This is defendant's revision against the order dated 7.1.82 passed by the learned Munsiff, Sibsagar, whereby the application for amendment in the plaint was allowed. 2. Briefly, the relevant facts are that the plaintiff-opposite party bad filed suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant petitioner from setting up a spice grinding mill on the ground that it was not convenient to the people in the locality and it was also stated that in spite of the objection by the plaintiff and other people of the locality, the Municipal Board had in the month of February, 1981 accorded permission to set up the mill in Ward No. 7 of Sibsagar. The defendant had denied the allegations. The plaintiff, however, later sought amendment in the plaint and prayed for addition of a new para 6 (Ka) wherein the plaintiff sought to raise the plea that the defendant had not in fact been allowed by the Municipal Bard in February, 1981 to set up any spice grinding mill. The application was opposed. The learned trial Court by the impugned order dated 7.1 82 allowed the prayer for amendment. Hence this revision. 3. Sri P. K. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the new para 6 (Ka) changed the nature of the suit and the learned trial Court was, therefore, in error in exercise of its jurisdiction to allow the amendment. 4. On the other hand, Sri D. Goswami, learned counsel for the .opposite party plaintiff has submitted that the suit was for injunction and still was for the same relief after the amendment, which did not change the nature of the suit. 5. I have considered the submissions for the parties. The suit filed was for injunction to restrain the defendant from operating spice grinding mill, in the locality because ii was stated that it caused annoyance to the people in the locality due to unbearable odour emanating from spices like chilli etc. and since the said ground was still valid the nature or character of the suit was not altered. 6. and since the said ground was still valid the nature or character of the suit was not altered. 6. Sari P. K. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner has 1 submitted that earlier the plaintiff in his plaint had admitted that •the Municipal Board had given permission to operate the said mill, but now by amendment, the plaintiff has sought to say that the Municipal Board had not given permission and therefore the plaintiff could not be permitted to resile from the fact admitted earlier which also had the effect to show that the Municipal Board had also considered the implication of operation of the spice grinding mill in the locality and had granted permission which was obviously a circumstance in favour of the defendant petitioner and therefore the learned trial Court was in error in allowing the amendment. 7. While it is true that the plaintiff had earlier stated in the plaint that the Municipal Board had given permission to the defendant to operate the said mill, the probability of the plaintiff having had been under some mis-conception regarding permission to set up a mill or a trade permit may not be excluded. It may also be noted that the amendment allowed only sought to raise another ground in support of the plaintiff's claim on the basis of want of permission from the Municipal Board. It is permissible to take alternative grounds and also at times to take inconsistent pleas provided the basic claim is not affected. In this case, the plaintiff by the amendment sought to say that the Municipal Board had not granted permission and therefore in allowing to take a fresh seemingly inconsistent plea, I think it should not be said that the learned trial Court had committed any such error in exercise of its jurisdiction as may require interference by this Court. It is well known that allegations made in the pleadings are not evidence and that admission of some fact made in the pleadings which is in favour of the other party may in some circumstances be wrong or erroneous particularly when as in the instant case, it pertains to some action by a third party like the Municipal Board. The fact that whether or not the Municipal Board had granted permission could be proved by evidence and for this reason also, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 8. The fact that whether or not the Municipal Board had granted permission could be proved by evidence and for this reason also, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 8. For the aforesaid reasons this petition is dismissed. The records be sent back immediately to the trial Court.