JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - In this revision petition filed by one of the judgment-debtors, challenge is raised to the order dated 12-7-1988 of the Executing Court rejecting the Petitioner's application u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The opp. party No 1 filed Money Suit No. 51 of 1968 in the Court of the Munsif, Kendrapara against the Petitioner and the opp. party No. 2 for realisation of Rs. 2078.55. The suit was decreed against the Defendants by judgment dated 19-10 1970 and the decree dated 3-8-1973. The opp. party No. 1 filed Execution Case No. 13 of 1975 in the 'Court of the Munsif, Kendrapara against the judgment-debtors (Petitioner and opp. party No. 2), for realisation of the decretal amount. In the execution petition the decree holder mentioned certain immovable properties (A. 3.16 decimals) belonging to the judgment-debtors jointly. When the said property under attachment was about to be sold the opp party No. 2 filed an application on 11-8-1977 u/s 13 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act seeking permission of the Executing Court to pay the decretal dues by instalments (Misc. Case No. 152 of 1977). The application was allowed by order dated 8-9-1977 and the opp.party No. 2 was permitted to pay the decretal amount in quarterly instalment of Rs. 300/-. The said opp. party paid a total sum of Rs. 300/- (on 30-9-1977 Rs. 100/-, on 7-12-1977 Rs. 70/- and on 2-11-78 Rs. 130/-). On 30-6-1978 the prayer for further time to pay the instalment dues was rejected and sale proclamation was issued. Thereafter the opp. party No. 2 filed a petition dated 27-11-1981 contending that the Execution Case had abated u/s 3 of the Orissa Debt Relief Act, 1980. He alleged, inter alia, that being a small farmer he was a 'scheduled debtor as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act. The said application having been dismissed for default, a fresh application in similar terms was filed on 24-10-1983. By order dated 20-11-1985 the Executing Court accepted the contention and exonerated him from the liability to pay the decretal amount. It was further held in the said order that the liability to discharge the decretal dues had been assigned to the opp. party No. 2 (judgment-debtor No. 1) in an amicable partition between himself and the Petitioner (judgment-debtor No. 2). On 31-1-1986 the opp. It was further held in the said order that the liability to discharge the decretal dues had been assigned to the opp. party No. 2 (judgment-debtor No. 1) in an amicable partition between himself and the Petitioner (judgment-debtor No. 2). On 31-1-1986 the opp. party No. 1 filed a petition to amend the execution petition by excluding A.1. 45 decimals of land belonging to the opp. party No. 2 (judgment-debtor No. 1) and to proceed against the balance land of A.2. 10 decimals and to include a further prayer in the execution petition to attach the monthly salary of the Petitioner (judgment-debtor No. 2). By order dated 10-7-1986 the Executing Court allowed the petition for amendment. Thereafter the Petitioner filed an application u/s 47 (Misc. Case No. 240 of 1987) contending, inter alia, that the decree could not be executed against him inasmuch as the Executing Court had accepted the position that the liability to discharge the decree was solely upon the opp. party No. 2 (judgment-debtor No. 1) and had exonerated the said judgment debtor from the liability relying on Section 3 of the Orissa Debt Relief Act and therefore the consequential position was that the joint decree against both the judgment-debtors stood discharged. The Petitioner raised a further plea that in any case the amendment to add a new property, that is his monthly salary in the Execution petition could not be allowed after 12 years from the date of passing of the decree. 3. The Executing Court by the impugned order rejected the aforementioned contentions raised by the Petitioner arid dismissed the application filed u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. From the facts discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, two questions arise for determination: Whether by the order of the Executing Court exonerating the opp. party No. 2 (judgment debtor No. 1) from the liability to discharge the decree the entire decree could be said to have been discharged, and whether the decree-holder's application to amend the Execution Petition to add the new prayer to attach monthly salary of the Petitioner was not entertainable being barred by limitation. While it is the contention of the Petitioner that both the questions are to be answered in the affirmative, according to the opp. party No. 1 (decree- holder) the Executing Court rightly answered the points in the negative. 5. While it is the contention of the Petitioner that both the questions are to be answered in the affirmative, according to the opp. party No. 1 (decree- holder) the Executing Court rightly answered the points in the negative. 5. On consideration, I am of the opinion that the first question is to be answered in the negative and the Executing Court rightly rejected the Petitioner's contention on that count, but the second question, is to be answered in the affirmative and the Executing Court erred in rejecting the Petitioner's contention regarding it. It is not in dispute that a joint decree was passed against the two judgment-debtors, Petitioner and opp. party No. 2 and that the Petitioner had neither claimed not was held to be a scheduled debtor as defined u/s 2(h) of the Orissa Debt Relief Act. To such a case Section 3(c) first proviso squarely applies. Section 3(c) provides that all suits and proceedings (including appeals, revisions, proceedings in execution and attachment, pending on the date of commencement of the Act for the recovery of any such debt or interest due thereon against a scheduled debtor shall abate, provided that where a suit or proceeding is pending jointly against a the scheduled debtor and any other person it shall not abate in so far as the claim against such other person is concerned. In view of the clear and unambiguous statutory provision there can be no mariner of doubt that the Petitioner cannot be exonerated from liability to discharge the decretal dues and as such his contention that the entire decree should be taken to have been discharged must fail. At this stage let me consider the contention of the Petitioner that since the Executing Court accepted the position that the liability to discharge the decree had been assigned to the judgment-debtor No. 1 alone in the family partition his (Petitioner's) liability should be taken to have been discharged. This contention has no force since the arrangement allegedly made in the family partition was a matter between the judgment-debtors to which the decree-holder was not a patty and in the absence of any material to show that he had accepted the said arrangement and had agreed to abide by the same it could not be made binding against him. 6. 6. Corning to the question regarding limitation, the relevant statutory provisions are Order 21, Rules 11(2), 13 and 17, CPC and Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Rule 11(2) of Order 21 provides that every application for the execution of a decree save as otherwise provided by Sub-rule (1) shall be in witting, and shall contain in a tabular form the particulars stated in the provision which includes in Clause (j) the mode in which the assistance of the Court in required, whether (1) by the delivery of any property specifically decreed:(ii) by the attachment or by the attachment and sale, or by the sale without attachment of any property, (iii) by the arrest and detention in prison of any person; (iv) by the appointment of a receiver; (v) otherwise as the nature of the relief granted may require. Rules ll-A to 14 make provisions regarding certain other paraphernalia to be complied, with by the decree-holder. Rule 17(i) of Order 21 provides, that .on receiving an application for execution of a decree as provided by Rule 11, Sub-rule (2), the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with; and if they have not been complied with, the Court shall allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it. Under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17, it is laid down that where an application is amended under the provisions of Sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented. Under Article 136 the period of limitation for execution of any decree or order of any civil Court other than a decree granting mandatory injunction is 12 years from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought takes place. 7. 7. In the present case, the Executing Court rejected the contention relating to limitation solely on the ground that the decree-holder's prayer for amendment having been allowed it relates back to the date of filing of the execution petition. But he failed to notice that the pertinent question was whether after expiry of the period of limitation (12 years) provided under Article 136 if an 'amendment in the execution petition seeking to introduce a new property could at all be allowed. The answer is that such an amendment could not be allowed since a fresh execution petition relating to that property would be dismissed as barred by limitation. In this connection I may notice a decision of this Court reported in Dolagobinda Sahu Vs. Chakradhar Mohapatra and Others wherein a Division. Bench of this Court considering Section 48 and Order 21, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 held that the Court has power apart from the provisions of Order 21, Rule 17, CPC to amend an execution petition by addition of fresh properties to the list of properties appended to the original execution petition provided the petition for amendment is filed before the expiry of the period of 12 years' limitation prescribed by Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure. This Court placed reliance on the decisions reported in A.I.R 1918 Cal 73. AIR 1923 Pat 224 . Brajasunder Das Vs. Radha Prasad Bhagat Nourangilal Marwari Vs. Sm. Charubala Dasi and Others Mahomedbhai Samsuddin Jivaji Raja Vohra Vs. M.A. Dawoodbhai and Co. Shekendarali Meah Vs. Abdul Gafur Choudhury and Others Gajanand Sha and Others Vs. Dayanand Thakur, and Deo narain Singh and Others Vs. Bibi Khatoon and Others. The provision in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 incorporates the provisions of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Dineshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Dayanand Thakur, and Deo narain Singh and Others Vs. Bibi Khatoon and Others. The provision in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 incorporates the provisions of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Dineshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Deoniti Prasad Singh and Others construing the provisions of Section 48 and Order 21, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 observed that where the execution petition was sought to be amended by addition of some more properties to the properties which were sought to be proceeded against in the first instance, the amendment which the decree-holder sought to make in the execution petition was not an amendment under Order 21, Rule 17; the application for amendment must be treated as a fresh application for execution and it was held that the decree was barred by limitation u/s 48, Code of Civil Procedure. The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rameshwar Lal Amar Chand Choudhary Vs. Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd., Ajmer and Others, construing the question of applicability of the period of limitation of 12 years to an application under Order 21, Rule 17, CPC observed that where if an execution application Rules 11 to 14 of Order 21, CPC as may be applicable are not complied with the executing Court can get the defect remedied even after the period of 12 years from the date of decree provided the execution application is pending; this will be treated as amending the original application itself. Elucidating the point the Court observed that if an execution application prays for the attachment and sale of immovable property, but at the same time no list of the immovable property is given, it is noncompliance of Order 21, Rule 13, CPC and under Order 21, Rule 17, CPC the executing Court is empowered to get the defect removed at any time even beyond the limitation of 12 years' period, if the execution application is pending. But where there is no such defect at the initial stage, but later on some more property is sought to be added to the former list with a view that fresh property may be got attached and sold, then this will be treated as a fresh application and will not be allowed, if filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of decree. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Gadadhar Mohapatra and Anr. v. Bisweswar Bhutia and Ors. reported in 69 (1990) C.L.T. 335 wherein my learned brother L. Rath, J. held that it is open to the Court at any time to allow an amendment in a proper case in order to cure any defect in a petition for execution and even apart from this power under Order 21, Rule 17(1) CPC the Court can in its general power allow such amendment. The learned Judge was considering a case where there were certain defects in the Execution petition due to non-compliance of Rules 11 to 14 of Order 21. In the back ground of those facts it was held as above. The present case is not one of any defect in the execution petition, but a case of the decree-holder seeking to add new item of property for attachment to the properties already included in the execution petition. 8. Testing the present case on the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions, the position is clear that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the amendment seeking to include the new property (salary of the Petitioner) was barred by limitation. As noticed earlier, in the execution petition certain immovable properties had been given for attachment and sale. Subsequently on 31-1-1986 the opp. party No. 1 (decree-holder, filed the application seeking to add the new item of property, that is, salary of the Petitioner which was clearly beyond 12 years from the decree passed on 3-8-1973. 9. My attention has been drawn to the order dated 20-11-1985 passed by the Executing Court where by the Court accepted the aplication filed by the opposite party No. 2 and exonerated him from the liability of the decree u/s 3 of the Orissa Debt Relief Act and it was contellded that there are several illegalities therein. 9. My attention has been drawn to the order dated 20-11-1985 passed by the Executing Court where by the Court accepted the aplication filed by the opposite party No. 2 and exonerated him from the liability of the decree u/s 3 of the Orissa Debt Relief Act and it was contellded that there are several illegalities therein. Though the contention is not without merit, yet I am not inclined to consider it since the decree holder has not challenged the said order in appropriate proceeding certain benefit has accrued to the opp. party No. 2 on the basis of the said order and in the absence of a proper proceeding challenging the order it will not be appropriate on my part to interfere with the same and deprive the party of the benefit which has already accured to him. 10. On the ultimate analysis of the matter discussed above, the revision petition is allowed in part, the order of the Executing Court rejecting the Petitioner's prayer to dismiss the Execution Case against him is sustained, but the order of the Court rejecting the Petitioner's contention that his monthly salary could not be included in the execution petition and could not be attached is set aside. The net result therefore is that the execution proceeding will continue against the Petitioner in respect of the properties included in the execution petition excluding the monthly salary of the Petitioner. Both parties will bear their respective costs of this proceeding. Petition allowed in part. Final Result : Allowed