Ramjeevani v. Narati Bai — 1989 DIGILAW 996 (RAJ)

Honble M.C. JAIN, Actg. C.J.—The question which has been referred for consideration by the learned Single Judge is as to whether after the death of the tenant his widow and children are entitled to retain the premises for the purpose of carrying on the business which is being carried on by the tenant in the said premises? This question involves the interpretation of the definition of the expression "tenant" as contained in Section 3 (vii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The facts, in brief, are that Ram Swaroop had taken a shop on rent at Rs. 16/-per month from Smt. Naroti Bai, respondent herein. The respondent filed a suit for eviction against Ram Swaroop on the ground of default in payment of rent and bonafide and reasonable personal necessity of premises for the use or occupation of the husband and son of the respondent. The said suit was decreed by the Additional Munsiff, Ajmer by his judgment and decree dated 16.12.1981. Ram Swaroop filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree of the Munsiff in the Court of District Judge, Ajmer and the said appeal was transferred for disposal to the Additional District Judge, No. 1, Ajmer. During the pendency of the appeal Ram Swaroop died and his legal heirs, namely, his wife-Smt. Ramjeevani, his adopted son Radhey Shyam Pandit and Yogesh Pandit, the son of Radhey Shyam Pandit, filed an application under Order 22 Rule 3 C.P.C. for being brought on the record in the place of deceased appellant Ram Swaroop. The said application was opposed by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that the applications did not fall within the ambit of the definition of tenant as contained in Sec. (3) (vii) of the Act. The Additional District Judge by his order dated 13.12.1988, dismissed the said application for the reason that the applicants could not be regarded as tenants under section 3 (viii) of the Act and they could not invoke the protection of the provisions of the Act. The Additional District Judge, therefore, held that the appeal had abated. Feeling aggrived by the said order dated 13.12.1988 passed by the Addl. District Judge legal representatives of Ram Swaroop have filed this revision in this Court. The Additional District Judge, therefore, held that the appeal had abated. Feeling aggrived by the said order dated 13.12.1988 passed by the Addl. District Judge legal representatives of Ram Swaroop have filed this revision in this Court. The said revision was heard by a learned Single Judge, who by his order dated 23.08.1989, has referred the following question for consideration by the Full Bench : "(1) Whether after the death of the tenant, his widow and children have right to survive by continuing the business which has been conducted by the husband/father ? (2) Whether the meaning assigned by this Court to the definition of tenant should be adopted in the future also?" The learned Single Judge felt that these questions arise for consideration in a number of cases pending in this Court as well as in the subordinate courts and would also arise in future and, therefore, be felt that the same may be considered by a Full Bench of this Court. 3. We have heard Shri B.P. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.M. Lodha, the learned counsel for the respondent. 4. Before we deal with the submissions urged by the learned counsel, we may take note of the background in which the definition of the expression tenant as contained in Section 3 (vii) of the Act came to be enacted. 5. In the original enactment the expression tenant was defined in section 3 (vii) in the following terms: "3 (vii) "tenant" means the person by whom the rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any premises and includes any person holding or occupying the premises as a sub-tenant. By section 2 (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1952 the following words were added in the said definition or any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of the Act." 6. In Anand Nivas Private Ltd. Vs. By section 2 (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1952 the following words were added in the said definition or any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of the Act." 6. In Anand Nivas Private Ltd. Vs. Anaddji Kalyanjis Pedhi (1) the Supreme Court while, dealing with the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotels & Lodging Houses Rates Control Act 1947,dealt with the question whether a person who remains in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of tenancy commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant has any estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. The Supreme Court held that such a person is not a tenant at all and he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. he has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal and it is not capable of being transferred or assigned and it devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. 7. In J.C. Chatterjee Vs. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon (2), the Supreme court while dealing with the provisions of the Act, considered the definition of expression "tenant" as contained in Section 3 (vii) of the Act. In that case the landlord filed the suit against the tenant, B N. Chatterji for eviction on the ground of bonafide personal necessity. The said suit was decreed by the trial court, but on appeal, it was dismissed by the District Judge. During the pendency of the Second Appeal of the plaintiff in this Court the tenant died and his widow and children were brought on record as legal representatives. This Court held that the protection granted by Section 13 of the Act was not available to the heirs of the tenant and therefore, it was not necessary to go into the question of bonafide and reasonable personal necessity of the land lord and the suit of the landlord was decreed. This Court held that the protection granted by Section 13 of the Act was not available to the heirs of the tenant and therefore, it was not necessary to go into the question of bonafide and reasonable personal necessity of the land lord and the suit of the landlord was decreed. The Supreme Court affirmed the said judgment of this Court and following the earlier decision in Anand Nivas Vs. Anandji Kalyanjis case (supra) it was held that : "When B N. Chatterji died, he was only a statutory tenant with a personal right to remain in possession till eviction under the provisions of the Act, and the heirs were incapable of inheriting any estate or interest in the original tenancy. It was also not shown to us that they fell within any other part of the definition of tenant reproduced above, Therefore, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased B.N. Chatterji could not in their own right claim to be tenant; within the meaning of the Act". 8. The effect of the aforesaid decision was that heirs and legal represen- tatives of the statutory tenant (as commonly called) after his death were completely deprived of the protection of the provisions of the Act after the death of the statutory tenant. 8. The effect of the aforesaid decision was that heirs and legal represen- tatives of the statutory tenant (as commonly called) after his death were completely deprived of the protection of the provisions of the Act after the death of the statutory tenant. With a view to remedy this situation and to give protection to the heirs and legal representatives of the statutory tenant after his death the Legislature intervened and enacted the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, whereby the definition of expression tenant" contained in clause (vii) of Section 3 of the Act was amended and clause (vis) was substituted by the following clause: "(vii) "tenant" means- (a) the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is, or, but for a contract express or implied would be payable for any premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act; and (b) in the event of death of the person as is referred to in sub-clause (a), his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him who had been, in the case of premises leased out for residential purposes, ordinarily residing and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes. Ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family upto his death." 9. After the aforesaid amendment had been introduced in the Act in 1976, the Supreme Court in Damadi Lal Vs. Parash Ram (3) while dealing with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, has referred to the earlier decisions in Anand Nivas Vs. Anandji Kalyanji (supra) and J.C. Chatterjee Vs. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon (supra) and then held: "The concept of a statutory tenant having no estate or property in the premises which he occupies is derived from the provisions of the English Rent Acts. But it is not dear how it can be assumed that the position is the same in this country without any reference to the provisions of the relevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in contract. But it is not dear how it can be assumed that the position is the same in this country without any reference to the provisions of the relevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in contract. There is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject-matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation. It is not possible to claim that the sanctity of contract cannot be touched by legislation." 10. After referring to the definition of "tenant" contained in section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the learned Judges observed that the said definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy, a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists and that the incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must, therefore, be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyd a contrary intention. 11. In V. Dhanpal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Amma (4) a Special Bench of seven Honble Judges of the Supreme Court was considering the question whether a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is required to be given in view of the fact that under the State Rent Acts protection against eviction has been afforded to the tenant. The Supreme Court has held that such a notice is not necessary in respect of the premises to which the Rent Act applied and in that context it was observed that: "Without detaining ourselves on this aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our opinion, it will suffice to say that the various State Rent Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom of contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. In spite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc. in accordance with the law". 12. The matter has been considered by the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Deve Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar (5). In that case the judgment of the Court was delivered by A.N. Sen J. for himself, Chandra-chud C.J. and Fazal Ali and Eradi JJ. Bhagwati J. gave a separate concurring judgment. Sen J. in his majority judgments, has referred to the decisions in Damadilals case (supra) and Dhanpal Chettiars case (supra) and has approved the observations in Damadi Lals case (supra) that it cannot be assumed that with the determination of the tenancy, the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve the status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in occupation and it is not possible to claim that the sanctity of the contract cannot be touched by legislation. 13. In Gian Devis case (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down as under: "Accordingly, we hold that if the Rent Act in question defines a tenant in substance to mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed, the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. As the protection afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant after determination of the tenancy and to his heirs on the death of such tenant is a creation of the Act for the benefit of the tenants. It is open to the Legislature which provides for such protection to make appropriate provisions in the Act with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and protection to be enjoyed. If the Legislature makes any provision in the Act limiting or restricting the benefit and the nature of the protection to be enjoyed in a specified manner by any particular class of heirs of the deceased tenant on any condition laid down being fulfilled, the benefit of the protection has necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of the condition in the manner and to the extent stipulated in the Act. The Legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants and to afford protection against eviction is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant. Such appropriate provision may be made by the Legislature both with regard to the residential tenancy and commercial tenancy. It is, however, entirely for the Legislature to decide whether the Legislature will make such provision or not. In the absence of any provision regulating the right of inheritance, and the manner and extent thereof and in the absence of any condition being stipulated with regard to the devolution of tenancy rights on the heirs on the death of the tenant, the devolution of tenancy rights must necessarily be in accordance with the ordinary law of succession." 14. In that case the Supreme Court has construed the definition of expression "tenant" contained in section 2(0 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In that case the Supreme Court has construed the definition of expression "tenant" contained in section 2(0 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In that definition special provision with regard to protection to the heirs of the deceased tenant had been made in respect of residential premises but no such provision was made in respect of commercial premises. It was urged on behalf of the landlords that since the legislature had made specific provision giving protection to the heirs of the deceased tenant in respect of the residential premises only and not with regard to the heirs of the statutory tenant in respect of commercial premises, it would mean that the heirs of the statutory tenants of commercial premises do not enjoy any protection under the Act The Supreme Court rejected the said contention and held that in the absence of any provision the heritable interest of the statutory tenant would devolve on ail the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death and the heris of such tenant would in law step into his position. In that context the Supreme Court has observed as under : "A tenant of any commercial premises has necessarily to use the premises for business purposes. Business carried on by a tenant of any commercial premises may be and often is, his only occupation and the source of livelihood of the tenant and his family. Out of the income earned by the tenant from his business in the commercial premises, the tenant maintains himself and his family, and the tenant, if he is residing in a tenanted house, may also be paying his rent out of the said income. Even if a tenant is evicted from his residential premises, he may with the earnings out of the business be in a position to arrange for some other accommodation for his residence with his family. When, however, a tenant is thrown out of the commercial premises, his business which enable him to maintain himself and his family comes to a standstill. It is common knowledge that it is much more difficult to find suitable business premises than to find suitable premises for residence. It is no secret that for securing commercial accommodation, large sums of money by way of salami, even though not legally payable, may have to be paid and rents of commercial premises are usually very high. It is common knowledge that it is much more difficult to find suitable business premises than to find suitable premises for residence. It is no secret that for securing commercial accommodation, large sums of money by way of salami, even though not legally payable, may have to be paid and rents of commercial premises are usually very high. Besides, a business which has been carried on for years at a particular place has its own goodwill and other distinct advantages. The death of the person who happens to be the tenant of the commercial premises and who was running the business out of the income of which the family used to be maintained, is itself a great loss to the members of the family to whom the death, naturally, comes as a great blow. Usually, on the death of the person who runs the business and maintains his family out of the income of the business, the other members of the family who suffer the bereavement have necessarily to carry on the business for the maintenance and support of the family. A running business is indeed a very valuable asset and often a great source of comfort to the family as the business keeps the family going. So long as the contractual tenancy of a tenant who carries on the business continues, there can be no question of the heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheriting the tenancy but also inheriting the business and they are entitled to run and enjoy the same. We have earlier held that mere termina-tion of the contractual tenancy does not bring about any change in the status of the tenant and the tenant by virtue of the definition of the tenant in the Act and the other Rent Acts continues to enjoy the same status and position unless there be any provisions in the Rent Acts which indicate to the contrary. The mere fact that in the Act no provisions has been made with regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies of the death of the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as had been done in the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises, does not indicate that the Legislature intends that the heirs of the tenants of commer-cial premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however, flourishing it may be, and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the entire family of a tenant depending upon the business carried on by the tenant will be completely stranded and the business carried on for years in the premises which had been let out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate, as they are afforded no protection under the Act." 15. We may now consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 16. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that in the definition of the expression "tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act, the Legislature has divided the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant into two categories. We may now consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 16. Shri Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that in the definition of the expression "tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act, the Legislature has divided the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant into two categories. In the first category fail the surviving spouse, son and daughter of the deceased tenant and these heirs are entitled to the same protection as was enjoyed by the deceased statutory tenant In the secod category fall other heirs in occordance with the personal law applicable to the deceased statutory tenant and it has been urged that such an heir can avail the protection of the provisions of the Act only if, in the case of premises leased out for residential purposes, he had been ordinarily residing in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased tenant upto his death and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, if such heir was ordinarily carring on business with the deceased tenant in the premises as a member of his family upto his death. The submission of Shri Agrawal is that the latter part of clause (b) after the words "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" qualify the words and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" only and they do not apply to "surviving spouse, son, daughter". The submission of Shri Agrawal is that the said construction is grammetically sound and is also in consonance with the object underlying the amendment that was introduced in the definition of the expression tenant by the Amending Act of 1976, namely, to give p otection to the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant. The submission of Shri Agrawal is that the said construction is grammetically sound and is also in consonance with the object underlying the amendment that was introduced in the definition of the expression tenant by the Amending Act of 1976, namely, to give p otection to the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant. Sh,<i Agrawal has urged that if the latter part of clause (b) after the words "and other heir, in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" are made applicable to "surviving spouse, son, daughter", the result would be that in a large number of cases the surviving spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant would be deprived of the protection of the Act which would have been otherwise available to them if the Legislature had not intervened by amending the definition of the expression tenant in as much as there may be many cases where the statutory tenant carrying on business in the premises leased out to him has died leaving behind his widow or minor children who were not carrying on business with him at the time of the death in the premises. The submission of Shri Agrawal is that this would mean that as a result of the amendment introduced in the definition of the expression "tenant" by the Amendment Act of 1976 the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant would be in a worse position than they would have been if such an amendment has not been introduced at all. 17. Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for plaintiff-non-petitioner, on the other hand, has urged that the latter part of clause (b) after the words "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" also apply to "surviving spouse, son, daughter" and the condition laid down therein is that the said heirs should ordinarily be residing in the premises with the deceased statutory tenant as members of his family upto his death if the premises are leased out for residential purposes and they should ordinarily be carrying on business with him in such premises as members of his family upto his death, if the premises are leased out for commercial or business purposes, is also applicable to "surviving spouse, son. daughter" in the same manner as it is applicable to other heirs in accordance with the personal law applicable to deceased tenant. daughter" in the same manner as it is applicable to other heirs in accordance with the personal law applicable to deceased tenant. Shri Lodha has urged that the intention of the Legislature in enacting the definition of tenant in Sub-Section (vii) of Sec. 3 of the Act by the Amendment Act of 1976 is to give a limited protection to the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant and the said protection has been afforded only to the heirs who were having nexus with the premises leased out to the deceased tenant. The submission of Shri Lodha is that if clause (b) of the definition of tenant is construed in the manner suggested by Shri Agrawal, it would mean that spouse, son and daughter having no connection whatsoever with the leased premises and who are not ordinarily residing with the deceased statutory tenant or are not ordinarily carrying on business with him would be entitled to invoke the protection of the Act which would not be reasonable and that the Legislature in amending sub-sec.(vii) of Sec. 3 of the Act has deliberately confined the scope of such protection to heirs who were ordinarily residing in the premises with the deceased statutory tenant as members of his family upto his death in respect of premises leased out for residential purposes and heirs who were ordinarily carrying on business in the premises with the deceased statutory tenant as members of his. family upto his death in respect of the premises leased out for commercial or business purpose. Shri Lodha has pointed out that in a number of decisions this Court has construed clause (b) of sub-sec. (vii) of sec. 3 of the Act in the manner suggested by him and the latter part of the said clause after words "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" have been held applicable to surviving spouse, son and daughter also. In this connection Shri Lodha has referred to the decisions of this Couit in Gordhan Lal vs. Panna Lal (6), Shaym Lal vs. Hira Lal (7), Ram Prasad vs. Tara Chand (8), Mohammad Hussain Vs. Abdul Rahim (deceased through his L. Rs. Abdul Karim (9) and Chandra Bhan vs. Madan Lal (10). 18. In this connection Shri Lodha has referred to the decisions of this Couit in Gordhan Lal vs. Panna Lal (6), Shaym Lal vs. Hira Lal (7), Ram Prasad vs. Tara Chand (8), Mohammad Hussain Vs. Abdul Rahim (deceased through his L. Rs. Abdul Karim (9) and Chandra Bhan vs. Madan Lal (10). 18. The aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel turn on the interpretation of clause (b) of the definition of the expression "tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act. As per the contention of Shri B.P. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, the said clause should be read as follows: "tenant" means in the event of the death of the person as is referred to in sub-clause (a) (i) his surviving spouse, son and daughter, and (ii) other heir in accordance with personal law applicable to him who had been in the case of the premises leased out for residential purposes, ordinarily residing and in the case of the premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family upto his death." 19. According to the interpretation placed by Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners the said clause should be read as follows: "tenant" means in the event of the death of his heir as is referred in sub-clause (a) his surviving spouse, son, daughter, and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him who had been in the case of premises leased out for residential purposes, ordinarily residing and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family to his death". 20. In the matter of interpretation of statutes the general principle called as the golden rule of construction, is that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word has to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. P. 84-85). According to the rules of grammer qualifying words are confined in their application to the subject which immediately precedes them. In Tirawaddy Flotilla Company Vs. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. P. 84-85). According to the rules of grammer qualifying words are confined in their application to the subject which immediately precedes them. In Tirawaddy Flotilla Company Vs. Bugwandas (11), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was considering the following clause in Section (1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:- "But nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any Statute, Act or Regulation not hereby expressly repealed nor any usage or custom of trade, nor any incident of any contract not inconsistent with the provision of this Act." The Privy Council has observed as under: "Their Lordships may observe in passing, and indeed it was admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the words "not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act "are not to be connected with the clause nor any usage or custom of trade. Both the reason of the thing and the grammatical construction of the sentence-if such a sentence is to be tried by any rules of grammer-seem to require that the application of those words should be confined to the subject which immediately precedes them." 21. In Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs. Arabinda Bose (12), the Supreme Court was construing Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, which provides as under: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 or in any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High Court every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right of practice in any High Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle any person merely by reason of his being an Advocate of the Supreme Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practise therein after ceasing to hold office as such Judge." The question for consideration in that case was whether adjectival clause "regulating the conditions etc. qualify the words "Indian Bar Councils Act." Sastri C.J., speaking for the majority, held that the adjectival clause "regulating the conditions etc." does not qualify the words "Indian Bar Councils Act" and that it is grammatical more correct to take the adjectival clause as qualifying law." 22. Applying the rules of grammer it must therefore be held that the qualifying words in the latter part of clause (b) after the words "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" apply only to "any other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him," and they do not apply to earlier part, namely, "his surviving spouse, son, daughter". 23. In this context, it may also be mentioned that comma has been used at various places in clause (b) but there is no comma after the expression "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" and before the words "who had been". Insertion of a comma at this place would have indicated that the latter part of clause (b) "who had been-upto his death applies not only to any other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him "but also to" his surviving spouse, son, daughter". The absence of the comma would mean that the latter part of clause (b) only applies to "any other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him" and does not apply to" surviving spouse, son, daughter". In this regard it may be mentioned that in England, earlier, there was no punctuation in parliamentary statutes but since 1850 punctuation is found in statutes therein and a view has been expressed that punctuation, when it occurs, has to be regarded to some extent atleast as contemporanea expositio. (See Craies on Statute Law 7th Edn. Page 198). 24. In Aswini Kumar Vs. Arvind Boses case (supra) Mukharjee J. has referred to these observations in "Craies On Statute Law". He has also referred to the statement of law in Crawford on Statutory Construction at Page 343 that "when a Statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation". 25. In Mohd. Shabbir Vs. He has also referred to the statement of law in Crawford on Statutory Construction at Page 343 that "when a Statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation". 25. In Mohd. Shabbir Vs. State of Maharashtra (13), the Supreme Court was construing the provisions of Section 27 of the Drugs & Cosmatics Act, 1940, which provided as under : "Whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes— (a) any drug— (i) deemed to be misbranded under clause (a), Clause (b), Clause (c), Clause (d), Clause (f) or Clause (g) of S. 17 or adulterated under Section 17-B; or (ii) without a valid licence as required under Clause (c) of Section 18 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extent to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; Provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year." 26. The question was whether the expression "stocks and exhibits for sale" is one indivisible whole implying that the words "for sale" would apply to the expression stocks also or the word "for sale" is limited in its application to "exhibits" only. The Supreme Court held that the expression "stocks or exhibits for sale "is one indivisible whole and in that context laid emphasis on the absence of comma after the word "stocks". The Supreme Court has observed as under: "The words used in S. 27 namely, "Manufacture for sale, sells" have a comma after each clause but there is no comma after the clause "stocks or exhibits for sale". Thus the section postulates three separate categories of cases and no other. (1) Manufacture for sale (2), actual sale: (3) stocking or exhibiting for sale or distribution of any drugs. The absence of any comma after the words "stocks" clearly indicates that the clause "stocks or exhibits for sale" is one indivisible whole and it contemplates not merely stocking the drugs but stocking the drugs for the purpose of sale and unless the drugs for the purposes of sale and unless ail the ingredients of this category are satisfied S. 27 of the Act would not be attracted." 27. In our opinion, therefore, it would be in consonance with the grammatical construction to read clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act, in the manner as suggested by Shri Agrawal and to construe the latter part of the said clause, i.e., the words "who had been------upto his death" being confined in application to "and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him "and not qualifying the expression "his surviving spouse, son, daughter". 28. This construction is also in consonance with the object and the intent of the Legislature in enacting the amended definition of "tenant" as contained in Section 3 (vii) of the Act by the Amendment Act of 1976. The intention of the Legislature in making the said amendment was to extend the protection of the beneficial provisions of the Act to the heirs of the so-called statutory tenants which protection was not available to them at that time, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chand Chatterjee Vs. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon (supra), The construction placed by us on clause (b) of the said definition advances the object underlying the said amendment in as much as it extends the protection to the widows and minor children of the deceased statutory tenants who would otherwise be deprived of their only source of livelihood. The considerations which weighed with the Supreme Court in construing the provisions of Section 2 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in respect of rights of heirs of the deceased statutory tenants of commercial premises are equally applicable in the matter of construction of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act. If the construction suggested by Shri Lodha is adopted the widow and the minor children of the deceased statutory tenant of commercial premises who were not ordinarily carrying on business with him would be deprived of the protection of the Act. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature to deny the protection of the Act to such heirs. It may be that the construction placed by us on the provisions of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in sub-sec. (vii) of sec. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature to deny the protection of the Act to such heirs. It may be that the construction placed by us on the provisions of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in sub-sec. (vii) of sec. 3 of the Act may result in the protection of the Act being extended to the spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant who may not be living with the deceased tenant in the premises let out for residential purposes and who may not be ordinarily carrying on business with him in the premises let out for commercial and business purposes and such heirs may not reasonably require the premises. But that is a matter which will be considered by the Court while adjudicating on the comparative needs of the landlord and the tenant while applying the provisions of the Act and therefore the hardship that would be caused to the landlord by extending the protection of the Act to the spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant would not be so great as the hardship that would be suffered by the widow and minor children of the deceased statutory tenant on account of denial of the protection of the Act because they would not be able to fulfil the condition for getting such protection provided in the latter part of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section i(vii) of section 3 of the Act. 29. It has also been urged by Shri Lodha that apart from the spouse, son and daughter there may be other heirs like father, mother, daughter-in-law of the deceased statutory tenant who may also need the same protection as spouse, son, daughter and that on the basis of the construction placed by us the said protection would be confined to spouse, son and daughter only. It may be that in some cases the father, mother and daughter-in-law of the deceased statutory tenant might suffer hardship on account of the death of the statutory tenant and they may not be able to avail the protection of the Act if they do not fulfil the conditions for grant of protection of the Act prescribed in the latter part of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom has, however, considered it fit to specify the spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant for such protection and the fact that the other heirs who also need such protection have not been afforded the said protection would not mean that the construction placed by us on clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" which would extend the necessary protection to spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant should not be adopted. 30. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that clause (b) of the definition of tenant contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act means that the protection of the Act is available to the spouse, son and daughter of the deceased statutory tenant and the said heirs are not required to fulfil the further condition laid down in the latter part of the said clause viz. that in case of premises leased out for residential purposes they must have been ordinarily residing with the deceased statutory tenant in said premises upto his death and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes they must have been ordinarily carrying on business with the deceased statutory tenant in such premises upto his death. 31. The other heirs of the deceased statutory tenant according to his personal law, in order to avail the protection of the Act will, however, have to satisfy the said conditions laid down in the latter part of clause (b) of the defi-nition of tenant. The decisions of the learned Judges of this Court, referred to above, on which reliance was placed by Shri Lodha, wherein it has been held that the latter part of clause (b) of the definition "tenant" contained in Sub-sec, (vii) of sec. 3 of the Act also qualifies the expression "his surviving spouse, son, daughter" do not, in our opinion, correctly interpret the provisions of clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act and for the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to endorse the view taken in those decisions. 32. Arguments were addressed before us on the meaning of the phrase "ordinarily residing" and "ordinarily carrying on business" contained in clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act. 32. Arguments were addressed before us on the meaning of the phrase "ordinarily residing" and "ordinarily carrying on business" contained in clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act. In view of the construction placed by us on the said clause (b), we do not consider it necessary to go into that question. 33. In the result, the questions referred for our opinion are answered as under: (1) Under clause (b) of the definition of "tenant" contained in Sub-section (vii) of section 3 of the Act, surviving spouse, son, daughter of the deceased tenant is entitled to the protection of the Act without his being required to fulfil the conditions laid down in the latter part of clause (b) and, therefore, the widow and children of the deceased tenant can avail the protection of the Act, in relation to the premises let out for business and commercial purposes and they can carry on the business of the husband or father in the said premises. (2) The decisions of this Court construing clause (b) of the definition of tenant" contained in Sub-Section (vii) of Section 3 of the Act wherein it has been held that the surviving spouse, son, daughter can avail the protection of the Act only if they fulfil the conditions laid down in the latter part of clause (b), do not lay down the correct law and the surviving spouse, son and daughter are entitled to avail the protection of the Act without their being required to fulfil those conditions. 34. The matter will go back to the learned Single Judge for consideration.