S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE short question involved in this appeal is as to whether learned single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent and in ordering his reinstatement in service with full back wages. A few facts leading to this appeal may be stated at the outset. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT who was original petitioner in the writ petition was employed as a clerk-cum-tracer by appellant No. 1 herein in Sabarkantha District. He was given various appointment orders of 29 days each. First such order was of 3/07/1984 Services of orders in succession followed and there sets a continuous link in these orders till we come to the last order for 29 days which was given from 29-9-1985 and it was to last upto 21-10-1985. Before that 29 days order could run out and could get exhausted by efflux of time services of the respondent were terminated by the impugned order of termination dated 14 wherein it was intimated that even though temporary appointment was given to him upto 21-10-1985 from 29-9-1985 on 29 days basis as a measure of economy he was to be terminated after offence hours on 19-10-1985 and that is how his services were put to an end. It is therefore apparent that the respondents services stood terminated not by efflux of time but by way of termination before time by the impugned order. This order was challenged by the respondent by filing Special Civil Application No. 6064 of 1987 in this Court. That petition was filed on 19 1987 In the said petition both the patties were heard and R. C. Mankad J took the view that the impugned termination was void and contrary to Rule 33 (1) (b) of Bombay Civil Services Rules 1959 Consequently the respondent was entitled to get reinstatement with full back wages. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal. ( 3 ) MR. Dave for the appellants raised the following contentions in support of the appeal: (1) That the order of the learned Judge ordering reinstatement is patently erroneous as Rule 33 (1) (b) will not apply to the facts of the present case as the respondent was given fixed period appointment of 29 days and for such fixed period appointment the aforesaid Rule cannot be pressed in service. (2) In any case order of full back wages from 1985 onwards cannot be justified as the respondent himself filed that writ petition after too years of termination and for this delay the appellant authorities cannot be penalized by way of ordering full back Sages from the date of terminationwe shall deal with these catenations seriatim. ( 4 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it is necessary to have a look at Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Rules which provides as under. (A)THE service of fl temporary Government Servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given to him by the appointing authority. (B) Where the temporary Government servants has put in service for a period exceeding one year the period of such notice shall be one month and where such Government servant has put in service for one year or any period less than one volt the period of such notice shall be one steels. PROVIDED that the services of any Such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of bus pay plus allowance for the period of the notice at the same rates at which be war drawing pay and allowances immediately before the termination of his service or as the case may be for the period by which such notice falls short of the notice period. Mr. Dave is right when he contends that the said provision deals with interception of services of a temporary Govt. servant by notice. He is also right when he contends that in the present case the last order of appointment given to the respondent was for a fixed period for 19 days which was to terminate on its expiry on 21-10-1985 after offence hours. It the appellants had relied upon termination of appointment by efflux of time and waited upto 21-10-1985 the situation would have been different and in that case the appellants would have been on a firmer ground. But unfortunately for them the respondents services are terminated not by efflux of time under the last appointment order of 29 days but prior thereto by way of intimation termination his services after office hours on 19-10-1985. Consequently on the date of such intimation respondent was a temporary Govt. But unfortunately for them the respondents services are terminated not by efflux of time under the last appointment order of 29 days but prior thereto by way of intimation termination his services after office hours on 19-10-1985. Consequently on the date of such intimation respondent was a temporary Govt. servant was sought to be terminated from service and consequently Rule 33 (1) (b) clearly got attracted It is not in dispute that by series of 29 days appointment total period of service which the respondent bad put in by 19-10-1985 was more than one year as his first appointment order was dated 1 It must therefore be held that Rule 33 (1) (b) got attracted on the facts of this case. It cannot be disputed that one months notice as required by Rule 33 (1) (b) was not given to the respondent while terminating his service on 19-10-1985. On the contrary it was a forth with termination. ( 5 ) HOWEVER Mr. Dave placed strong reliance on the proviso to the said Rule. He submitted that at the highest respondent would be entitled to two days salary or for that matter full one months salary If such notice was not given. But the impugned order cannot get voided. It is not possible to agree with this contention in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Ray Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 536 wherein an identical Rule 5 (1) (a) of the Central Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court proviso therein was similarly worded and it was provided that services of any such Govt. servant may be terminated forthwith by payment. Interpreting these words employed in the proviso the Supreme Court held that this showed that the payment was a condition of the termination of service forthwith and once it is not done the order would get voided. In the facts of the present case a similar situation has arisen. Necessary payment of notice period pay has not been made to the respondent simultaneously with the impugned order. Therefore the order gets vitiated in law. Consequently no fault can be found with the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge that the termination is violative of Rule 33 (1) (b) We may also mention are aspect of the matter highlighted by Mr. Dave for the appellants. Therefore the order gets vitiated in law. Consequently no fault can be found with the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge that the termination is violative of Rule 33 (1) (b) We may also mention are aspect of the matter highlighted by Mr. Dave for the appellants. Ho submitted that the respondent could not have been appointed regularly as he was not qualified and till regularly appointed person was available by way of ad hoc arrangement the respondent was given 29 days appointments. Be that as it may the short question is whether his termination on 19-10-1985 was contrary to Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Rules or not. So far as that question is concerned the question whether the respondent was qualified or not pales into insignificance. The First contention therefore fails. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) (KMV) Special dismissed .