JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This group of petitions is the outcome of orders passed by the State Government. The impugned orders have destroyed the entire institution of State Law Officers in this Court. An institution having great traditions and a glorious history. State Law Officers of this Court have risen to the highest rung of the ladder rendering valuable service to the administration of Justice in this country. One order after another has been passed within about a year. The impugned orders have brought down the status of the State Law Officers to a naught and have put them to such indignity which is unthinkable in a democratic State. The State Government and its officers have completely forgotten that legal profession is a noble profession. It is a profession of service - service to the community. In ensuring the rule of law the most significant part is played by the lawyers. Even if relationship between the State and their Law Officers may be in a way of relationship of a lawyer and client but the State cannot treat Law Officers as worse than casual Government servants. The status of a professional person has to be recognised and respected. 2. In accordance with clause 2.01 of Chapter II of the Legal Remembrancer Manual, hereinafter referred to as 'L.R. Manual' Advocate General is Chief Legal Adviser of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The State of U.P. has two categories of the counsel to defend it. One category belongs to Criminal side and the other to civil side. There is one Government Advocate in the High Court at Allahabad and another in its Lucknow Bench. Besides Government Advocate there are Additional Government Advocates, Deputy Government Advocates and Assistant Government Advocates, both at Allahabad and Lucknow. In view of Section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 Government Advocate is now designated as Public Prosecutor and other Advocates are designated as Additional Public Prosecutors. In the circumstances on the Criminal side there are only two types of Public Prosecutors viz. Public Prosecutor and the Additional Public Prosecutors. 3. In so far as the civil side is concerned there is, one Chief Standing Counsel in the High Court at Allahabad and another for its Lucknow Bench and a number of Standing Counsel both at Allahabad and Lucknow. Public Prosecutor and the Additional Public Prosecutors. 3. In so far as the civil side is concerned there is, one Chief Standing Counsel in the High Court at Allahabad and another for its Lucknow Bench and a number of Standing Counsel both at Allahabad and Lucknow. Under Chapter VI of L.R. Manual the State Government is entitled to appoint a number of Brief Holders from amongst the practicing advocates in the High Court as it may deem necessary from time to time to conduct civil and criminal cases on the High Court that may be entrusted to them. The Government Advocate in respect of the criminal cases and the Chief Standing Counsel in respect of the civil cases are authorised to allot the cases to the Brief Holders as and when required. In the circumstances on the criminal side the State Law Officers consist of Public Prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors and the Brief Holders. On the civil side State Law Officers are Chief Standing Counsel. Standing Counsel and Brief Holders. On the civil side State Government has from time to time also appointed Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 4. The State Law Officers are paid fixed remuneration in accordance with the Government Orders issued from time to time. Since the last Government Order in respect of fee was issued in 1980. representations were made to the State Government to consider revision of the fee and remuneration to be paid to the State Law Officers. The State Government after taking into consideration the request of the State Law Officers of the State revised the emoluments by an order issued on 30th June, 1989. In this order dated 30th June, 1989 monthly fee was fixed of the Chief Standing Counsel, Additional Chief Standing Counsel as well as for the Standing Counsel on the civil side and a similar order dated 30th June, 1989 was issued fixing monthly fee for the Public Prosecutor and the Additional Public Prosecutors. By this Government Order State Government further put a complete ban on private practice and also directed that State Law Officers shall keep details of the work done of each day in the diary which if demanded shall be produced for perusal to the Joint Legal Remembrancer in the Office of the State Law Officers or any other Deputy Legal Remembrance Additional Legal Remembrancer or the Legal Remembrancer, of the Government. The order further provided that the engagement of the State Law Officers shall be treated as purely professional engagement and the Government shall have a right to terminate the engagement at any time without assigning any reason. It was further provided that State Law Officers shall not be deemed to be holders of any post in the Government service and they shall not be entitled to the allowances and the benefits permissible to the Government servants and the engagements shall continue to be a purely professional engagements. 5. After these two orders were issued on 30th June, 1989 in respect of the State Law Officers both on the civil and criminal sides a second order was issued on 6th Nov. 1989. The orders dated 30th June, 1989 were clarified to the extent that private practice on behalf of the Undertakings; Corporations/Boards etc. and the Central Government can be done but that can be only after intimation to the Legal Remembrancer and after obtaining his permission. It was further directed that all the bills relating to the practice on behalf of the Undertakings/Corporation/Boards etc. shall be sent by the counsel to the Judicial Accounts Department of the State and that the payments of the bills shall be made only after due verification by the Judicial Accounts Department. The ultimate effect is that even if the State Law Officers appear as counsel for Undertakings, Corporations or Boards they can only appear with the permission of the Legal Remembrancer and the bills can only be paid after they were sanctioned by the office of the Legal Remembrancer which means that the Legal Remembrancer was to control the appointment as well as payment of the bills of each and every matter where a counsel appeared for the Undertakings, Corporations, or the Boards in the State. 6. On 26th May, 1990 an axe fell on the Brief Holders who are mostly junior Advocates of the Court. An order was issued by the Government that the system for engagement of the Brief Holders in the High Court shall be abolished with immediate effect and the allotment of the work should be stopped with immediate effect to all the Brief Holders already engaged for civil and criminal works. An order was issued by the Government that the system for engagement of the Brief Holders in the High Court shall be abolished with immediate effect and the allotment of the work should be stopped with immediate effect to all the Brief Holders already engaged for civil and criminal works. After abolishing the system of engaging the Brief Holders both at Allahabad as well as Lucknow another order was issued on 28th June, 1990 authorising the Joint Legal Remembrancer to appoint special counsel for any special manner before the High Court. The Joint Legal Remembrancer was further given financial power and all administrative powers which were earlier exercised by the Chief Standing Counsel and the Public Prosecutor, he was further given power to distribute the work to the various Standing counsel and the Additional Public prosecutors. The effect of this order was that though the system for engaging the Brief Holders were abolished but an arbitrary power was given to the Joint Legal Remembrancer engage any special counsel as and when he desires at any rate of the fee absolutely at his discretion. 7. The interference in the working of the State Law Officers did not end by the above Government orders but all of a sudden on 23rd July, 1990 the services of 26 State Law Officers were terminated both in the civil and criminal side in the Allahabad High Court as well as in the Lucknow Bench. By this order it was directed that the tenure of engagement of the learned counsel shall come to an end with effect from the forenoon of 24th July, 1990. 8. On 23rd July, 1990 simultaneously orders were passed engaging 26 State Law. Officers to argue all the cases filed on behalf of or against the State both on civil and criminal side. The appointment was for a period of one year. It may be specifically mentioned that the detail of the Government Order dated 23rd July, 1990 appointing State Law Officers is G.O. No. 2380/Sat/NIYU- 3/90, dated 23-7-1990. By this very order Sri Bengali Yadav has been appointed as Chief Standing Counsel. 9. On 13th July, 1989 Writ Petition No. 12942 of 1989 was filed by Sri R.P. Singh and five others challenging the Government Order dated 30th July, 1989. By this very order Sri Bengali Yadav has been appointed as Chief Standing Counsel. 9. On 13th July, 1989 Writ Petition No. 12942 of 1989 was filed by Sri R.P. Singh and five others challenging the Government Order dated 30th July, 1989. On 5th December, 1989 U.P. State Law Officers Association of the High Court filed Writ Petition No. 22578 of 1989 also challenging the Government Order dated 30th June, as well as Government Order dated 6th Nov. 1989. This petition was subsequently amended, the U.P. State Law Officers Association further challenged the orders passed on 23rd July, 1990 terminating the services of 26 State Law Officers. On 21-12-1989 Writ Petition No. 24928 of 1989 was filed in this Court initially for a relief that the respondents be directed to pay the pending bills of the Brief Holders. Thereafter the petition has been amended and order dated 26th May, 1990, by which engagement of the Brief Holders was terminated has been challenged. On 1-8-1990 Amarjit Singh one of the Standing Counsel of this Court filed a separate Writ Petition No. 19731 of 1990 challenging the order dated 23rd July, 1990 by which his term of engagement as Standing Counsel was terminated. On 7-8-1990 Sri A.P.N. Giri and two others filed Writ Petition No. 20188 of 1990 challenging the appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav as Chief Standing Counsel. On 9-8-1990 Sri R.P. Singh and others filed another separate Writ Petition No.20183 of 1990 challenging the order dated 23rd July, 1990 by virtue of which their engagement as Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel was terminated. On 9-8-1990 another Writ Petition No. 20182 of 1990 was filed by Sri Gyaneshwar Bhatt and three others Additional Public Prosecutors whose appointment was terminated. They have also challenged the order dated 23rd July, 1990. 10. We have heard Sri V.B. Upadhya, Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of this State, Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate and also former Advocate General of this State, Sri Sushil Harkauli and Sri A.P.N. Giri in person on behalf of the petitioners and learned Additional Advocate General Sri R.N. Trivedi on behalf of the respondents. We have also heard Sri Murlidhar, Senior Advocate on behalf of the respondent Sri Bengali Yadava in Writ Petition No. 20188 of 1990. We have also heard Sri Murlidhar, Senior Advocate on behalf of the respondent Sri Bengali Yadava in Writ Petition No. 20188 of 1990. Learned counsel are agreed that Writ Petition No. 22578 of 1989 may be treated as leading petition as questions of law involved in the petitions are same except that in Writ Petition No. 20188 of 1990 where an additional question in regard to the validity of the appointment of the Chief Standing Counsel is involved. They have stated that they are not challenging the remuneration fixed by the State by the order dated 30th June, 1989 to be payable to the State Law Officers. 11. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 are still applicable to the State Law Officers. The subsequent Notification No. 2555/VII-AI-202- 1951. dated 29th June, 1968 by which U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 have been rescinded and the Office Memorandum No. 2556/VII-AI-202/1951, dated 29th June, 1968 issuing instructions and regulating appointments and tenure of the State Law Officers as amended by the Office Memoranda dated 6th December, 1974 and 18th October, 1976, are both illegal and ultra vires. In effect, the argument is that the services of the State Law Officers could not be terminated unless they are given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in their defence. In order to consider the above mentioned submissions made on behalf of the petitioners it is necessary to quote entire U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 as well as Notification No. 2555 and Office Memorandum No. 2556, dated 29th June, 1968. The Office Memorandum No. 2556 was subsequently amended by Office Memoranda dated 6-12-1974 and 18-10-1976. The Office Memorandum No. 2556, dated 29th June, 1968 as it originally stood is quoted below. Clause 6 was substituted by Office Memorandum, dated 6th December. 1974 and clauses 2 and 4 were substituted by Office Memorandum, dated 18th October, 1976. They are also quoted below: U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 "In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) and clause (b) of sub- section (2). Clause 6 was substituted by Office Memorandum, dated 6th December. 1974 and clauses 2 and 4 were substituted by Office Memorandum, dated 18th October, 1976. They are also quoted below: U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 "In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) and clause (b) of sub- section (2). of Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and in supersession of all previous rules on the subject, the Governor of the United Provinces is pleased to make the following rules regulating the appointment and conditions of service of the Law Officers of the Crown in the High Court and the Chief Court. RULES 1. Short title & commencement. (1) These rules shall be called the "United 'Provinces Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942. 2. Status of the posts. - The posts dealt with by these rules are tenure posts and are classed as specialist. They carry with them past time civil employment under the Crown. 3. In these rules unless there be anything repugnant in the subject or context - Definition. - (a) "Chief Court" means the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow. (b) "Governor" means Governor of the United Provinces. (c) "High Court" means the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad; and (d) "Law Officer" means any of the Law Officers specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 4. 4. The Governor may appoint the following Law Officers in the High Court and the Chief Court : (a) In the High Court (i) Criminal side Government Advocate 1 Deputy Government Advocate 1 Assistant Government Advocate 1 (ii) Civil Side Standing Counsel 1 Junior Standing Counsel 1 (b) In the Chief Court Government Advocate 1 Assistant Government Advocate 1 5. Nationality, domicile and residence. Nationality, domicile and residence. - No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Law Officer unless he is (a) a natural born British, subject, the domicile of original of whose father is in the United Provinces and who himself is domiciled in the United Provinces; or (b) a natural born British subject, the domicile of origin of whose father was not the United Provinces, but who or whose father has acquired a domicile in the United Provinces, provided that the candidate himself has, after such acquisition, resided in the United Provinces for not less than five years at the date on which he applies for appointment: or (c) a natural born British subject who was born in the United Provinces and whose father is (or, if dead, was at the time of his death) employed in any department of the Central Government and is, or was liable to inter- Provincial transfers; provided that he has himself resided in the United Provinces for three continuous years immediately preceding the date of his application for appointment; or (d) the ruler or a subject of an Indian State ora native of a tribal area or territory adjacent to India in respect of whom or which a declaration(*) has been made by the Governor under sub-section (2) of Section 262 of the Government of India Act, 1935. (*) A declaration has been made only in respect of the subjects of the Benaras Rampur and Tehri (Garhwal) States. 6. Professional Qualification. No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Law Officer unless he is an advocate of at least five years' standing enrolled in the High Court or the Chief Court. 7. Age. - No age limits are prescribed for appointment to the posts of Law Officer but appointments shall be made with due regard to the physical fitness of the candidates. 8. Method of recruitment.An appointment to the Office of a Law Officer shall be made by the Governor after taking into consideration the recommendation of the Legal Remembrancer and the High Court or the Chief Court, as the case may be. All appointments under this rule shall be notified in the official Gazette. 9. Prohibition of canvassing. Any canvassing on the part of a candidate may disqualify him for appointment. 10. Probation and confirmation. All appointments under this rule shall be notified in the official Gazette. 9. Prohibition of canvassing. Any canvassing on the part of a candidate may disqualify him for appointment. 10. Probation and confirmation. Every Advocate selected for appointment under Rule l by the Governor shall ordinarily be appointed in the first instance on probation for a period of six months; provided that the Governor may in special cases either dispense with or extend the period of probation. A Law Officer will be confirmed in his appointment on completion of the period of probation provided he has been found to have discharged his duties satisfactorily. 11. Tenure of appointment. On confirmation the appointment shall ordinarily be made for a term of three years from the date of termination of the period of probation. At the end of the first term and of each subsequent term an officer may be re- appointed for a further term not exceeding three years. 12. Pay any remuneration. No pay is attached to the post of Standing Counsel and Junior Standing Counsel. The rates of pay for other posts shall be as follows and shall also apply to the probationary period (a) High Court- Government Advocate Rs. 1.000 per mensem Deputy Government Advocate Rs. 750 per mensem Assistant Government Advocate Rs. 500 per mensem (b) Chief Court - Government Advocate Rs. 1,000 per mensem Assistant Government Advocate Rs. 500 per mensem In addition to the pay specified above, Law Officers shall be entitled to such other remuneration as is provided in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual and they shall, in respect of restrictions in regard to private practice and other matters, be subject to the rules contained in that Manual. 13. Temporary vacancies. - An appointment to fill up a temporary vacancy in the post of a Law Officer shall be made in the same manner as is provided in Rule 8. Except Standing Counsel, and Junior Standing Counsel, any person appointed to officiate for a Law Officer who is granted leave other than leave on average pay or is transferred to some other appointment shall be entitled to the full pay of the post to which he is appointed. Except Standing Counsel, and Junior Standing Counsel, any person appointed to officiate for a Law Officer who is granted leave other than leave on average pay or is transferred to some other appointment shall be entitled to the full pay of the post to which he is appointed. Provided that, if a Law Officer takes leave during the vacation of the High Court or the Chief Court, as the case may be and under the relevant rules referred to in Rule 15 he cannot be allowed, because of the appointment of a substitute during such vacation, leave salary equal to the average pay to which he would have otherwise been entitled, the pay to be allowed to the officiating incumbent and the leave salary to be allowed to the permanent incumbent in lieu of average pay shall be such as may be determined by the Government with due regard to Subsidiary Rule 162 in the Financial Handbook volume II. Such leave shall count as duty in the same way as leave on average pay irrespective of the rate of leave salary actually received by a Law Officer on leave. 14. Removal or suspension. - The Governor reserves to himself the right to remove or suspend any Law Officer at any time during his term of office for misconduct or dereliction of duty subject to the provision that no Law Officer shall be so removed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence. 15. Regulation of leave, allowances and other conditions of service. - Except as provided by these rules, the pay, allowances, leave and other conditions of service of a person appointed as a Law Officer shall be regulated by the General rules made by the Governor under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 241 of the Government of India Act. 1935, and pending the issue of such rules - by the rules continued in force by Section 276 of the said Act and by and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 15(2) of the Government of India (Commencement and Transitory Provisions) Order, 1956." NOTIFICATION No. 2555/VIII-AI-202-1951 In pursuance of the provisions of clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution, the Governor is pleased to order the Publication of the following English translation of Notification No. 2555/VII-Al-202-1951, dated June 29, 1968. WHEREAS the Governor of the United Provinces purporting to act under clause (b) of sub-section (1) and clause(b) of sub-section (2) of Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, made certain rules called the United Provinces Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 for regulating the appointment and conditions of service of the Law Officers of the Crown in the High Court and the Chief Court; And Whereas, legal practitioners who are appointed as Law Officers of the State are free to carry on their private practice subject to certain restrictions and be paid emoluments which are in the nature of fees for professional services rendered to Government, although the same may be described as pay or salary, and the relation between Government and such Law Officer is that of client and counsel. And Whereas, the Governor is accordingly advised that legal practitioners appointed as Law Officers of the State are not members of holders of Public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State and as such it is neither necessary nor proper to continue the said rules in force. Now Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) in so far as the said provisions may apply for rescission of any rules purporting to be made under Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and all other powers enabling him in this behalf the Governor is pleased to rescind, with immediate effect; the said rules, and accordingly to terminate the appointments of all the legal practitioners who hereto without prejudice to his powers and discretion to appoint all or any of them, as Law Officers of the State in accordance with such general or special orders as he may from time to time pleased to make." OFFICE MEMORANDUM No. 2556/V II-A I-202-1951 DATED 29-6-1968. "The Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to issue the following general instructions regarding the appointment and tenure of Law Officer of the State in the High Court. "The Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to issue the following general instructions regarding the appointment and tenure of Law Officer of the State in the High Court. (1) Definition : Law Officers of the State in the High Court namely, Government Advocate, Additional Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocates, and Assistant Government Advocates on the criminal side and Chief Standing Counsel and Standing Counsel on the civil side are legal practitioners appointed by the State Government to conduct in the High Court such Government litigation as may be assigned to them either generally or specially by Government (2) Eligibility : No Legal practitioner shall be eligible for appointment as Law Officer unless he has been an Advocate of the High Court for at least five years. (3) Age and Physical fitness : No age limit is prescribed for appointment as a Law Officer, but appointments shall be made with due regard to physical fitness. (4) Appointment : The Governor may appoint any qualified legal practitioners as a Law Officer, and before making any such appointment he may, if he thinks fit, take into consideration the view of the Advocate General of the Chief Justice or any other Judges of the High Court or of any Committee that the Governor may constitute for the purpose. All appointments shall be notified in the Official Gazette. (5) Remuneration etc. : The fee and other terms and conditions of appointment of Law Officers shall be governed by any general or special Orders of the Governor in that behalf. (6) Tenure : The Governor reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any Law Officer at any time without assigning any cause, and subject thereto, Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years, which term may be renewed from year to year. OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATED 6-12-1974 (6) Tenure : The appointment of any legal practitioner as a Law Officer is only a professional engagement terminable at will on either side and accordingly the Governor reserves the right to terminate the engagement of any Law Officer at any time without assigning any cause, and subject to this right. Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of one year in the first instance which term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time." OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATED 18-10-1976. Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of one year in the first instance which term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time." OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATED 18-10-1976. (2) Eligibility : A Legal Practitioner eligible for appointment as Law Officer must have been in practice as an Advocate for not less than seven years in the case of a Public Prosecutor (Government Advocate, Additional Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocate or Assistant Government Advocate) and ten years in the case of Chief Standing Counsel or Standing Counsel : Provided that in the case of outstanding merit the Governor may relax the above requirement as to minimum practice for appointment of a Law Officer on the civil side. (4) Appointment : The Governor may appoint any qualified Legal Practitioner as a Law Officer, and before making any such appointment he may, if he thinks fit, take into consideration the views of the Advocate General or of the Chief Justice or any other Judge of the High Court or of any Committee that the Governor may constitute for the purpose and for an appointment on the criminal side shall also consult the High Court. All appointments shall be notified in the official Gazette. 12. Elaborating the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, the learned counsel have relied upon Article 313 of Constitution of India which reads as under : "313 - Until other provision is made in this behalf under this Constitution all the laws in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution and applicable to any public service or any post which continues to exist after the commencement of this constitution, as an all-India service or as service or post under the Union or a State shall continue in force so far as consistent with the provisions of the Constitution." 13. The submission is that under Article 313 of the Constitution, 'until other provision is made i n this behalf under this Constitution', the U.P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Crown Rules of 1942) shall continue to be applicable to the services of the State Law Officers. Article 309 of the Constitution of India is relevant in this connection. It is quoted below : "309. Article 309 of the Constitution of India is relevant in this connection. It is quoted below : "309. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of person appointed to public services and posts in connection with the Union or of any State : Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and post in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of the State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of appropriate Lagislature under this Article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act." 14. Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the appropriate Legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. Under the Proviso to this Article, till an appropriate Legislature makes any provision, the Governor has been empowered to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services of posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The argument is that since neither the Legislature nor the Governor under the Proviso has made any rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the State Law Officers, the Crown Rules of 1942 shall continue to apply to the State Law Officers, as guaranteed by Article 313 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, it has been further urged on behalf of the petitioners that under Article 309 of the Constitution, neither the Governor under the Proviso nor the Legislature has the power to rescind the rules. The only power given to the Legislature or to the Governor as the case may be, is to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services or posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The only power given to the Legislature or to the Governor as the case may be, is to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services or posts in connection with the affairs of the State. It is urged that under Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor cannot merely rescind the rules and create a vacuum, Neither the appropriate Legislature nor the Governor under the Proviso has the power to rescind. They have only the power to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the persons so appointed. It is, consequently, submitted that the notification issued on 29th June, 1968. rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 was wholly invalid. The learned Additional Advocate General, however, has urged that after passing the notification on 29th June, 1968, under Article 309 of the Constitution of India rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942, administrative instructions were issued simultaneously on the same day, namely, 29th June, 1968, regulating the appointment and tenure of the State Law Officers in the High Court and this, according to the Additional Advocate General, is another provision; which is contemplated by Article 313 of the Constitution and, as such, the administrative instructions issued on 29th June, 1968, would be applicable in the case of the State Law Officers in the High Court. 15. The question which we have to consider is, firstly, as to what meaning should be given to the provision `until other provision is made in this behalf under this Constitution used in Article 313 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, we have to consider as to what is the scope of Article 309 of the Constitution. Can the Governor under the Proviso merely rescind the rules which are to continue to be applicable to a public service under Article 313 of the Constitution and not make any further rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service, and, thirdly, as to whether administrative instructions could override the Crown Rules of 1942, which were made under Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and which continue to be applicable to a service under the provisions of Article 313 of the Constitution of India. 16. 16. In regard to the first aspect, mentioned above, the argument made on behalf of the petitioners is that the words 'until further provision is made in this behalf under this Constitution' should be interpreted to mean that the provision must be in the nature of a rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution and mere making of an administrative instruction will not serve the purpose. The right given to a member of public service under Article 313 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by making executive instructions. 17. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume II, the word 'provision, has been defined as under : 'Provision....Each of the clauses or divisions of a legal or formal statement, or such a -statement itself, providing for some particular matter; and a clause in such a statement which makes an express stipulation." 18. The definition of the word 'provision' indicates that it is in the nature of a formal statement providing for some particular matter. The words 'under this Constitution' used in Article 313 of the Constitution along with the words 'until other provision is made in this behalf under this Constitution' make it clear that a provision, which is contemplated under Article 313 of the Constitution is a provision under the Constitution namely, any provision which any authority is empowered to make under the Constitution and in regard to the services under the Union and the States. 19. Article 313 is contained in Part XIV of the Constitution of India which deals with services under the Union and the States and is a part of Chapter I relating to services. In this Chapter, the only Article under which a provision can be made in regard to public service or a post in connection with the affairs of the State is Article 309. Article 309, as already stated, even empowers the appropriate Legislature-or under the proviso, the Governor to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service. In our opinion, Article 313 of the Constitution has to be read with Article 309 and what is contemplated by Article 313 is that the laws enforced immediately before the commencement of the Constitution are to continue to apply to public services until the rules are made, as required by Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, Article 313 of the Constitution has to be read with Article 309 and what is contemplated by Article 313 is that the laws enforced immediately before the commencement of the Constitution are to continue to apply to public services until the rules are made, as required by Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Issue of administrative institutions cannot fulfill the requirement of Article 313 of the Constitution and it cannot be said that administrative instructions are 'other provisions' which will take away the right, which has been conferred on the members of a service under Article 313 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, therefore, unless rules are made under Article 309 of the Constitution, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service or posts in connection with the affairs of the State, the rules in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India shall continue to be applicable to such services. Issue of administrative instructions in exercise of the executive powers of the State will not take away the right conferred on the members of the service under Article 313 of the Constitution of India. 20. In regard to the second aspect of the matter Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the appropriate Legislature or when the proviso is applicable, the Governor can make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service, but this Article does not empower the killing of a service or putting an end to the tenure of a member of a service the right which has been conferred on a member of the service under Article 313 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, it is not disputed that after the issue of the notification dated 29th June, 1968 rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 the posts of the State Law Officer continued and they were appointed on the same posts again. Once the post and service continued the rules made under the Government of India Act, 1935, could not have been rescinded and a vacuum created. (Refer to Chaudhary Tika Ram and others v. The State of U.P. and others (1956 SCC 676) and Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnatka ( 1990 (2) SCC 562 )). 21. The Governor under the provisions could have made rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service. (Refer to Chaudhary Tika Ram and others v. The State of U.P. and others (1956 SCC 676) and Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnatka ( 1990 (2) SCC 562 )). 21. The Governor under the provisions could have made rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service. The Governor could have amended, modified or could have made changes in the Rules but the Governor has no power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India to put an end to the service itself, particularly when, in fact, the Service still continued. Bypassing a notification dated 29th June, 1968, rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 and by not making any further provision in the nature of Rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service the State acted directly in violation of the right guaranteed under Article 313 of the Constitution of India. Article 309 of the Constitution is subject to the other provisions in the Constitution while the right conferred by Article 313 of the Constitution is absolute. The notification, therefore, merely rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 is wholly invalid and is violative of Article 313 of the Constitution of India. 22. In regard to the third aspect, we are of the opinion that the rules applicable to any public service, which have been continued under Article 313 of the Constitution of India, cannot be substituted by mere administrative instructions. The Supreme Court has, in many cases, taken this view and it is practically settled law now. 23. In B. N. Nagarajun and others v. State of Mysore and others ( AIR 1966 SC 1942 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the terms of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, there is nothing to abridge the power of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law, but if there is a statutory rule or an Act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act. 24. 24. In Smt. Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others ( AIR 1967 SC 1910 ), this matter again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. 25. In State of Haryana v. Shamsher Jang Shukla ( AIR 1972 SC 1546 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the statement of law which was laid down by it in the case of Smt. Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (supra) namely, that the Government cannot amend or supersede the statutory rules by administrative instructions. It specifically laid down that the Government cannot alter the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India by means of administrative instructions. In the instant case, the Crown Rules of 1942 had been framed under Section 241 of the Government of India Act and they continued to be applicable by virtue of Article 313 of the Constitution. In the circumstances, these rules could not have been altered by means of administrative instructions in view of the clear dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case. 26. A similar question again arose in the case of Union of India v. Majji Jangammayya and others, ( AIR 1977 SC 757 ), Hon'ble A.N. Ray, Chief Justice (as he then was), while considering the effect of Article 313 of the Constitution of India, held as follows : "Article 313 does not change the legal character of a document. Article 313 refers to laws in force which mean statutory laws an administrative instruction or order is not a statutory rule." It was further held that there is distinction between statutory orders and administrative instructions of the government. It is only in the absence of statutory rules that executive orders or administrative instructions can be made. From this authority, it is clear that when there are statutory rules contained under Article 313 of the Constitution of India they cannot be changed by administrative instructions, as the laws in force are statutory rules. 27. It is only in the absence of statutory rules that executive orders or administrative instructions can be made. From this authority, it is clear that when there are statutory rules contained under Article 313 of the Constitution of India they cannot be changed by administrative instructions, as the laws in force are statutory rules. 27. In Baleshwar Dass and others v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1981 SC 41 ), a question arose as to whether the rules made in the year 1936 under the Government of India Act and continued by force of Article 313 of the Constitution of India in respect of the U.P. Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) could be superseded by administrative instructions. It was held as under (at pages SC 51 AIR 1981) : The rules are, we make it clear, those made in 1936 under the Government of India Act, 1919 and continued by force of Article 313 of the Constitution. Changes wrought by orders and instructions such as the 1961 Memorandum cannot override the rules themselves but will operate subject to them in case of inconsistency. Even an Administrative of Inaction Unlimited must remember that a systematic set of Service Rules is vital not only in fulfilment of its constitutional obligation under the proviso to Article 309 but also to keep the morale and to promote contentment among the Civil Services by eliminating the `inglorious uncertainties about career prospects which cut at the root of planned living." 28. In Ramendra Singh and others v. Jagdish Prasad and others, ( AIR 1984 SC 885 ), the Supreme Court again held that in the absence of any legislation on the subject or a rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the State Government could regulate its public services in the exercise of its executive power, but if there is statutory rule or an act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it could not in exercise of the executive power under Article 162, ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act. In our opinion, this decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. The Crown Rules of 1962 are statutory rules. In our opinion, this decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. The Crown Rules of 1962 are statutory rules. They continued to be applicable under Article 313 of the Constitution of India and, as such, the executive could not in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India frame administrative instructions which are contrary to the rules. The administrative instructions, consequently, issued on 29th June, 1968, could not stand in view of the Statutory Crown Rules of 1942. 29. In a recent decision in P.D. Aggarwal and others v. State of U.P. and others, ( AIR 1987 SC 1676 ) : (1987) Lab IC 1307), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the validity of an Office Memorandum issued on December 7, 1961, purporting to amend the U.P. Service of Engineers (Buildings and Road Branch) Class II Rules, 1936, which came up for consideration, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Office Memorandum cannot override, amend or supersede the statutory rules. The Memorandum is nothing but an administrative order or instruction, and as such, it cannot amend or supersede the statutory rules by adding something therein. In the instant case, consequently, the mere fact that notification No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968 merely by naming it as an Office Memorandum, cannot have the effect of overriding, amending or superseding of the statutory rules, which were applicable to the State Law Officers of the High Court, namely, the Crown Rules of 1942. 30. In view of the above decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is now well established that the statutory rules cannot be superseded by mere executive or administrative instructions or by issuance of an Office Memorandum relating to the appointment or a tenure of members of a public service in the State or in relation to members holding posts in connection with the affairs of the State. 31. The Crown Rules 1942 created a service of Law Officers in the State. It was laid down that they are tenure posts and are classed as specialists. They carried with them part time civil employment under the Crown. 31. The Crown Rules 1942 created a service of Law Officers in the State. It was laid down that they are tenure posts and are classed as specialists. They carried with them part time civil employment under the Crown. It was also laid down under Rule 14 that the Governor reserves to himself the right to remove or suspend any Law Officer at any time during his term of office or misconduct or dereliction of duty subject to the provision that no Law Officer shall be so removed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence. It is, therefore, clear that under the Crown Rules of 1942, there was a specific rule that no Law Officer could be removed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence. Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968 as amended from time to time laying down general instructions regulating the appointment and tenure of the State Law Officers of the State in the High Court provides in Clause 6 that the appointment as a Law Officer is only a provisional engagement terminable at will on either side and accordingly, the Governor reserves a right to terminate the engagement of any Law Officer at any time without assigning any cause. This clause 6 of the Office Memorandum directly in conflict with the statutory Crown Rules of 1942. Clause 6 contemplates that the Law Officers in the High Court could be removed without assigning any cause and without affording any opportunity to the Law Officers. This clause, in effect, supersedes the statutory rules contained in the Crown Rules of 1942 and, as such, this Clause 6 cannot be given effect to as it is ultra to the 1942 Rules. 32. It is not disputed that no opportunity was given to the State Law Officers either on the Civil Side or on the criminal side before passing the order dated 23rd July, 1990, terminating the services of the State Law Officers. This could not have been done. The first submission, therefore, made on behalf of the petitioners is well founded. 32. It is not disputed that no opportunity was given to the State Law Officers either on the Civil Side or on the criminal side before passing the order dated 23rd July, 1990, terminating the services of the State Law Officers. This could not have been done. The first submission, therefore, made on behalf of the petitioners is well founded. The notification No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968 issued under Article 309 of the Constitution of India rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 as well as the Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June 1968 as amended issuing general instructions regulating the appointment and tenure of the Law Officers of the State are both invalid in law and what is applicable to State Law Officers are the Crown Rules of 1942. Since an opportunity had been given to the State Law Officer whose services have been terminated, as required by Rule 14 of the Crown Rules of 1942, the orders dated 23rd July, 1990 terminating the services of the State Law Officers, both on the civil side as well as on the criminal side are invalid in law. 33. The second submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that even in accordance with the office memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968 already quoted above petitioners' appointment is treated only as a matter of professional engagement, then too they are holders of a 'public office' and consequently Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is applicable to the case and since the order of termination has been passed without any cause, it is wholly arbitrary and consequently liable to be set aside. In this connection an additional point has been raised in regard to the Public Prosecutors. The case of the Public Prosecutor is that the appointment of a Public Prosecutor having been made after consultation with the High Court the services of the Public Prosecutors could not have come to an end without approval of the High Court. 34. In Chapter I paragraph 1.06 Law Officers of the Government have been enumerated. They include Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocates, Assistant Government Advocates in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow and are now designated as Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors. They also include Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow. In Chapter I paragraph 1.06 Law Officers of the Government have been enumerated. They include Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocates, Assistant Government Advocates in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow and are now designated as Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors. They also include Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow. In the circumstances, petitioners who consist of the State Law Officers both in the civil and criminal sides, are holders of an office and consequently they are designated as Law Officers of the State. 35. Chapter IV of the Legal Remembrancer Manual deals with the Public Prosecutor while Chapter V of the Legal Remembrancer Manual deals with the Chief Standing Counsel and the State Counsel in the High Court. Both these Chapters lay down the responsibilities of the State Law Officers and their duties. The State Law Officers are responsible for conducting of all criminal and civil cases in the High Court. They represent the State Government in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow. The manner in which the State Law Officers have to be appointed is mentioned in the office memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1988. The counsel who are appointed by virtue of this office memorandum are designated as Law Officers of the State and then appointments have to be notified in the Gazette. Their eligibility has also been defined. The appointments have to be made of the Law Officers if they have completed minimum period of standing as an Advocate and the appointment is also made by the Governor. It is laid down that the Governor may if he thinks fit take into consideration the view of tie Advocate General or the Chief Justice or other Judges of the High Court or any Committee which the Governor may constitute for the purposes. The fees and other terms and conditions of appointment of the State Law Officers is governed by any general or special order passed by the Governor. In fact, now the State Law Officers are paid monthly remuneration and they are paid from Government funds. The State Law Officers are initially appointed for a term of one year which term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time. In the circumstances the State Law Officers also have tenure. In fact, now the State Law Officers are paid monthly remuneration and they are paid from Government funds. The State Law Officers are initially appointed for a term of one year which term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time. In the circumstances the State Law Officers also have tenure. From the above provisions it is clear that the State Law Officers are holders of a 'public office'. They are appointed by the Governor, paid by the Government and they are appointed for a tenure. 36. In Prithwinath Chowdhry v. State of U.P., (1959 All LI 323) a question arose as to whether a person appointed as an Additional Government Advocate under the Crown Rules of 1942 was holder of a civil post or not. A Division Bench of this Court took the view that the Additional Government Advocate viz. State Law Officers appointed under the Crown Rules of 1942 was holder of a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. 37. In Shivamurthy Swamy Inamdar v. Anadi Sanganna Andanappa. (1971 Vol. III SOC 870). the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down five tests to determine as to whether an office in question if an office under a Government and whether it is an office of profit. The five tests are (1) whether the Government makes the appointment: (2) Whether the Government has a right to remove or dismiss the holder, (3) Whether the Government pays the remuneration (4) What are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the Government; and (5) Does the Government exercise any control over the performance of those functions? In the case of State Law Officers it is not disputed that the Government makes appointment. It is also not disputed that the Government has a right to remove the State Law Officers. It is also not disputed that the Government pays remuneration. It is also not disputed that the State Law Officers act as a counsel on behalf of the Government. The four tests, therefore, mentioned above are fully satisfied. In regard to the fifth test it is to be considered whether the Government exercise any control over the working of the State Law Officers. It is also not disputed that the State Law Officers act as a counsel on behalf of the Government. The four tests, therefore, mentioned above are fully satisfied. In regard to the fifth test it is to be considered whether the Government exercise any control over the working of the State Law Officers. Clause 6 of the office memorandum dated 26th June, 1968 clearly provides that appointment initially shall be made for a period of one year and it can be renewed for a period of three years at a time. The question of removal will only arise when the Government examines the performance of the State Law Officers and then passes an order of removal. Clause 3.04 of the L.R. Manual also provides that the Legal Remembrancer shall be the Chief Law Officer of the Government and his jurisdiction extends to whole of the U.P. All other officers except the Advocate General shall be in his control and supervision. It is, therefore, clear that the Legal Remembrancer acts on behalf of the Government and exercises control and supervision over the State Law Officers. The fifth test in our opinion is also satisfied. We are consequently of the opinion that the post held by the State Law Officer is a public post under the Government. The State Law Officers hold specific posts and consequently they are holders of a public office. 38. In Mundrika Prasad v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1979 SC 1871 ), the question arose as to whether a Government pleader can be held to be a holder of a public post. The Hon'ble Supreme Court repelled the contentions of the Advocate General in that case that the Government pleader is only agent of the Government and he would not be holder of public office. It categorically held as follows at page SC 1874; AIR 1979 : "I am clearly of the opinion that having regard to the fact that the Government Pleader of this Court is employed by the State on remuneration paid from the public exchequer and having regard to the various functions and duties to be performed by him in the due exercise of that office, most of which are of an independent and responsible character, the office must be held to be a public office within the scope of a quo warranto proceedings. I consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erle. J. in (1851) 17 QB 149. The three criteria are source of the office, the tenure and the duties. I have applied that test and I am of opinion that the conclusion that the office is a public office is irresistible." As has been held in Mundrika Prasad v. State of Bihar (supra) that the Government Pleader is holder of public office, the same principle would apply in the case of State Law Officers. They are also appointed by the Government. They have a tenure. They act on behalf of the Government. In the circumstances the office of the State Law Officer has to be held as 'public office'. 39. Recently in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. v. State of U.P. and others in Writ Petition No. 786 of 1990 decided on 20-9-1990 JT 1990 (4) SC 211, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question as to whether office held by the Government Counsel (civil, criminal and revenue) in all the districts of the State is a public office or not. After examining the various authorities it came to the conclusion that the District Government Counsel holds a public office and the argument of the Additional Government Advocate that the appointment of the District Government Counsel by the State Government is only a professional engagement like that between private client and a lawyer was not accepted. Similar principles are applicable to the State Law Officers in the High Court. 40. So far as the Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutors are concerned now under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 the State Government has to make an appointment after consultation with the High Court. Sub-clause (7) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 further prescribes that a person shall be eligible to be appointed as Public Prosecutor only if he has been in profession as an Advocate for not less than seven years. There is clearly statutory element attached to the appointment by virtue of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The provisions of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are also applicable in the case of the Public Prosecutors and the Additional Public Prosecutors. There is clearly statutory element attached to the appointment by virtue of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The provisions of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are also applicable in the case of the Public Prosecutors and the Additional Public Prosecutors. While considering the case of a District Government Counsel (criminal only) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Km. Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) has opined as follows "In the case of Public Prosecutors also known as District Government Counsel (Criminal), there can be no doubt about the statutory element attaching to such appointments by virtue of these provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In this context Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is also significant. 11 Section 321 permits withdrawal from prosecution by the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced. This power of the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case is derived from statute and the guiding consideration for it must be the interest of administration of justice. There can be no doubt that this function of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of Public Prosecutors, this additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure undoubtedly invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case will equally apply to the case of the Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutors appointed in the High Court. 41. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the State Law Officers in the High Court are holder of a 'public office'. 42. Since the office held by the State Law Officers is a public office under the State, Article 16 of the Constitution of India would clearly apply to the instant case. 41. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the State Law Officers in the High Court are holder of a 'public office'. 42. Since the office held by the State Law Officers is a public office under the State, Article 16 of the Constitution of India would clearly apply to the instant case. It is now well settled that Article 16 would also apply to a case of termination, refer State of U.P. v. Bhola Nath Srivastava, (AIR 1972 Allahabad 460 : 1972 All U 457)); Suresh Prakash Agarwal v. State of U.P., (1970 AU 351); Abdul Ahad v. Inspector General of Police, (AIR 1965 Allahabad 142: (1964 All LJ 791)) (FB) and General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (AIR 1962 SC 36). 43. Since Article 14 of the Constitution of India is only an instance of the application of the general rule of the policy laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is attracted to the present case and it is now to be examined as to whether the impugned orders suffer from the vice of the arbitrariness or not. In the case of Km. Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, however, further laid down that even otherwise without public element so obvious in these appointments, the appointment and its concomitants viewed as purely contractual matters after the appointment is made also attracts Article 14 and exclude arbitrariness permitting judicial review of the impugned State action. 44. In order to consider the question as to whether the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1990, terminating the engagement of the Chief Standing Counsel, Standing Counsel and the Additional Public Prosecutors, is arbitrary it is necessary to quote the actual order passed by the State Government on 23rd July, 1990. It is Government Order No. D-2015/Sat-Niyu-3/90, issued by Sri A.K. Singh, Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer to the Advocate General, State of Uttar Pradesh. The original order is in Hindi. The English translation of the said order is quoted below : No. D-2015/Sat-Niyu-3/90 From: A. K. Singh, Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer, Government of Uttar Pradesh. To Advocate General, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad/Lucknow. Judicial Section-3/Appointments/Lucknow, Dated 23rd July, 1990. Subject : Termination of engagements of Chief Standing Counsel/Standing Counsel/Additional Public Prosecutors in the High Court. The English translation of the said order is quoted below : No. D-2015/Sat-Niyu-3/90 From: A. K. Singh, Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer, Government of Uttar Pradesh. To Advocate General, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad/Lucknow. Judicial Section-3/Appointments/Lucknow, Dated 23rd July, 1990. Subject : Termination of engagements of Chief Standing Counsel/Standing Counsel/Additional Public Prosecutors in the High Court. Sir, I have been directed to say that the Governor is pleased to accord approval to hereby terminate from the forenoon of 24 July, 1990 the tenure of engagement of Chief Standing Counsel/Standing Counsel/Additional Public Prosecutors engaged in the High Court. Allahabad and Lucknow Bench and mentioned in the list attached. 2. I have also been directed to say that governmental work should not be given with immediate effect to the counsel whose tenure of engagement has been terminated hereby and it should be ensured that such files, records, letter sets as had been handed over to them prior to this are taken back immediately. Sd/-Illegible. (A.K. Singh) Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer." Encl : As mentioned above 45. Along with the above order has been annexed a list of twenty-six State Law Officers, which consists of the Chief Standing Counsel, Standing Counsel and the Additional Public Prosecutors, both in the Allahabad High Court and in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. As would he apparent from the order, no reason has been given as to why the engagement of these twenty-six State Law Officers is being terminated. 46. The learned Additional Advocate General Has, in this connection relied upon clause 6 of the Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968, which has already been quoted in the earlier part of this judgment. His submission is that in accordance with clause 6, the appointment of the legal practitioner as a State Law Officer is only a professional engagement; it is terminable at will and, consequently, the Governor had the right to terminate the engagement of the State Law Officers at any time without assigning any cause. His submission is that the engagement is merely contractual and, as such, it is not necessary that there should be a cause for termination and it is also not necessary to give any reason as to why the engagements were terminated. 47. His submission is that the engagement is merely contractual and, as such, it is not necessary that there should be a cause for termination and it is also not necessary to give any reason as to why the engagements were terminated. 47. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect of a similar clause like clause 6 on which the Additional Advocate General is.relying upon which relates to the termination of engagement of the District Government Counsel. The Clause, which was under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is sub-clause (3) of para-7.06 of the Legal Remembrancers Manual, which reads as under : "The appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointed to a post under the Government. Accordingly, the Government reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause. 48. While interpreting sub-clause (3) of para-7.03 of the Legal Remembrancers Manual, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "The other part of clause 6 which enables the Government to terminate the appointment ,at any time without assigning any cause' can also not be considered in the manner, suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression 'at any time' merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and 'without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, 'without assigning any cause' is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not-to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and others, ( AIR 1984 SC 1271 : (1984) 3 SCC 465 ), that the expression 'without assigning any reason' implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but a termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause 3 of pars 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with the appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment maybe terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the Government which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby' save it from any attack to its validity." The principle which has been made applicable by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of the District Government Counsel will equally apply to the case of the U.P. State Law Officers. In Clause 6, the words 'without assigning any cause' cannot be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It does not mean that it is a sweet will of the Government that it can terminate the engagement at any time without the existence of any cogent reason. The cause may not be stated in the order terminating the engagement, but it must be on the record. The termination cannot be wholly arbitrary. The learned Additional Advocate General, in the instant case, has conceded that there was no cause for termination and, as such, no reason has been given in the order of termination. His case is that the relationship between the State. Government and its counsel requires a high degree of mutual trust and confidence. It is a relationship of a fiduciary character and as such, no reason need be given for terminating the engagement. In view of the above law, this position cannot be accepted. His case is that the relationship between the State. Government and its counsel requires a high degree of mutual trust and confidence. It is a relationship of a fiduciary character and as such, no reason need be given for terminating the engagement. In view of the above law, this position cannot be accepted. The office held by a State Law Officer is a public office. It cannot be terminated without any cause and, admittedly, there being no cause the termination order is arbitrary. 49. In support of Clause 6 of the Office Memorandum dated 29th June, 1968. the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1990, is violative of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India, as the order is wholly arbitrary and by one stroke of pen, all the twenty-six State Law Officers' engagement has been terminated without the Government applying its mind to each individual case, the tenure in respect for which each State Law Officer was appointed and the number of years put by him as the State Law Officer. In fact, it is urged that the impugned order has been passed on a mere whim and fancy of the State Government. It is alleged that the Government has merely picked up arbitrarily some of the State Counsel without following any of the norms or guidelines and has terminated their engagement. 50. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a number of cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein principles have been laid down as to what should be considered as an arbitrary exercise of power. It is needless to refer and consider each of the cases separately, as now, during the hearing of this petition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on 24th September, 1990 considered this question in regard to the District Government Counsel of the State Government in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others (supra). We consequently, refer only to the law laid down in this latest case by the, Hon'ble Supreme Court. We consequently, refer only to the law laid down in this latest case by the, Hon'ble Supreme Court. In regard to arbitrariness, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vide of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with the private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and the private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind. 51. The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in the manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This is what men in power must remember, always.......... 52. No doubt, it is for the person alleging arbitrariness who has to prove it. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is contrary to the prescribed mode of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is contrary to the prescribed mode of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. If this is shown, then the burden is shifted to the State to repel the attack by disclosing the material and reasons which led to the action being taken in order to show that it was an informed decision which was reasonable. If after a prima facie case of arbitrariness is made out, the State is unable to show that the decision is an informed action which is reasonable, the State action must perish as arbitrary." 53. As already observed above, no reason has been given in the order terminating the engagement of the State Law Officers. The learned Additional Advocate-General had also stated that there is no reason or case for terminating their engagement except that the, engagement has been terminated, as it was a matter of mutual confidence. Sri A.K. Singh, Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer to the State of Uttar Pradesh in the Judicial Department, Lucknow, has also filed a counter affidavit in this Court. He has also not given any reason as to why the engagement of the twenty-six State Law Officers has been terminated. The only ground given is that it is a professional engagement and, consequently, it is the sweet will of the Government to terminate the engagement. It has been stated in the counter affidavit that a counsel cannot compel or force a client to engage him on his own terms He can also not dictate his own terms to him. Reciprocally, a client cannot impose his own terms on his counsel. The relationship between the both is purely contractual and they are governed by the terms of the contract of their professional engagement. 54. It is not disputed that, in some cases of termination of the engagement, even the tenure for which the State Law Officers had been appointed had not been completed. It is also not disputed that many State Law Officers have worked in this Court for more than ten years. There was no complaint against the State Law Officers neither any mention has been made in the counter affidavit of any complaint made against any State Law Officers. It is also not disputed that many State Law Officers have worked in this Court for more than ten years. There was no complaint against the State Law Officers neither any mention has been made in the counter affidavit of any complaint made against any State Law Officers. The engagement of all the State Law Officers has been terminated merely on account of the professional engagement and the right of the State Government to terminate the engagement unilaterally. From the facts and circumstances on the record, it is clearly established that the order dated 23rd July, 1990, terminating the engagement of the my-six State Law Officers was wholly arbitrary. There was no application of mind the State Government on each individual case. By one stroke of pen, the engagement all the twenty-six State Law Officers has terminated. This possibly cannot be me. In our opinion, therefore, it is clear, t the order dated 23rd July, 1990, suffers) from the vice of arbitrariness and is hit by, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and, consequently, liable to be set aside. 55. We will now consider the additional submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in so far as public prosecutors, are concerned. Public prosecutors are now appointed in the manner laid down in Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 24(1), (2), (7) and (8) are relevant so far as the appointment of Public Prosecutors in the High Court is concerned. They are quoted below : "24(1). For every High Court, the Central. Government or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be. (2) The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting any case or class of cases in any district or local area. (3) .......... (7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section(3) or sub-section (6) only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than 'seven years. (3) .......... (7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section(3) or sub-section (6) only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than 'seven years. (8) The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purpose of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor." 56. Section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that for every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the' case may be. The qualification for' appointment of a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor is that the person roust have practised as an Advocate for not less than seven years. It is, therefore, clear that a Public Prosecutor as well as an Additional Public Prosecutor can only be, appointed after consultation with the High Court. 57. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed great reliance on the expression `after consultation with the High Court' and it has been urged that since the appointment of a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor is made `after consultation with the High Court; the order terminating the engagement as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor can only be' made `after consultation with the High Court'. The termination has to be in the same manner as the appointment is made and, since, admittedly, there was no consultation with the High Court before terminating the appointment of the Public Prosecutors, the order dated 23rd July, 1990, is alleged to be invalid on that ground. 58. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two cases; one of the Bombay High Court and the other of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Mohammad Ilyas v. State of Maharashtra is a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1965 Bombay 156. 58. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two cases; one of the Bombay High Court and the other of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Mohammad Ilyas v. State of Maharashtra is a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1965 Bombay 156. The Bombay High Court has held in the case of District Judges that the power of dismissal of the District Judges has to be read in Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India with the aid of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. It was held that the a exercise of power of dismissal has to be in the same manner as the exercise of the power of appointment and, therefore, even the power of dismissal will have to be exercised by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. 59. The case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel is a decision given in Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., (1966 All LJ 778) : ( AIR 1966 SC 1987 ). In this case, the question which was being considered by the Supreme Court, was in regard to the appointment of a District Judge. None of the aforementioned two cases relate to a case of a Public Prosecutor. 60. Article 233 of the Constitution of India provides that the appointment of persons to be and the posting and promotion of District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 also provides for appointment of Public Prosecutor `after consultation with the High Court'. There is a clear distinction between the case of District Judge and that of Public Prosecutors. In the case of Public Prosecutors there is no further control of the High Court after appointment while in the case of District Judges Article 235 of the Constitution confers in the High Court complete control over them and the High Court has also power to regulate the conditions of service. The High Court consequently controls also the termination of services of a District Judge. 61. In the cases before the Bombay High Court, as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question was in regard to the District Judge. The High Court consequently controls also the termination of services of a District Judge. 61. In the cases before the Bombay High Court, as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question was in regard to the District Judge. If the Parliament intended that the termination of services of a Public Prosecutor was to be under the control of the High Court then a specific provision would have been made requiring consultation of the High Court even at the time of termination. 62. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act reads as under : "16. Where by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any' person appointed whether by itself or any other authority in exercise of that power." 63. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act only lays down the principle that the authority having the power to make an appointment will also have power to dismiss unless a different intention is culled out from the provisions applicable to an employee. 64. In Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which lays down the manner of appointment of Public Prosecutors and 'Additional Public Prosecutors, there is no impediment for the Government terminating the appointment of the Public Prosecutors. There is also no power of supervision of the Public Prosecutors in the High Court. It therefore, clear that the intention of t Legislature was not to put an impediment on the power of the State Government t terminate the engagement of any Public Prosecutor in case there was a cause for sue termination. The principle, which has bee relied upon to District Judges by the Bombay High Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chandra Mohan's case (supra) would not possibly apply to the case of a Public Prosecutor. 65. Great reliance has, however, been placed on Section 321, Cr. P. C. wherein power has been given to the Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw the Prosecution. 65. Great reliance has, however, been placed on Section 321, Cr. P. C. wherein power has been given to the Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw the Prosecution. It is urged that in case with the change of Government, absolute discretion is left with the State Government to terminate the engagement of a Public Prosecutor then it will not be possible for the Public Prosecutor to effectively discharge his duties, as required by Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In our opinion, merely because the Public Prosecutor has to discharge hi duties under Section 321 of the Code Criminal Procedure, 1973, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended that the High Court should be consulted at the time of termination also. As we have already held above, even in the case of a Public Prosecutor, the State Government cannot arbitrarily terminate the engagement. It has to be for a cause and, therefore, any termination can be matter of judicial review and the order of the State Government cannot possibly be arbitrary. This, in our opinion, is a sufficient safeguard on the right of the Government to terminate the appointment of a Public Prosecutor. We, consequently, do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that even at the time of termination of an appointment of a Public Prosecutor it should e done only after consultation with the High Court. We, therefore, uphold the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, that the order dated 23rd July, 1990, is arbitrary and, consequently, violative of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India, but the order cannot be bad merely because no consultation has been done with the High Court in regard to the case of the Additional Public Prosecutors. So far as the ultimate decision is concerned, whether the termination order has been passed after consultation with the High Court or not is not very material as, in the instant case, we have held, the termination being otherwise arbitrary and invalid. 66. So far as the ultimate decision is concerned, whether the termination order has been passed after consultation with the High Court or not is not very material as, in the instant case, we have held, the termination being otherwise arbitrary and invalid. 66. The third submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that clause 6 of the office memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968 which provides that the termination of the professional engagement can be made at any time without assigning any cause is ultra vires as it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India since it gives an arbitrary and unfettered power to the Governor to terminate the professional engagement at any time without assigning any cause. 67. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied on many decisions but the three main decisions relied upon are AIR 1987 SC 111 : (1987 Lab IC 25), O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.; AIR 1985 SC 722 : (1985 Lab IC 885), West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and AIR 1988 SC 286 : (1988 Lab IC 380) M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank. 68. In view of the interpretation which we have put on the expression 'without assigning any cause' it is necessary to consider this submission as this clause cannot then be held to be arbitrary. We have already held that 'without assigning any cause' implies that the cause and reasons for the decision must exist on the record otherwise the decision would be arbitrary. If necessary and should the occasion warrant the cause and reasons can be communicated. Since the cause and reasons must exist before action is to be taken under Clause 6 of the office memorandum it cannot be said that Invoking of Clause 6 would be an arbitrary exercise of the powers. Before the professional engagement is terminated a cause must exist and the reasons for such an action must be found on the record. 69. It will, however, be appropriate at this stage to consider as to in what manner the Governor can take action of termination of professional engagement under Clause 6. Before the professional engagement is terminated a cause must exist and the reasons for such an action must be found on the record. 69. It will, however, be appropriate at this stage to consider as to in what manner the Governor can take action of termination of professional engagement under Clause 6. Since a cause must exist before professional engagement could be terminated, the proper cause which should be adopted is that as soon as it is found on enquiry or a complaint is received that there is some cause against a State Law Officer on the basis of which State wants to take action for determination of professional engagement. State Law Officer should be informed of the charge against him and he should be given an opportunity of giving an explanation. It is, however, not necessary that a detailed enquiry be held, as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. The State Law Officer holds 'Public office' and, as such, he is entitled to give his version and to controvert the charge levelled against him in order to enable the Government to come to the conclusion as to whether the charge against the State Law Officer is made out or not. 70. In Clause 6, referred to above, the appointment of the State Law Officer is initially for a period of one year. This term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time. If the State Government wants to terminate the engagement before the expiry of the period of one year. It cannot do so unless the officer concerned is given an opportunity to explain the charge or charges against him. Similarly, even after the expiry of the period of one year, the State Law Officer gets a right to be considered for renewal for a period not exceeding three years at a time fixed. The period can be extended for three years at a time and a number of time, there is no limitation. If it is proposed not to renew the term, then the State Law Officer would be entitled to know as to why and for what reason his term is not being renewed. These limitations on the power of the State Government to terminate the assignment is implied in Clause 6. This modality will also; ensure a proper selection and appointment of State Law Officer. These limitations on the power of the State Government to terminate the assignment is implied in Clause 6. This modality will also; ensure a proper selection and appointment of State Law Officer. In a system of accountability selection of an incumbent to a public post is as much a matter of responsibility as the matter of termination of his assignment. 71. In Bool Chand v. Kurushetra. University, AIR 1968 SC 292 : (1968 Lab IC 232), a question arose as to whether a Vice-Chancellor who is appointed for a tenure could his service be determined unilaterily without giving him an opportunity at all to the Vice-Chancellor. It was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that once an appointment is made in pursuance of a Statute though the appointing authority is, not precluded from determining the employment. The decision of the appointing authority to terminate the appointment may be based only upon the result of the enquiry held in the manner consistent with the basic concept of -justice and fairplay. It was further observed as follows (at page SC 297 : AIR 1968) : "The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor Ihas its source in the University Act; investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment; but the power is coupled with duty. The power may not be exercised arbitrarily; it can be only exercised for good cause i.e. in the interests of the University and only when it is found, after due enquiry held - in the manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that the holder of the office is unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor." "The, Supreme Court further observed as follows : "I find a unbroken line of authority to The effect that an officer cannot lawfully be dismissed without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held after relying upon the dictum of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40) : "The case of the appellant falls within the third class mentioned by Lord Reid and the tenure of his office could not be interrupted without first informing him to what was alleged against him and without giving him an opportunity to make his defence or explanation." 72. We are, therefore, clear that in the case of a State Law Officer the appointment is for a tenure 'or even in the case where the tenure has expired and he is continuing until further orders' expecting for renewal of his term he is entitled to make his defence and submit an explanation to any charge levelled against him on the basis of which the State Government feels that the term should either be put to an end or it be not renewed. 73. In Legal Remembrancer's Manual pars 1.06 enumerates Law Officers. The Advocate General Uttar Pradesh is at No. 1 in the list. He is the highest Law Officer of the Government. Para 2.01 lays down that the Advocate General shall be the Chief Legal Adviser of the Government. He shall advise the Governor on any legal matter or on any project of legislation on which he may be consulted. Para 2.19 is very significant. It provides that the Advocate General shall be in overall charge of all the State Counsel in the High Court and shall superintend, control and direct the conduct of all important cases of the Government in the High Court and the Supreme Court. Chapter III of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual deals with Legal Remembrancer to the Government. Paragraph 3.04. provides that the Legal Remembrancer shall be the Chief Law Officer, of the Government and his jurisdiction extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. All other law officers except the Advocate General shall be under his control and supervision. On a reading of these paragraphs it is clear that paragraph 3.04 has to be read subject to paragraph 2.19. The power of the Legal Remembrancer in regard to the control, and supervision of the State Law Officers is, subject to the powers given to the Advocate General in paragraph 2.19. It is, therefore, the Advocate General, who is head of the, entire State Counsel in the High Court. He, has a power to superintend, control and direct the conduct of all important cases of they Government in the High Court. It is not disputed and is specifically laid down in Crown Rules, 1942 that the post of the State Law, Officers is a tenure post and they are classed as specialists. He, has a power to superintend, control and direct the conduct of all important cases of they Government in the High Court. It is not disputed and is specifically laid down in Crown Rules, 1942 that the post of the State Law, Officers is a tenure post and they are classed as specialists. The Legal Remembrancer sitting, in his closed chamber in the office at Lucknow cannot possibly judge the conduct of the State Law Officers who are working in the High Court at Allahabad or in the Bench at Lucknow. It is the Advocate General alone who would be in position to judge the merit or demerit of the State Law Officers and whether a particular State Law Officer is able to conduct the cases of the Government in a proper manner. In our view, therefore, before fly action for termination of an engagement of a State Law Officer is proposed the, Advocate General of the State has to be consulted in that regard. It is only when the Advocate General agrees that the charges against the State Law Officer is made out hen alone the State Government has a power to terminate his engagement. If this power is pot given to the Advocate General then there is likelihood of the exercise of the arbitrary power by the State Government in determining the professional engagement of the State Law Officers. 74. We are, therefore, of the opinion that not only a cause must exist before terminating the engagement of the State Law Officer, but the said cause must be such in respect of which the Advocate General is satisfied that the gravity of the cause makes it necessary that the professional engagement be terminated. If both these conditions do not exist, there cannot be termination of the professional engagement of a State Law Officer. 75. The fourth submission made on behalf of the petitioners relates to the validity of certain terms and conditions laid down in the orders dated 30th June, 1989, the order dated 6th November, 1989 the order dated 26th May, 1990 and the order dated 28th June, 1990. 76. There are two orders of the same date 30th June, 1989 one relating to the State Law Officers on the civil side and the other, order relates to the State Law Officers on the Criminal side. The contents in both these orders are the same. 76. There are two orders of the same date 30th June, 1989 one relating to the State Law Officers on the civil side and the other, order relates to the State Law Officers on the Criminal side. The contents in both these orders are the same. The petitioners have challenged condition Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the, said orders which are quoted below : "3. During the period of engagement, they aforesaid counsel shall not be permitted to do cases (civil criminal, writs etc.) other than] various types of cases of the State and they shall not do private practice in this office. 4. In the event of absence of more than, one working day proportionate deduction shall be made from remuneration payable. 5. Every aforesaid counsel shall keep the details of the work done each day in a diary which, if demanded, shall be produced for perusal of the Joint Legal Remembrancer in the office of State Law Officers or any other Deputy L.R./L.R./Addl. L.R./L.R. of the Government. 6. Appearance on behalf of corporations/II undertakings/autonomous Institutions/authorities connected with the Government can be only with the prior permission of Legal Remembrancer." In the order dated 6th November, 19891 further conditions have been laid down. The condition Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 which have also been challenged are quoted below : "2. I have also been directed to say that, Chief Standing Counsel/Additional Chief, Standing Counsel/Standing Counsel/Public -Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor who had made available to the Government their consent for engagement under the terms mentioned in the Government order dated 30-6-1989 by the date prescribed under the said Government Order dated 30-6-1989 should send the names and the details of concerned matters of maximum three such Public undertakings/Corporations/Boards/Autonomous Institutions/Authorities on whose behalf they want permission to appear so that Legal Remembrancer may consider grant of permission in respect of that. 3. It has come to the notice of the Government that the diary of work done on each working day is also not being maintained regularly by these counsel as has been directed by the aforementioned Government order in absence of which due to non-verification of the work done drawing and disbursing of monthly fees would not be proper. 4. 3. It has come to the notice of the Government that the diary of work done on each working day is also not being maintained regularly by these counsel as has been directed by the aforementioned Government order in absence of which due to non-verification of the work done drawing and disbursing of monthly fees would not be proper. 4. I have been directed to clarify that fee bills relating to all such matters should be sent by the counsel through the under taking/corporation/Board and autonomous Institution/Authority for verification to Nyay (Lekha) Anubhag and the concerned Corporation/undertaking/Institutions shall make payments from their budget only after their verification by Nyay (Lekha) Anubhag. 5. Therefore, I have been directed to say again that every officer shall keep the details of the work done each day in a diary which shall be verified at the end of each month by the Legal Remembrancer, Additional Legal Remembrancer/Joint Legal Remembrancer on the basis of which alone drawing and disbursing of fees of that month shall be done. In any month absence of only one working day shall he condoned but in the event of no work done or absence of more than one working day in any month proportionate deduction shall be made from the monthly remuneration of the concerned counsel. The order dated 26th June, 1989 however, has been challenged as a whole since it abolishes entire system of the engagement of the Brief Holders. By order dated 28-6-1989 the power of the Chief Standing Counsel were taken away and conferred on the Joint Legal Remembrancer posted in the High Court. He was also given power to distribute the work to the Standing Counsel. A further power was given to appoint special counsel for any special manner before the High Court. In effect, the superintending power has been given to the Joint Legal Remembrancer by this order. It is not now necessary to go into the validity of this superintending power given by the order dated 28th June, 1990 as after the earing of these petitions had been concluded and judgment was reserved a supplementary affidavit dated 16th October, 1990, has been filed on behalf of the State sworn by Sheo Baran Singh. Joint Legal Remembrancer, High Court, Allahabad, wherein it has been stated that by subsequent Government order dated 5-10-1990 the Government Order dated 28th June, 1990 has been withdrawn. Joint Legal Remembrancer, High Court, Allahabad, wherein it has been stated that by subsequent Government order dated 5-10-1990 the Government Order dated 28th June, 1990 has been withdrawn. We will now consider the validity of the various conditions laid down in the Government orders which have already been quoted above. 77. On a reading of the above orders and conditions mentioned therein a question arises that can we call this action on the part of the State Government dignified treatment to the State Law Officers. Paying them a paltry salary, cutting salary even for day's absence, putting a complete ban on private practice, directing maintenance of a diary to be inspected by the subordinate judicial officer of the State, regulating even the engagement as Counsel on behalf of the public bodies, permission being required and billing in respect of the work done for public bodies to be under the complete control of the State Government prima facie it appears to us that this treatment is being meted out to the counsel of this Court as an outcome of malice for the Bar so that if any one wants to become State Counsel be should make himself completely subservient to the Legal Remembrancer and the rights and liberty of counsel has to be placed in his hands and he can, at the same time, exercise power of summary dismissal at his sweet will. The Legal Remembrancer wants to arrogate more powers to himself than warranted. The institution of State Counsel is not to be run as a zamindari system with the Legal Remembrancer as its izar. 78. main-challenge in regard to the validity of the various conditions in the impugned orders is that all these conditions in the various orders are arbitrary and are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are, consequently, not maintainable in law. In the case of Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (supra), which has already been quoted in extenso, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the question as to when the orders will be held to be arbitrary as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been laid down that the question whether a particular act of the State Government is arbitrary or not is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. It has been laid down that the question whether a particular act of the State Government is arbitrary or not is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The test laid down is that the Court has to see as to whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned order and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. Rules of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. The observation made in the case of S.G. Jai singhani v. Union of India, ( 1967 (2) SCR 703 ) : ( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ), given in the year 1967 have been reiterated in the decision and it has been held that the discretion means "sound discretion guided by law". It must be governed by rule, not humour. It must not be, arbitrary, vague and fanciful. It has been further held that it is for the person alleging arbitrariness to prove it. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the State Action is uninformed by reason and thereafter burden shifts on the State to show that it was informed decision which was reasonable and, in case State is unable to show that the decision is uninformed the State action must perish as arbitrary. In the leading case (Writ Petition No. 22578 of 1989) counter-affidavit on behalf of the State has been filed by Sri K.L. Sharma, Judicial Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer, State of U.P. In the entire affidavit the attitude of the State Government is writ large. Their case is that the State Government cannot be compelled to continue engagement of those counsel who are not willing to comply with the conditions prescribed in the Government orders. The case is that the appointment of the State Law Officer is a pure professional engagement and as such the client has a right to offer remuneration which he wants to pay and the counsel has a right to accept the same or decline the offer. The case taken is that no counsel can compel the client to engage him on his own terms. The case taken is that no counsel can compel the client to engage him on his own terms. If the terms offered by the counsel are accepted by a client he may engage a counsel although the term may be harsh or unreasonable. It will depend on the offer and acceptance which complete a contract. It is not a case that a counsel has no option but to work on the conditions imposed by the Government. If any condition is taken to be unreasonable counsel has a right to refuse engagement on the said terms but in no case the counsel can impose his own terms against the wishes of the client. This in our opinion, is a very peculiar attitude taken on behalf of the State Government. The State cannot take this arbitrary attitude that even if the terms are harsh or unreasonable then too it is for the counsel to accept or not to accept the engagement but if they accept they have to accept it on the terms offered by it. It is an attitude which is unheard of in a democratic State. The State has to protect its citizens and not to taken undue advantage of their need by putting conditions which are onerous and which destroy the status of a counsel as an institution. There is no justification givers in this counter-affidavit in regard to the various terms and conditions imposed by the State Government. 79. By the orders dated 30th June, 1989 monthly fees which has been fixed for the various State Law Officers is Rs. 5,000/- and less Rs. 5,000/- has been fixed for the Chief Standing Counsel and the Public Prosecutor and other State counsel are to receive less than this. It is the case of the State, Government that professional engagement can be terminated at any time by their own will. In a situation like this where the State Law Officer is going to be paid a fixed amount of money per month and his engagement is terminable at any time, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that once a counsel becomes a State Law Officer he not only loses his private practice against the State but all other work also is diminished as client feels that now once having become State Law Officer, he will not have time to devote for private work. By putting a condition that the State Law Officer cannot do private practice would have the effect of bringing him on the street with no income, as soon as an order is passed terminating his engagement. All clients gone. Having no security of tenure and a monthly payment, it is only the counsel who are unable to carry their livelihood otherwise will accept the office of the State Law Officer. With the enforcement of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cases against the State in the High Court involve great stakes putting onerous conditions dissuading competent counsel to accept the office of the State Law Officer is against public interest. If the State Law Officer carried on his private practice and does not appear against the State, no harm is going to be caused to the State at all. In the context of lawyers and the facts and circumstances of this case, condition placing complete ban on private practice is a wholly unreasonable condition which does not serve the purpose for which the condition has been imposed by the State. There is nothing on the record to establish as to why complete ban is placed on private practice. In our opinion, this condition is onerous and wholly arbitrary. Condition of putting a complete ban on private practice is not at all required for any lawyer's effective functioning as a State Law Officer. We therefore, find that condition mentioned in clause 3 of the order dated 30-6-1989 is wholly arbitrary. 80. The next condition which has been imposed is that during the engagement in the event of absence of more than one working day proportionate deduction shall be made from the remuneration payable. This condition also in our opinion is wholly arbitrary and fanciful. Monthly fees is only given to the State Law Officer it is not a salary. The order does not prescribe that State Law Officer will be entitled to minimum number of casual absences in the year. When monthly fees is payable no question of deduction from the same arises. No body can be expected to work for each and every day in the year. This is humanly impossible at times. Constitution of India envisages establishment,of welfare State. It is against social justice not to permit single day's casual absence to a person who has been appointed by the State Government and who holds a public office. No body can be expected to work for each and every day in the year. This is humanly impossible at times. Constitution of India envisages establishment,of welfare State. It is against social justice not to permit single day's casual absence to a person who has been appointed by the State Government and who holds a public office. Every person is entitled to some leave in the whole year. Even a casual Government servant is entitled to the same. State Government by putting this condition expects that a State Law Officer shall never fall ill, he shall never have any personal problem and if he has, he must pay the price for it. Then, a salary is subject to adjustment on the cost of living index. What the State Government calls salary, is nothing but a retainer without a fee. This attitude is wholly unreasonable in a democratic State. In our opinion, conditions mentioned in Clause 4 of the order dated 30th June, 1989, and Clause 5 of the order dated 6th November, 1989, are also arbitrary. 81. The next condition which has been put on a State Law Officer is that he must maintain his diary. This diary is to be produced before the Joint Legal Remembrancer in the office of the State Law Officer at High Court. Joint Legal Remembrancer is just a subordinate Judicial Officer of the State. No client can ask his counsel as to how and in what manner work has been done by him. This condition completely dilutes the status of the State Law Officer. No dignified counsel will accept the office of the State Law Officer on the condition that his diary will be inspected by the subordinate Judicial Officer of the State. The Advocate General of the State is present in the Court to assess the work of the State Counsel and he can also ask the State Counsel to give the details of the cases in which they have appeared, if necessary. The condition contained in Clause 5 of the order dated 30-6-1989 and clause 3 of the order dated 6-11-1989 are not only arbitrary and unreasonable but are a modicum of indignity for the Bar. 82. The condition contained in Clause 5 of the order dated 30-6-1989 and clause 3 of the order dated 6-11-1989 are not only arbitrary and unreasonable but are a modicum of indignity for the Bar. 82. Clause 7 of the order dated 30-6-1989 and Clauses 2 and 4 of the order dated 6-11 1989 relate to still another condition imposed on the State Counsel placing restriction on their appearing on behalf of certain bodies viz. Corporations, Public undertakings, autonomous institutions, authorities and Boards. They can appear in only three of them with the permission of the Legal Remembrancer. Fee bills in respect of them have to be sent to the department for verification. 83. Prior to the passing of the impugned orders para 5.07 L.R. Manual provides for, restriction on private practice which reads as' follows : "5.07. Restriction on private practice- (1) The Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel shall have the right of private practice, but shall not, save with the special permission of the Government, appear against the State in any civil case or proceedings nor shall they advise any private party regarding any civil case which might be pending or be likely to be instituted in Uttar Pradesh against the State or any State authority. (2) Save as may be required for the purposes of any case in which he appears on behalf of the State Government, the Chief Standing Counsel or the Standing Counsel shall not without the permission of the Legal Remembrancer, communicate directly indirectly to any person or party the contents of any documents or convey any information which has come in his possession or knowledge in the course of his duties. (3) The Chief Standing Counsel nor the Standing Counsel shall not accept any appointment as director of any Company without the previous sanction of the Government." 84. The intention behind the present conditions which have been imposed could only be that the State Counsel may not earn more money. If the intention was that they may devote time to State work, this problem could have been solved by taking action for dereliction of duty against a particular State Counsel if he did not devote time for State work. The matter could also be brought to the nor a of the Advocate General as under para 5.17 of the L.R. Manual the Advocate General has the power of supervision. The matter could also be brought to the nor a of the Advocate General as under para 5.17 of the L.R. Manual the Advocate General has the power of supervision. State only gives monthly fee to the State Counsel. The appointment is only for a year initially. If a counsel is not permitted to appear for bodies other than State then it would amount to an unreasonable restriction on his right of practice. Permission is to be granted for appearance on behalf of three bodies only. No guidelines have been prescribed. The Legal Remembrancer can exercise arbitrary power permitting counsel to appear for a particular body. Some bodies have voluminous work while others may have very meagre work. One State Counsel is likely to have the most lucrative practice, but the other counsel may have practically nothing. We are unable to understand how the State can restrain other bodies not to engage State Counsel and to restrain them from paying fees only on what the State permits. The conditions are otherwise also not in public interest. Finding these conditions, no competent counsel will accept the post of State Counsel. The posts of State Counsel are of vital importance for the efficient working of the High Court and they are, ultimately, likely to be filled by medicore persons only without having regard to their capability and competency who can approach the Legal Remembrancer or other person in power. Then, autonomous or statutory bodies are created for the very purpose of decentralisation and free then from State control. The Legal Remembrancer cannot impliedly rule that they shall engage State Counsel only, and that also under his control. The Legal Remembrancer cannot reserve for himself the power to control litigation of autonomous bodies. This will open doors for favours and intrigue, enveloping Judicial Officers. 85. In our opinion, the condition in question imposed by the State Government are not reasonable restrictions within Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. In fact they interfere with the right to practice as a lawyer guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 19(1)(g) and hence are void in law. 86. On a careful examination of the facts and circumstances it does appear that these conditions have been put only to put pressure on the State Law Officer and to keep a complete control over them and to undermine their dignity position and prestige. 86. On a careful examination of the facts and circumstances it does appear that these conditions have been put only to put pressure on the State Law Officer and to keep a complete control over them and to undermine their dignity position and prestige. In our opinion these conditions are otherwise also arbitrary. Conditions imposed by para 5.07 of the L.R. Manual have stood the test of time for decades and they are reasonable restrictions, we do not see why and there is also nothing on the record to establish why deviation was required. 87. The order dated 26th May, 1989 abolishes the entire system of the engagement of the Brief Holders. Junior counsel of this Court are engaged as Brief Holders so that whenever required they may be engaged on behalf of the State. This, in fact, is a stepping stone for them to be appointed in future as State Law Officers. By the order dated 28th June, 1989 power has been given to the Joint Legal Remembrancer posted at High Court to engage special counsel. No guidelines have been provided as to in what manner the Joint Legal Remembrancer would appoint special counsel. Abolishing a system of engagement of Brief Holders and putting arbitrary power into one officer without any guidelines to appoint special counsel at his own choice and at a fee determined by him makes the whole order dated 26th May, 1989 arbitrary. A system in vogue since a very long time has been absolutely abolished resulting in serious prejudice to the counsel who have been appointed as Brief Holders. This action has been taken to vest the entire power of, engaging counsel at the absolute discretion of the Joint Legal Remembrancey without laying any guidelines. The establishment of the Legal Remembrancer has reserved powers to itself to dispense favours to engage lawyers in State litigation at their discretion and will. Such favour seeking coterie cannot exist at the expense of destroying the institution of brief holders. This cannot be done. This action is wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact, now though the order dated 28-6-1990 has been rescinded, but the order dated 26-5-1990 has not been recalled. The Legal Remembrancer wants to teach these young lawyers a lesson that they should not approach the High Court for payment of their bills. 88. This action is wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact, now though the order dated 28-6-1990 has been rescinded, but the order dated 26-5-1990 has not been recalled. The Legal Remembrancer wants to teach these young lawyers a lesson that they should not approach the High Court for payment of their bills. 88. Imposing of the conditions by order issued on 28-6-1990 are fanciful, arbitrary and unreasonable. After the arguments were completed, the order dated 28-6-1989 has been rescinded by subsequent order dated 5-10-1990 and, as such, it is not necessary to consider in detail each clause of this order. 89. In the circumstances, we accept the fourth submission made on behalf of the petitioners viz. that the conditions 3, 4, 5 and 7 of orders dated 30-6-1990 are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, conditions 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the order dated 6th November, 1989, are also, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The order dated 26th May, 1989 is also liable to be quashed as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Clause 7 of the Order dated 30-6-1989 and clauses 2 and 4 of the Order dated 6-11-1989 are also violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 90. The above submissions have been made in regard to the group of six petitions. Now we will consider Civil Misc. Writ No. 20199 of 1990 A.P.N. Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, as this petition has been separately argued. Civil Misc. Writ No. 20188 of 1990 A.P.N. Giri v. The State of Uttar Pradesh This petition has been filed by an Advocate of this Court along with two other petitioners challenging the appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav as the Chief Standing Counsel of the High Court at Allahabad. Sri Bengali Yadav was appointed as the Chief Standing Counsel by order dated 23rd July, 1990. By the same order, many other persons were appointed as Standing Counsel at Allahabad and at Lucknow. It is not disputed that there is only one post of Chief Standing Counsel at Allahabad and one at Lucknow. So far as the posts of Standing Counsel are concerned there is no fixed number of posts. The State appoints the Standing Counsel from time to time according to their choice and requirements. It is not disputed that there is only one post of Chief Standing Counsel at Allahabad and one at Lucknow. So far as the posts of Standing Counsel are concerned there is no fixed number of posts. The State appoints the Standing Counsel from time to time according to their choice and requirements. Since there is only one post of the Chief Standing Counsel hence this petition has acquired importance. 91. The petitioners' case is that Sri Bengali Yadav was practising in the District Court at Basti. His case is that an Advocate practising in the District Court of Basti having no experience of the High Court work could not have been appointed as a Chief Standing Counsel in the High Court as the Head of the entire U.P. State Law Officers on the civil side. His further case is that the appointment order issued in favour of Bengali Yadav is wholly arbitrary and discriminatory, as no other member of the Bar has been considered for the said post and all the members of the Bar practising in the Allahabad High Court have been completely ignored. 92. In one of the affidavits filed subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, it has been further alleged that Sri Bengali Yadav has been impleaded in a case in relation to a forged bail order and the matter was sent to the Criminal Investigation Department for investigation. It has been further stated that the Criminal Investigation Department investigated the case and got some persons guilty, including Sri Bengali Yadav, and a case No. 476 of 1987 was registered under Sections 467/468/420, I.P.C. in police station Hazratganj, Lucknow, State v. Sobha Singh and others. In the same affidavit, it has been further alleged that Sri Bengali Yadav confessed his guilt before the Special Magistrate and, consequently, the further case taken is that a person, who is convicted or confesses his guilt in a court of law, cannot be placed in the post of the Chief Standing Counsel. 93. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, which has been added by means of a supplementary affidavit, a counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Bengali Yadav in which he has denied the allegations made in the affidavit and he has further stated that he was never found guilty in Case No. 476 of 1987, State v. Sohan Singh and others. We did not think it necessary to send for the record of the case and to examine the allegations and the counter allegations made in regard to this criminal case, as we propose to dispose of the writ petition on legal grounds alone. 94. We have already held above that the Crown Rules of 1942 are still continuing to remain in force by virtue of Article 313 of the Constitution of India. Under Rule 8 of the. Crown Rules of 1942, the appointment to the office of a Law Officer has to be made after taking into consideration the recommendation of the Legal Remembrancer and of the High Court. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appointment of the Chief Standing Counsel was not referred to the High Court at all and, consequently, no recommendation of the High Court exists for appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav as Chief Standing Counsel. Since the recommendation of the High Court was mandatory under Rule 8, consequently, the appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav is, in our opinion, wholly illegal. 95. Sri R.P. Singh was working as the Chief Standing Counsel. His services were terminated by order dated 23rd July, 1990, and it is on the same day that Sri Bengali Yadav was appointed as Chief Standing Counsel by a separate order. Since we have taken the view that the order terminating the engagement of Sri R.P. Singh as Chief Standing Counsel is illegal, consequently, the appointment made on the said post has to be set aside, as Sri R.P. Singh has to be restored to the post on which he had been working. The consequence is that the appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav has to be set aside in view of the finding recorded by us above. 96. The petitioner, as stated above, has raised two main objections to the appointment of Sri Bengali Yadav as Chief Standing Counsel. His first objection is that the Chief Standing Counsel could only have been appointed if he had practised in the High Court and he could not have been appointed directly from the District Court. His second objection is that his appointment is wholly arbitrary. 97. In regard to the question of arbitrariness, Sri A.K. Singh, Joint Secretary, Judicial Department and Joint Legal Remembrancer, has filed a counter-affidavit- on behalf of the State. His second objection is that his appointment is wholly arbitrary. 97. In regard to the question of arbitrariness, Sri A.K. Singh, Joint Secretary, Judicial Department and Joint Legal Remembrancer, has filed a counter-affidavit- on behalf of the State. In paragraph 9 of the, said counter-affidavit, it has been categorically stated that in view of the fiduciary nature of counsel-client relationship between the State and Law Officers. The State Government has a right to engage a counsel of its own choice and on its own terms. A counsel cannot dictate terms to his client. In the counter-affidavit, it has not been stated that any other person was considered for the post of the Chief Standing Counsel. 98. It is not disputed that there are more than two dozen Standing Counsel in this Court as well as in the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. Many of the Standing Counsel have, put in more than ten years as Standing, Counsel. There is no allegation against any of the Standing Counsel challenging their competence. The Standing Counsel who have; already worked in this Court as counsel for the State Government for more than a decade are at least entitled to be considered for the, post of the Chief Standing Counsel. From the record, it is apparent that the appointment of Bengali Yadav has been made on the sole discretion of the State Government without considering any other person for the said post. In our opinion, consequently, the appointment is wholly arbitrary and this submission of the learned counsel does have substance. 99. In regard to the second question as to whether as Advocate of the District Court can be appointed as the Chief Standing Counsel or not, we have to consider t question in two different aspects. Since, in our opinion, the Crown Rules of 1942 are still applicable to the U.P. State Law Officers. Rule 6 of the said Rules is relevant for this purpose. It provides that no person shall be eligible for appointment as a Law 'Officer unless he is an Advocate of at least five years' standing enrolled in the High Court or the Chief Court. This rule emphasises that the Law Officer must have at least five years' standing in the High Court, namely, that the person should have practised at least five years in the High Court. This rule emphasises that the Law Officer must have at least five years' standing in the High Court, namely, that the person should have practised at least five years in the High Court. In this rule, the words 'Standing' and 'enrolled' have been separately used. When the 1942 Rules were made, it was the' High Court which used to enrol the Advocates. In this context, it is clear that by using the word `standing' in Rule 6, it was clearly intended that a person can only be eligible for appointment as a Law Officer in the High Court if he had five years' standing in the High Court, namely, he has put in five years' practice in the High Court In view of the 1942 Rules, a District Court lawyer could not have been appointed as the Chief Standing Counsel in the High Court. 100. The second aspect of the matter which we are called upon to consider is that in case the Crown Rules of 1942 are not applicable and the administrative instructions issued on 29th June, 1968, are valid, is it then also necessary that a person, who has practised in the High Court alone, could have been appointed as Chief Standing Counsel and not a person, who has to his credit practice in the District Court. In the Rules initially made on 29th June, 1968, by office Memorandum No. 2556, Paragraph 2 provided for eligibility. It provided that no legal practitioner shall be 'eligible for appointment as Law Officer unless' he has been an Advocate of the High Court for at least five years. Paragraph 2 substituted by the Office Memorandum dated 18th October, 1976. It now reads as under : "(2) Eligibility. A legal practitioner eligible for appointment as Law Officer must have been in practice as an Advocate for not less than seven years in the case of a Public Prosecutor (Government Advocate, Additional Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocate or Assistant Government Advocate) and ten years in the case of Chief Standing Counsel or Standing Counsel; Provided that in the case of outstanding merit, the Governor may relax the above requirement as to minimum practice for appointment of a Law Officer on the civil side," 101. In this amended rule, the only requirement is that a person should be an Advocate having not less than ten years' practice before he is appointed as Chief Standing Counsel. 102 Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that merely because the words High Court having been omitted in the amended clause, which came into effect from 18th October, 1976, it made no difference so far as the question of eligibility was concerned in regard to the practice in the High Court. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of "Sri Bengali Yadav has, however, contended that in view of the substituted paragraph 2 which came with effect from 18th October, 1976, there is no bar how to the appointment of a Chief Standing Counsel from any of the Advocates practising in the subordinate courts. 103. In the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.P. Agarwal v. C.D. Parikh and others, ( AIR 1970 SC 1061 ), the expression "an advocate of a High Court" ,used in Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in view of the fact that now enrolment as an Advocate is made under the Advocates Act of 1961, it makes no difference whether the word 'advocate' has been used or the use of the words 'an advocate of the High Court'. It opined as under at page 1064 of AIR 1970 SC : "The distinction, if any, between the words an advocate' in Article 233(2) and the words 'an advocate of a High Court' in Article 217(2)(b) has no significance in any event after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, as by virtue of Section 16 of that Act there are now only two classes of persons entitled to practice, namely, senior advocates and other advocates." 104. The rival contentions of the parties have to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Legal Remembrancers Manual, which relate to the appointment of the Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel in the High Court on the civil side and the appointment of the District Government Counsel in the subordinate courts in the civil side. 105. The rival contentions of the parties have to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Legal Remembrancers Manual, which relate to the appointment of the Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel in the High Court on the civil side and the appointment of the District Government Counsel in the subordinate courts in the civil side. 105. Chapter V of the Legal Remembrancers Manual deals with the Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel, in the High Court the administrative instructions in regard to the appointment and the tenure of these State Law Officers was laid down by office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968. In those instructions, Paragraph 2 provided that no legal practitioner shall be eligible for appointment as Law Officer unless he has been an advocate of the High Court for at least five years. 106. Chapter VI deals with brief holders in the High Court. Paragraph 6.02(2) provides that no advocate shall be appointed as a Brief Holder unless he is practising in the High Court and has to his credit five years' practice at the Bar and is otherwise qualified and fit to i perform his duties effectively. 107. When a civil case is allotted to a Brief Holder then he works in the same capacity as a Standing Counsel On a reading of the various provisions of Chapter V along with the Office Memorandum dated 29th June, 1968, and the provisions of Chapter VI of the Legal Remembrancers Manual, when in the eligibility clause relating to the Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel, it was provided that he shall be eligible for appointment only if he was an advocate of the High Court for at least five years, in our opinion, it was clearly intended that a Chief Standing Counsel or a Standing Counsel in the High Court would be appointed my if he has practised in the High Court for a period of at least five years. In paragraph 2 of the Office Memorandum dated 29th June, 1968, the expression 'an advocate of a High Court' was not intended to mean that the person should have been enrolled by the High Court, but what was intended was that he should have practised for at least five years in the High Court. 108. In paragraph 2 of the Office Memorandum dated 29th June, 1968, the expression 'an advocate of a High Court' was not intended to mean that the person should have been enrolled by the High Court, but what was intended was that he should have practised for at least five years in the High Court. 108. The above intention is further clear if the provisions relating to the appointment of the District Government Counsel are examined. Chapter VII of the L.R. Manual deals with the District Government Counsel. It lays down the appointment and conditions of their engagement. Paragraph 7.03(1) provides that whenever the post of any of the Government Counsel in the district is likely to fall vacant within the next three months or when a new post has been created, the District Officer, viz., the District Magistrate concerned, shall notify the vacancy to the members of the Bar. Members eligible for consideration will be those having at their credit a practice of ten years in the case of the District Government Counsel, seven years in the case of an Assistant District Government Counsel and five years in the case of a Sub District Government Counsel. The District Magistrate is further obliged to ask those who went to be considered for appointment to a particular office and to give their names to him. This clause clearly provides that it is only the members of the Bar, who are practising in the said district who would be considered for the post of the District Government Counsel provided they have practised fora number of years provided in this clause. 109. Sub-clause (2) of Para 7.03 further provides that the District Government Counsel and the legal practitioners of the neighbouring districts may also send their particulars for the post of the District Government Counsel. 110. From a reading of Clauses (1) and (2) of paragraph 7.03, it is clear that the only counsel who are practising in the same district where the vacancy has occurred or counsel practising in the neighbouring districts are to be considered for appointment on the vacant post of the District Government Counsel. Merely because the person is an advocate and practising in any other district of the State which is neither the district in which the vacancy has occurred nor the neighbouring district, the said counsel cannot be considered for the post of the District Government Counsel. Merely because the person is an advocate and practising in any other district of the State which is neither the district in which the vacancy has occurred nor the neighbouring district, the said counsel cannot be considered for the post of the District Government Counsel. Similar was the intention in framing the eligibility clause so far as the High Court is concerned. The entire scheme is that if an appointment of a State Counsel has to be made in the High Court, counsel practising in the High Court would alone be considered for the said post while if an appointment is to be made in the districts, the advocates practising in the district where the vacancy has occurred have to be considered and the maximum latitude has been given that the advocates practising in the neighbouring districts may also be considered but not beyond that. This scheme appears to us to be fair and just and serving the ends of justice. 111. Judicial notice has to be taken of the fact that-after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the High Court has an extraordinary jurisdiction of issuing writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the major litigation against the State on the civil side is now the writ petitions which are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. So far as the State is concerned, public interest requires that these petitions should be defended by competent counsel who are aware of the procedure relating to the writ petitions and also who are fully conversant with the provisions of the Constitution of India and their implications. 112. An advocate practising in the District Court does not have to deal with the Constitution of India as a routine at all. The litigation is entirely of a different nature in the District Courts. In the circumstances, it is fit and proper that persons who are appointed as Chief Standing Counsel or Standing Counsel should be those who have experience of the work of the High Court so that the State does not suffer. At times, great stake are involved in a particular petition which seriously affects not only the revenue, of the State, but other public interest also. At times, great stake are involved in a particular petition which seriously affects not only the revenue, of the State, but other public interest also. Keeping the above in mind, we think that this was the reason why the provisions of the L.R. Manual intended that persons, who should be appointed as Chief Standing Counsel and Standing Counsel in the High Court shall be those who have put in a minimum number of years of practice in the said Court. 113. The amendment, which was brought about on 18th October, 1976, only enhanced the period of practice required for appointment of a Standing Counsel or Chief Standing Counsel. Initially, under the Rules of 1968, only five years practice was required, but under the amended rule now, ten years' practice has been made compulsory in the case of a Chief Standing Counsel or a Standing Counsel. The Governor, however, has been given the power to relax the above requirement of minimum practice for appointment of a Law Officer on the civil side. In our opinion, the use of the word 'practice' in this amended clause too relating to eligibility means "practice in the High Court." It is not just a practice in any other court. If this interpretation is not given then even an advocate practising in the outlying (court in any district before the Munsif 'Magistrate would be entitled to become the Chief Standing Counsel of the State. This could never have been intended. 114. It is not disputed that Sri Bengali Yadav did not at all practice in the High Court. He has practised in the District Court at Basti. In the circumstances, we accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners and we do not agree with the submission advanced on behalf of Sri Bengali Yadav. It is not that Shri Bengali Yadav cannot become the Chief Standing Counsel. He can, but he will have to put in the requisite number of years as practice at the High Court as prescribed. 115. The question now arises as to what relief should be granted to the petitioner. In the case of those Standing Counsel or the Additional Public Prosecutors where the term for which they were appointed had not expired on the date of their termination, there is no difficulty whatsoever. 115. The question now arises as to what relief should be granted to the petitioner. In the case of those Standing Counsel or the Additional Public Prosecutors where the term for which they were appointed had not expired on the date of their termination, there is no difficulty whatsoever. Their tenure could Only be prematurely brought to an end if there was a cause against them and they had been given an opportunity of submitting their explanation to the charge if any, levelled against them. The problem, however, arises in respect of those cases where the term has expired and the Standing Counsel are continuing to work as State Counsel by an order 'until further' passed by the State Government. In some of the cases, the State Counsel have continued to work for many years after the expiry of their term for which they had been originally appointed and they have been continuing to work 'until further orders' of the State Government. In these cases also, we are of the opinion that they are entitled to the protection of the fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In other words, they cannot be dealt with in an arbitrary manner. Their services can either be renewed or if it is proposed to terminate their services then it has to be for a cause and after giving them an opportunity of submitting an explanation to the charge levelled against them. The same principle will be applicable to them as will be applicable to the State Counsel whose tenure is sought to be prematurely brought to an end. 116. In this connection, a decision of the Hon'ble. Supreme Court in K.C. Joshi v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1985 SC 1046 ) : (1985 Lab IC 1032) has been cited before us. In this case, K.C. Joshi was appointed as Store Keeper through selection by open competition on December 7, 1963. After completion of his probationary period, be was informed by the employers that be will continue in service on regular basis until further orders. His services were terminated. The termination order was challenged by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the petition. Against the said decision, an appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. His services were terminated. The termination order was challenged by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the petition. Against the said decision, an appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under (at page 1048 of AIR 1985 SC) : "The words used are : He is continue in service on a regular basis until further orders; The expression 'until further orders' suggest an indefinite period. It is difficult to construe it as clothing him with the status of a temporary employee. It is even worse than being a probationer because the apprehended further orders may follow the very next day. Therefore, the expression 'until further orders' being thoroughly irrelevant has to be ignored. It is even inconsistent with the appointment on regular basis, as stated in that very order." 117. In the instant case, initially, all the State Counsel, who are continuing 'until further orders' has been appointed fora fixed tenure. They had completed their tenure and, thereafter, they were continued 'until further orders'. The words 'until further orders' in the instant case cannot possibly be construed to mean that they be asked to go without assigning any cause. If such a power is conferred on the State Government, it would smack of discrimination and, consequently, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The State Counsel would have a right to know as to why their services have not been renewed. In the circumstances, they would be entitled to know as to what is the cause why their services are being terminated and also they are entitled to have an opportunity to explain the charge levelled against them. The orders terminating their services have also to be passed with the approval of the Advocate General. 118. It will be appropriate, in the instant case, to summarise our conclusions as, under: 1. The U.P. Crown Rules of 1942 are still applicable to the State Law Officers by virtue of Article 313 of the Constitution of India. The notification No. 2555 dated 29th June, 1968, rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 is wholly invalid. The Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968, as subsequently amended, cannot be given effect to and is invalid. 2. The notification No. 2555 dated 29th June, 1968, rescinding the Crown Rules of 1942 is wholly invalid. The Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968, as subsequently amended, cannot be given effect to and is invalid. 2. Since no opportunity had been given to the State Law Officers under Rule 14 of the Crown Rules of 1942, the order dated 23rd July, 1990, terminating the services of the State Law Officers is invalid. 3. The State Law Officers in the High Court are holders of a public office and since they are holders of a public office, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India apply to them. 4. In the alternative, taking the notification No. 2555 dated 29th June, 1968, and the Office Memorandum No. 2556 dated 29th June, 1968, to be valid even then the services of the State Law Officers cannot be terminated without a cause. The reasons for termination must exist on the record and the State Law Officer must be given an opportunity of submitting an explanation to the charge, if any, levelled against him. The order of termination can be passed only with the approval of the Advocate General of the State. If the termination is without a cause, the order of termination is liable to be struck down as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 5. In so far as the Public Prosecutors and the Additional Public Prosecutors are concerned, it is not necessary to consult the High Court when the order of termination is sought to be passed, but the termination order can only be passed for a cause and after affording an opportunity to the incumbent to submit his explanation to the charge, if any levelled against him and that too, with the approval of the Advocate General. 6. Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the two orders dated 30th June, 1989, applicable to the State Law Officers on the civil side and the criminal side are invalid. Condition Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the order dated 6th November, 1989, are also invalid. The whole order dated 26th May, 90, is invalid. 7. 6. Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the two orders dated 30th June, 1989, applicable to the State Law Officers on the civil side and the criminal side are invalid. Condition Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the order dated 6th November, 1989, are also invalid. The whole order dated 26th May, 90, is invalid. 7. The Chief Standing Counsel, Standing Counsel, Public Prosecutor and the Additional Public Prosecutors can be appointed in the High Court only after they have put in a minimum number of years of practice in the High Court, in accordance with the eligibility clause. No counsel practising in the District Court can be appointed directly as a State Law Officer in the High Court. 119. Before concluding the matter we would like to make certain observations. 120. In Writ Petition No. 22578 of 1989 paragraph 37 it has been stated that after receipt of the Government Order dated 30th June, 1989 State Law Officers met Advocate neral U.P. He was apprised with the derogatory terms and conditions of the Government Order. On 6th July, 1989 Advocate-General issued an order which has been attached as Annexure 7 to the writ petition. A circular was ultimately issued to all the State Law Officers. The material portion of this circular reads as follows :- "I have seen the Government Order. I appreciate the objection to payment of fixed monthly fee and requirement in Clause 5 for keeping a diary and the same has been produced before Deputy Legal Remembrancer/Joint Legal Remembrancer/Additional Legal Remembrancer. In my opinion this condition is who by impermissible and is derogatory to the status of State Law Officers. I appreciate the resentment and therefore, suspend the condition in Clause 5 for the time being and I am referring the matter back to Government regarding objection to payment of fixed monthly fees and other conditions." It has been further stated in paragraph 42 of the writ petition that in spite of the circular letter issued by the Advocate-General dated 6th July, 1989 the Joint Legal Remembrancer at Allahabad did not pass the fee bill for September 1989 and insisted that the State Law Officers should produce the diary to him for his scrutiny. Similarly again in October, 1989 the Joint Legal Remembrancer insisted for the production of the case diary. Similarly again in October, 1989 the Joint Legal Remembrancer insisted for the production of the case diary. The Joint Legal Remembrancer thereafter asked the Standing Counsel for production of the diary failing which they were told that they may be removed from their office. In this petition a counter affidavit has been filed by Sri K.L. Sharma. The Stand taken in paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit is that the Legal Remembrancer does not agree with the stand taken by the Advocate-General and it is only the Government which hag power to suspend, revoke or withhold any Government Order. In regard to the other allegations also the stand taken by the Legal Remembrancer is that even if any.order has been passed by the Advocate-General then too the same cannot be given effect to and the payment of the bills would only be made after the conditions had been complied with. We are really surprised by this attitude of the Legal Remembrancer. The stand taken by the Government undermines the status of the Advocate-General. If the Advocate General finds any condition put by the Government as being derogatory to the status of the State Law Officer, it was open to him to suspend any condition till the decision was taken by the Government in this regard. The present Legal Remembrancer over shot himself by disrespecting and mistreating the position, status and the dignity of the Advocate-General of the State, both under the I.R. Manual and the Constitution of India. 121. Paragraph 1.06 of the L.R. Manual places the Advocate-General above the Judicial Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer to the Government. Paragraph 2.19 of the said Manual specifically lays down that the Advocate General shall be in over all charge of all the State Counsel in the High Court and shall superintend, control and direct the conduct of all important cases against the Government in the High Court and the Supreme Court. In view of these specific provisions in the L.R. Manual and the fact that the Advocate-General is the first Law. Officer of the State. Any order passed in relation to the State Law Officers can only be passed in consultation with the Advocate General of the State. In view of these specific provisions in the L.R. Manual and the fact that the Advocate-General is the first Law. Officer of the State. Any order passed in relation to the State Law Officers can only be passed in consultation with the Advocate General of the State. His views have to be given top priority, as it is he who is in over all charge of the State Counsel and it is he who has to superintend, control and direct the conduct of the cases in the High Court. The Advocate-General even otherwise has a constitutional status. Under Article 165 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of each State has been empowered to appoint a person, who is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court to be the Advocate- General of the State. It is the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character as may, from time to time, be referred to or assigned to him by the Governor and to discharge the functions conferred upon him by or under the Constitution or any other law, for the time being, in force. Once a duty has been assigned to the Advocate-General to be in over all charge of the State Counsel in the High Court, it is incumbent upon the Judicial Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer in the State to adhere to the advice in so far as the State Counsel are concerned. He cannot ignore the orders passed by the Advocate- General in relation to the State Counsel. The post of Advocate-General is a political post. A very healthy convention has been developed that with the change of the Government, the advocate-General resigns and another advocate-General is appointed by the new Government. The Advocate-General cannot be equated to a post such as held by the State Counsel of this Court who have a tenure and a right to continue on the post in question unless determined for a cause. We hope and trust that, in future, the Judicial Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer of the State shall give due respect to the views and orders passed by the Advocate-General of the State particularly in regard to the State Counsel of this Court. 122. We hope and trust that, in future, the Judicial Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer of the State shall give due respect to the views and orders passed by the Advocate-General of the State particularly in regard to the State Counsel of this Court. 122. It is not disputed that all the officers working in the Judicial and Legislative branches of the State Government are on deputation from the High Court. They are all Judicial Officers. After going on deputation, they cease to be in the regular line and do not work as Judges. It would be advisable that these officers should not be permitted to continue for long duration on deputation. It is necessary that the officers, who are on deputation for a long period, should be recalled on the regular side so that they are reminded of the fact that they are still members of the Judicial service. They Will then also be reminded of the relationship which must exist between the Bench and the Bar. Those officer, who have been on deputation for long, should be considered for being called back to the regular side. A copy of this judgment may be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for necessary action in this behalf as he thinks appropriate. 123. Now, the question arises as to what effective relief has to be granted. Once we have held that the order of termination dated 23rd July, 1990, in regard to Standing Counsel and Additional Public Prosecutors in the High Court at Allahabad and in the Lucknow Bench of this Court are illegal and have to be quashed, the consequential order has to be passed setting aside the orders of appointments made by orders dated 23rd July, 1990, appointing fresh Standing Counsel and Additional Public Prosecutors at Allahabad and in the Lucknow Bench of this Court. A similar situation arose in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had in that case passed the following order : "In short, the status quo ante as on 28-2-1990 on which date the impugned circular dated 6-2-1990 was made effective, will be restored and be maintained till change in any appointment is found necessary and is made in the manner prescribed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had in that case passed the following order : "In short, the status quo ante as on 28-2-1990 on which date the impugned circular dated 6-2-1990 was made effective, will be restored and be maintained till change in any appointment is found necessary and is made in the manner prescribed. The fresh appointments, if any, made by the State Government implementation of the impugned circular dated 6-2-1990 being subject to the validity of the circular and the result of these matters, would stand superseded in this manner." 124. We have no option, but to pass a similar order in the same terms as passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 125. In view of the above, writ petitions Nos. 22578, 12942 and 24928 of 1989, 19731, 20183 and 20182 of 1990 are allowed and the G. O. No. D-2015/Sat-Niyu-3/90 dated 23rd July, 1990. terminating the services of the State Counsel, both on the civil side as well as on the criminal side, is quashed. Conditions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the orders dated 30th June, 1989, applicable to the State Law Officers, both on the civil side and the criminal side, are quashed. Conditions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the order dated 6th November, 1989, are also quashed. The order dated 26th May, 1990, by which the system of engagement of brief holders has been abolished is also quashed. A writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to continue the system of engagement of brief holders. The status quo ante on 26th May, 1990, is hereby restored. Writ Petition No. 20188 of 1990 is also alleged and the G.O. No. 2380/Sat-Niyu-3/90 dated 23rd July, 1990, appointing Sri Bangali Yadav, the Chief Standing Counsel, is hereby quashed. We further direct that fresh appointments of Standing Counsel and Additional Public Prosecutors in the High Court at Allahabad and in the Lucknow Bench of this Court made by G.O. No. 2380/Sat- Niyu-3/90 dated 23rd July. 1990, shall stand superseded and are hereby quashed. 126. The State Law Officers whose termination orders we have quashed shall be entitled to payment of remuneration till today at the rate mentioned in the orders dated 30th June, 1989, applicable to the State Law Officers on the civil and the criminal sides. This compensation shall be paid within six weeks from today. The petitions are allowed with costs.