on his profession as Vaidya. After taking into consideration the evidence on record the Trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he requires the suit premises accordingly bona fide for his personal necessity. The Trial Court also examined the question of comparative hardship and has found that while the plaintiff is permanently employed in the University of Rajasthan from where he is getting sufficient income the defendant has no other place to carry on his business and that the hardship suffered by the defendant would be greater than the plaintiff. The Trial Court also examined the question of comparative hardship and has found that while the plaintiff is permanently employed in the University of Rajasthan from where he is getting sufficient income the defendant has no other place to carry on his business and that the hardship suffered by the defendant would be greater than the plaintiff. On appeal the Additional District Judge has affirmed the said finding recorded by the trial court I have perused the judgments of both the courts below and I find no ground for interference in second appeal with the said concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below. 42. Since I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to seek eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act, the appeal must succeed and the judgment and decree of the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur City. Jaipur dated 25th January, 1982 must be set aside and a decree for eviction should be passed against the defendant-respondent and in favour of the plaintiff-appellant for eviction of the defendant- respondent of the suit premises on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the defendant-respondent has been in possession of the suit premises since 1951, I consider it reasonable to give six months time to the defendant-respondent to seek alternative accommodation. 43. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree dated 25th January, 1982 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur is set aside and a decree for eviction from the suit premises is passed against the defendant respondent and in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. The defendant-respondent is, however, granted six months time to vacate the suit premises. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal Allowed. *******