JUDGMENT Giridhar Gopal, Member - This second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellants, Itarbasi Devi and others, against the judgment and decree pronounced by the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, dated 18-2-1980 upholding the judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated 2-6-1978 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants. 2. On the death of Itarbasi, plaintiff-appellant, substitution was moved on 10-5-1985. That day order-sheet shows that Sri S.B. Verma, counsel for the plaintiff-appellants and Sri D.P. Agarwal, counsel for the defendant-respondents were present. This court had ordered on 9-8-1985 "Heard. Substitution is within time. Allowed." After that the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents moved an application on 16-2-1989 that Smt. Itarbasi had died on 11-2-1984 and the date given by the plaintiff-appellant as 11-3-1985 was wrong. On 9-8-1985 when the order allowing the substitution was passed, it was further clarified that the parties were heard, and the substitution was found within time. The information given by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent subsequently, now cannot be utilised for recalling that order. At best if the death had taken place earlier ; under the present circumstances, the delay should be taken to have been condoned and the substitution should stand allowed. Let the case be heard on merit. 3. On merit, in this second appeal the main point argued before me is that there were two sale deeds executed by the recorded tenure-holder, Sheorati. One was executed on 31-1-1909 in favour of Satya Narain Singh and others which was registered on 27-11-1969 and they later-on executed sale deed in favour of Itarbasi Devi and others, plaintiff-appellants. The other sale deed was get executed from Sheorati in favour of defendant-respondents on 5-11-1969 and it was registered on the same day. The main issue thus is that which sale deed will take priority for deciding the title. 4. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants argued that with reference to a sale deed executed in connection with immoveable property, what is important is the date of execution and not the date of registration and to support his argument he referred to 1984 R.D. 213 in which it has been held that the deed executed earlier though registered later, will have priority, and the executant, actually has nothing to execute, after having executed a sale deed on an earlier date. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondents, in reply, referred to section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 47 of the Registration Act and pressed that in a case of immoveable property for a value"over Rs. 100/-, registration is necessary and alter registration the title passes to the vendees, and since in this case the registration of the sale deed in favour of the defendant-respondents was done on 5-11-1969 i.e. on the date prior to 27-11-1969 on which date, sale deed in favour of sellers of the plaintiff-appellants was done, as such the sale deed registered earlier has rightly been accepted as superior by the trial court and the learned Addl. Commissioner. Alternatively he also argued that it was alleged that the sale deed executed in favour of Satya Narain and others was fictitious. It has not been considered and decided by the learned Addl. Commissioner and as such his judgment should be remanded for further consideration. While replying to the second argument, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant argued that there is a clear and categorical finding of the learned trial court, who after examining both the sale deeds, found that none of the sale deeds was fictitious and then decided the case. 5. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The learned trial court and the learned Addl. Commissioner both have held the view that the sale deed, though executed earlier, but registered later, will not claim priority the other sale deed which was registered earlier and they attached mere importance to the date of registration than the date of execution. On this salient point 1 would like to be guided by the ruling reported in 1984 R.D. page 213 in which it has been decided that, what is important is the date of execution, if the question of two sale deeds comes up for consideration. What is necessary is that the sale deed should have been registered as per the provisions of law. The date of registration will not be deciding factor for giving priority to the sale deed but that point should be decided keeping in view the date of execution. In this case the sale deed executed in favour of the sellors of the plaintiff-appellants was of 3-11-1969 while the sale deed in favour of defendant-respondents was executed on 5-11-1969. The date of registration will not be deciding factor for giving priority to the sale deed but that point should be decided keeping in view the date of execution. In this case the sale deed executed in favour of the sellors of the plaintiff-appellants was of 3-11-1969 while the sale deed in favour of defendant-respondents was executed on 5-11-1969. In the light of the opinion expressed above, the title should be decided in the light of the sale deed executed earlier. 6. As for the second point about the fictitious nature of the sale deed I have found that the learned trial court has considered both the sale deeds in detail and found both as genuine and not fictitious. This finding of fact though not discussed in the judgment of the learned Addl. Commissioner is worthy of acceptance. In the light of the above observations I allow the second appeal, set aside the judgment and decrees of the courts below and decree the suit of the plaintiff-appellants.